• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.15 no.2
• /
• pp.225-261
• /
• 2005

Under Article IV of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), in order to obtain the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, a party applying for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award shall supply (a) the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof and (b) the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. In addition, if the arbitral award or arbitration agreement is not made in an official language of the country in which the award is relied upon, the party applying for recognition and enforcement of the award shall produce a translation of these documents into such language, and the translation shall be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent. In a case where a Vietnamese company which had obtained a favorable arbitral award in Vietnam applied for recognition and enforcement of a Vietnamese arbitral award before a Korean court, the recent Korean Supreme Court Judgment (Docket No. 2004 Da 20180. 'Judgment') rendered on December 12, 2004 has alleviated the document requirements as follows : The Judgment held that (i) the party applying for recognition andenforcement of a foreign arbitral award does not have to strictly comply with the document requirements when the other party does not dispute the existence and the content of the arbitral award and the arbitration agreement and that (ii) in case the translation submitted to the court does not satisfy the requirement of Article 4, the court does not have to dismiss the case on the ground that the party applying for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award has failed to comply with the translation requirement under Article 4, and instead may supplement the documents by obtaining an accurate Korean translation from an expert translator at the expense of the party applying for recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award. In this regard, the author fully supports the view of the Judgment. Finally, the Judgment held that, even though the existence of a written arbitration agreement was not disputed at the arbitration, there was no written arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant and wenton to repeal the judgment of the second instance which admitted the existence of a written arbitration agreement between the parties. In this regard, the author does not share the view of the Judgment. The author believes that considering the trend of alleviating the formality requirement of arbitration agreements under Article 2 of the New York Convention, the Supreme Court could have concluded that there was a written arbitration agreement because the defendant participated in thearbitration proceedings in Vietnam without disputing the formality requirement of the arbitration agreement. Or the Supreme Court should have taken the view that the defendant was no longer permitted to dispute the formality requirement of the arbitration agreement because otherwise it would be clearly against the doctrine of estoppel.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.19 no.3
• /
• pp.161-178
• /
• 2009

This article focuses on the enforceability of arbitration agreements m the dispute of standby letter of credit, especially with the case analysis of the leading case from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. In Nova Hut a.s. v. Kaiser Group International Inc. case, while the underlying contract contained an arbitration clause, a guarantee to assure contractor's performance did not contain an arbitration clause. Nova Hut drew on the standby for the Contractor's failure to deliver contractual obligations. Against the Kaiser's action under US Bankruptcy law, Nova Hut moved to stay the proceedings pending arbitration, to compel arbitration, and to dismiss the complaint. The US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware denied Nova Hut's motions. On appeal, Kaiser argued that it was not subject to arbitration since it was not a party to the contract. It also argued that Nova Hut had waived its right to arbitration by filing a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding and commencing legal actions in other countries. The appeals court noted that in order to avoid arbitration on those grounds prejudice must be shown. It indicated that because there was no long delay in requesting arbitration and no discovery conducted m the course of litigation, the Kaiser could not demonstrate actual prejudice on the part of Owner. In light of public policy favoring arbitration, the nature of the claims in the parties' agreements, Kaiser's conduct in embracing the agreements, and their expectation of benefit, the appeals court ruled that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied in requiring the Parent to arbitrate.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.24 no.3
• /
• pp.47-77
• /
• 2014

Ever since its introduction in the 1927 ICC Arbitration Rules, scrutiny of awards by the ICC Court has been a cornerstone feature of ICC arbitration. Most players involved in the arbitral process are likely to concede that a certain level of review of arbitral awards is both desirable and beneficial. Indeed, proponents among the users are frequently influenced in their choice of the ICC as the administering arbitral institution, based on their strong conviction that time and money invested in the resolution of a dispute is ultimately only well spent if awards are voluntarily complied with or at least less susceptible to be set aside. By providing a look behind the scenes of the scrutiny process, the article does away with tales of excessive intervention on behalf of the arbitral institution when reviewing and approving awards and demystifies the role played by the ICC Court throughout its close interaction with arbitral tribunals operating under the ICC Rules. The article further argues that the scrutiny process can be a highly efficient tool that helps to increase the quality and enforceability of awards rendered under the aegis of the ICC.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.28 no.2
• /
• pp.217-248
• /
• 2018

This paper reviews the Supreme Court of Japan in Decision of December 12, 2017, 2016 (Kyo) 43 (2011) concerning arbitrator's duty of disclosure and reasonable investigation under the Japan Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act). The Supreme Court of Japan recently issued a precedential decision interpreting, for the first time, the arbitrator disclosure requirements of the Arbitration Act. Under Article 18(4) of the Arbitration Act, arbitrators have an ongoing obligation to disclose circumstances which may give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence. The Supreme Court held that Article 18(4) of the Arbitration Act - requiring arbitrators to disclose all "facts likely to give rise to doubts as to his/her impartiality or independence" - (1) is not satisfied by blanket disclosures or advance waivers of potential future conflicts, and (2) requires disclosure of facts both known to an arbitrator or "that can be normally ascertained by an investigation that is reasonably possible${\cdots}$" This new standard presents opportunities and challenges for enforcing arbitration awards in Japan, and suggests measures that both arbitrators and parties can use to protect their awards. Also, the Supreme Court's new standards for evaluating arbitrator conflict disclosures suggest some measures that both arbitrators and parties to arbitration in Japan can take to protect the enforceability of their awards. The key factual question posed by the Supreme Court's ruling was whether an arbitrator's conflicts check was reasonable. Maintaining records regarding a review of potential conflicts or any investigation provides a ready source of proof in case of a future challenge. The Supreme Court has spoken clearly that so-called advance waivers of potential conflicts are not effective under Japanese law. Instead, to the extent that potential conflicts arise during the course of arbitration, they should be specifically disclosed.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.19 no.1
• /
• pp.67-98
• /
• 2009

Recently there are many cases on the intellectual property dispute. Among them some cases are solved through mediation and arbitration. Mediation and arbitration hold some advantage over court proceeding for intellectual property dispute. However the traditional litigation system has material limitation to settle down international intellectual property dispute. Without arbitration, litigation in court would be the only choice in case of no consensual settlement between the disputing parties. However, once being aware of the usefulness of the arbitration, people in international business widely realize that arbitration is generally preferred to litigation. Mediation is a method of settling dispute outside of court setting and many mediation committee are established since 1986 in Korea. Arbitrability has been a crucial issue in the intellectual property dispute. In most developed countries including the U.S.A. and Switzerland, arbitrability in the intellectual property dispute has been changed in recent years by law. Now in resolving the dispute with international intellectual property is needed for legal research, experience, working practices and knowledge of the intellectual property industry and so on.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.15 no.3
• /
• pp.55-84
• /
• 2005

The arbitral award is the decision of the arbitrators on the dispute that had been submitted to them by the parties, either under the arbitration clause providing for the determination of future disputes or under submission of an existing controversy. The arbitral award has the same effect between the parties as a final and binding court judgment. The arbitration award shall acquire, as soon as it is given and delivered to each parties, the authority of res judicata in respect of the dispute it settles. The validity of an award is a condition precent for its recognition or enforcement. The validity of an award depends on the provisions of the arbitration agreement including any arbitration rules incorporated in it, and the law which is applicable to the arbitration proceedings. Such provisions usually address both the form and the content of the award. As the 'form', requires article 32 of Arbitration Act of Korea that an arbitral award should, at least, (1) be made in writing and be signed by all arbitrators. (2) state the reasons upon which it is based unless the parties have agreed that it should not, (3) state its date and place of arbitration. There are some further requirement which may have to be observed before an award which has been made by a tribunal can be enforced. (4) The duly authenticated award signed by the arbitrators shall be delivered to each of the parties and the original award shall be sent to and deposited with the competent court, accompanied by a document verifying such delivery. This rule can be interpreted as if the deposit of an arbitral award with the competent court is always required as a condition for its validity or as a preliminary to its enforcement in Korea. However, we must regard this rule which requires the deposit of an arbitral award with court, as rule of order, but not as condition of its validity. Because that the date on which the award is delivered to each party is important as it will generally determine the commencement of time limits for the making of any appeal which may be available. Furthermore, the party applying for recognition or enforcement merely has to supply the appropriate court with the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof, not any document which proves that an the arbitral award is sent to and deposited with the competent court. In order to avoid some confusion which can be caused by its interpretation and application, the Article 32 (4) of Arbitration Act of Korea needs to be abolished or at least modified.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.26 no.1
• /
• pp.29-51
• /
• 2016

This paper reviews the Supreme Court decision of the United Kingdom in Jivraj v. Hashwani (2011) concerning the employment issue of arbitrators, falling within the exception of genuine occupational requirement under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, and nationality of arbitrators. In 2011, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom delivered its judgment in Jivraj v. Hashwani, unanimously overturning decision of the English Court of Appeal. The facts of this case and the decision of the Court of Appeal have been widely discussed. The decision of the Supreme Court has been met with approval within the international arbitration community in London, having restored the legal position to that prior to the Court of Appeal's ruling. Thus, the Supreme Court unanimously overturned the Court of Appeal's finding that arbitrators are the employees of the arbitrating parties. Arbitrators were held to be genuinely self-employed, and therefore outside the scope of the Regulations or Equality Act(2010). As such, the anti-discrimination provisions are not applicable to the selection, engagement or appointment of arbitrators. Most importantly, the Supreme Court's finding that arbitrators are not employees removes the possibility of challenges to arbitration agreements on the grounds that they are in breach of the Equality Act. As a practical matter, parties no longer need to consider carving out nationality provisions when drafting arbitration agreements.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
• /
• v.35
• /
• pp.101-124
• /
• 2007

This paper purposes to examine the setting aside and the refusal of enforcement of arbitral awards and their implications for practitioners. The aim of challenging an award before a national court at the seat, or place, of arbitration is to have it modified in some way by the relevant court, or more usually, to have that court declare that the award is to be disregarded (i.e. "annulled" or "set aside") in whole or in part. If an award is set aside or annulled by the relevant court, it will usually be treated as invalid and accordingly unenforceable, not only by the courts of the seat of arbitration but also by national courts elsewhere. This is because, under both the 1958 New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law, the competent court may refuse to grant recognition and enforcement of an award that has been "set aside" by a court of the seat of arbitration. The New York Convention set out various grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of an arbitration award. The provisions of the Model Law governing recognition, enforcement or setting-aside of awards are almost identical to those set out in the Convention. Especially, the New York Convention and the Model Law state that an arbitral award may be refused and set aside if a national court of the place of arbitration finds that the award is in conflict with the public policy of its own country. Each state has its own concept of what is required by its "public policy". It is possible to envisage, for example, a dispute over the division of gaming profits from a casino. In many states, the underlying transaction that led to the award would be regarded as a normal commercial transaction and the award would be regarded as valid. Indeed, it is a consistent theme to be found in the legislation and judical decision of many countries. If a workable definition of "international public policy" could be found, it would provide an effective way of preventing an award in an international arbitration from being set aside and refusal for purely domestic policy consideration.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.32 no.3
• /
• pp.47-70
• /
• 2022

This paper studies legal regulation of the public policy exception in the Russian Federation and domestic judicial practice on the issue. It reviews current legislation and analyzes a number of recent court cases where an arbitral award rendered by a foreign arbitration body was refused recognition and enforcement based on public policy violation. By doing so, it contributes to the knowledge on the concept of public policy in the Russian legal system and how public policy can affect the process of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards on its territory. The review of court cases demonstrates different aspects of how the public policy exception can be applied by Russian arbitrazh courts. Such decisions can provide a clearer picture of the kinds of situation that can lead to invoking the public policy clause by the court. Also, it is of practical value as persons preparing to file a claim or to be a defendant in a Russian court can be required to present existing court decisions in support of their claim or defence.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
• /
• v.24 no.2
• /
• pp.109-136
• /
• 2014

The separability of an arbitration clause is generally recognized throughout the world, but there are no provisions of it under the Federal Arbitration Act(FAA) of the United States. As such, the controversy over the recognition of separability has developed with the rise of certain cases. The Supreme Court recognized this separability based on section 4 of the FAA in the decision of the Prima Paint case. The Court ruled that courts must decide the claim about the fraudulent inducement of an arbitration agreement itself, but they must not decide the claim about the fraudulent inducement of a contract involving a broad arbitration clause, and they have to proceed with the arbitration. The Court said that the subject of an arbitral award is set by the agreement of the parties, and thereby arbitrators can decide the issues about the fraudulent inducement of a contract on the basis of the arbitration clause when it is broad to the point of including the issues. Many courts have extended the separability beyond the fraud context to include other defenses to contract formation in the federal courts such as the occurrence of mistake, illegality, and frustration of purpose. In interpreting the parties' intention of ensuring arbitrator competence, the Supreme Court has treated differently the issues about whether the arbitration agreement exists or not and the issues about whether the preconditions for dispute resolution by a valid arbitration agreement is fulfilled or not. The Court holds that the federal policy in favor of arbitration does not apply to the former issues, and arbitrators can decide theses issues only when parties assign them clearly and unmistakably to them. However, the later issues receive a presumption in favor of arbitration; i.e., when the interpretation of a valid arbitration clause is contested, the arbitrators can decide these issues. In the First Options case, the former issue was questioned. The question of the separability of an arbitration clause is where the validity of the main contract involving the arbitration clause is contested. Therefore, the doctrine of separability did not operate in the First Options case in which the validity of the arbitration clause itself was questioned, and the decision in the First Options was irrelevant to the separability. I think that the Prima Paint case and the First Options case have different issues, and there is no tension between them.