• Strategy21
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• 통권36호
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• pp.59-93
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• 2015

A Paradigm shift is in process in China's foreign policies during Xi Jinping's era. Such changes occur with changing national identities from developing country to great power, and from continental power to continental-maritime power. China's pursuit for sea power embraces its global strategy. Accommodating the new identity of maritime power, China is developing its maritime strategy. New silk-road strategy actively utilizes China's advantage in economy, while avoiding direct military challenges against the U.S. China seeks an associated balance of power with the U.S. On the other hand, China make its determination clear to protect its core national interests, particularly Taiwan straits issue, deploying Anti-Access and Area-Denial strategy. 'Pax-Americana 3.0' and 'China's rise 2.0' have convoluted and evolved in complexity. South Korea faces much tougher challenges ahead in its foreign and security environments.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• 제17권1호
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• pp.112-129
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• 2018

Produced by Chinese local television stations, Maritime Silk Road is a documentary which adopts ancient Maritime Silk Road as a historical nostalgia to interpret "the Belt and Road Initiative", a contemporary Chinese economic, political, and cultural strategy put forward by Chinese government mainly aiming at the countries of Southeast Asia. The main body of this article has three parts and the first part analyses how the documentary adopts computer-generated imagery (CGI) to create a historical nostalgia about ancient Maritime Silk Road in the period of Imperial China. At the same time, this part also presents a sense of diasporic nostalgia of the overseas Chinese. This historical and diasporic nostalgia is related to Chinese President Xi Jinping's political discourse: "Chinese dream" that propagandises to build a strong China put forward by Xi in 2013. The second part analyses how this historical and diasporic nostalgia legitimates Xi's "Chinese dream" and how it responds to recent territorial dispute when China continuously claims its territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. In this light, the documentary repeatedly mentions two political rhetoric: "coexistence" (gongcun) and "mutual benefit"(huli gongying) as a practical strategy to deal with the dispute between China and some countries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the third section, the concept of "community of common destiny" (mingyun gongtongti) is adopted by the documentary to depict a convenient and effective organization of China and ASEAN, which is framed as an ultimate goal that Chinese government is depicted as the potential leader of this nostalgic community. At the same time, by providing different and even opposite viewpoints, this article discusses three controversial political rhetoric to present how historical and diasporic nostalgia is politicalized and served for Chinese diplomacy and national interest. Overall, this article argues that the documentary creates a glorious ancient Maritime Silk Road, as a sense of nostalgia, to expand China's economic and political influence, to respond to the controversial issues, and to reassert China's leadership as the centre of Asia.

• 한국과 국제사회
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• 제2권2호
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• pp.89-130
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• 2018

본 논문은 '미중관계의 전개와 현안문제 및 시사점을 분석하기 위한 것이다. 초기 및 적대적 대결기의 미중관계, 미중접근 관계정상화기 및 1980~90년대 미중관계, G2시대 개막후 2010년대 중반까지의 미중관계, 트럼프-시진핑시대의 미중관계와 주요현안과 시사점을 살펴본 후 결론을 도출해본 것이다. 지난 30여 년간의 중국의 급속한 성장은 기존의 미국중심의 단극적 국제질서를 변화시키며 양국간의 경쟁을 촉발시키고 있다. 미국과 중국은 전략 경제대화'를 정기적으로 개최하는 유일한 국가가 되었고, 주제 역시 양자간의 관계뿐만 아니라 글로벌 이슈까지 논의하는 나라로 발전해왔다. 미중협력 갈등의 현안문제는 양국관계는 물론 글로벌 이슈를 망라하고 있다. 예컨대 남중국해, 북핵과 사드, 통상 금융질서, 대만문제 등이 바로 그것이다. 미중갈등은 남의 일이 아니라 한국의 외교 안보 경제에도 직결되는 문제이다. 우리는 미중관계에 있어서 '코리아 패싱(Korea passing)'이 나오지 않도록 튼튼한 한 미 안보공조관계를 유지 강화해 나가는 한편, 한 중 경제협력관계도 조화롭게 추진해 나가는 헤징전략이 요구된다.

• 동남아시아연구
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• 제28권1호
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• pp.145-171
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• 2018

라오스의 2017년은 정치적 '정체'와 경제적 '변화'가 혼재한 1년이다. 정치 분야는 부패지수(CPI)가 개선되는 등의 성과에도 불구하고 지속적인 개혁 여부의 성과는 지켜봐야 한다. 외교적으로 중국의 영향력은 더욱 증가할 것으로 보이며, 특히 2017년 11월 시진핑(Xi Jinping) 국가 주석이 라오스를 방문한 이후 경제회랑과 란창-메콩회의 협력회의(Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Meeting)의 틀은 더욱 강화될 것으로 전망된다. 다른 접경국인 아세안 국가와는 우호적 관계를 지속해왔지만 캄보디아의 총선에 따른 라오스-캄보디아 국경 문제 이슈는 잠재된 위험 요소이다. 경제 부문은 대형 인프라 건설로 인한 자본 유입과 관광 산업의 호조로 높은 성장률이 유지되었지만, 재정 경상수지의 적자와 같은 구조적 문제는 해결되어야 한다. 한국과 라오스는 2017년 3월 메콩고위관리회의, 9월 한-라오스 외교장관회의를 통해 양국간의 포괄적 협력을 논의하였다. 라오스는 한국의 ODA 원조 8위(무상)를 차지하고 있으며 향후에도 ODA는 양국의 중요한 외교적 협력 채널이 될 것이다. 경제관계에 있어 무역 부문은 감소 추세이지만 투자와 인적교류는 지속적으로 증가하고 있다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.37-64
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• 2014

The year 2010 has been regarded as a year of China's assertive diplomacy. A series of China's behavior--including China's critical reaction to the U.S. for its sales of weapons to Taiwan, the Dalai Lama's visit to President Obama, China's arbitrary designation of 'core interests' over the South China Sea, China's inordinate reactions to the sinking of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong bombardment, and China's activities in the Senkaku/Diaoyu island areas--has served as the witnesses to China's assertive diplomacy in 2010. The major causes of China's assertive diplomacy can be summed up by three factors: potential power transition from U.S. to China; emerging China's nationalism; and the recession of the Tao Guang Yang Hui as a diplomatic principle. But a majority of Western sinologists claim that China's assertive diplomacy is defensive in terms of its character. China's neighboring states, however, perceive its assertive diplomacy as diplomatic threat. Due to these states' geographical proximity and capability gaps with China, these neighbors experience difficulties in coping with China's behavior. In particular, China's coercive economic diplomacy, in which China tends to manipulate the neighbors' economic dependency on China for its diplomatic leverage, is a case in point for China's assertive diplomacy. China's assertiveness seems to be continued even after the inauguration of Xi Jinping government. Although the Xi government's diplomatic rhetorics in "New Type of Great Power Relationship" and the "Convention for Neighboring States Policy" sound friendly and cooperative, its subsequent behavior, like unilateral announcement of Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), does not conform with its rhetoric. Overall, China's assertiveness has been consolidated as a fashion of its diplomacy, and it is likely to continue in its relations with neighbors. As a neighboring state, the ROK should approach to it with more balanced attitude. In addition, it needs to find out a new diplomatic leverage to deal with China in accordance with its security environment, in which China plays a growing role.

• Strategy21
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• 통권36호
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• pp.94-120
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• 2015

The Asia-Pacific Region has emerged as a arena of geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. The Obama administration of the U.S. had laid out the concept of rebalancing strategy toward the region, concentrating its 60 percent of Naval Forces to the region till 2020 and consolidating its network of allies and partners. Whereas Chinese leader Xi Jinping also put forward the concept of new type of major power relations concerning its relations with the U.S. and a concept of 'the Asian Community of Common Destiny' aiming at a more intensified mutual relation among countries in the region. In doing so, Asia-Pacific region gradually became the arena where mutual competition and cooperation between the U.S. and China has crossfired. As a close ally to the U.S. and a partner to Japan, South Korea should develop trilateral naval cooperation by holding joint naval drill with the aim of humanitarian support and disaster relief. At the same time, Seoul also should make efforts to proceed mutual confidence building with Beijing by deepening military-to-military cooperation. These policy options will be helpful to enhance Seoul's security posture in the region.

• 무역학회지
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• 제44권1호
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• pp.285-299
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• 2019

The 'One Belt One Road (OBOR)' initiative, which was promulgated as part of the enlargement policy along with the advent of Xi Jinping in 2013, is a policy to expand China's political and economic power externally through linkages with neighboring countries. China's overseas port investment plays an important role in the promotion of the 'OBOR' policy from the coast of China through maritime transportation routes from S.E Asia to Mediterranean and Europe. Since China's overseas port investment has been made from several factors such as political, economic, and military motives, it differs in purpose and character from investments made by private companies, such as Global Port Operators(GTO) which consider profitability first. This study aims to address future prospects and implications by analyzing the geopolitics of China's overseas port investment under the 'One Belt One Road' initiative. According to the results, China's overseas port investment is dominated by state-owned enterprises and political and security factors are more important than profitability. China's overseas port investment has been on a large scale in a short period of time, and China has faced with various problems both domestically and internationally. such as debt default, environmental problems, subordination problems from recipient countries and political and military confrontation with great countries such as United States, Japan and India etc.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제5권1호
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• pp.59-85
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• 2021

中国的公共外交在与韩国和台湾等周边国家地区发展关係方面有着很大的贡献。但当东北亚地区发生巨大的秩序变动或与台湾和韩国发生政治安保矛盾时,中国的公共外交却无法发挥缓解紧张关係并提供解决方案的角色。为什么中国公共外交无法在缓解与周边国家的政治安保矛盾中充分发挥其作用？本研究着重于中国的体制特性会对公共外交的目标,战略以及行为人和行为所带来的影响。具体来说,嚮往着与西方国家相反的政治价值与体制的中国通过公共外交所追求的目标以及战略的确与众不同。台湾和韩国以及其他东北亚的周边国家都有着迥然不同的体制。因此,为了在这些国家地区推动公共外交,通常都会利用彼此共有的歷史文化议题。这些特征可以视为说明中国公共外交在政治安保矛盾方面弱点的主要关键。不仅如此,以中国权威主义的政治以及国家-社会关係为由,也可说明中国一丝不乱并具系统性的中国公共外交推进体制以及成果。但另一方面,本论文也会提出为什么中国公共外交在与周边国家发生的政治安保矛盾方面无法有效地起缓衝作用的原因。本研究以此分析框架为基础,并探讨上文所提研究问题的答案。

• 분석과 대안
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• 제2권1호
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• pp.71-106
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• 2018

The 19th CPC National Congress has a key historical significance in the development of China's constitution. It will also play a decisive role in the history of the seventy years'constitutional change in New China. XiJinping's new socialist thought with Chinese characteristics established in the report of 19th CPC National Congress will be written in the preface of the March 2018 National People's Congress's constitutional amendment. The fifth revision of 1982 Constitution will touch on many issues such as the leadership of the CPC into the constitution, the abolition of the tenure of the president, the constitutional oath system, and the reform of the national supervisory system. In addition, the constitutionality review system, the establishment of the National Security Council, the constitutional status of socialist public property and private property and the adjustment of major economic system has become a hot topic in the theory field. In the history node towards a socialist country ruled by law, the theory and practice of the China indeed have the academic ideas, value position and path model differences, which will delay the Chinese constitutional development, but also is the necessary pain in the process of moving towards the rule of law in China. Indeed, how to the development and where to go in the future of Chinese constitutionalism itself has sample value, which deserves rational attention and in-depth inquiry from Chinese and Western academics.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제2권2호
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• pp.111-141
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• 2018

By the middle of 2018 there are signs of China's entry into a new period of development, characterized by a change in the old model: "market reforms-inner-party democratization - moderate foreign policy" to another: "market reforms - Xi Jinping personality cult - offensive foreign policy." This model contains the risks of arising of the contradiction between economic freedom and political-ideological rigidity which can lead to destabilization of the political life. However, in the current positive economic dynamics, these risks may come out, rather, in the medium and long term. Today, the political situation in China remains stable - despite growing dissatisfaction in scientific expert and educational circles due to increased control over the intellectual sphere by the authorities. The need for a new redistribution of power between central and provincial authorities could potentially disrupt political stability in the medium term, but, at the moment, is not a critical negative factor. The economic situation is positive-stable. Forecasts indicate a possible increase in China's GDP in 2018 at 6.5%. At the same time, there are negative expectations in connection with the Sino-US and potentially Sino-European "trade war". In the Chinese foreign policy, as a response to Western pressure, China increasingly uses the Russian direction of its diplomacy in the expanded version of Russia + SCO. The nuance here is seen in China's adjusted approach to the SCO: first of all, not as a mechanism for cooperation with Russia, but as an organization that allows using Russia's potential for pressure on the US in the Sino-US strategic rivalry. In the second half of 2018, the Chinese economy will continue to develop steadily, albeit with unresolved traditional problems (debts of provinces and state-owned enterprises, ineffective state sector, risks on the financial and real estate market). In politics, discontent with the cult of Xi will accumulate, but without real threats to its power. Weakening in economic opposition between China and the United States is possible due to Beijing's search for compromises on tariffs, intellectual property, trade deficit. To find such trade-offs, Xi will use the so-called. "Personal diplomacy" of direct contacts with Trump.