• Journal of Korean Society for Atmospheric Environment
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.1-15
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• 2018

Nation-wide systematic and comprehensive measurements of air quality criteria species have been made over 340 sites currently in Korea since 1990. Using these data, temporal and spatial trends of $SO_2$, $PM_{10}$, $NO_2$, $O_3$, CO and $O_x(NO_2+O_3)$ were analyzed to characterize and evaluate implementing efficiency of air quality policy and regulations. Due to strict and effective policy to use cleaner fuels in late 1980s and 1990s, the primary pollutants, such as $SO_2$, CO, and $PM_{10}$ decreased sharply by early 2000s in all parts of Korea. After this period, their concentrations declined with much lower rates in most parts of Korea. In addition, isolated but noticeable numbers of places, especially in major ports, newly developing towns and industrial parks, sustained high levels or even showed further degradation. Despite series of emission control strategies were enforced since early 1990s, $NO_2$ concentrations haven't changed much till 2005, due to significant increase in number of automobiles. Nevertheless, we confirmed that the staggering levels of $NO_2$ and $PM_{10}$ improved evidently after 2005, especially in Seoul Metropolitan Area (SMA), where enhanced regulations for $NO_2$ and $PM_{10}$ emissions was imposed to automobiles and large emission sources. However, their decreasing trends were much lessened in recent years again as current air quality improvement strategies has been challenged to revise further. In contrast to these primary species, annual $O_3$, which is secondary product from $NO_2$ and volatile organic compounds (VOCs), has increased consistently with about 0.6 ppbv per year in every urban part of Korea, while yearly average of daily maximum 8-hour $O_3$ in summer season had a much higher rate of 1.2 ppbv per year. Increase of $O_3$ can be explained mainly by reductions of NO emission. Rising background $O_3$ in the Northeast Asia and increasing oxidizing capacity by changing photochemistry were likely causes of observed $O_3$ increase. The future air quality policy should consider more effective ways to lower alarming level of $O_3$ and $PM_{10}$.

• Tuberculosis and Respiratory Diseases
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• v.52 no.2
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• pp.137-144
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• 2002

Background: Hemoptysis is an often alarming presenting symptom and VEGF is a major regulator of both normal and abnormal angiogenesis, including many inflarrunatory diseases. In this report the clinical significance of the serum VEGF level in patients with hemoptysis was investigated. Methods: Thirty-two patients with hemoptysis were evaluated. The estimated amount of hemoptysis, etiology and serum VEGF level was examined at admission and bronchial angiography was performed in 22 patients. In order to objectify the neovascularization status, one point for the presence of the A-V shunt, hypervascularity, vascular tortuosity was designated for a total of 0-3 points. Results: Mean quantity of hemoptysis was $172.4{\pm}270.4ml$. The mean angiographic neovascularization score was $1.23{\pm}0.75$. The serum VEGF level correlated with the quantity of hemoptysis(r=0.524, p=0.002) and with the angiographic neovascularization score(r=0.441, p=0.04). Using the standard diagnostic criterion for massive hemoptysis, the serum VEGF level of patients with massive hemoptysis($642.4{\pm}545.6$ pg/ml, n=13) was found to be higher than that of patients with non-massive hemoptysis($394.6{\pm}225.8$ pg/ml, n=19) (p=0.069). Conclusion: Regardless of the etiology, the serum VEGF may contribute to abnormal neovascularization in patients with hemoptysis. Therefore, it is suggested that serum VEGF measurements may help in predicting a massive hemoptysis.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.39 no.3
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• pp.127-133
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• 2014

North Korea's uranium enrichment facility is a matter of international concern. It is of particular alarming to South Korea with regard to the security and safety of the country. This situation requires continuous monitoring of the DPRK and emergency preparedness on the part of the ROK. To assess the detectability of an undeclared uranium enrichment plant in North Korea, uranium concentrations in the air at both a short and a long distance from the enrichment facility were estimated. $UF_6$ source terms were determined by using existing information on North Korean facility and data from the operation experience of enrichment plants from other countries. Using the calculated source terms, two atmospheric dispersion models (Gaussian Plume Model and HYSPLIT models) and meteorological data were used to estimate the uranium particle concentrations from the Yongbyon enrichment facility. A maximum uranium concentration and its location are dependent upon the meteorological conditions and the height of the UF6 release point. This study showed that the maximum uranium concentration around the enrichment facility was about $1.0{\times}10^{-7}g{\cdot}m^{-3}$. The location of the maximum concentration was within about 0.4 km of the facility. It has been assumed that the uranium sample of about a few micrograms (${\mu}g$) could be obtained; and that few micrograms of uranium can be easily measured with current measurement instruments. On the contrary, a uranium concentration at a distance of more than 100 kilometers from the enrichment facility was estimated to be about $1.0{\times}10^{-13}{\sim}1.0{\times}10^{-15}g{\cdot}m^{-3}$, which is less than back-ground level. Therefore, based on the results of our paper, an air sample taken within the vicinity of the Yongbyon enrichment facility could be used to determine as to whether or not North Korea is carrying out an undeclared nuclear program. However, the air samples taken at a longer distance of a few hundred kilometers would prove difficult in detecting a clandestine nuclear activities.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.5
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• pp.53-75
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• 1993

This article is concerned with the comment on "Some New Problems of International Aviation Security-Considerations Forcused on its Legal Aspects". Ever since 1970, in addition to the problem of failure to accept the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions, there has been also the problem of parties to them, failing to comply with their obligations under the respective treaties, in the form especially of nominal penalties or the lack of any effort to prosecute after blank refusals to extradite. There have also been cases of prolonged detention of aircraft, passengers and hostages. In this regard, all three conventions contain identical clauses which submit disputes between two or more contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of the respective conventions to arbitration or failing agreement on the organization of the arbitration, to the International Court of Justice. To the extent to which contracting States have not contracted out of this undertaking, as I fear they are expressly allowed to do, this promision can be used by contracting States to ensure compliance. But to date, this avenue does not appear to have been used. From this point of view, it may be worth mentioning that there appears to be an alarming trend towards the view that the defeat of terrorism is such an overriding imperative that all means of doing so become, in international law, automatically lawful. In addition, in as far as aviation security is concerned, as in fact it has long been suggested, what is required is the "application of the strictest security measures by all concerned."In this regard, mention should be made of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on Security-Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Intereference. ICAO has, moreover, compiled, for restricted distribution, a Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, which is highly useful. In this regard, it may well be argued that, unless States members of ICAO notify the ICAO Council of their inability to comply with opecific standards in Annex 17 or any of the related Annexes in accordance with Article 38 of the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, their failure to do so can involve State responsibility and, if damage were to insure, their liability. The same applies to breaches of any other treaty obligation. I hope to demonstrate that although modes of international violence may change, their underlying characteristics remain broadly similar, necessitating not simply the adoption of an adequate body of domestic legislation, firm in its content and fairly administered, but also an international network of communication, of cooperation and of coordination of policies. Afurther legal instrument is now being developed by the Legal Committee of ICAO with respect to unlawful acts at International airports. These instruments, however, are not very effective, because of the absence of universal acceptance and the deficiency I have already pointed out. Therefore, States, airports and international airlines have to concentrate on prevention. If the development of policies is important at the international level, it is equally important in the domestic setting. For example, the recent experiences of France have prompted many changes in the State's legislation and in its policies towards terrorism, with higher penalties for terrorist offences and incentives which encourage accused terrorists to pass informations to the authorities. And our government has to tighten furthermore security measures. Particularly, in the case an unarmed hijacker who boards having no instrument in his possession with which to promote the hoax, a plaintiff-passenger would be hard-pressed to show that the airline was negligent in screening the hijacker prior to boarding. In light of the airline's duty to exercise a high degree of care to provide for the safety of all the passengers on board, an acquiescence to a hijacker's demands on the part of the air carrier could constitute a breach of duty only when it is clearly shown that the carrier's employees knew or plainly should have known that the hijacker was unarmed. The general opinion is that the legal oystem could be sufficient, provided that the political will is there to use and apply it effectively. All agreed that the main responsibility for security has to be borne by the governments. A state that supports aviation terrorism is responsible for violation of International Aviation Law. Generally speaking, terrorism is a violation of international law. It violates the sovereign rights of states, and the human rights of the individuals. We have to contribute more to the creation of a general consensus amongst all states about the need to combat the threat of aviation terrorism. I think that aviation terrorism as becoming an ever more serious issue, has to be solved by internationally agreed and closely co - ordinated measures.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.1
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• pp.351-370
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• 1997

This study concerns possible measures to prevent separatists' terrorist acts against overseas Korean businessmen. Of late, many Korean enterprises are helping a number of foreign countries develop their economy, by building factories and manning regional offices in those countries. But recent development of terrorism especially against Korean businessmen is alarming. This report discusses the need for Korean enterprises heading overseas to prepare themselves with awareness of terrorism and possible protective measures against it, besides their routine pursuance of profits; and for the government and prospective enterprises to refrain from investing in those countries having active separatist movements. If an investment has become inevitable, a careful survey of the region in conflict should be conducted and self-protective measures should be put in place through security information exchange, emergency coordination and training of personnel, etc. This study will first review the past terrorist incidents involving employees of overseas Korean enterprises, and then will focuss on seeking effective measures on the basis of the reported incidents. In carrying out the study, related literature from both home and abroad have been used along with the preliminary materials reported and known on the Internet from recent incidents. 1. The separatist movements of minority groups Lately, minority separatist groups are increasingly resorting to terrorism to draw international attention with the political aim of gaining extended self rule or independence. 2. The state of terrorism against overseas Korean enterprises and Koreans Korean enterprises are now operating businesses, and having their own personnel stationed, in 85 countries including those in South East Asia and Middle East regions. In Sri Lanka, where a Korean enterprise recently became a target of terrorist bombing, there are 75 business firms from Korea and some 700 Korean employees are stationed as of August 1996. A total of 19 different terrorist incidents have taken place against Koreans abroad since 1990. 3. Terrorism preventive measures Terrorism preventive measures are discussed in two ways: measures by the government and by the enterprises. ${\blacktriangleleft}$ Measures by the government - Possible measures at governmental level can include collection and dissemination of terrorist activity information. Emphasis should be given to the information on North Korean activities in particular. ${\blacktriangleleft}$ Measures by individual enterprises - Organizational security plan must be established by individual enterprises and there should also be an increase of security budget. A reason for reluctant effort toward positive security plan is the perception that the security budget is not immediately linked to an increment of profit gain. Ensuring safety for overseas personnel is a fundamental obligation of an enterprise. Consultation and information exchange on security plan, and an emergency support system at a threat to security must be sought after and implemented. 4. Conclusion Today's terrorism varies widely depending on reasons and causes, and its means has become increasingly informationalized and scientific as well while its method is becoming more clandestine and violent. Terrorist organizations are increasingly aiming at enterprises for acquisition of budgets needed for their activities. Korean enterprises have extended their business realm to foreign countries since 1970, exposing themselves to terrorism. Enterprises and their employees, therefore, should establish their own security measures on the one hand while the government must provide general measures, on the other, for the protection of the life and property of Korean residents abroad from terrorist attacks. In this regard, set-up of a counter terrorist organization that coordinates the efforts of government authorities in various levels in planning and executing counter terrorist measures is desired. Since 1965, when the hostile North Korea began to step up its terrorist activities against South Koreans, there have been 7 different occasions of assassination attempt on South Korean presidents and some 500 cases of various kidnappings and attempted kidnappings. North Korea, nervous over the continued economic growth and social stabilization of South Korea, is now concentrating its efforts in the destruction and deterioration of the national power of South Korea for its earlier realization of reunification by force. The possibility of North Korean terrorism can be divided into external terrorist acts and internal terrorist acts depending on the nationality of the terrorists it uses. The external terrorist acts include those committed directly by North Korean agents in South Korea and abroad and those committed by dissident Koreans, hired Korean residents, or international professionals or independent international terrorists bought or instigated by North Korea. To protect the life and property of Korean enterprises and their employees abroad from the threat of terrorism, the government's administrative support and the organizational efforts of enterprises should necessarily be directed toward the planning of proper security measures and training of employees. Also, proper actions should be taken against possible terrorist acts toward Korean business employees abroad as long as there are ongoing hostilities from minority groups against their governments.

• 한국노년학
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• v.36 no.4
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• pp.1037-1058
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• 2016

This study aims to investigate the female caregivers'experiences of aggression by nursing home residents, and to identify the policy strategies for violence prevention referred by the female caregivers. A total of 121 female caregivers with more than 6 months of working experiences had participated in this study. Of these, 56.2% had experienced verbal aggression, 51.2% physical aggression, and 27.3% sexual aggression, which reveals that client violence toward caregivers in nursing homes was at an alarming level. Although, physical and verbal violences were mostly caused unintentionally, about a half of the sexual aggression were caused deliberately. Aggression occurred the most when caregivers were providing the following services: changing the diapers or clothes, giving a bath, and serving meals. It was found that 'hitting' was the most common form of physical aggression and it was 'swearing' and 'touching or physical contacting' in the case of verbal and sexual aggression, respectively. Though there was a difference depending on the type of aggression, the most frequent reactions against client violence were to start a conversation or calm down the nursing home residents, and to leave the scene or ignore the incident. This means that the caregivers are coping very passively through resolving the aggressions by themselves, or overlooking the situation. The most frequently recommended strategy to prevent resident aggression was to provide educational programs on violence prevention to nursing home residents and caregivers(42.7%). Compared to the previous studies, this study indicates some differentiated strategies to prevent violence in nursing homes, which include hiring male caregivers, assuring directors to pay closer attention toward caregivers, using refined language between caregivers and residents, and keeping caregivers to wear appropriate clothes. Based on the study results, some policy recommendations on the prevention of client violence in nursing homes were suggested.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.