• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.5-46
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• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.11-21
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• 2014

South Korea should not be in subordinate position in international relationships like the past. As the status of middle power. South Korea achieves peaceful unification through overcoming North Korea's nuclear and conventional threats, and builds military power in Northeast Asia as a 'balancer'. This can firstly be achieved by constructing "attack systems triad". 'attack systems triad' can be established through integrating the C41SR as a common strategy for the purposes of preemptive deterrence and retaliatory deterrence against the dangers of the present and the future. Second, denial deterrence can be achieved by establishing "defense system triad" by combining common military power and defensive weapon system. Finally, development of independent advanced technological strategies can be achieved by building defense industry and combination of research and development through constructing "Infra triad". As for constructing and reinforcing the future of the ROK military, a unilateral principle and policy efforts to achieve the aforementioned force construction models are needed. This can only be achieved through the government's national vision to take on the role of mediator and a basis founded upon the consensus of the public.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Disaster Information Conference
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• 2023.11a
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• pp.289-290
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• 2023

이 연구의 목적은 집중억제전략(focused deterrence)이 자치경찰제에 미칠 수 있는 영향을 검토하는 데 있다. 구체적으로 집중억제전략이 실시된 보스턴 총기 프로젝트의 성공 원인을 검토하고, 국내 자치경찰위원회의 시책과 비교·분석하였다. 이를 통해 집중억제전략이 자치경찰제에 가지는 의미를 파악하고, 국내에서 집중억제전략이 성공적으로 실행되기 위한 방안을 제언하였다.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.208-231
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• 2017

The balance of power in conventional forces between the two Koreas works in favor of the South Korea in the Korea peninsula. But, the balancing mechanism between the two Koreas in asymmetric forces like nuclear and missile forces works absolutely in favor of the North Korea. That's why it should be timely for the ROK military to review existing strategy and revise a new counter strategy against the threat posed by the North Korea's nuclear and missile forces. The ROK military is now developing 4D, KAMD, KILL Chain strategies as means to cope with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. Considering efforts and resources invested now, the strategies are expected to be in place in next five or more years. However, approaches to those strategies seem to be rather fragmentary and conceptual than comprehensive and pragmatic. The types of strategies against the North Korea's military threats need to be a deterrence in peace time and a fighting and winning in war time in the Korean theater. But, the most important element in the deterrence strategy is the credibility. This study concludes with an new strategic concept titled "ADAD(Assured Defense, Assured Destruction)" as an alternative to existing strategies to deal with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.82-113
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

• Industry Promotion Research
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.123-134
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• 2020

This study analyses the Korean successive governments' nuclear strategies after the post-cold war and suggests the future countermeasures as analysing to reciprocally interconnect B. Clinton and G.W.Bush governments' policies and North Korea's nuclear strategy. As the conclusion, this study suggests that the most urgent domestic alternative measure to North Korea's nuclear dismantlement is to prepare the grand strategy with the united whole national consensus and to order the renewed stronger future role by the mutual cooperation of multilateral agreement system and international regimes and lastly to adopt the extended deterrence through the reinforcement of the 5 great joint statements between the South-North Koreas.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.4
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• pp.241-287
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• 2006

16th CPC National Party Congress established multi-polarization strategy as an external strategy, and 'The Great Reinvigoration of Chinese Nation' as the aim of The Great Strategy of China. It is required to maintain stabilized and peaceful surrounding circumstance in order to make it possible. The ideal surrounding circumstance that China is aiming for is to achieve multi-polarization of international society while maintaining strategic deterrence. Multi-polarization now in 'One super Multi powers' is that 'Multi powers' deter 'One super' to prevent predominance of USA and to decentralize the power. China wishes to realign international order as it accomplishes multi-polarization. China who wants 'Peace and Stabilization' emphasizes autonomy, peace and unification of Korean peninsula. Autonomy means the restraint intervention of foreign power, that is, American influence in Korean peninsula. Multi-polarization strategy of China will be used in Korean peninsula to solve nuclear issue of North Korea, to support neutral unification and to keep balance of power with USA, Japan and Russia as it renders economic advantages to South Korea and security engagement to North Korea, based on special geographical, cultural and historical relationship with two Koreas. The nuclear issue of North Korea will be a stage to test multi-polarization of China. When it deduces positive solution of nuclear issue due to successful six-party talks, and advances to security talks of Northeast Asia, it will contribute a lot to power and elevation of national stature of China in international society. Thus, the Chinese strategy will be an accommodative condition for the security of South Korea, and it requires wise decision of South Korea to make hay while the sun shine.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.47-81
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• 2016

This paper has attempted to examine the political and operational contexts within which North Korea's latest acts of nuclear blackmail, its test-firing of an SLBM on April 23rd 2016 and its fourth nuclear test on January 6^th 2016, should be understood. Analysis of the KN-11 SLBM and the Sinpo-class SSB is based on official South Korean, US and others sources, especially the ROK MND, as well as other resources from South Korea, US and others. Unfortunately, the results of this exploration are inconclusive: there is simply not enough evidence available at present to either confirm or refute the existence of a functional North Korean SLBM and SSB. Nevertheless, the North Korean determination to possess such assets should not be taken lightly. But even accepting North Korea's claims about its SLBMs at face value, which is undermined by news of apparently unsuccessful follow-up test-firings in November, and probably December 2015, there is little proof that North Korea has yet succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear warhead, so the most extravagant fears are not yet justified. Taken together with North Korea's latest announcement of a supposed successful SLBM ejection-test, on March 23^th 2016, the KN-11 SLBM claims should probably be seen as primarily about proving North Korea's status as a nuclear power, both to exert external political pressure and to bolster internal political support for Kim Jong-un's rule. In conclusion, this paper recommends formulating a preemptive anti-access strategy for the ROKN, proposes acquiring an ASW CV and SSNs to implement submarine strategic deterrent patrols, and urges extending the existing limited AORs to facilitate the preemptive anti-access strategy. Other deterrence options may be suggested, but it is surely significant that the ROKN has recently publically referred to the deployment of an ASW CV and SSNs for the first time.