• 통상정보연구
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• 제19권1호
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• pp.155-187
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• 2017

WTO에서는 GATT체제에서 나타났던 분쟁해결에 따른 문제점을 해결하기 위해 복잡한 절차를 분쟁해결양해(DSU)로 통일하였으며, 분쟁해결을 담당하는 상설기관으로 DSB와 상소기관(the Appellate Body)을 설치하였다. 또한 패널보고서의 신속한 의사결정을 위해 역총의제(reverse consensus system)를 도입하고, 사법적 기능을 크게 강화하는 등 절차에서 많은 개선이 이루어졌다. 그러나 미국은 아직도 자국법인 통상법 제301조를 통하여 일방적으로 분쟁해결을 시도하고 있다. 이와 같은 301조에 의한 일방적 보복조치는 공정한 분쟁해결을 저해하는 WTO협정위반에 해당한다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 DSU의 특성과 최근 동향을 검토하고, WTO에서 합법적으로 인정하고 있는 대항조치와 미국의 일방적 보복조치를 비교하였다. 또한 일방적 보복조치에 따른 대표적인 US-Japan Automobiles (DS6) 사건과 EC-Bananas III (DS27) 사건을 법제적으로 분석하였다. 결과적으로 이러한 사건들은 WTO의 정합성(WTO-consistency)에 맞지 않는 것으로 미국의 일방적 보복조치가 국제적으로 인정되기 어렵다는 점을 시사점으로 제시하였다.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제22권
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• pp.255-285
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• 2004

After more than 15 years of negotiations, China was finally able to achieve the WTO membership, opening up new trade opportunities for China as well as existing WTO members. China accepted a special safeguard mechanism as one of its WTO- plus commitments. And in response, Korea has since introduced China special safeguard rules, which in simple terms, allows an invocation of safeguard measures against Chinese product imports under more lapse conditions than would normally be allowed under the existing general safeguard rules. China also introduced new safeguard rules in November 2001 in an effort to increase transparency in its operation of safeguard measures. However, the current article contends that the new rules pose a serious threat to free trade in the form of the retaliation provision, which enables China to take unilateral retaliatory actions against safeguard measures on Chinese product imports, It indicates that the provision could be operated in an arbitrary manner as the US Super 301, and lead to infringements of WTO disciplines. This paper indicates that the foregoing elements could lead to mort trade disputes between Korea China regarding safeguard measures and subsequent retaliations on the hills of the so called the Garlic War. The current article goes on to offer policy recommendations toward deterring such disputes. First, it recommends a more active invocation of Korea's own retaliatory provision against China's unilateral actions at least to gain negotiating leverage. Second, it sites problems involving China's still conspicuous state-trading practices, and proposes to raise issues again China to induce more faithful implementation of WTO disciplines Final, it stresses the importance of preventing disputes before they arise, and suggests several specific preventive measures.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.5-46
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• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'