• Proceedings of the KWS Conference
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• 2000.10a
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• pp.13-18
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• 2000

Welding is critical technique for the joining of materials in the nation's major Manufacturing industries. Since 1998, leaders in welding industry have defined a vision of the issues and opportunities that it will face in 2020. In developing this vision document, more than 25 senior managers and respected experts from various segments of the welding community met to begin a dialog about the future of the welding industry. They were brought together to develop a long-range business plan for their industry that would identify how it would meet the needs of manufacturers, of the marketplace, and of society in 2020. In essence, these decision makers created an ideal vision of the state of their industry in 20 years, and the strategy to reach it. Welding is a precise, reliable, and cost-effective, method for joining materials. No other technique is as widely used by manufacturers to join metals and alloys efficiently. Most of the familiar objects in modern society, form buildings and bridges, to vehicles, computers, and medical devices, could not be produced without the use of welding. Despite the importance of welding to the manufacturing industry, the leaders in this area felt that welding was not appreciated as much as it should be from the society. The welding industry consists of the “users” of welding techniques as well as the companies, universities and other organizations that industry look for improvements in their operations by 2020, and should find their interest addressed in this document. A major economic impact study co sponsored by AWS and EWI and supported by US Navy, State of Ohio, US Department of Commerce, and major companies was kicked off. This two-year study will determine the economic impact of welding on the United States economy. The objective of this study is to break a paradigm about welding-those of us who are heavily involved in welding, believe strongly that much of our gross domestic product is directly dependent on welding. Furthermore, continued advances in the field of welding are necessary to achieving further increases in productivity that makes our economy strong. Yet, despite intuition, anecdotal information, and fragmented analyses, the completing quantitative information that would proved the justification for strategic actions to further develop this critical field is not currently available.

• Strategy21
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• s.43
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• pp.175-199
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• 2018

Recent marine territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea have come to us as a great threat. China, which has recently established the China Coast Guard and has rapidly developed maritime security forces, is trying to overcome the various conflict countries with its power. Japan is also strengthening intensively its maritime security forces. Since Korea, China, and Japan are geographically neighboring and sharing maritime space in Northeast Asia, there is no conflict between maritime jurisdiction and territorial rights among the countries. The struggle for initiative in the ocean is fierce among the three coastal nations in Northeast Asia. therefore, Korea needs more thorough preparation and response to protect the marine sovereignty. As the superpowers of China and Japan are confronted and the United States is involved in the balance of power in strategic purposes, the East Asian sea area is a place where tension and conflict environment exist. China's illegal fishing boats are constantly invading our waters, and they even threaten the lives of our police officers. The issue of delimiting maritime boundaries between Korea and China has yet to be solved, and is underway in both countries, and there is a possibility that the exploration activities of the continental shelf resources may collide as the agreement on the continental shelf will expire between Korea and Japan. On the other hand, conflicts in the maritime jurisdictions of the three countries in Korea, China and Japan are leading to the enhancement of maritime security forces to secure deterrence rather than military confrontation. In the situation where the unresolved sovereignty and jurisdiction conflicts of Korea, China and Japan continue, and the competition for the strengthening of the maritime powers of China and Japan becomes fierce, there is a urgent need for stabilization and enhancement of the maritime forces in our country. It is necessary to establish a new long-term strategy for enhancing the maritime security force and to carry out it. It is expected that the Korean Coast Guard, which once said that it was a model for the establishment of China's Coast Guard as a powerful force for the enforcement of the maritime law, firmly establishes itself as a key force to protect our oceans with the Navy and keeps our maritime sovereignty firmly.

• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.54-61
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• 2019

The 3D printing technology took the second place within the top ten rising technologies at the World Economic Forum in 2012. It arose as a core technology that would enable transformation in the manufacturing industry and develop new markets through the change of existing industry paradigms. Leading countries, like the United States of America, are actively expanding the use of 3D printing technologies within their defense areas. In order to utilize the technology within her defense areas, the Republic of Korea is planning to acquire defense spare parts manufacturing technologies and nurture professional defense personnel specializing in the 3D printing technology. Hence, this study offers various methods to efficiently apply reliable 3D printing spare parts to operation fields in the future by utilizing spare parts localization development management methods within existing weapon systems' development, manufacturing and sustainment phases.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2016.10a
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• pp.537-539
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• 2016

Recently, unmanned technologies interest increased. An unmanned boat is not directly on people and radio can be controlled by boat. Used for military unmanned boat was first developed in the United States Navy. In recent years, for hobby, for pesticide application, for water activities, expanding exploration in various ways, including for use. The role of a variety of unmanned boat above, In the case of a variety of unmanned probe of the role of unmanned boat on the boat people who don't be able to come to the vision of the advantage can not be exploring places like blind spot. In this paper, The Blind Spot are explorations of places such as streaming real-time as possible, an unmanned boat using Raspberry Pi that support implementation. Receiver input signals of an unmanned boat to the transmitter under the manipulation of, using smartphones hotspot feature Raspberry Pi and smartphones, network connection. Via Raspberry Pi motion of using real-time streaming using unmanned boat.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.20 no.9
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• pp.142-149
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• 2019

In the early 2000s, the Korean government first attempted to acquire nuclear-powered submarines as strategic assets. Acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines must overcome the challenges of the initial costs and operating costs of trillions of US dollars per ship, must be agreed to by the international community (including neighboring countries) and in a national consensus, and must have an established technical infrastructure (including manpower). The US navy has been working with governments that want to acquire nuclear propulsion warships since the 1950s, and in 1982, they enacted an executive order called the United States Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program to consolidate efforts and prepare for the future, which sets out the organizational structure, authority, and responsibilities of US governmental management, and integrates national efforts. This paper is to gain valuable wisdom from the U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program by analyzing all of its histories and contributions, thereby providing valuable lessons for a future program in Korea. It might not be possible to follow the U.S.A. one-on-one because of the scale of national and military forces, but at least we can avoid time and effort spent on trial and error.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.236-261
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• 2014

The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.