• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2001.10a
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• pp.226-229
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• 2001

Owing to handset subsidies, large growth in the Korean mobile telephony subscribers has occurred. While most of firms create artificial switching costs by rewarding customers for repeated purchases to retain their customers, mobile telephone carriers discriminate against loyal customers through handset subsidies. This article examines the effect of switching cost on the prices and profits in a two-period, differentiated product duopoly model.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.31-46
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• 1978

Consider a time interval during which the demand for trips is fixed (e.g. the rush hour period). The traveller has a choice between various public modes, whose travel times and fares are fixed, and the automobile mode, for which travel time and cost depend on the volume of traffic flow on those roads, which are subject to congestion. We consider the equilibrium in terms of a representative travellerm, who choses for any trip the mode and route with the least combined money and time cost. When several (parallel) model or routes are chosen, then the combined cost of money and time must be equal among these. Our problem is first, to find the optimal flows of cars and of public mode carriers on the various links of their networks and second the optimal fares for trips by the variousmodes. The object is to minimize the total operating costs of the carriers and car plus the total time costs to travellers. The optimal fares are related to, but not identical with the dual variables of the underlying Nonlinear Program. They are equal to these dual variables only in the case, when congestion tolls on trips or on the use of specific roads are collected from automobile users. When such tolls are not collected, they must be passed on as subsidies to travellers using competing modes. The optimal fares of public modes are then reduced by the amounts of these subsidies. Note that subsidies are not a flat payment to public carriers, but are calculated on the basis of tickets sold. Fares and subsidies depend in general on tile period considered. They will be higher during periods of higher demand. When the assumption of fixed trip demand is relaxed, this tare system is no longer best, but only second best since too much traffic will, in general, be generated. The Free Rider Theorem states the following : Suppose road tolls can be charged, so that a best pricing system for public modes is posssible. Then there may exist free rides on some routes and modes, but never on a complete round trip.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.31-48
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• 2006

This study was motivated by a recent channel conflict on subsidies for mobile handset between a service provider and a handset manufacturer in the mobile communication market. In this study, we have developed a two-person non-zero sum game for the channel conflict on subsidies for mobile handset, and derived its optimal strategic game solution. As a result, we have found that, between the service operator and the handset manufacturer, one who has high level of market leadership in his own market has a power to affect the optimal strategic game solution. We have also found that, when the service operator and the handset manufacturer have relatively high level of market leadership in their own market, there exist both of potential channel conflict and cooperation. The result of this study may provide an effective reference for a solution of similar channel conflicts.

• Informatization Policy
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.86-103
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• 2010

This paper computes the economic impact of handset subsidies using the recent Input-Output Tables and compares the results with other alternatives which telecommunications companies can choose. The first scenario is that telecommunications companies give handset subsidies to consumers and sales agents. The second is that the companies do not give the subsidies to them, but instead spend the same amount of subsidy on facility investment. The third is that the companies lower the prices of their mobile communications services and consumers spend the saved expenses on other goods and services. The result is that the production, value added, import, job, employment inducement coefficients of the first scenario is larger than those of the second and third scenarios. The reason is as follows. The handset subsidy results in the incentive to consumers for handset purchase or the incentive for sales agents to sell the telecommunication services of the companies. The former has larger production and import inducement effect, and the latter also has larger value-added, job, and employment inducement effect than those of other scenarios.

• Journal of agricultural medicine and community health
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• v.46 no.4
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• pp.266-279
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• 2021

Objectives: The purpose of the study was to classify the health and medical service affairs of local governments, and to analyze the proportions of non-matching fund by local governments and central government subsidies for local government health budget. Methods: First of all, health affairs of local governments were classified to categories based on health-related laws and previous studies by review of the authors. In order to specify the scale of local government-led health affairs, we allocated 1,916 budget units into 6 main and 24 sub categories of the health and medical service affairs of local governments for the 2020 health budget of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province. For each categories, we compared the total amounts and the percentages of the 'central government subsidies', 'local government budget - matching fund', and 'local government budget - non-matching fund'. Results: The total health budget of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province accounts for 1.2% of the total budget. Of the total health budget of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province, the proportion of central government subsidies was 39.6% and the proportions of local government budget-matching fund and non-matching fund were 33.8% and 26.6%, respectively. The proportions of non-matching fund by provincial and basic local governments were 37.3% and 19.9%, respectively. Conclusion: In order for local governments to deal with the health problems of residents, it is necessary to secure and spend more local government budget(i.e., non-matching fund by local government) for health affairs in their administrative jurisdiction.

• Current Industrial and Technological Trends in Aerospace
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.11-21
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• 2008

This paper focuses on finding the way of aerospace industry promotion in Korea compatible with fair trade system under international rules by considering and analysing the WTO subsidy rules and WTO dispute settlement cases. As for subsidy rules in WTO, the paper deals with two matters such as financial contribution and benefit and further studies provisions on the prohibited subsidies and actionable subsidies. And as for the dispute settlement matters, it reviews the Brazil-Canada case and the US-EC case on civil aircraft export subsidies. While aerospace industry in Korea is not yet internationally competitive still requiring government's continuous supports, it must not be in conflict with subsidy rules under WTO mechanism. This paper makes several suggestions to meet these conditions.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.21 no.4
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• pp.1366-1385
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• 2018

Recently, government policy focuses on R&D subsidies for venture firms in the early and medium stage. However, due to the 'asymmetric information' on those firms, a concern about the possibility of adverse selection of government policy, that is, whether the R&D subsidies are offered to the less-growth potential venture firms is on the rise. Therefore, based on the "2015 venture firm's survey" data in Korea, we compared the managerial efficiency of venture firms in manufacturing sectors by dividing them into beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups at government R&D subsidies. We found that the beneficiary groups showed lower managerial efficiency than non-beneficiary groups, even if they are superior to non-beneficiary groups in technological performance. We also observed that the phenomenon involve 'low managerial efficiency in the beneficiary groups' is more relevant in mid-high tech. manufacturing sectors. Our findings provide an exploratory empirical evidence of the concern about adverse selection in the selection of R&D subsidies beneficiary groups. Therefore, the government should consider managerial performance as the key criteria for selecting R&D subsidies beneficiary groups, rather than depending on technological performance solely. Furthermore, the government should develop other complementary policies to support financial performance of the groups. Lastly, the government should make those policies attract venture firms with potential to achieve financial performance.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.17 no.6
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• pp.39-50
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• 2022

Based on the signaling theory, this study examined whether startups are more likely to attract venture investment when receiving government R&D subsidies. First, we reviewed previous studies of the investment decision-making process of venture capitalists and understood the conditions that influence investment decisions. Based on previous studies on the signal effect of government subsidies, particularly government R&D grants, on inducing private fund investment, this study revealed a mechanism to induce venture investment by startups. In addition, in order to verify whether government R&D subsidies have the effect of inducing venture investment, an empirical analysis was conducted based on data from startups under seven years and certified as a venture companies in 2021. This paper used PSM(Propensity Score Matching) method and DID(Difference In Difference) analysis for an empirical study to analyze the average treatment effect on the treated group(beneficiary startups of government R&D grants). As a result of empirical analysis, companies that receive more government R&D subsidies after starting a business are more likely to attract venture investment. From two to three years after conducting the first government R&D project, startups that received government R&D grants attracted more venture investment than those that did not. The results of this paper demonstrate that government R&D projects can also affect the venture investment ecosystem, giving policy implications to government R&D projects targeting startups. It is also expected to suggest strategic implications to startups that need new funding.

• Korean System Dynamics Review
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.27-43
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• 2008

This study investigates market barriers in increasing the market share of Alternative Fuel Vehicles (AFVs). In particular, this study first conceptualizes the AFVs market model with the aid of generic system archetypes suggested by Wolstenholme. Among four generic system archetypes suggested by Wolstenholme, the market structure of AFVs can be explained by the 'relative achievement' archetype. Starting from the generic system archetype, this study extends the model boundary step by step to take account of various model assumptions necessary to simulate the model numerically. If there is a significant network effect on vehicle operating costs, it is difficult to achieve the shift to AFVs even in the long term without a policy intervention because the car market is locked into the current structure. There are several possible policy options to break the 'locked-in' structure of the car market, such as subsidies on vehicles, subsidies on fuels, and a niche management policy.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.65-84
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• 2004

Korean Government has provided special support to Korean export industry during past 40 years. However, due to the agreement on UR and appearance of WTO, the Government can't provide most of the subsidies which were allowed before WTO era. Hence, export insurance system became more useful tool since it's one of the few allowed subsidies under WTO. This study tries to find the impacts of export insurance systems on the exports in Korea, the United States, and Japan. Firstly, this study surveyed the export insurance systems of Korea, the United States, and Japan. Then, using a regression analysis it analysed the effects of export insurance systems upon the exports in Korea, the United States, and Japan respectively. The period of data is from 1980 to 1999. The results of the regression analysis for export insurance showed significant and positive effects of both Korean and Japanese but the United States showed insignificant and positive upon the exports.