Purpose - This paper aims to test the effects of Korean food service franchisors' and franchisees' TSI (Transaction Specific Investment) on dependence and trust toward the franchisor and re-contract intention. The study examines the effects of both franchisors' and franchisees' TSI on dependence and trust, as compared with Ganesan (1994). Research design, data, and methodology - Data were collected from 495 Korean food service franchisees and analyzed with structural equation modeling using path analysis through SPSS 18.0 and AMOS 18.0. Results - 1) The franchisor's TSI has positive effects on the franchisee's dependence and trust toward the franchisor. 2) The franchisee's TSI has a positive effect on the franchisee's dependence toward the franchisor. 3) The franchisee's dependence and trust have positive effects on commitment. 4) The franchisee's dependence, trust, and commitment have a positive effect on re-contract intention. Conclusions - The franchisor's and franchisee's TSI affect the franchisee's dependence and trust toward the franchisor. The franchisee's dependence and trust influence commitment and re-contract intention. This has managerial implications for franchisors striving to raise franchisees' re-contract intention.
It seems essential to examine the factors that may affect relationship commitment of subcontractors to parent companies in the industrial market in Korea in an effort to construct a win-win-type cooperative network among them. Lots of studies have been focusing on the consumer goods market. Relatively few studies have been focused on industrial market. In the industrial goods market subcontractors used to sell their parts or services only to a small number of parent companies in a large quantity, resulting in decisive control of subcontractors over the quality of parent companies' finished goods. This is why relationship between subcontractors and parent companies is extremely important. From this viewpoint, this study aims to survey and analyze empirically the paths leading to relationship commitment of subcontractors toward the parent companies which are required to incite them to build up a collaborative network by means of subcontractors' entrepreneurship. For this aim, market orientation effects of entrepreneurship as well as factors of performance and trust are particularly set forth as the bases of developing hypotheses in this study in order to explore the paths from entrepreneurship to relationship commitment as follows. First, the path of entrepreneurship-market orientation-communication-trust- relationship commitment; second, the path of entrepreneurship-market orientation-performance-relationship commitment; third, the path of entrepreneurship-market orientation-transaction specific asset investment -trust-relationship commitment; and fourth, the path in which the entrepreneurship is expected to promote direct transaction specific asset investment by parent companies to induce their trust and, eventually, relationship commitment of subcontractors. The outcomes of the empirical analysis in this study may be summed up as follows: First, the conclusions of preceding studies are also supported here by the fact that the entrepreneurship of subcontractors promotes their market orientation (hypothesis 9), indicating that the entrepreneurship can facilitate collection, proliferation of and response to market informations. On the contrary, however, the assumption that the entrepreneurship of subcontractors might directly accelerate transaction specific asset investment by parent companies (hypothesis 8) is rejected. Second, although the influence of subcontractors' entrepreneurship on parent companies' investment of assets peculiar to their transactions is not affirmed, the assumption is found to be supported that subcontractors' market orientation would expedite the parent companies' investment of assets peculiar to their transactions. Moreover, it is also confirmed that parent companies' investment of assets peculiar to transactions would promote subcontractors' trust toward the parent companies (hypothesis 6), signifying that parent companies may level up their trust in subcontractors when they make great amount of efforts to invest in the assets peculiar to transactions, not behaving opportunistically, Third, the hypotheses 4 and 5 also turn out to be supported by the analysis as the former assumes that market orientation could promote communication and the latter relates that the communication between subcontractors and parent companies would prompt trust, both results in affirming that market orientation could introduce open communication to speed up sharing of information and that sharing of information by way of communication might give an impetus to trust. Fourth, the assumption that subcontractors' market orientation would expedite performance (hypothesis 3) is also proved favorably to the significant level equivalent to that of preceding studies. Fifth, same as preceding studies, it is also verified in this study that the benefit (outcomes) awarded by parent companies to subcontractors will be a direct cause exercising a positive impact upon relationship commitment(hypothesis 2) and that the trust of subcontractors toward parent companies may have affirmative influence on the relationship commitment(hypothesis 1). Overall, the first, second and third paths are identified as being supported by the hypotheses among constituent factors, while the fourth path is deemed meaningless since it is shown that the entrepreneurship exercises no effects on parent companies' investment in the assets peculiar to transactions.
A review of shows that past research has focused predominately on foreign market entry strategy issues in relatively well-established firms. These studies have either ignored venture firms or have failed to treat these firms separately. Only recently, researchers have broadened their search to include aspects of the foreign market investment of the venture. The purposes of this study are to identify and explain the impact factors such as ownership specific advantage, transaction cost, and location specific advantage on the choice of foreign market entry strategy for venture firms. To find the perceived the foreign market entry strategy and determinant factors, 130 venture CEOs from the computer and communications equipment industries were asked to describe their venture's foreign market entry strategy through 17 questionnaire items on competitive method. Using factor analysis, the six determinant factors were categorized. To test the relationships between the foreign market entry strategy and factors such as ownership specific advantage, transaction cost, and location specific advantage, the data collected by questionnaire from 92 ventures. The main results of this research are as follows. First, the factors of ownership specific advantage have partially significant impact on the foreign market entry strategy of venture firms, Second, the factors of transaction cost have significant impact on their foreign market entry strategy. Third, the factors of location specific advantage have significant impact on their foreign market entry strategy. This study has produced evidence to demonstrate that the foreign market entry strategy profile of venture firms can be distinguished from those of relatively well-established firms. An expanded study would allow for stronger conclusions regarding the relative explanatory power of individual variables in the method. Additional research is also needed to examine other determinant variables connecting foreign market entry strategy.
This study aims to provide distributors with several implications on the channel strategy by testing factors which influence on the offsetting investment. Medium-sized distributor facing a relatively inferior power can cause profit vulnerability from large manufacurer's opportunistic behaviors. At the same time, we tested the relationship commitment to the relation with manufacturer as another alternative strategy taken by medium-sized distributer. For this research, samples from dealers in oil-petroleum refinery industry were selected and the data was collected using mail survey. The data was analyzed utilizing validity test, reliability test, factor analysis, correlation analysis and LISREL. The major analyzed results are as follows: First, the offsetting investment of preventing loss from manufacturer's opportunism didn't affect medium-sized distributor's sales empirically. Second, the hypothesis that the more the medium-sized distributor's transaction specific assets which they invest in the transactional relationship with manufacturer, the more the safeguard against the expected opportunism of manufacturer was not supported by the results. Third, the more use of coercive power by the manufacturer, the more increase in the perception of expected opportunism of manufacturer by the medium-sized distributor, it make stimulates offsetting investment as safeguard by medium-sized distributor and it has negative effect on developing commitment. Finally, the large manufactures dealing with a medium-sized distributor firm which had a reputation of fairness didn't make offsetting investment as a response for distributor's opportunism.
This paper undertakes a conceptual review of transaction cost to broaden the understanding of the transaction cost analysis (TCA) approach. More than 40 years have passed since Coase's fundamental insight that transaction, coordination, and contracting costs must be considered explicitly in explaining the extent of vertical integration. Coase (1937) forced economists to identify previously neglected constraints on the trading process to foster efficient intrafirm, rather than interfirm, transactions. The transaction cost approach to economic organization study regards transactions as the basic units of analysis and holds that understanding transaction cost economy is central to organizational study. The approach applies to determining efficient boundaries, as between firms and markets, and to internal transaction organization, including employment relations design. TCA, developed principally by Oliver Williamson (1975,1979,1981a) blends institutional economics, organizational theory, and contract law. Further progress in transaction costs research awaits the identification of critical dimensions in which transaction costs differ and an examination of the economizing properties of alternative institutional modes for organizing transactions. The crucial investment distinction is: To what degree are transaction-specific (non-marketable) expenses incurred? Unspecialized items pose few hazards, since buyers can turn toalternative sources, and suppliers can sell output intended for one order to other buyers. Non-marketability problems arise when specific parties' identities have important cost-bearing consequences. Transactions of this kind are labeled idiosyncratic. The summarized results of the review are as follows. First, firms' distribution decisions often prompt examination of the make-or-buy question: Should a marketing activity be performed within the organization by company employees or contracted to an external agent? Second, manufacturers introducing an industrial product to a foreign market face a difficult decision. Should the product be marketed primarily by captive agents (the company sales force and distribution division) or independent intermediaries (outside sales agents and distribution)? Third, the authors develop a theoretical extension to the basic transaction cost model by combining insights from various theories with the TCA approach. Fourth, other such extensions are likely required for the general model to be applied to different channel situations. It is naive to assume the basic model appliesacross markedly different channel contexts without modifications and extensions. Although this study contributes to scholastic research, it is limited by several factors. First, the theoretical perspective of TCA has attracted considerable recent interest in the area of marketing channels. The analysis aims to match the properties of efficient governance structures with the attributes of the transaction. Second, empirical evidence about TCA's basic propositions is sketchy. Apart from Anderson's (1985) study of the vertical integration of the selling function and John's (1984) study of opportunism by franchised dealers, virtually no marketing studies involving the constructs implicated in the analysis have been reported. We hope, therefore, that further research will clarify distinctions between the different aspects of specific assets. Another important line of future research is the integration of efficiency-oriented TCA with organizational approaches that emphasize specific assets' conceptual definition and industry structure. Finally, research of transaction costs, uncertainty, opportunism, and switching costs is critical to future study.
Researchers in channel dyads have devoted much attention to relationship between interdependence (i.e. interdependence enymmetry and total interdependence) and conflict that promote channel performance. In social science, in spite of the inconsistent results in marketing practice, there are two contradictory theories explain the relationship between interdependence and conflict - bilateral deterrence theory and conflict spiral theory. The authors apply these theories to co-marketing alliance situation in terms that this relationship is also incorporated both company's dependence, either from one company's perspective or each partner about its respective dependence. Using survey data and archival data from 181 companies enlisted in a telecommunication membership program, the authors find out the relationship between interdependence and conflict as well as investigate the antecedents of interdependence - transaction age, transaction frequency, the numbers of alliance partner, and co-marketing alliance specific assets according to previous researches. Using PLS analysis, the authors demonstrate that, with increasing total interdependence in a telecommunication membership program, two co-marketing partners' conflict level is increased in accord with the author's conflict spiral theory predictions. As expected, higher interdependence asymmetry has negative value to level of conflict even though this result is not statistically significant. Other findings can be summarized as follows. In the perspective of telecommunication company, transaction age, transaction frequency, and co-marketing alliance specific assets have influence on its dependence on a partner as independent variables. To the contrary, in a partner's perspective, transaction frequency, co-marketing alliance specific assets and the numbers of alliance partner have significantly impact on its dependence on a telecommunication company. In direct effect analysis, it is shown that transaction age, frequency and co-marketing alliance specific assets have direct influence on conflict. This results suggest that it is more useful for a telecommunication company to select a co-marketing partner which is frequently used by customers and earned high rates of mileage. In addition, the results show that dependence of a telecommunication company on a co-marketing partner is more significantly effected to co-marketing alliance conflict than partner's one. It provide an effective conflict management strategy to a telecommunication company for controling customer's usage rate or having the co-marketing partner deposit high level of alliance specific investment (i.e. mileage). To a co-marketing partner of telecommunication company, it is required control the percentage of co-marketing sales in total sales revenue or seek various co-marketing partners in order for co-marketing conflict management. The research implications, limitation and future research of these results are discussed.
The purpose of this study is to investigate determinants of partner opportunism in Korean discount store distribution channels. In addition, this study also try to examine moderating role of relational learning in the relationship. This study deals with transaction specific investment asymmetry, mutual hostages, payoff inequity, cultural diversity, and goal incompatibilities as determinants of partner opportunism. For empirical testing, 293 respondents of suppliers of discount store in Korea were surveyed and the analysis utilizing partial least square model indicated that TSI asymmetry, payoff inequity, and goal incompatibilities had positive effects on partner opportunism. On the other hand, mutual hostages had negative effect on partner opportunism. In addition, relational learning had moderating effect on the relationship between TSI asymmetry, mutual hostages, and payoff inequity and partner opportunism.
With enormous changes in market condition, firms try to collaborate with their transaction partners. Recently, the diffusion of the Internet has made it possible for firms to directly collaborate with their partners. Accordingly, the importance of the Collaborative Commerce( C-Commerce) based on the Internet and IT has been emphasized. The literature in relational marketing and strategic alliance, however, has focused on the relational characteristics among firms. Therefore, the fundamental objective of this study is to investigate whether C-Commerce can enhance the positive relationships among firms. Based on theoretical and empirical research, some meaningful discussions can be made. First. the asymmetric commitment between buyers and suppliers decreases the C-Commerce utilization. Second, when specific investment is made to facilitate transactions, firms try to trade efficiently and depend on partners in a long-term period.
This study investigates the effects of relationship characteristics on the adoption of online distribution channels in Korea. A questionnaire survey of 81 domestic manufacturing companies revealed that relationship characteristics have no effects on the range of products sold through online channels. In terms of functional usage, manufactures' dependence and their perceptions of middlemen's opportunism were found to affect the extent of adoption of online channels. Overall, these two variables were significantly related to such functions as delivery, refunding, and A/S that have been traditionally considered efficient when implemented by the middlemen. None of the relationship characteristics was found significantly related to the adoption of online channels as a tool of information provision. The authors discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the findings.
The ownership structure of a franchise system is determined by the franchisor's strategic choice. A close look at the extant theories and perspectives in economics and management such as resource scarcity theory, agency theory, transaction cost analysis, and mixed ownership theory reveals that firms choose their ownership structure for the sake of economic efficiency, profit potentials, the chance of survival, and other strategic concerns. The present study, on the basis of strategic choice perspective, reviews the divergent theories of a franchise system's ownership structure and its determinants, thus providing a theoretical framework for comparing the contradictory arguments along the several critical dimensions. We also developed and tested the conflicting hypotheses regarding key determinants of ownership structure including firm's age, size, transaction-specific investments, uncertainty, and risk-sharing propensity. Using a FDD (Franchise Disclosure Document) data set of 543 Korean franchisors, we found that the years in business, the total number of employees, days of training, the inverse of the years of franchising, and the requirement of royalty payment have positive relationships with the proportion of company-owned outlets to total number of outlets. On the other hand, the proportion of company-owned outlets was found to have negative relationships with the total number of outlets and the extent of geographic dispersion of outlets, but to have no significant relationships with the initial investment required and the inverse of contract length. Based on the findings, we provide several theoretical and managerial implications for studying ownership structure of franchise systems.
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