• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.59-86
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• 2002

Using the simulated data set which is based upon the data set merging Economically Active Population Survey(EAPS) and the Supplementary Survey (SS) in 1998-2001, this paper examines the relevance of alternative programs Unemployment Insurance Savings Account (UISA) and Pension-funded Unemployment Benefit (PUB) - to unemployment insurance system in Korea. Estimating the relative size of unemployment benefit and IA balance under a specific type of UISA or PUB by simulation, this paper yields the two main results. First, replacing UI by UISA with the same benefit being maintained would be beneficial in terms of search efficiency in general, although its effectiveness is a little doubtful as for the non-regular workers. Second, the PUB is better than UISA as an alternative to UI, and also works relatively well even for the non-regular workers.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.39-59
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• 2000

Given the constraint that the unemployment benefit is not allowed to vary freely over the unemployment duration, this paper examines the optimal UI benefit structure. In particular, identifying the conflicting effects of benefit amount and benefit duration upon incentive and insurance, this paper characterizes the optimal combination of UI benefit amount and duration. Based upon some important factors determining the optimal UI benefit structure that are derived from the model, a set of directions for UI reform in Korea have been proposed.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.40 no.3
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• pp.1-44
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• 2018

This paper studies the macroeconomic effects of an enhancement in unemployment benefits in Korea. In particular, I quantify the welfare effect of two specific policy chances which have been mainly discussed among policymakers in recent years: increasing wage replacement rates by 10%p and extending maximum benefit durations by one month. To this end, I build and calibrate an overlapping generation model which reflects the heterogeneity of the unemployed and the specificity of the unemployment insurance (UI) system in Korea. The quantitative analysis conducted here shows that extending maximum benefit durations by one month improves social welfare, whereas increasing wage replacement rates by 10%p deteriorates social welfare. Extending maximum benefit durations is applied to potentially all the UI recipients, including unemployed workers whose wage before job loss is relatively low and whose marginal utility is relatively high. However, increasing wage replacement rates is applied to only a small number of UI recipients whose wage before job loss is relatively high, while the increase in the UI premium is passed onto all of the employed. This study suggests that given the current UI system and economic environment in Korea, it is more desirable to extend maximum benefit durations rather than to increase wage replacement rates in terms of social welfare.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.37
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• pp.1-31
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• 1999

In Korea, little is known about unemployment duration and exit rate from unemployment. This paper empirically examines the duration of unemployment using data for the years 1996 and 1997 on unemployed individuals who are eligible for unemployment insurance benefits in Korea. A parametric survival model (log-normal model) is adopted to identify factors predicting transitions to reemployment. Factors that affect unemployment duration are sex, age, employment duration (year), prior salary, region, prior employment industry, cause of unemployment, officially determined unemployment benefit duration, degree of benefit exhaustion, and amount of benefits for early reemployment. However, education is not statistically significant In degree of benefit exhaustion, the exit rate from unemployment decreases as benefit exhaustion is approached. In amount of benefits for early reemployment, the exit rate from unemployment increases as amount of benefits increases. Hazards for reemployment gradually increase until 80 days after unemployment and gradually decrease in the following period. Thus, we find that distribution of hazards for reemployment has log-normal shapes between inverted U and inverted L This paper takes advantage of a unique analysis about unemployment duration and exit rate from unemployment in the Korean Unemployment Insurance system which functions as the most valuable social safely-net mechanism in the recent national economic crisis. Indeed, this paper provides a basic knowledge about realities of unemployed individuals in the Unemployment Insurance system and identifies research areas that require further study.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.39 no.1
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• pp.1-31
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• 2016

This paper investigates the cyclical behavior of UI benefit take-up rate, the share of unemployed persons who are eligible for job seekers' allowances(JSA) and actually receive them. Using Korea's Employment Insurance DB, it also identifies the factors linked to the decision to take up job seekers' allowances. The results show that the take-up rate is countercyclical and leads both unemployment rate and Coincident Composite Index cyclical component by 6 months and is positively correlated with replacement rate and benefit duration, suggesting that extending benefit duration and raising benefit level can boost benefit claims to increase take-up rates in Korea.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.77-105
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• 2004

Given the limitations of UI benefit and self-insurance through precautionary savings, this paper suggests a new scheme of income support for the unemployed, which offers unemployed workers not only UI benefit but also borrowings from their future pension incomes. Allowing individuals to have effective self-insurance through pension- borrowing, this scheme provides them with consumption-smoothing and reduction in risk burden while maintaining search incentives of the unemployed. Simulation study based upon household panel data in Korea suggests that a heavy reliance should be set upon self-insurance through pension-borrowings rather than upon UI benefit, even for the low-income individuals who are subsidized under UI system. This result provides us with insightful implications for a social safety net in (fast-growing) developing countries, where people cannot afford a good amount of UI benefit or of precautionary savings against unemployment although they expect their incomes to be much higher in the future. Indeed, it is consumption-smoothing effect of self-insurance through pension- borrowings, as well as its incentive-maintaining effect, that makes it a promising alternative of social safety net in developing countries.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.45
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• pp.7-39
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• 2001

This paper examines the effect of active labor market policy on the unemployment rates in 8 welfare states. This paper focuses on the following questions: what are the major predictors of the changes in unemployment rates?; and what is the effect of active labor market policy in reducing unemployment rates? Using the data from Comparative Welfare States Data Set by Stephens (1997), Key Indicators of the Labour Market by ILO (1999) and Social Expenditure Database by OECD (1999), this paper attempts to answer the above research questions. Fuller-Battese model, a data analysis method in pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis, is adopted to identify variables predicting changes in unemployment rates. This paper analyzes the predictors by using 3 analysis models about 2 types of unemployment (overall unemployment and long term unemployment). Results are as follows: (1) economic variable such as changes in GDP has a positive effect in reducing unemployment rates; (2) active labor market policy has a positive effect in reducing unemployment rates as well; (3) job brokering service among 3 major active labor market programs has a positive effect in reducing unemployment rates; and (4) there is an interaction effect between unemployment benefit level and active labor market policy in reducing unemployment rates. Through the empirical analysis, this paper provides valuable knowledge about effects of active labor market policy on unemployment in 8 welfare states and discusses implications for the active labor market policy in Korea.

• 한국사회정책
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.345-375
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• 2018

This study examines labour market and unemployment protection policies as a configuration in 12 OECD countries in order to investigate how countries from different regime conform to or diverse from previous welfare state regime discussion, and to examine its relationship with poverty and inequality. In analyzing the combination of the unemployment insurance, the unemployment assistance, and active labour market policy, firstly, fuzzy scores of unemployment insurance was calculated by analyzing the strictness of eligibility, duration of benefit and the generosity of income replacement rate. For unemployment assistance, the ratio of public assistance expenditure to the GDP in each country and the ratio of unemployment benefit level to the average wage in each country have been considered. As for the active labour market policy, the total expenditure per GDP of this policy was converted into fuzzy points and analyzed. As a result, 5 types in 2005 and 6 types in 2010 were generated. Specifically, 'assistance type(iAp)', 'insurance type (Iap)', 'comprehensive safety net type (IAP)', 'weak safety net type(iap)' were analyzed. This paper suggested policy implication for South Korean case, which consistently had high score for weak safety net type(iap).

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.91-134
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• 2010

This study examines job transition process and its lahor market performance by reasons of job separation, using the Employment Insurance DB(2000~07). The findings show that involuntary job changers lend to suffer greater loss in job spell and real wage than voluntary job changers, which seems to reflect their characteristics such as lower quality of job matching due to unsystematic job search, negative signaling effect in the labor market and decreasing availability of human capital in previous job. In addition, unemployment benefit eligible for involuntary job changers tends to prolong the period of unemployment, while increasing job spell in the following employment.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.131-169
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• 2010

I develop a matching model in which risk-averse workers face borrowing constraints and make a labor force participation decision as well as a job search decision. A sharp distinction between unemployment and out of the labor force is made: those who look for work for a certain period but find no job are classified as the unemployed and those who do not look for work are classified as those out of the labor force. In the model, the job search decision consists of two steps. First, each individual who is not working obtains information about employment opportunities. Second, each individual who decides to search has to take costly actions to find a job. Since individuals differ with respect to asset holdings, they have different reservation job-finding probabilities at which an individual is indifferent between searching and not searching. Individuals, who have large asset holdings and thereby are less likely to participate in the labor market, have high reservation job-finding probability, and they are less likely to search if they have less quality of information. In other words, if individuals with large asset holdings search for job, they must have very high quality of information and face very high actual job-finding probability. On the other hand, individuals with small asset holdings have low reservation job-finding probability and they are likely to search for less quality of information. They face very low actual job-finding probability and seem to remain unemployed for a long time. Therefore, differences in the quality of information explain heterogeneous job search decisions among individuals as well as higher job finding probability for those who reenter the labor market than for those who remain in the labor force. The effect of the extended maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefits on the aggregate labor market and the labor market flows is investigated. The benchmark benefit duration is set to three months. As maximum benefit duration is extended up to six months, the employment-population ratio decreases while the unemployment rate increases because individuals who are eligible for benefits have strong incentives to remain unemployed and decide to search even if they obtain less quality of information, which leads to low job-finding probability and then high unemployment rate. Then, the vacancy-unemployment ratio decreases and, in turn, the job-finding probability for both the unemployed and those out of the labor force decrease. Finally, the outflow from nonparticipation decreases with benefit duration because the equilibrium job-finding probability decreases. As the job-finding probability decreases, those who are out of the labor force are less likely to search for the same quality of information. I also consider the matching model with two states of employment and unemployment. Compared to the results of the two-state model, the simulated effects of changes in benefit duration on the aggregate labor market and the labor market flows are quite large and significant.