• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.69-96
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• 2017

Wittgenstein criticizes explicitly Russell's theory of types and, in particular, his axiom of reducibility in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. What, then, is the point of Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell's theory of types? As a preliminary study to answer this question, I will examine how Wittgenstein criticized Russell's axiom of reducibility. Wittgenstein declares that Russell's axiom of reducibility is not a logical proposition, that if it is true it will be so mere by a happy chance and that "we can imagine a world in which the axiom of reducibility is not valid." What, then, is the ground for that? I will endeavor to show that by explicating the ideas of Wittgenstein's 1913 letter to Russell, those ideas decisively influenced on Ramsey's and Waismann's model which intended to show that the axiom of reducibility is not valid.

• Asian review of World Histories
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.37-58
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• 2015

The paper examines, in the light of current historiography, the recent trends in the application and applicability of the World Historical studies on the Indian Ocean scenario. Calling for the combination of the breadth of the World Historical studies with the analysis of a historical scenario in its specific spatio-temporal context-instead of a synchronic approach-the present study takes a close look at commerce and politics in the western Indian Ocean in the light of an early 14th century Latin Crusade tract, How to Defeat the Saracens by William of Adam (Guillelmus Ade, Tractatus quomodo Sarraceni sunt expugnandi), a Dominican friar. The text offers remarkable insights into the interlocking of the Indian Ocean and the South Asian subcontinent with the Mamluk Sultanate, the Ilkhanid realm and the Crusades. The paper argues for what is now termed as braided and connected histories.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.147-157
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• 2001

In this study I try to show some numerical analogy between Leibniz's binary system anc I-ching's symbolic system of duo rerum principia, imagines quator, octo figurae am 64 hexagrams. But, there is really a formal logical accordance in their symbolic foundations, on which are based especially the Wittgenstein's 16 truth-tables in his Tractatus-logico-philosophicus(5.101) am 16 hexagrams, as long as we interpret with the binary values 0 am 1, i.e. the Bi-Polarity, the logical tradition from J. Boole, G. Frege through B. Russell and AN. Whitehead to R. Wittgenstein. So, I argue that the historical and theoretical root of that tradition goes back to the debate between Bouvet and Leibniz about the mathematical structure of I-ching' symbols and the Leibnizian binary arithmetic. In the letter on 4. 11. 1701 from Peking to Leibniz, Bouvet wrote that the I-Ching's symbolism has an analogous structure with Leibniz's binary arithmetic. Corresponding to his suggestion, but without exact knowledge, in the letter of 2. January 1967 to the duke August in Braunschweig-Lueneburg-Wolfenbuettel had Leibniz shown already an original idea for the creation of the world with imago Dei which comes from binary progression, dark and light on water.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.309-346
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• 2013

This paper deals with the problem, which logic of language and which metaphysics Wittgenstein suggests in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus. I will ultimately show how he bases the metaphysics on the logic of language. The logic of language by which Wittgenstein sets the limit to the language 'in the language' is the logical syntax of the language. And Wittgenstein extends the idea of the logical syntax to the understanding the nature of the world, i.e. to the metaphysics. The logical form the language(proposition) must have is the form of the world(or the nature of the world), and it can be determined only together with the logical syntax of the language. But what is the logical form(form of the world) 'cannot be said', since the proposition saying it is devoid of 'sense' and 'says nothing'. Therefore Wittgenstein expresses that the logical form(form of the world) 'can only be shown' in the proposition that has sense. The Metaphysics Wittgenstein wants to base on the logic of language(the logical syntax) must be mystical.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.347-380
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• 2013

In this paper I will try to show how Wittgenstein criticized Frege's theory of meaning. Frege's theory of meaning can be compressed as sense-reference theory. Frege distinguishes between sense and reference on all the linguistic expressions. In particular, he regards that a sentence has sense and reference. This distinction was raised from, so to speak, the problem of identity sentences. Wittgenstein's "fundamental thought" of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the key of his direct criticism of Frege's sense-reference theory. That is, it is an attack on Frege's thought that the reference of a sentence is a truth value and truth values are "objects themselves" (in Frege's meaning). According to Wittgenstein, such an object does not exist and according to his picture theory, the function of a name and that of a proposition are fundamentally different. By the way, Frege can reply justly to this criticism that it is insufficient. In short, Frege's 'sense' and 'reference' etc, are the technical terms. Hence Wittgenstein's decisive criticism of Frege's theory consists in accusing his theory of logical flaws. There is an another route to the sense and reference of a sentence which Frege introduces. In discourses of judgement stroke and content stroke in his Begriffsshrift and in those of horizontal stroke since his "Function and Concept", Frege deals with the sense and reference of a sentence. Wittgenstein criticize that the sense of a complex sentence such as ~p would by no means be determined by Frege's determination.