We tried to establish the history of outbreaks and control methods of 'hwangchung' in Joseon Dynasty, uncovering the biological reality of the 'hwangchung' (called hwang or bihwang) analyzed through the Database program on 'the Annals of the Joseon Dynasty' and 'the Emollment of Haegoeje', two of the finest examples of classical historical records. The total number of articles on the outbreak of the hwangchung is 261 in the Annals of the Joseon Dynasty and 65 in the Emollment of Haegoeje. There were four peaks by hwangchung throughout the Joseon Era. Among them, the periods of King Taejo to King Sejong had the highest incidence. By comparing the number of records of the hwangchung from the Annals of the Joseon Dynasty with that in the Emollment of Haegoeje during the same period, results show the former was less than the latter, 35 vs 65. However, both records were relatively inconsistent with each other. Insect pests in forests as well as in agriculture were included in the biological identities of the hwangchung in the Joseon Dynasty periods, which is in accordance with those of Saigo's. The taxonomic identity could be confirmed in only 25 cases (9.5%) among the articles on hwangchung. It largely coincided with Paik's opinion: II in armyworm, nine in moth larva, one in rice stem borer, two in migratory locust, one in planthopper and one in rice-plant weevil. Therefore, it is not reasonable to regard hwangchung as a migratory locust or grasshopper only. The number of reports on the occurrence of hwangchung in the Annals of the Joseon Dynasty was 173 (66% of the total) and 47% of them were just simple reports, which means the report itself on the appearance of hwangchung was very significant. The reports on controlling insect pests were of low frequency, in 20% (34 cases) of the total reports, capturing insect pests or holding traditional ceremony called 'Poje'. Among them, only one case related to the treatment of seeds to prevent the damage by hwangchung was published in the King Sejong period. There were 37 discussions about changes and management of government policies due to disasters by hwangchung. They were mostly about relief or tax cut to the people who suffered damage and about cancellation of recruiting people to military training, constructing castles, and so on. It seems that not only the people but also the king was influenced by the hwangchung. In the case of King Seongjong, he referred to the stress of the prevention measure of locusts in 10 articles. The damage also had an effect on abdication in the reign of King Jeongjong.
This case study was conducted by verification the site characteristics based on the questionnaire and interview obtained from the all factories located at No. 1 developing area in Kumi industrial complex. The site characteristics were presumed from the process of location behavior and spatial linkage. Kumi industrial complex was developed to improve export industry at national levels by providing chief land price and benefiting various tax. Kumi industrial complex which enticed many factories is playing an important role in export industry in Korea. At beginning, the detention of large enterprises promoted the establishment of related small to medium sized factories into the complex. Two distinctive industries. textile and electronic, were reflected by the purpose to establish the complex and industrial characteristics of Taegu city. respectively. In Kumi industrial complex, positive responses on traffic and raw material supply and negative reactions on the environmental impact on social community as well as high labor charge were investigated. Especially the higher labor cost prevented to hire laborers effectively. In the linkages of spatial and raw material, most factories in the complex depended on the availability of out side the Kumi city. For the textile factories, the supply of raw material and parts were relied on Taegu and/or other cities, whereas in electronic factories purchased them mainly from other cities and partly from abroad. Although questionnaire and interview suggested it, most of the parts were supplied by a parts maturing companies on the complex to a few large enterprises. In the marketing linkage, textile factories revealed higher relation-ship with the foreign countries and sewing factories in Korea. On the other hand, electronic factories have strong relation-ships in the marketing linkage to the parts supplying companies in the complex or large-scale resembling companies in other cities. In the textile companies, the right for decision on purchasing raw materials and parts is belonging to the owner whereas mother enterprise usually have the right for the marketing. In the case of the electronic factories, all the purchasing activities are related to the sub-contracting companies. In the service linkage, the Quality of the service created spatial distinction. There was high linkages on inside of Kumi complex for the low grade services such as repairing and installing machines, whereas strong linkages on outside of the complex for the high grade services such as management, law, taxation, new product development. and manufacturing technology. In the linkages of activity on the R&D (research and development), electronic factories do not have sufficiently qualified institutes in the complex. Strong regional linkages in the field of textile and electronic industries revealed limitations of the local industrial complex. In the sub-contracting linkage, high linkage ship within Kumi boundary reflected the characteristics of industrial site in the complex. There, most decisions by the companies centered by the mother enterprise.
This paper analyzes Cuba's market-oriented reforms to alleviate essential problems with socialist countries such as soft budget constraints and incentive problems. It also discuss about effectiveness of industrial policy as a development strategy. The soft budget constraints and incentive problems resulted in the collapse of Soviet bloc and COMECON in early 1990s. After the collapse, Cuban economy suffered a steep dive, and national income tumbling down rapidly. Cuban faced serious shortages of food, gasoline, and other basic necessities of life. To halt and partially reverse economic downturn and dire austerity in the 1990's, the Cuban government made some partial reforms to the inherited Soviet system of cental planningand faced severe shortage in food, energy, and daily necessities. In response to the economic crisis. Cuba introduced economic reforms and implemented industrial policy as a development strategy as long as Cuba maintained a strong socialist country. Cuban government established the economic free zone law and attempted to induce foreign direct investment by implementing export-led industrial policy. Fiedel Castro approved the Law No. 165 "Free Zones and Industrial Parks", in 1996. However, Cuba's ESZ strategy seems to have failed because of the U.S. sanctions, but also because of Cuba's own policies, which do not allow foreign investors to hire workers directly and impose a high implicit tax on wages. By limiting advanced techniques of personnel and organization management, indirect employment can result in lowering work efforts and productivity of workers, and aggravating production efficiency in the ESZs. Another reason to fail comes from the double wage structure due to the double monetary-exchange rate system. Most of the high non-wage costs result from the double exchange rate system. Due to Cuba's imbalanced industry and production structures, concentrated labor force, and urbanization and centralization of agriculture production, the industrial transformation development model suggested by Lewis has not been successful unlike other Asian agriculture-led development model. Cuba has to overcome many difficulties in implementing industrial policy as a development strategy.
Market liberalization progressing simultaneously with high and rapidly rising domestic wages has created an adverse business environment for domestic firms. Korean firms are losing their international competitiveness in comparison to firms from LDC(Less Developed Countries) in low-tech industries. In high-tech industries, domestic firms without government protection (which is impossible due to the liberalization policy and the current international status of the Korean economy) are in a disadvantaged position relative to firms from advanced countries. This paper examines the division of roles between the private sector and the government in order to achieve a successful structural adjustment, which has become the impending industrial policy issue caused by high domestic wages, on the one hand, and the opening of domestic markets, on the other. The micro foundation of the economy-wide structural adjustment is actually the restructuring of business portfolios at the firm level. The firm-level business restructuring means that firms in low-value-added businesses or with declining market niches establish new major businesses in higher value-added segments or growing market niches. The adjustment of the business structure at the firm level can only be accomplished by accumulating firm-specific managerial assets necessary to establish a new business structure. This can be done through learning-by-doing in the whole system of management, including research and development, manufacturing, and marketing. Therefore, the voluntary cooperation among the people in the company is essential for making the cost of the learning process lower than that at the competing companies. Hence, firms that attempt to restructure their major businesses need to induce corporate-wide participation through innovations in organization and management, encourage innovative corporate culture, and maintain cooperative labor unions. Policy discussions on structural adjustments usually regard firms as a black box behind a few macro variables. But in reality, firm activities are not flows of materials but relationships among human resources. The growth potential of companies are embodied in the human resources of the firm; the balance of interest among stockholders, managers, and workers of the company' brings the accumulation of the company's core competencies. Therefore, policymakers and economists shoud change their old concept of the firm as a technological black box which produces a marketable commodities. Firms should be regarded as coalitions of interest groups such as stockholders, managers, and workers. Consequently the discussion on the structural adjustment both at the macroeconomic level and the firm level should be based on this new paradigm of understanding firms. The government's role in reducing the cost of structural adjustment and supporting should the creation of new industries emphasize the following: First, government must promote the competition in domestic markets by revising laws related to antitrust policy, bankruptcy, and the promotion of small and medium-sized companies. General consensus on the limitations of government intervention and the merit of deregulation should be sought among policymakers and people in the business world. In the age of internationalization, nation-specific competitive advantages cannot be exclusively in favor of domestic firms. The international competitiveness of a domestic firm derives from the firm-specific core competencies which can be accumulated by internal investment and organization of the firm. Second, government must build up a solid infrastructure of production factors including capital, technology, manpower, and information. Structural adjustment often entails bankruptcies and partial waste of resources. However, it is desirable for the government not to try to sustain marginal businesses, but to support the diversification or restructuring of businesses by assisting in factor creation. Institutional support for venture businesses needs to be improved, especially in the financing system since many investment projects in venture businesses are highly risky, even though they are very promising. The proportion of low-value added production processes and declining industries should be reduced by promoting foreign direct investment and factory automation. Moreover, one cannot over-emphasize the importance of future-oriented labor policies to be based on the new paradigm of understanding firm activities. The old laws and instititutions related to labor unions need to be reformed. Third, government must improve the regimes related to money, banking, and the tax system to change business practices dependent on government protection or undesirable in view of the evolution of the Korean economy as a whole. To prevent rational business decisions from contradicting to the interest of the economy as a whole, government should influence the business environment, not the business itself.
I test the hypothesis that the gradual diffusion of information across asset markets leads to cross-asset return predictability in Korea. Using thirty-six industry portfolios and the broad market index as our test assets, I establish several key results. First, a number of industries such as semiconductor, electronics, metal, and petroleum lead the stock market by up to one month. In contrast, the market, which is widely followed, only leads a few industries. Importantly, an industry's ability to lead the market is correlated with its propensity to forecast various indicators of economic activity such as industrial production growth. Consistent with our hypothesis, these findings indicate that the market reacts with a delay to information in industry returns about its fundamentals because information diffuses only gradually across asset markets. Traditional theories of asset pricing assume that investors have unlimited information-processing capacity. However, this assumption does not hold for many traders, even the most sophisticated ones. Many economists recognize that investors are better characterized as being only boundedly rational(see Shiller(2000), Sims(2201)). Even from casual observation, few traders can pay attention to all sources of information much less understand their impact on the prices of assets that they trade. Indeed, a large literature in psychology documents the extent to which even attention is a precious cognitive resource(see, eg., Kahneman(1973), Nisbett and Ross(1980), Fiske and Taylor(1991)). A number of papers have explored the implications of limited information- processing capacity for asset prices. I will review this literature in Section II. For instance, Merton(1987) develops a static model of multiple stocks in which investors only have information about a limited number of stocks and only trade those that they have information about. Related models of limited market participation include brennan(1975) and Allen and Gale(1994). As a result, stocks that are less recognized by investors have a smaller investor base(neglected stocks) and trade at a greater discount because of limited risk sharing. More recently, Hong and Stein(1999) develop a dynamic model of a single asset in which information gradually diffuses across the investment public and investors are unable to perform the rational expectations trick of extracting information from prices. Hong and Stein(1999). My hypothesis is that the gradual diffusion of information across asset markets leads to cross-asset return predictability. This hypothesis relies on two key assumptions. The first is that valuable information that originates in one asset reaches investors in other markets only with a lag, i.e. news travels slowly across markets. The second assumption is that because of limited information-processing capacity, many (though not necessarily all) investors may not pay attention or be able to extract the information from the asset prices of markets that they do not participate in. These two assumptions taken together leads to cross-asset return predictability. My hypothesis would appear to be a very plausible one for a few reasons. To begin with, as pointed out by Merton(1987) and the subsequent literature on segmented markets and limited market participation, few investors trade all assets. Put another way, limited participation is a pervasive feature of financial markets. Indeed, even among equity money managers, there is specialization along industries such as sector or market timing funds. Some reasons for this limited market participation include tax, regulatory or liquidity constraints. More plausibly, investors have to specialize because they have their hands full trying to understand the markets that they do participate in
The study was made to give some helpful information for policy-making on ornamental tree cultivation by doing a survey on general situations, management analysis, and future prospects of the ornamental tree growing. The study was carried out through literature studies related to the subject, questionaire surveys, and on-the-spot investigation. The questionaire surveys could be divided into two parts: pre-questionaire survey and main-questionaire survey. In the pre-questionaire survey, the researchers intended to identify the total number of ornamental tree growers, cultivation areas in size and their locations. The questionaires were sent to each town and county administration authorities, forest cooperatives, and related organizations through-out the nation. The main-questionaires were prepared for detailed study and the questionaires were sent to 200 tree growers selected by option by taking considerations of the number of tree growers and the size of cultivating areas in regions. The main findings and some information obtained in the survey were as follows: 1. The total land for ornamental tree growing was amounted to 1,873.02 hectares and the number of cultivators was totaled to 2,717. 2. The main occupations of the ornamental tree growers were found in horticulture (41.9%), agronomy (25.9%), officialdom (11.3%), animal husbandry (6.5%), business circle(4.8%), and forestry (3.2%) in sequence. 3. The ornamental trees were cultivated mostly upperland (54.8), forest land (19.4%), rice paddy (11.3%) and others. 4. The educational training of the tree growers seemed quite high. The results of the survey indicated that a large number of tree growers was occupied by college graduates (38.7%), and then high school graduates (34.7%), middle school graduates (12.9%) in order. 5. The tree farming was undertaken as a side-job (41.9%) rather than main-job (23.4%), but a few of respondents rated as subsidiary-job (18.6%). 6. The management status classified by the rate of hired labors used was likely to belong to three categories: independant enterprise management (41.9%); half independant management (31.5%); and self-management (32.4%). 7. The majority of the tree growers sold their products to the consumers through middle-man channel (48.4%), or directly to the house-holder and detailers (13.7%), but a few of the respondents answered that they disposed of their products by bidding (11.2%) or by direct selling to the contractors (4.8%). 8. The channel cf marketing seemed somewhat complicated. The results of the survey were as: (1) producers
The US supports the Information and Communication (IC) industry as a strategic one to wield a complete power over the World Market. However, several other countries are also eager to have the support for the IC industry because the industry produces a high added value and has a significant effect on other industries. Korea is not an exception. Korea recently succeeded in the commercialization of CDMA for the first time in the world, after the successful development of TDX. Hence, it is highly likely to get tracked by the US. Although the IC industry is a specific sector of IT, there is a concern that there might be a trade friction between the US and Korea due to a possible competition. It will be very important to prepare a solution in advance so that Korea could prevent the friction and at the same time increase its share domestically and globally. It will be our important task to solve the problem with the minimum cost if the conflict arises unfortunately in the IT area. The parties that have a strong influence on the US trade policy are the think tank group and the IT-related interest group. Therefore, it would be important to have a close relationship with them. We found some implications by analyzing the case of Japan, which has experienced trade frictions with the US over the long period of time in the high tech industry. In order to get rid of those conflicts with the US, the Japanese did the following things : (1) The Japanese government developed supporting theories and also resorted to international support so that the world could support the Japanese theories. (2) Through continual dialogue with the US business people, the Japanese business people sought after solutions to share profits among the Japanese and the US both in the domestic and in the worldwide markets. They focused on lobbying activities to influence the US public opinion to support the Japanese. The specific implementation plan was first to open culture lobby toward opinion leaders who were leaders about the US opinion. The institution, Japan Society, were formed to deliver a high quality lobbying activities. The second plan is economic lobby. They have established Japanese Economic Institute at Washington. They provide information about Japan regularly or irregularly to the US government, research institution, universities, etc., that are interested in Japan. The main objective behind these activities though is to advertise the validity of Japanese policy. Japanese top executives, practical interest groups on international trade, are trying to justify their position by direct contact with the US policy makers. The third one is political lobby. Japan is very careful about this political lobby. It is doing its best not to give impression that Japan is trying to shape the US policy making. It is collecting a vast amount of information to make a correct judgment on situation. It is not tilted toward one political party or the other, and is rather developing a long-term network of people who understand and support the Japanese policy. The following implications were drawn from the experience of Japan. First, the Korean government should develop a long-term plan and execute it to improve the Korean image perceived by American people. Second, the Korean government should begin public relation activities toward the US elite group. It is inevitable to make an effort to advertise Korea to this elite group because this group leads public opinion in the USA. Third, the Korean government needs the development of a relevant policy to elevate the positive atmosphere for advertising toward the US. For example, we need information about to whom and how to about lobbying activities, personnel network who immediately respond to wrong articles about Korea in the US press, and lastly the most recent data bank of Korean support group inside the USA. Fourth, the Korean government should create an atmosphere to facilitate the advertising toward the US. Examples include provision of incentives in tax on the expenses for the advertising toward the US and provision of rewards to those who significantly contribute to the advertising activities. Fifth, the Korean government should perform the role of a bridge between Korean and the US business people. Sixth, the government should promptly analyze the policy of IT industry, a strategic area, and timely distribute information to industries in Korea. Since the Korean government is the only institution that has formal contact with the US government, it is highly likely to provide information of a high quality. The followings are some implications for business institutions. First, Korean business organization should carefully analyze and observe the business policy and managerial conditions of US companies. It is very important to do so because all the trade frictions arise at the business level. Second, it is also very important that the top management of Korean firms contact the opinion leaders of the US. Third, it is critically needed that Korean business people sent to the USA do their part for PR activities. Fourth, it is very important to advertise to American employees in Korean companies. If we cannot convince our American employees, it would be a lot harder to convince regular American. Therefore, it is very important to make the American employees the support group for Korean ways. Fifth, it should try to get much information as early as possible about the US firms policy in the IT area. It should give an enormous effort on early collection of information because by doing so it has more time to respond. Sixth, it should research on the PR cases of foreign enterprise or non-American companies inside the USA. The research needs to identify the success factors and the failure factors. Finally, the business firm will get more valuable information if it analyzes and responds to, according to each medium.
Recently, the global insurance industry is rapidly developing digital transformation through the use of artificial intelligence technologies such as machine learning, natural language processing, and deep learning. As a result, more and more foreign insurers have achieved the success of artificial intelligence technology-based InsurTech and platform business, and Ping An Insurance Group Ltd., China's largest private company, is leading China's global fourth industrial revolution with remarkable achievements in InsurTech and Digital Platform as a result of its constant innovation, using 'finance and technology' and 'finance and ecosystem' as keywords for companies. In response, this study analyzed the InsurTech and platform business activities of Ping An Insurance Group Ltd. through the ser-M analysis model to provide strategic implications for revitalizing AI technology-based businesses of domestic insurers. The ser-M analysis model has been studied so that the vision and leadership of the CEO, the historical environment of the enterprise, the utilization of various resources, and the unique mechanism relationships can be interpreted in an integrated manner as a frame that can be interpreted in terms of the subject, environment, resource and mechanism. As a result of the case analysis, Ping An Insurance Group Ltd. has achieved cost reduction and customer service development by digitally innovating its entire business area such as sales, underwriting, claims, and loan service by utilizing core artificial intelligence technologies such as facial, voice, and facial expression recognition. In addition, "online data in China" and "the vast offline data and insights accumulated by the company" were combined with new technologies such as artificial intelligence and big data analysis to build a digital platform that integrates financial services and digital service businesses. Ping An Insurance Group Ltd. challenged constant innovation, and as of 2019, sales reached $155 billion, ranking seventh among all companies in the Global 2000 rankings selected by Forbes Magazine. Analyzing the background of the success of Ping An Insurance Group Ltd. from the perspective of ser-M, founder Mammingz quickly captured the development of digital technology, market competition and changes in population structure in the era of the fourth industrial revolution, and established a new vision and displayed an agile leadership of digital technology-focused. Based on the strong leadership led by the founder in response to environmental changes, the company has successfully led InsurTech and Platform Business through innovation of internal resources such as investment in artificial intelligence technology, securing excellent professionals, and strengthening big data capabilities, combining external absorption capabilities, and strategic alliances among various industries. Through this success story analysis of Ping An Insurance Group Ltd., the following implications can be given to domestic insurance companies that are preparing for digital transformation. First, CEOs of domestic companies also need to recognize the paradigm shift in industry due to the change in digital technology and quickly arm themselves with digital technology-oriented leadership to spearhead the digital transformation of enterprises. Second, the Korean government should urgently overhaul related laws and systems to further promote the use of data between different industries and provide drastic support such as deregulation, tax benefits and platform provision to help the domestic insurance industry secure global competitiveness. Third, Korean companies also need to make bolder investments in the development of artificial intelligence technology so that systematic securing of internal and external data, training of technical personnel, and patent applications can be expanded, and digital platforms should be quickly established so that diverse customer experiences can be integrated through learned artificial intelligence technology. Finally, since there may be limitations to generalization through a single case of an overseas insurance company, I hope that in the future, more extensive research will be conducted on various management strategies related to artificial intelligence technology by analyzing cases of multiple industries or multiple companies or conducting empirical research.
Land was originally communized by a community in the primitive society of Korea, and in the age of the ancient society SAM KUK-SILLA, KOKURYOE and PAEK JE-it was distributed under the principle of land-nationalization. But by the occupation of the lands which were permitted to transmit from generation to generation as Royal Grant Lands and newly cleared lands, the private occupation had already begun to be formed. Thus the private ownership of land originated by chiefs of the tribes had a trend to be gradually pervaded to the communal members. After the, SILLA Kingdom unified SAM KUK in 668 A.D., JEONG JEON System and KWAN RYO JEON System, which were the distribution systems of farmlands originated from the TANG Dynasty in China, were enforced to established the basis of an absolute monarchy. Even in this age the forest area was jointly controlled and commonly used by village communities because of the abundance of area and stocked volume, and the private ownership of the forest land was prohibited by law under the influence of the TANG Dynasty system. Toward the end of the SILLA Dynasty, however, as its centralism become weak, the tendency of the private occupancy of farmland by influential persons was expanded, and at the same time the occupancy of the forest land by the aristocrats and Buddhist temples began to come out. In the ensuing KORYO Dynasty (519 to 1391 A.D.) JEON SI KWA System under the principle of land-nationalization was strengthened and the privilege of tax collection was transferred to the bureaucrats and the aristocrats as a means of material compensation for them. Taking this opportunity the influential persons began to expand their lands for the tax collection on a large scale. Therefore, about in the middle of 11th century the farmlands and the forest lands were annexed not only around the vicinity of the capital but also in the border area by influential persons. Toward the end of the KORYO Dynasty the royal families, the bureaucrats and the local lords all possessed manors and occupied the forest lands on a large scale as a part of their farmlands. In the KORYO Dynasty, where national economic foundation was based upon the lands, the disorder of the land system threatened the fall of the Dynasty and so the land reform carried out by General YI SEONG-GYE had led to the creation of ensuing YI Dynasty. All systems of the YI Dynasty were substantially adopted from those of the KORYO Dynasty and thereby KWA JEON System was enforced under the principle of land-nationalization, while the occupancy or the forest land was strictly prohibited, except the national or royal uses, by the forbidden item in KYEONG JE YUK JEON SOK JEON, one of codes provided by the successive kings in the YI Dynasty. Thus the basis of the forest land system through the YI Dynasty had been established, while the private forest area possessed by influential persons since the previous KORYO Dynasty was preserved continuously under the influence of their authorities. Therefore, this principle of the prohibition was nothing but a legal fiction for the security of sovereign powers. Consequently the private occupancy of the forest area was gradually enlarged and finally toward the end of YI Dynasty the privately possessed forest lands were to be officially authorized. The forest administration systems in the YI Dynasty are summarized as follows: a) KEUM SAN and BONG SAN. Under the principle of land-nationalization by a powerful centralism KWA JEON System was established at the beginning of the YI Dynasty and its government expropriated all the forests and prohibited strictly the private occupation. In order to maintain the dignity of the royal capital, the forests surounding capital areas were instituted as KEUM SAN (the reserved forests) and the well-stocked natural forest lands were chosen throughout the nation by the government as BONG SAN(national forests for timber production), where the government nominated SAN JIK(forest rangers) and gave them duties to protect and afforest the forests. This forest reservation system exacted statute labors from the people of mountainious districts and yet their commons of the forest were restricted rigidly. This consequently aroused their strong aversion against such forest reservation, therefore those forest lands were radically spoiled by them. To settle this difficult problem successive kings emphasized the preservation of the forests repeatedly, and in KYEONG KUK DAI JOEN, the written constitution of the YI Dynasty, a regulation for the forest preservation was provided but the desired results could not be obtained. Subsequently the split of bureaucrats with incessant feuds among politicians and scholars weakened the centralism and moreover, the foreign invasions since 1592 made the national land devasted and the rural communities impoverished. It happned that many wandering peasants from rural areas moved into the deep forest lands, where they cultivated burnt fields recklessly in the reserved forest resulting in the severe damage of the national forests. And it was inevitable for the government to increase the number of BONG SAN in order to solve the problem of the timber shortage. The increase of its number accelerated illegal and reckless cutting inevitably by the people living mountainuos districts and so the government issued excessive laws and ordinances to reserve the forests. In the middle of the 18th century the severe feuds among the politicians being brought under control, the excessive laws and ordinances were put in good order and the political situation became temporarily stabilized. But in spite of those endeavors evil habitudes of forest devastation, which had been inveterate since the KORYO Dynasty, continued to become greater in degree. After the conclusion of "the Treaty of KANG WHA with Japan" in 1876 western administration system began to be adopted, and thereafter through the promulgation of the Forest Law in 1908 the Imperial Forests were separated from the National Forests and the modern forest ownership system was fixed. b) KANG MU JANG. After the reorganization of the military system, attaching importance to the Royal Guard Corps, the founder of the YI Dynasty, TAI JO (1392 to 1398 A.D.) instituted the royal preserves-KANG MU JANG-to attain the purposes for military training and royal hunting, prohibiting strictly private hunting, felling and clearing by the rural inhabitants. Moreover, the tyrant, YEON SAN (1495 to 1506 A.D.), expanded widely the preserves at random and strengthened its prohibition, so KANG MU JANG had become the focus of the public antipathy. Since the invasion of Japanese in 1592, however, the innovation of military training methods had to be made because of the changes of arms and tactics, and the royal preserves were laid aside consequently and finally they had become the private forests of influential persons since 17th century. c) Forests for official use. All the forests for official use occupied by government officies since the KORYO Dynasty were expropriated by the YI Dynasty in 1392, and afterwards the forests were allotted on a fixed standard area to the government officies in need of firewoods, and as the forest resources became exhausted due to the depredated forest yield, each office gradually enlarged the allotted area. In the 17th century the national land had been almost devastated by the Japanese invasion and therefore each office was in the difficulty with severe deficit in revenue, thereafter waste lands and forest lands were allotted to government offices inorder to promote the land clearing and the increase in the collections of taxes. And an abuse of wide occupation of the forests by them was derived and there appeared a cause of disorder in the forest land system. So a provision prohibiting to allot the forests newly official use was enacted in 1672, nevertheless the government offices were trying to enlarge their occupied area by encroaching the boundary and this abuse continued up to the end of the YI Dynasty. d) Private forests. The government, at the bigninning of the YI Dynasty, expropriated the forests all over the country under the principle of prohibition of private occupancy of forest lands except for the national uses, while it could not expropriate completely all of the forest lands privately occupied and inherited successively by bureaucrats, and even local governors could not control them because of their strong influences. Accordingly the King, TAI JONG (1401 to 1418 A.D.), legislated the prohibition of private forest occupancy in his code, KYEONG JE YUK JEON (1413), and furthermore he repeatedly emphasized to observe the law. But The private occupancy of forest lands was not yet ceased up at the age of the King, SE JO (1455 to 1468 A.D.), so he prescribed the provision in KYEONG KUK DAI JEON (1474), an immutable law as a written constitution in the YI Dynasty: "Anyone who privately occupy the forest land shall be inflicted 80 floggings" and he prohibited the private possession of forest area even by princes and princesses. But, it seemed to be almost impossible for only one provsion in a code to obstruct the historical growing tendecy of private forest occupancy, for example, the King, SEONG JONG (1470 to 1494 A.D.), himself granted the forests to his royal families in defiance of the prohibition and thereafter such precedents were successively expanded, and besides, taking advantage of these facts, the influential persons openly acquired their private forest lands. After tyrannical rule of the King, YEON SAN (1945 to 1506 A.D.), the political disorder due to the splits to bureaucrats with successional feuds and the usurpations of thrones accelerated the private forest occupancy in all parts of the country, thus the forbidden clause on the private forest occupancy in the law had become merely a legal fiction since the establishment of the Dynasty. As above mentioned, after the invasion of Japanese in 1592, the courts of princes (KUNG BANGG) fell into the financial difficulties, and successive kings transferred the right of tax collection from fisherys and saltfarms to each KUNG BANG and at the same time they allotted the forest areas in attempt to promote the clearing. Availing themselves of this opportunity, royal families and bureaucrats intended to occupy the forests on large scale. Besides a privilege of free selection of grave yard, which had been conventionalized from the era of the KORYO Dynasty, created an abuse of occuping too wide area for grave yards in any forest at their random, so the King, TAI JONG, restricted the area of grave yard and homestead of each family. Under the policy of suppresion of Buddhism in the YI Dynasty a privilege of taxexemption for Buddhist temples was deprived and temple forests had to follow the same course as private forests did. In the middle of 18th century the King, YEONG JO (1725 to 1776 A.D.), took an impartial policy for political parties and promoted the spirit of observing laws by putting royal orders and regulations in good order excessively issued before, thus the confused political situation was saved, meanwhile the government officially permittd the private forest ownership which substantially had already been permitted tacitly and at the same time the private afforestation areas around the grave yards was authorized as private forests at least within YONG HO (a boundary of grave yard). Consequently by the enforcement of above mentioned policies the forbidden clause of private forest ownership which had been a basic principle of forest system in the YI Dynasty entireely remained as only a historical document. Under the rule of the King, SUN JO (1801 to 1834 A.D.), the political situation again got into confusion and as the result of the exploitation from farmers by bureaucrats, the extremely impoverished rural communities created successively wandering peasants who cleared burnt fields and deforested recklessly. In this way the devastation of forests come to the peak regardless of being private forests or national forests, moreover, the influential persons extorted private forests or reserved forests and their expansion of grave yards became also excessive. In 1894 a regulation was issued that the extorted private forests shall be returned to the initial propriators and besides taking wide area of the grave yards was prohibited. And after a reform of the administrative structure following western style, a modern forest possession system was prepared in 1908 by the forest law including a regulation of the return system of forest land ownership. At this point a forbidden clause of private occupancy of forest land got abolished which had been kept even in fictitious state since the foundation of the YI Dynasty. e) Common forests. As above mentioned, the forest system in the YI Dynasty was on the ground of public ownership principle but there was a high restriction to the forest profits of farmers according to the progressive private possession of forest area. And the farmers realized the necessity of possessing common forest. They organized village associations, SONGE or KEUM SONGE, to take the ownerless forests remained around the village as the common forest in opposition to influential persons and on the other hand, they prepared the self-punishment system for the common management of their forests. They made a contribution to the forest protection by preserving the common forests in the late YI Dynasty. It is generally known that the absolute monarchy expr opriates the widespread common forests all over the country in the process of chainging from thefeudal society to the capitalistic one. At this turning point in Korea, Japanese colonialists made public that the ratio of national and private forest lands was 8 to 2 in the late YI Dynasty, but this was merely a distorted statistics with the intention of rationalizing of their dispossession of forests from Korean owners, and they took advantage of dead forbidden clause on the private occupancy of forests for their colonization. They were pretending as if all forests had been in ownerless state, but, in truth, almost all the forest lands in the late YI Dynasty except national forests were in the state of private ownership or private occupancy regardless of their lawfulness.
Korea's business is composed of a few large-sized enterprises (which can be abbreviated as LSE) and a majority of small-sized enterprises (SSE). Although there has been a growing recognition of the need for the development of medium-sized enterprises (MSE) which can serve as a link between SSE and LSE, as yet there has not yet been a consensus on the definition, characteristics and the function of the MSE in Korea. Nowadays, the world is being globalized, and Japan and China are in competition to ne a great economic power. While East Asia is experiencing rapid changes, promoting MSE which can secure flexibility and efficiency through covering up the limitation of LSE and SSE is needed in order to respond the global market which is being specialized. The features of MSE in Japan can be listed as follows. First, the MSE in Japan is developing the company through getting into niche markets which are hard for major companies to enter rather than developing markets in order to compete against major companies directly. While MSEs are endeavoring to build the business firmly in the domestic market, they can possess special and competitive technical skills through trials and errors; so that they can get a chance develop their business through independent business system rather than putting their effort to compete against major companies. Second, from the MSEs with competitive edge in the market, there are many contributions to the national exportation. Those MSEs produce in domestic and maintain the quality of high price products which need cutting-edge technology, while they relocate the low and middle priced goods to the country where manufacturing costs are low, so that they can maintain the price competitiveness. Third, the industrial structure in Japan is formed from dual structure between major companies and small sized companies. In other words, in Japan's industrial structure which are composed of subcontract structure, this dual structure has taken a major role of small sized companies' growth and manufacturing businesses' international competitive power. Forth, MSE in Japan adopt a strategy of putting their value on qualitative scale growth rather than quantitative scale growth. In this paper, the case of Japanese MSE is analyzed. Along with its long history of Industrialization, Japan has a corporate environment where the SSEs can develop as a MSE and later a LSE through a full-support system. Among its SSEs, there are a number of world class corporations equipped with a large domestic market, win-win cooperation with the LSEs and an independent technology development. It can also be observed that these SSEs develop into MSEs with sustainable growth potentials. This study will focus on the condition under which the MSEs of Japan have been developed, and how they have survived the competition between SSEs and LSEs. Through this study, this paper attempts to offer solutions to Korea's polarization between the SSE and LSE, while providing the basis for SSEs revitalization. In general, if both extremities phenomenon deepen between LSE and SSE, there are possible fears of occurring disutility in national economy by the monopolization of LSE. For that reason, enterprise group, which can make SSE or MSE compete LSE in some area and ease the monopoly and oligopoly problem, is needed. This awareness has been shared for ages long. Nevertheless, there is no legal definition for MSE in Japan, and there is no definition about the enterprise size or unified view of MSE between scholars, but it is defined differently by each of academical person or research institution and study meeting. For that reason, this paper will organize the definition of MSE in Japan, and then will propose the characteristics of the background which has made MSE secure competitiveness and sustainable growth in global market. This study focus on that because through this process, the positive change to the awareness of MSE can be proposed in Korea and to seek the policy direction for building institutional framework which can make SSE become MES. Through this way, the fundamentals for SSE to become MSE can be managed and some appropriate suggestions which will be able to make MSE enter the global market in the future can also be proposed. Due to these facts, this study is very important and well timed task. In a sense of this way, this study will examine the definition and role of MSE in Japan. after this examination, this study will deal with the status, special feature, and promotion policy for MSE. Through this analysis of MSE in Japan, the foundation which be able to set the desirable role model for MSE in Korea can be proposed. Also, the political implication which is needed to push ahead to contribute to creating employment and economic growth through sustainable growth of MSEs in economic system of Korea can be offered through this study. It has been found that Japan's MSE functions as an indispensable link among various industrial structures by holding a significant position in employment rate, production and value added. Although the MSEs took up less than 1% of the entire number of businesses with 2700 manufacturing firms and 7000 non-manufacturing firms, its employment ratios are about 15%, while taking about 25% of the manufacturing industry's exports. In industries such as machinery and electronics which is considered Japan's major industry, the MSEs showed a higher than average ratio of manufacturing exports and employment rate. It can be analyzed that behind Japan's advantageous industries, close and deeply knit MSEs exist. Although there are no clearly stated policies geared towards the MSEs by the Japanese government, various political measures exist such as the R&D Project and the inducement of cooperation between enterprises which gives room for MSEs to participate in the SSE policies. In relation to these findings, the following practical measures can be considered in order to revitalize Korea's MSEs: First, there is a need for a legal definition of MSE and the incentives to provide legal support for its growth. Second, if a law to support the MSEs is established, it could provide a powerful inducement for the SSE to grow as a MSE, rather than stay as a SSE. Third, there is a need for a strategy of MSEs to establish a stable base in the domestic market and then advance to the global market with the accumulated trial and error and competitiveness. Fourth, the SSE themselves need the spirit of entrepreneurship in order to make the leap to a MSE. Because if nothing is to be changed about the system on the firms that grew, and the parts of the past custom was left to be managed alone, confusion and absence of management can take place. No matter how much tax favors the government will give and no matter how much incentive there could be through the policies, there are limits for industries to higher the ability to propagate. And because of that it is a period where industries need their own innovative skills to reform their firms.