This paper traces the process how Confucianism was established as a state ideology in Vietnam. Confucianism is said to have first been introduced into Vietnam around the early 3rd century. However, it had been outshone by Buddhism until the 1389s when Ho Quy Ly rose to power and emphasized pre-Qin Confucianism. In 1428, Lê Loi founded a new dynasty and changed the state ideology from Buddhism to Confucianism. Despite this radical shift, however, Confucianism was not firmly established at the beginning of the Lê Dynasty. It was Lê Thanh Tong (1460-1497) who fully established neo-Confucianism as the state ideology. The reason was that he devoted himself to the study of Confucian texts from a young age and sought to strengthen his own royal authority by emphasizing the neo-Confucian concept of loyalty and filial piety.
Education is a key element in shaping the worldview of the next generation and determines society's core values, ideology, and basic understanding of human rights. While Kyrgyzstan is a secular state, Islamic education, backed by Arab and Turkish sponsors, continues to increase in popularity with the construction of thousands of mosques and dozens of new Islamic educational institutions. Young women have become an important target for Islamic ideology and Islamic educational institutions seek to introduce a new type of ideal woman who is obedient, submissive, and modest. This research uses curricula content analysis, participant observation, and in-depth interviews with teachers and students to examine the effects of newly introduced Islamic education institutions and concludes that the schools are succeeding in training female Kyrgyz students for sheltered lives of dependency, threatening to fundamentally erode women's rights in the country. Two tasks thus demand the attention of policymakers: preserving Kyrgyzstan's secular state and introducing new interpretations of the Quran, which strengthen support for women's rights among believers.
This research established that the two characteristics of Femail Gugguek were explored on the character as genre and the nationalism discourse. This research also included how to encounter the characteristic of Female Gugguek as a popular entertainment with the social context at the time and how to re-produce the social ideology. The 'historical nationalism narrative' piercing Female Gugguek had the close relation with the nation/state discourse of the time. The history reproduced by Female Gugguek was not real. It was the imagined past, the history as image. The Female Gugguek was a genre which typically showed how to intermediate fantasy, ideology and narrative. The happy-endings with the victory of male hero, the narrative pattern on overcoming national crisis, the narrative emphasizing the glorious past and the unification of nation, all these were projected the discourse on nationalistic ideology and nation/state-making in 1950's. The Utopian desire of Female Guggeuk imagining the glorious past and strong nation was the fantasy which concealed the contradiction in real life and the national identity damaged by colonial experience, division of territory, governance by U.S. Military Government and the Korean War. The Female Guggeuk was doing well, because it had amusement. Futhermore, imagination of glorious past and strong state/nation of Female Guggeuk satisfied the public's desire of escapism and wish to establish their position and identity in the rapid social-economic changes. However, Female Guggeuk repeatedly produced the never-changing characters, narrative pattern and conservative world-view. Thus, it became regarded as immature and obsolete thing in late 1950's. Female Guggeuk, which kept re-producing the retrogressive image of the past without modern viewpoint and interpretation, was not sensitive about change of time and trend of the people. Consequently, it was pushed out of people's major interest.
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) is an Islamic social movement that struggles to change the existing political system to the Islamic system. HT argues that all problems in the Muslim world are rooted in adopting secular thought and ideology and the separation between Islam and the state. Hence, HT works to persuade Muslims to abandon that way of life and only apply Islam as the country's only ideology and constitution. HT has spread this narrative since it started in 1953 in Jordan. With this ideological and political attitude, many countries consider HT a threat to their political and community life, suppressing this movement by arresting members and banning the group to reduce or end HT activities in these countries. The Indonesian government has also carried out this repressive policy to limit the influence of Indonesian HTI since 2017. This paper aims to discuss the strategy of Hizb ut-Tahrir to continue its political activities Indonesia after being dissolved by the Indonesian government in 2017. This article used content analysis method to interpret the data collected from interview and documents from Hizb ut-Tahrir. Responding to state repression, HTI sought other methods of action by changing the place of resistance or activities, and by changing its identity.
This paper examines the institutionalized images of Indonesian womanhood during the Orde Baru (New Order; 1966-1998). In doing so, it discusses these images as manifested in the Indonesian constitution, governmental organizations such as such as 'Dharma Wanita' and 'Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga' (PKK), school textbooks and 'Televisi Republik Indonesia' (TVRI) dramas. Under the post-1966 Orde Baru, certain images of womanhood were institutionalized under the influence of the state ideology of womanhood ('ibuism') which emphasizes women's roles in the domestic domain. These institutionalized images were propagated largely by governmental organizations such as 'Dharma Wanita' and 'PKK', and even transmitted through educational text-books and mess media such as TVRI. In conclusion, it also points out that since the mid-1990s, other 'discursive' and 'multi-faceted' contemporary images of womanhood have emerged through the mass media in Indonesian society. Consequently, images of Indonesian womanhood were somehow contested by 2000 and beyond. This paper is expected to develop a detailed discussion on the 'means' and 'contents' of the state ideology of womanhood. Therefore, this paper is expected to add a significant contribution to comprehending the institutionalized images of Indonesian womanhood during the Orde Baru regime.
In The Great Hunger (1942) Patrick Kavanagh opens an Irish postnationalist discourse. Taking advantage of historical revisionism and postcolonialism, he not only demystifies a romantic nationalist ideology rooted in rural Ireland but also searches for an autonomous literary tradition free of the Irish Literary Revival, supposedly an outcome of a colonial influence. As a farmer-poet, Kavanagh deconstructs in two ways myths of rural areas, to which the Revivalists aspire. Contrary to Revivalism, he reveals that rural Ireland is not an idealized place where national identity arises and individual spirits are restored. It is instead a cruel place where farmer Maguire, deprived of health, wealth, and love, is tortured by hard labor in the field, moral regulations imposed by the Church, and his mother's domestic authority, all of which leave him unmarried until age sixty-five. Kavanagh also challenges the Revivalist tradition, led by W. B. Yeats commonly referred to as the poet of the nation, by indicting its reliance on former colonial authority and its lack of a sense of communal autonomy, both of which are diagnosed as "provincialism" by Kavanagh. Given that modern Irish literature has been strongly colored as nationalistic during the course of anticolonial resistance, Kavanagh's critique of the Revival in The Great Hunger, whose proponents blindly beautify the lives of farmers, runs directly against the grain of the founding ideology of the Irish nation-state. His voice, like that of a whistle-blower, disclosing the harsh realities of rural Ireland, ushers in a "post"-nationalist perspective on nation and national myths in Irish poetics.
The late $19^{th}$ and early $20^{th}$ centuries of Korea were the times when the Confucianism (牲理學) ideology was shaken heavily under the influences of modernism and capitalism by Western and Japanese military and political-economic forces. Under such circumstances, alteration of clothing was much influenced by ideologies than changes in social structure or technological advance. In this study, an ideology was defined as "the force which drives people into a particular social order". Ideologies were postulated as an ongoing process of socialization with dialectic features rather than being a static state. Comparative analyses on conflict structures and different clothing patterns symbolizing the ideologies of the Ruling (支配) and the Opposition (對抗) were conducted. Investigating dresses as representations of ideologies is to reconsider the notion of dichotomous confrontation between the conservatives (守舊派) and the progressives (開化派) and a recognition of Koreans' passively accepting modernity during the Japanese occupation. This may also have contributed to enlightening Koreans about modernization. Here are the results. First, the theoretical review found that ideologies were represented by not only symbols of discourse, but also dresses, and that dresses embodied both physical and conceptual systems presenting differences between ideologies and their natures, Second, during the late 19th century Korea, conflict between conservatives' Hanbok (韓服) and progressives' Western suits (洋服) was found. Moderate progressives showed their identity by "Colored Clothing" (深色衣), and radical progressives by black suits with short hair (黑衣斷髮) or by western suits (洋服). The ultimate goal of both parties was a "Modern Nation". With these efforts, pale jade green coats and traditional hats symbolizing the nobleman class was eliminated within 30 years from 1880 to 1910, and then simple robes and short hair emerged. However, the powerful Japanese army had taken over the hegemony of East Asia, and Korea was sharply divided into modernization and pro-Japanese camps. Third, during the time of Japanese colonial rule, the dress codes having set by the modernization policies during the time of enlightenment were abandoned and colonial uniforms for the colonial system was meticulously introduced. During this period, Western or Japanese-style uniforms were the symbol of the ruling ideology. In the mean time, Hanbok, particularly "White Clothing (白衣)", emerged as a representation of the opposition ideology. However, due to Japan's coercive power and strong zeal for "Great orient (大東亞)", white clothing remained as a mere symbol. Meanwhile, Reformists (實力養成論者) movement toward improving quality of life followed a similar path of the Japanese policies and was eventually incorporated into the ruling ideology. Fourth, dresses as representations of ruling ideologies were enforced by organizational powers, such as organizations and laws, and binding policies, and changes in such dresses were more significant when the ruling ideologies were stronger. Clothing of the opposition ideology was expressed as an aggregation of public consciousness. During the period, the subjects of ruling ideology and the objects who were granted modernization benefits were different although their drives for colored clothing with short hair (色衣斷髮) for modernization were similar.
This text discusses trends in the construction of religions since the Meiji Era, using Konkokyo and Restoration Shintoism as examples. The construction of religions is applied here as the process of a deliberate acceptace of religious images as a discourse of "Civilization" endowed with "kyougi" or "Doctrine" and "kyousoku" or "Rules of Instruction." Winding through a meandering path, these constructed religions do not take precedence over "Jikyou" or "State Religion." Yet, "Jikyou" for a while was fixed in its own fragemented self-imagery. As for Shinto, in 1900, the Office of Shinto Shrines became independent from the Office of Shrines and Temples in the Department of Domestic Affairs, and clearly Shinto and Shinto Shrines were part of secular state ideology. In the Bakumatsu and Meiji Periods, it ultimately was cut off from Restoration Shinto, thereby achieving this development on its own. This tells of the formation of an entirely new and modern Shinto within a secular "Jikyou." Konkokyo, moreover, as a religion establishes "kyousoku" and "kyougi." As a Shinto sect, it takes steps on the path toward recognizing a self-identity, namely as religious Shinto. As a result, dogmatization and systemization progress, and "Byoukinaoshi" or "illness-recovery" from the Tokugawa Period weathers. Also, as for progress in the Shinto religious order, from its foundation, the characteristics of a unified state and religion emerge, and thus there is an acceptance of significant restrictions. This dillema continues to persist as a problem in postwar Japan. Shedding light on Tokugawa Era practice also sheds light on where we can now take religious concepts.
This paper seeks to search for wisdoms that may be applied to modern leadership through Tasan Jeong Yakyong's ideology, ShilHak, from the Chosun Dynasty. The present period is referred as the period of transformation and innovation or the period of knowledge information The leadership appropriate for the current period is thus called revolutionary leadership. This leadership accomplishes its goals by influencing the constituent's values, ethics, behavioral norms, and visions based on the leader's moral values, knowledge, and information. Thus, the essence of this paper is in acquiring wisdoms of leadership by company revolutionary leadership with Tasan's life. Tasan pursued change and innovation in a time where Chosun was in a state of decay by following the flow of world powers towards the concept of studying truth based upon facts such as changing the system of thought, reforming legislation, and developing technology. Moreover, he gave courage and hope to the people by demonstrating such leadership in practice. In addition, despite false accusations and spending 18 years in exile, he showed revolutionary life as an active intellectual by leaving 542 volumes of writing through his 'value innovation' that he "pursue things only for the people and the state." Consequently, the paper first deals with what kind of leadership is required for a leader in the position of a general and examines the kind of leadership capacity demanded. Subsequently, Tasan 's revolutionary life and hints of leadership messages in MokMinSimSuh are examined. Thus, this paper is centered upon the leadership of generals regarding how MokMinShimSuh may be applicable to modern leadership.
In the early days of human history, the governing groups of rulers needed to justify their rule. The cause of rule became the ruling ideology. In China, the backbone of the ruling ideology was originally referred to as 'Di(帝)' or 'Shangdi(上帝)', who was later replaced by 'Tian(天)', Heaven. So there was a claim that Heaven gave the cause of the rule. This idea is the 'Tianming (天命)' idea. When the Zhou(周) Dynasty took control of the central government, the 'Tianming' idea had had a relatively sophisticated form. It was the 'Zhouli(周禮)' that organized the systematic order of the Zhou Dynasty. After this system collapsed, those who recognized 'Zhouli' as a desirable social system considered the collapse of 'Zhouli' as a situation of turbulent age. It was Qin(秦) State that unified all of the states of the period. However, after the unification, the Qin Dynasty fell sharply. The next dynasty was the Han(漢) Dynasty. The new ruling powers of the Han Dynasty needed to justify their regime. That means that it was necessary to establish the ruling ideology of the Han Dynasty. The representative of the ruling ideology of the Han Dynasty was Dongzhongshu, whose thought was based on Confucianism. His thought was related to "Chunqiugongyangzhuan(春秋公羊傳)", an interpretation of "Chunqiu(春秋)". This interpretation perspective is based on the idea of religious Heaven. Dongzhongshu thought that there were co-communions between Heaven and humans. His thought has the meaning of political theology in which rulers hold the basis of the rulers' sovereignty.
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