• Title/Summary/Keyword: Unilateral Retaliation

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The Characteristics and Suggestions of the Unilateral Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (WTO분쟁해결제도에서 일방적 보복조치의 특성과 시사점)

  • Hong, Sungkyu
    • International Commerce and Information Review
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    • v.19 no.1
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    • pp.155-187
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    • 2017
  • In the US, the Sections 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 are still being used to resolve disputes. The U.S' such unilateral retaliations grounded on the Sections 301 of the Trade Act, in fact, violate the WTO agreements and hinder the development of international trade as the trade partner may assume it as a reprisal move impeding the fair settlement of disputes. Here, this study is going to examine the characteristics and functions of the WTO dispute settlement system briefly and compare the countermeasures recognized to be legitimate by the WTO with the U.S' unilateral retaliation. Also, this author will analyse the US-Japan Automobiles (DS6) and EC-Bananas III (DS27) as one of the typical cases resulted from the unilateral retaliation. According to the result, these cases do not conform to WTO-consistency, and it implies that it is absurd to accept the US' unilateral retaliation internationally. In conclusion, presently, it is a global trend to solidify protectionism, and to vitalize trade and resolve trade disputes efficiently, it is needed to prohibit the recourse to unilateral retaliations and also positively apply the WTO dispute settlement system(DSU) defining rules about how to strengthen the multilateral system.

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A Study of the Dispute Between Korea and China on the Safeguard Measure (한(韓).중간(中間) 세이프가드 관련분쟁(關聯紛爭)의 전개(展開)에 따른 우리나라의 대응(對應))

  • Lee, Won-Keun;Chang, Dong-Sik
    • THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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    • v.22
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    • pp.255-285
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    • 2004
  • After more than 15 years of negotiations, China was finally able to achieve the WTO membership, opening up new trade opportunities for China as well as existing WTO members. China accepted a special safeguard mechanism as one of its WTO- plus commitments. And in response, Korea has since introduced China special safeguard rules, which in simple terms, allows an invocation of safeguard measures against Chinese product imports under more lapse conditions than would normally be allowed under the existing general safeguard rules. China also introduced new safeguard rules in November 2001 in an effort to increase transparency in its operation of safeguard measures. However, the current article contends that the new rules pose a serious threat to free trade in the form of the retaliation provision, which enables China to take unilateral retaliatory actions against safeguard measures on Chinese product imports, It indicates that the provision could be operated in an arbitrary manner as the US Super 301, and lead to infringements of WTO disciplines. This paper indicates that the foregoing elements could lead to mort trade disputes between Korea China regarding safeguard measures and subsequent retaliations on the hills of the so called the Garlic War. The current article goes on to offer policy recommendations toward deterring such disputes. First, it recommends a more active invocation of Korea's own retaliatory provision against China's unilateral actions at least to gain negotiating leverage. Second, it sites problems involving China's still conspicuous state-trading practices, and proposes to raise issues again China to induce more faithful implementation of WTO disciplines Final, it stresses the importance of preventing disputes before they arise, and suggests several specific preventive measures.

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Nuclear-First Politics of Kim Jung Un Regime and South Korea's Deterrence Strategy (김정은 정권의 선핵(先核) 정치와 한국의 억제전략)

  • Kim, Tae Woo
    • Strategy21
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    • s.39
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    • pp.5-46
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    • 2016
  • North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'