• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.5-36
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• 2016

Recently, the Japanese government revised the three guidelines of its security policy, the National Security Strategy(NSS), the National Defense Program Outline and Midterm Defense Buildup Plan, exceptionally at one time. This means Japan has been seeking the new strategy and strengthening military power considering changing regional security environment. Moreover, Japan revised the security laws for the right to collective self-defense, which authorized the use of force even when Japan is not under attack. Also, Japan renewed the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in twenty years, and has expanded JSDF's scope of activity to a worldwide level. These changes imply Japan would constantly seek to build military forces focusing on naval forces. Because Japan's naval forces, the JMSDF is the means that allow Japan to use its force at anywhere overseas and expand its roles and missions in international society by the basis of the right to collective self-defense. This research will analyze Japan's new maritime strategy and trend of force development and eventually look for the implication on our maritime security These days, Japan has perceived Chinese rapid increase of naval power and pursuing of maritime hegemony as a grave threat. In response to this, Japan is designing new maritime strategy, which are "remote islands defense and recapture" and proactively develop a new type of naval forces to accomplish this new strategy. The Japan's "remote island defense and recapture strategy" is to harden its defensive posture in Nansei islands which correspond to China's 1st island chain for chinese A2/AD strategy and directly encounter with China and to protect its own dominium and maritime interest while supporting US national strategy in East Asia. Japan continues to build compact, multi-functional ship to accomplish "remote island defense and recapture strategy" and keep strengthening its maritime power projection capability to include build of new amphibious ship, and large, multi-functional ship which can provide effective C2. These changes imply that Japan is shifting its strategy from passive and defensive to proactive and aggressive way and continues to pursue naval buildup.The implication of Japan's new maritime strategy and naval buildup needs to be observed carefully and we need to keep developing naval power required to protect our maritime sovereignty and interest.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.261-293
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• 2017

Nuclear power is a way of attaining an enormous amount of energy with relatively small amount of resources and after it has been introduced to the submarine since 1954, there are approximately 150 of nuclear powered submarine currently on a mission around the world. This is due to the maneuverability, mountability and covertness of nuclear submarines. However, there are other tasks, not only the high level of nuclear technology that are needed to be dealt with in order to construct nuclear powered submarine. The biggest task of all is to secure the enriched uranium. Accordingly, this research is about the way of enriching and securing the nuclear fuel that are used in the nuclear submarine with the characteristics, merits and demerits of the nuclear submarine. Due to the fact that the pressurized water reactor in South Korea is the reactor that was originally built for the development of nuclear powered submarine, many parts is designed to be suitable for the submarine propulsion. However, in order to apply this to submarine it is needed to consider additional requests such as the position of reactor, accident-coping system, radioactive covering, reactor output adjustment and ship's pitch and roll in order to apply this to submarine. Nuclear submarines have much higher speed based on the powerful propulsion in comparison with diesel-electric submarine and also have bigger loading area. Besides, there is no need to snorkel and they also have advantages in covertness with the multi-noise proof system. The nuclear technology in South Korea has seen the dramatic development since 1962 and in 1998 reached to the level that we have succeeded in the localization of nuclear plant and exported the world-class one-piece small-sized reactor (SMART) to UAE. To operate these reactors, we import the whole quantity of low-enriched uranium and having our own uranium enrich facility is not probable because of the budget and international regulations. With the ROK/US nuclear agreement revised on 2015 November, the enrichment of uranium that are available without special permission has changed up to 20%. According to the assumption that we use the 20% enrichment of Uranium on U.S. virginia class submarine, it is necessary to change the fuel after 11 years and it will cause additional cost of 1 billion dollars. But the replace period by the uranium's enrichment rate is not fixed so that it is possible to change according to the design of reactor. Therefore, I would like to make a suggestion on two types of design concepts of nuclear submarine that can be operated for 30 years without nuclear fuel change by using the 20% enriched uranium from ONNp.First of all, it is possible by increasing the size of reactor by 3 times and it results in the 1,000t increase of the weight. And secondly, it is by designing the one piece reactor to insert devices such as steam turbine, condenser into the inside of nuclear core like the Rubis class submarines of France.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.242-274
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• 2015

2015년 5월 수중발사 탄도미사일(SLBM) 발사시험을 통해 북한은 전 세계의 이목을 또 다시 집중시켰다. 북한은 2013년 제3차 핵실험을 감행한 이후 최근까지도 탄도미사일과 로켓 발사 등의 무력도발을 지속해 왔다. 이와 같은 북한의 무력도발은 한반도의 안정뿐만 아니라 미국 본토의 안보에도 매우 부정적인 영향을 미치고 있다. 지금까지 미국은 북한의 핵미사일 개발 저지를 위해 경제적 또는 군사적 방안들을 선별적으로 적용해 왔다. 그러나, 이러한 미국의 노력에도 불구하고 북한은 여전히 핵미사일을 개발하겠다는 꿈을 포기하지 않고 있는 것이 사실이다. 본 논문은 북한의 핵미사일 개발에 대한 미국의 대안적 전략(Alternative Strategy)을 제시하는데 그 목적이 있다. 필자는 대안적 전략 제시에 앞서 북한의 핵과 탄도미사일 개발현황을 내용(Contents)과 맥락(Context) 차원에서 분석하고 미 오바마 행정부의 대북전략을 비판적으로 검토하였다. 그리고 대안적 전략으로 동맹국과 함께 경제적(Sticky Power), 군사적(Sharp Power) 수단의 동기화(Synchronizing)를 통해 북한이 감당하기 힘든 전략적 환경을 조성(Shaping the Strategic Environment)하는 것이 '북한의 핵개발 포기' 라는 전략목표를 달성하는 방안 임을 강조하고 있다. 미국이 대안적 전략목표를 달성하기 위해서는 경제적 수단으로 ① 북한의 자금세탁 및 위조지폐 발행국 지정, ② 북한을 지원하는 모든 해외자산에 대한 제재조치, ③ 북한의 테러지원국 재지정, ④ 북한 제재를 위한 미국의 입법추진, ⑤ 대량살상무기 관련 금수품목의 확대를 적용함과 동시에 군사적 수단으로 ① 대량살상무기 비확산 활동 강화, ② 대탄도미사일 전략 개발 및 정보(ISR: Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance) 공유, 맞춤형 억제전략(TDS: Tailored Deterrence Strategy)의 구체화 등을 통한 한·미 군사 억제방안의 강화, 그리고 ③ SM-3, THAAD(Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) 등 한·미·일 3자간 MD(Missile Defense)체제의 구축 등을 동기화하여 적용해야만 할 것이다. 미국의 대안적 전략은 ① 북한의 핵미사일 개발에 대한 중국의 협력방지, ② 한·중간 경제관계의 악화, ③ 한·일간의 역사적 긴장관계라는 위험요소를 내포하고 있는 것 또한 사실이다. 따라서 미국이 대안적 전략목표인 '북한의 비핵화' 달성을 위해서는 이와 같은 위험요소를 완화시키는 노력도 병행되어야 할 것이다. 끝으로, 미국은 북한의 김정은이 핵미사일 개발 포기라는 상이한 방향의 전략적 결정을 할 경우에 대비하여 한·미 연합훈련의 보류, 북한에 대한 경제제재조치 해제 등 북한과의 협상 가능성도 열어두고 이에 대해서도 철저하게 준비해 나가야 할 것이다.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.35 no.3
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• pp.197-204
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• 2011

The authors adopt the Unmanned Undersea Vehicle(UUV), the shape of which is like a manta. They call here it Manta UUV. Manta UUV has been designed from the similar concept of the UUV called Manta Test Vehicle(MTV), which was originally built by the Naval Undersea Warfare Center of USA(Lisiewicz and French, 2000; Simalis et al., 2001; U.S. Navy, 2004). The present study deals with the effect of Reynolds numbers on hydrodynamic forces acting on Manta UUV at large angles of attack. The large angles of attack cover the whole range of 0 to ${\pm}$ 180 degrees in horizontal plane and in vertical plane respectively. Static test at large attack angles has been carried out with two Manta UUV models in circulating water channel. The authors assume that the experimental results of hydrodynamic forces (lateral force, yaw moment, vertical force and pitch moment) are analyzed into two components, which are lift force component and cross-flow drag component. First of all, Based on two dimensional cross-flow drag coefficient at 90 degrees of attack angle, the cross-flow drag component at whole range of attack angles is calculated. Then the remainder is assumed to be the lift force component. The only cross-flow drag component is assumed to be subject to Reynolds number.entstly the authors suggest the methodology to predict hydrodynamic derivertives acting on the full-scale Manta UUV.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.236-261
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• 2014

The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.