• Korean Security Journal
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• no.42
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• pp.251-276
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• 2015

The purpose of this article is to examine Israeli intelligence activity which had contributed to the building of Israel and of its national identity. In the late 19th, the Jews scattered around the world had shared the image of victims shaped in the history of the persecution. In this process, intelligence activity was a staple factor which established the state of Israel; political and religious community. Fighting against Arabs, Israel's intelligence agents had played key role in migrating Jews to Palestine and building their own state. In other words, Intelligence activity was the instrument of implementing political Zionism, Jewish nationalism. Even after independence in 1948, despite the opposition of Arab, Israeli intelligence agencies had persuaded the United States and the Soviet Union to recognize Israel as a member of the international society. Arab countries, nevertheless, had regarded Israel as 'a state to be disappeared', and its national identity was totally denied. However, Israel officially gained recognition for statehood through Arab-Israeli war and summit talks with Egypt. Israel finally restored the 'Promised Land' that is recorded in the Bible and established its identity of a winner. In conclusion, Israeli intelligence agency played a decisive role in founding the nation and even forming the consciousness of the people.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.113-122
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• 2018

The issue of security on the Korean peninsula is facing the greatest upheaval in 2018 with the inter-Korean summit and the US-North Korea summit. North Korea has pursued the parallel policy developing military and economic at the same time. However, North Korea is changing its route to give up nuclear weapons and focus on the economy through summit talks. Since the change in North Korea is similar to that of Libya in the past, it is necessary to analyze why North Korea is trying to abandon its nuclear program and how the process is flowing compared to the case of Libya. The Libya model was constructed and analyzed in terms of international and domestic perpectives and recognition of the situation by leadership. North Korea's nuclear policy was evaluated based on the Libya model. The nuclear development of Libya and North Korea has caused diplomatic and economic pressures from the international community and ultimately led to instability of the regime. Two countries have tried to abandon nuclear program in order to solve the instability of the regime, also gain the economic reward insead. Libya took economic benefits and secured some of the stability of the regime, but the regime collapsed under the wave of democracy due to the influx of foreign capital and ideas. North Korea will seek diplomatic and economic gains with the example of Libya, but will try to limit as much as possible the culture of democracy and the full opening that can be incidental.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.87-130
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• 2019

This paper aims to analyze the recent progress(current situation) and tasks of arms control in North and South Korea. To this end the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled instruction; recent progress(current situation) of arms control in South and North Korea; constraints and tasks of arms control on the Korean peninsula; and conclusion. One of the most important tasks for the establishment of a peace structure for the coexistence of the Korean people in the 21st century is the realization of military control in order to resolve the acute military confrontation situation and mutual threats. With the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, the North-South summit and the subsequent talks for peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, the North Korea-US summit, and subsequent talks are creating conditions for trust building and arms control between the two Koreas. The military trust between the two Koreas and operational arms control are being achieved through the declaration of the April 27 Panmunjom and the 'Military Agreement for the Implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration.' However, since there are constraints on the control of arms control, such as the persistence of hostility and distrust of the two Koreas, the defense treaty between the two Koreas and neighboring countries, the competition of neighboring countries and the complex interests of the Korean peninsula, Trust Building is important. We should resolve the issue of arms control between the two Koreas, taking into account the trend of international arms control over the internal and external dynamics of the Korean peninsula gradually and carefully, with a vision of long-term unification security.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.93-112
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• 2018

The Pyeongchang 2018 Olympic Winter Games is a good example of functionalism in integration theories. President Moon Jae-in is extremely lucky to play host to the Winter Olympics. Moon should be particularly happy to have declared the 23rd Winter Games open, because a handful of North Korean athletes marched into the Pyeongchang Stadium as members of a joint team from "Corea," the result of his strenuous efforts to have the North participate in the world festival of sports on snow and ice. But the president of this divided nation hardly draws envy from other world leaders, as he is faced with the daunting task of accommodating the selfish positions of surrounding powers concerning North Korean nuclear and missile threats. North Korea, a trivial competitor in winter sports, scored big outside the games' sporting arenas by inviting President Moon to summit talks in Pyongyang. As a precondition for a 2018 summit, Pyongyang will first ask for the cessation of the annual joint Korea-US military exercises. President Moon invested a lot in the Olympic delegates from the North. Korea's leader will now have to start a truly difficult game which will require the best of best strategies as well as a great deal of wisdom and tenacity not only to deal with the weapons of mass destruction-toting North Koreans, but also with allies. On the other hand, Moon needs to make the effort to reset domestic politics with tolerance and compromise, so he can better concentrate on the conundrum of North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.25-44
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• 2017

In 2017, the EU-Japan FTA talks were resumed ahead of the G20 summit in Brussels, Belgium, and agreed to abolish tariffs on 95% of all trade items. These figures are highly liberalized agreements that are equivalent to the Pacific Rim Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). Particularly, Japanese automobiles were aggressively negotiating the abolition of tariffs with 7-year grace period and the gradual elimination of European cheese in 15 years. If the agreement is concluded, the tariffs of 1 billion euros (about 1.3 trillion won) will disappear, and Korea, which has similar industrial structure with Japan, will be hit by the processed food, chemical products, medical equipment, dairy products and automobile industries. do. The purpose of this study is to examine the mutual recognition agreement (MRA) that can directly affect the Korean companies in the content of the Japan-EU FTA and to suggest the implications for the Korean export companies.

• The Journal of the Korea institute of electronic communication sciences
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• v.13 no.6
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• pp.1161-1168
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• 2018

On April 27 2018, North-South Korea agreed to establish the practical methods for connecting the railway in the inter-Korean summit talks. This is often reported that the train will be operated directly between Busan and Europe. However, there are many problems for the railway to directly connect between Busan and Europe. Because a train from Busan to Europe should pass through North Korea, China or Russia, and each national railway systems are different. Thus, South Korean railway has to study thoroughly an interoperability before railways directly operates between a nation and another. The standards and technical harmony for direct connection with a different railway network is very important, because a rail transport is a total network system. This paper surveyed a European railway interoperability and studied on the basic direct operation for the North-South Korean railway systems.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.16 no.10
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• pp.101-113
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• 2018

This study aims to elucidate the major issues and problems of the North Korean woman defectors focusing on the Community settlement system of Korean society in the time of the historical change of the rapidly changing inter - Korean relations starting from the recent summit talks between North and South Korea. Analytical methods were conducted using literature and previous research data. The results of this study are summarized as follows. The necessity of legal and institutional support reflecting the characteristics of life of North Korean woman defectors and experience of defecting, the necessity of development and management of employment education and employment support program for stable settlement support, the necessity of an integrated support system of public - private cooperation governance structure The need for a tailored social adaptation program tailored to individual needs arises. The results of this study are important to suggest the direction of improvement of the actual system through studying the policy and system of the settlement of Korean society in advance of the unification era. In future research, the support system for the settlement of the South Korean society A variety of studies to identify the factors for role formation will be needed.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.85-114
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• 2023

The purpose of this study is to analyze Russia-Central Asia relations since the launch of the EAEU in 2015 and forecast the future from a structural realism perspective. Bilateral relations have both elements of close cooperation and elements of conflict. Russia and Central Asia, which have the characteristics of an authoritarian alliance, also have a symbiotic relationship in which they have no choice but to cooperate with each other to maintain the regime. Based on this, Russia has made various efforts to reunify Central Asia. Central Asia also has no choice but to cooperate with Russia for its survival, but at the same time, it has expanded its scope of cooperation in the international community to avoid being subjugated to Russia again. However, as China's power expands, Russia's relative weakness, and wariness toward Russia increases after the Ukraine War, the gap in bilateral relations is widening. In particular, as China's influence grows, Russia's nervousness also increases. This is why Putin visits Central Asia and holds active summit talks even during the war in Ukraine. If competition between Russia and China surfaces, there is a high possibility that the international order in Central Asia will become unstable. However, it is still unlikely that the power of Russia and China will reverse in Central Asia. Above all, the security, historical, and cultural connections between Russia and Central Asia are areas that are difficult for China to catch up with. Therefore, a weakening of Russia's influence compared to the past is inevitable, but its superiority is expected to continue. If Russia breaks away from belligerence and transforms into an attractive cooperative partner, there is a possibility that bilateral relations will take an upward turn again. However, it seems unlikely that such changes and innovations will occur under the Putin regime. Therefore, the biggest obstacle to realizing Putin's goal of reunifying Central Asia is Putin himself.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.71-96
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• 2017

This study speculates on responses to the nuclear threats of North Korea and mutual assistance and cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and China for the unification of the Korean Peninsula. As for the North Koreas nuclear issue and unification of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea is the subject of national division, the U.S. is a responsible country in international issues and does not have diplomatic ties with North Korea. China is a traditional socialist nation and a supporter of North Korea. As North Korea's strategic weapons including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are international issues, to defend against Kim Jung-Eun's unexpected acts, the three countries should actively cooperate with each other and develop countermeasures. However, with respect to the road map of the North Koreas issue, there are subtle differences between the U.S. and China in recognition of and sanctions against North Korea as a resolution of the U..N. Security Council. The U.S. has continued a deterrence policy and sanctions against North Korea based on joint threats between South Korea and the U.S. while China has showed a negative position in the process of solving the North Korean nuclear issue because of the unstable security derived from the U.S. 's intervention in the Korean peninsula. North Korea should change its diplomatic policy in a more concrete way towards world peace although it has continued trade of strategic weapons with Middle Eastern countries to maintain its political system. For example, to restart the summit talks and open multilateral security channels. Although the issue of unification of the Korean peninsula should be resolved by South and North Korea themselves, it is strange that South and North Korea depend on the logic of powerful countries for the resolution of a national problem. As for North Koreas nuclear and the Unification issues, peaceful solutions presented by South Korea seem more persuasive than the solution presented by North Korea which did not secure any international support. However, South Korea, the U.S. and China need to develop uni-directional two-tract strategies for sanctions against North Korea and talks with North Korea for peace on the Korean peninsula, and should continue to support the economic independence of North Korea.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.