• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.65-112
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• 2014

Recent trends show that the PRC has stepped aside its "army-centered approach" and placed greater emphasis on its Navy and Air Force for a wider range of operations, thereby reducing its ground force and harnessing its economic power and military technology into naval development. A quantitative growth of the PLA Navy itself is no surprise as this is not a recent phenomenon. Now is the time to pay closer attention to the level of PRC naval force's performance and the extent of its warfighting capacity in the maritime domain. It is also worth asking what China can do with its widening naval power foundation. In short, it is time to delve into several possible scenarios I which the PRC poses a real threat. With this in mind, in Section Two the paper seeks to observe the construction progress of PRC's naval power and its future prospects up to the year 2020, and categorize time frame according to its major force improvement trends. By analyzing qualitative improvements made over time, such as the scale of investment and the number of ships compared to increase in displacement (tonnage), this paper attempts to identify salient features in the construction of naval power. Chapter Three sets out performance evaluation on each type of PRC naval ships as well as capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery (i.e., strategic missile forces) and satellites that could support maritime warfare. Finall, the concluding chapter estimates the PRC's maritime warfighting capability as anticipated in respective conflict scenarios, and considers its impact on the Korean Peninsula and proposes the directions ROK should steer in response. First of all, since the 1980s the PRC navy has undergone transitions as the focus of its military strategic outlook shifted from ground warfare to maritime warfare, and within 30 years of its effort to construct naval power while greatly reducing the size of its ground forces, the PRC has succeeded in building its naval power next to the U.S.'s in the world in terms of number, with acquisition of an aircraft carrier, Chinese-version of the Aegis, submarines and so on. The PRC also enjoys great potentials to qualitatively develop its forces such as indigenous aircraft carriers, next-generation strategic submarines, next-generation destroyers and so forth, which is possible because the PRC has accumulated its independent production capabilities in the process of its 30-year-long efforts. Secondly, one could argue that ROK still has its chances of coping with the PRC in naval power since, despite its continuous efforts, many estimate that the PRC naval force is roughly ten or more years behind that of superpowers such as the U.S., on areas including radar detection capability, EW capability, C4I and data-link systems, doctrines on force employment as well as tactics, and such gap cannot be easily overcome. The most probable scenarios involving the PRC in sea areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula are: first, upon the outbreak of war in the peninsula, the PRC may pursue military intervention through sea, thereby undermining efforts of the ROK-U.S. combined operations; second, ROK-PRC or PRC-Japan conflicts over maritime jurisdiction or ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could inflict damage to ROK territorial sovereignty or economic gains. The PRC would likely attempt to resolve the conflict employing blitzkrieg tactics before U.S. forces arrive on the scene, while at the same time delaying and denying access of the incoming U.S. forces. If this proves unattainable, the PRC could take a course of action adopting "long-term attrition warfare," thus weakening its enemy's sustainability. All in all, thiss paper makes three proposals on how the ROK should respond. First, modern warfare as well as the emergent future warfare demonstrates that the center stage of battle is no longer the domestic territory, but rather further away into the sea and space. In this respect, the ROKN should take advantage of the distinct feature of battle space on the peninsula, which is surrounded by the seas, and obtain capabilities to intercept more than 50 percent of the enemy's ballistic missiles, including those of North Korea. In tandem with this capacity, employment of a large scale of UAV/F Carrier for Kill Chain operations should enhance effectiveness. This is because conditions are more favorable to defend from sea, on matters concerning accuracy rates against enemy targets, minimized threat of friendly damage, and cost effectiveness. Second, to maintain readiness for a North Korean crisis where timely deployment of US forces is not possible, the ROKN ought to obtain capabilities to hold the enemy attack at bay while deterring PRC naval intervention. It is also argued that ROKN should strengthen its power so as to protect national interests in the seas surrounding the peninsula without support from the USN, should ROK-PRC or ROK-Japan conflict arise concerning maritime jurisprudence. Third, the ROK should fortify infrastructures for independent construction of naval power and expand its R&D efforts, and for this purpose, the ROK should make the most of the advantages stemming from the ROK-U.S. alliance inducing active support from the United States. The rationale behind this argument is that while it is strategically effective to rely on alliance or jump on the bandwagon, the ultimate goal is always to acquire an independent response capability as much as possible.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.21 no.11
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• pp.420-426
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• 2020

The purpose and main points of the ROK-US Navy were analyzed from various angles using the big data technology Word Cloud for efficient sea trials. First, a comparison of words extracted through keyword cleansing in the ROK-US Navy sea trial showed that the ROK Navy conducted a single equipment test, and the US Navy conducted an integrated test run focusing on the system. Second, an analysis of the ROK-US Navy sea trials showed that approximately 66.6% were analyzed as similar items, of which more than two items were 112 items Approximately 44% of the 252 items of the ROK Navy sea trials overlapped, and that 89 items (35% of the total) could be reduced when integrated into the US Navy sea trials. A ship is a complex system in which multiple equipment operates simultaneously. The focus on checking the functions and performance of individual equipment, such as the ROK Navy's sea trials, will increase the sea trial period because of the excessive number of sea trial targets. In addition, the budget required will inevitably increase due to an increase in schedule and evaluation costs. In the future, further research will be needed to achieve more efficient and accurate sea trials through integrated system evaluations, such as the U.S. Navy sea trials.

• 대한예방의학회:학술대회논문집
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• 1994.02b
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• pp.164-168
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• 1994

Single serologic tests may occasionally influence clinicians in making diagnoses. The antistreptolysin O (ASO) test is a frequently used tool for detecting recent Streptococcus pyogenes infection and is helpful in the diagnosis of diseases like rheumatic fever. Using data from a 1989 prospective study of 600 healthy male military recruits, in which 43% experienced S. pyogenes upper respiratory tract infection (2-dilution rise in ASO), this report compared two methods of interpreting a single ASO titer. Using the 'upper limit of normal' (80 percentile) method, recruits with an ASO titer of greater than 400 showed evidence of recent S. pyogenes infection. This method had a sensitivity and specificity of only 65.9 and 81.9% respectively. In contrast to the 'yes-no'. dichotomy of the 'upper limit of normal' method. the likelihood ratio method statistics were ASO value specific, more consistent with clinical judgment, and better emphasized the caution clinicians must use in interpreting a single ASO test.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2015.10a
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• pp.567-569
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• 2015

To response quickly rapidly changing threats, and to reduce development and operational maintenance budget, U.S. Navy has been significantly applied commercial communication equipments instead of MIL-SPEC equipments. Starting from Aegis Baseline 7 combat system, components of systems were replaced to COTS-based system, and Littoral Combat Ships(LCS) and Zumwalt class destroyers have fully COTS-based combat system. In this paper, it is surveyed and analyzed that cases of COTS-based systems were applied and is compared difference from each type of ships.

• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.44-51
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• 2016

This paper describes the operational concept of the Aegis ship's missile defense. Recently, North Korea conducted a fourth nuclear-weapon test that involved the launch of a long-range missile and the underwater launch of an SLBM. The ground-based BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) system is very limited for the SLBM of a miniaturized nuclear warhead; therefore, it is necessary to build a reliable sea-based missile-defense system. The ROK Navy has, however, only utilized the Aegis ship that is designed with a search-and-tracking sensor but is without a ballistic-missile interception capability. Given this information, this work focuses on the operational concept of the Aegis BMD by comparing the BMD capabilities of the ROK with those of the U.S.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.5-28
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• 2020

In 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State issued two reports to announce their plan to fulfill "free and open Indo-Pacific". Two reports commonly insisted on the support and participation from allies and partners to maintain security and stability in the Indo-Pacific. In response to this, neighboring states in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, Australia, India, ASEAN, and Taiwan have different perspectives and stances based on their national interests. South Korea, too, has not clearly announced its position because they need to consider the alliance between the U.S. and South Korea as well as relationships between South Korea and China. This report focuses on the stances of neighboring states to the Indo-Pacific strategy and expected pros and cons of the participation of the strategy. In addition, when considering the name of strategy, the Indo-Pacific, naval power will be a main instrument to implement the strategy. Thus, this study also investigates the role of naval power in the Indo-Pacific strategy.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.149-177
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• 2014

Today distant oceans around the world are regarded as a major 'global commons' for international trade and transportation. Korea is not an exception, because Korea hugely depends on sea lines of communication (SLOC) for supplying vital commodities such as food and energy resource. As a result, assuring a free and safe use of distant ocean beyond territory is also an important agenda for Korea's maritime security. However there are a number of challenges for Korea to enjoy a free and safe use of distant ocean; dangers of regional maritime conflict in East Asia, naval arms race of China and Japan, and concerns on possible decline of U.S naval presence and power projection capabilities. These factors provide a reasonable basis for Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) to pursue capabilities for major naval operations at distant ocean in a long-term perspective toward the year 2030. The introduction of aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered submarine is a key requirement for achieving this goal. ROKN needs to acquire a 'multi-role strategic landing platform' type of light aircraft carrier, which takes a role to escort naval task force by providing air superiority at distant ocean. Additionally nuclear-powered submarine will offer ROKN a formidable power to carry out offensive missions effectively at distant ocean.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.224-257
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• 2017

As the Trump administration withdraws the Paris Climate Agreement and shows its antipathy toward free trade, the U.S.'s soft power is most likely to weaken and its behaviors could be perceived as acts to surrender the U.S. hegemonic leadership in the world stage. Hegemonic stability theory notes that the existence of a hegemonic power contributes to international stability in the sense that it provides international public goods. A lack of the U.S's leadership in international politics, however, could be recognized as its denial of a hegemonic status. Is it intentional or accidental? The U.S's denial of hegemonic roles is the byproduct of the Trump administration's "American First" policy, not the showcase of its intention to transit hegemony to others. What is noteworthy is that China targets a niche market of hegemony as the U.S. denies its roles as the international leader. Put it another way, China attempts to ride hegemony for free when the U.S. denies its hegemonic roles accidentally. Faced with a niche market of hegemony, China has begun to accelerate its national strategy to make "Chinese Dream" come true. To that end, China promised again to keep the Paris Climate Agreement and attempts to play more active its roles in Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO), Asia Infra Investment Bank(AIIB), and "One Belt, One Road". Despite all these efforts, the U.S. is most likely to withdraw its denial of hegemony any time soon. The U.S's resumption of Freedom of Navigation Operations(FONOPs) could be a precursor of the return to a hegemonic power's willingness. In this vein, it is noteworthy that the South China Sea serves as a quasi-war zone for hegemonic conflict.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.160-191
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• 2013

This article is focused how the maritime strategy between continental powered country(the Soviet, the China) and maritime powered country(the U.S.) interact with attack and defense theory. We will know, what is the maritime strategy that the U.S. of military superiority has pursued with the point of view of attack, on the other hand, relatively what is the maritime strategy that the Soviet-Sino of military inferiority has pursued with the point of view of defense. In cold war, the Soviet has counteracted to 'blue belt defense' in active defense as to the U.S. 'sea strike' and in post cold war, the China counteract to 'A2/AD' as to the U.S. 'Air-Sea Battle'. The difference between the Soviet-Sino maritime strategy is that the China has emerged the second an economic power and their leadership has a strong's will to strengthen their navy's power. although the U.S. declare the pivot to Asia, the influence on Asia of the U.S. tend to decrease because of sequest. therefore, the China will seek to the more active defense beyond the first island chain. Meanwhile, the U.S. has reinforced of 'hub and spoke strategy' to solidify the U.S. formal allies to band together regional powers and to overcome the A2/AD challenge, the U.S. has been developed that the Air-Sea Battle concept meshes with Washington's 'rebalancing' policy toward the Asia-Pacific as its vital missions to safeguard core island or semi-island allies-namely, Korea and Japan-and crucial sea lanes of communication in the region are conducted mostly from or over the sea.

• Membrane Journal
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• v.6 no.4
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• pp.189-195
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• 1996

It is concluded from this study that human consumption of very low TDS water does not leach minerals from the body that cause ill health effects because; -The human body's own control mechanism of homeostasis and internal body secretions keep tight controls on body fluid composition regardless of drinking water TDS for a normal person under normal csonditions. -The unofficial WHO document's proposed guideline of a 100m/l lower limit for drinking water due to mineral leaching and subsequent ill health was not found to be scientifically or physiologically credible. Leaching of minerals from the body is not officially recognized by WHO. -The experience of the U.S. Navy, Army, NASA and dommunity demonstrations do not support ill health symptoms caused by consumption of low TDS drinking water. -Millions of people regularly consume maturally occurring low TDS water without symptoms of ill health.