As the Trump administration withdraws the Paris Climate Agreement and shows its antipathy toward free trade, the U.S.'s soft power is most likely to weaken and its behaviors could be perceived as acts to surrender the U.S. hegemonic leadership in the world stage. Hegemonic stability theory notes that the existence of a hegemonic power contributes to international stability in the sense that it provides international public goods. A lack of the U.S's leadership in international politics, however, could be recognized as its denial of a hegemonic status. Is it intentional or accidental? The U.S's denial of hegemonic roles is the byproduct of the Trump administration's "American First" policy, not the showcase of its intention to transit hegemony to others. What is noteworthy is that China targets a niche market of hegemony as the U.S. denies its roles as the international leader. Put it another way, China attempts to ride hegemony for free when the U.S. denies its hegemonic roles accidentally. Faced with a niche market of hegemony, China has begun to accelerate its national strategy to make "Chinese Dream" come true. To that end, China promised again to keep the Paris Climate Agreement and attempts to play more active its roles in Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO), Asia Infra Investment Bank(AIIB), and "One Belt, One Road". Despite all these efforts, the U.S. is most likely to withdraw its denial of hegemony any time soon. The U.S's resumption of Freedom of Navigation Operations(FONOPs) could be a precursor of the return to a hegemonic power's willingness. In this vein, it is noteworthy that the South China Sea serves as a quasi-war zone for hegemonic conflict.
Artificial-intelligence (AI) semiconductors are crucial for securing national core competitiveness, including dominating the AI and data ecosystem and succeeding in the Digital New Deal. When examining the macroenvironment, the global division of labor in the semiconductor industry has weakened owing to the technological competition between the United States and China. Major countries are aiming to build the entire semiconductor ecosystem around their territories. As a result, these countries are formulating policy goals tailored to their realities and actively pursuing key policies such as research and development, securing manufacturing bases, workforce development, and financial support. These policies also focus on intercountry cooperation and bold government policy support, which is deemed essential. To secure core competitiveness in AI semiconductors, South Korea needs to examine the policy directions of major countries and actively formulate and implement policies for this semiconductor industry.
China has been pushing for a systematic strategy for territorialization over a long period of time to invade Korea's West Sea (Yellow Sea) in order to create China's territorial water. China's strategy for territorializing the West Sea is an activity in which China curbs the use of South Korea and enforces the illegal use of China in order to dominate the West Sea exclusively. China aided Chinese fishing boats that engaged in illegal fishing in Korea's jurisdiction as a means to territorialize the West Sea, and is opposed to combined exercise and training of Korea and the United States Naval Forces in the West Sea, while intentionally entering KADIZ(Korea Air Defense Identification Zone). In addition, Beijing used 'scientific exploration and research' measures as a pretext for its strategies in order to encroach on Korea's West Sea. China is carrying out such work to announce to the world that China is a systematic and organized country while consistently attempting to dominate the West Sea. China's activities in the West Sea seriously infringe South Korea's sovereignty. In order to respond to China's strategies of territorialization in the West Sea stated above, I analyzed the rejection effect of the ROK-US combined military training in the West Sea and presented a 'proportional response strategy centered on the ROK-US combined forces'. Korea should be able to respond proportionally to China's activities in the seas around the Korean peninsula, and Korea should be able to neutralize China's attempt to a Fait Accompli. In addition, just as China installs buoys in the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone, Korea should be able to install and actively utilize some devices in the West Sea and for the use of free and open West Sea. Korea should not just wait for the tragic future to come without preparing for China's gradual and long-term strategy, and Seoul needs to respond to China's maritime policy in the West Sea with a more active attitude than it is now. China has historically taken a bold and aggressive response to neighboring countries that are consistent with a passive attitude, on the other hand, Beijing has taken a cautious approach to neighboring countries that respond with an active attitude. It should not be forgotten that Korea's passive response to the Chinese strategy in the name of a 'realistic approach' such as Korea's economic dependence on China for economy will result in China's success for territorialization of the West Sea.
Kim, Min Woo;Kim, Il Hwan;Kim, Jaehyoun;Ha, Oh Jeong;Chang, Jinsook;Park, Sangdon
KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
/
v.16
no.12
/
pp.4062-4080
/
2022
COVID-19, a highly infectious disease, has affected the globe tremendously since its outbreak during late 2019 in Wuhan, China. In order to respond to the pandemic, governments around the world introduced a variety of public health measures including contact-tracing, a method to identify individuals who may have come into contact with a confirmed COVID-19 patient, which usually leads to quarantine of certain individuals. Like many other governments, the South Korean health authorities adopted public health measures using latest data technologies. Key data technology-based quarantine measures include:(1) Electronic Entry Log; (2) Self-check App; and (3) COVID-19 Wristband, and heavily relied on individual's personal information for contact-tracing and self-isolation. In fact, during the early stages of the pandemic, South Korea's strategy proved to be highly effective in containing the spread of coronavirus while other countries suffered significantly from the surge of COVID-19 patients. However, while the South Korean COVID-19 policy was hailed as a success, it must be noted that the government achieved this by collecting and processing a wide range of personal information. In collecting and processing personal information, the data minimum principle - one of the widely recognized common data principles between different data protection laws - should be applied. Public health measures have no exceptions, and it is even more crucial when government activities are involved. In this study, we provide an analysis of how the governments around the world reacted to the COVID-19 pandemic and evaluate whether the South Korean government's digital quarantine measures ensured the protection of its citizen's right to privacy.
China's cultural diplomacy is mostly understood as an endeavour to build and project soft power, which draws on three sources of 'culture, political values and foreign policy' according to Nye. This paper focuses on the debates about the vehicle and agents of China's cultural diplomacy. It starts with a theoretical discussion of the competing views in the Chinese context, and develops an argument that the vehicle of China's cultural diplomacy tries to project soft power on two wheels of culture and political values, to serve the purpose of reshaping China's image away from being the 'cultural other' and 'ideological other' respectively. However, the state-led approach to driving this vehicle is generating some side effects with its sponsorship, censorship and presence in the driver's seat. Then the paper analyses the inherent tensions existing in practice both between the two sources of building soft power and between the two means of doing so, attraction and persuasion, with empirical evidence through a comparative case study of the Confucius Institutes in the US and South Korea. The finding shows that China's attempt at reshaping its image as an Eastern cultural contestant is often disrupted by its authoritarian political values, and the state-led persuasion is often reducing China's cultural attraction. Following this, the paper finishes with some recommendations regarding evolving the cultural diplomacy approach from a vertical one that is government-centred to a horizontal one that is network-based with multiple agents, and localising its practice by engaging the target audiences as stakeholders.
This article explores why the two Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam and the Philippines, choose different strategies to cope with the Chinese threat. Despite the evident Chinese threat in the South China Sea, Vietnam has not meaningfully expanded the military cooperation with the United States, whereas the Philippines, ironically, has distanced itself with its ally, the United States. Existing studies on the topic does not offer a satisfactory explanation. We assign that two cases are examples of "underbalancing" - the failure of balancing even though there is an evident threat. Furthermore, we demonstrate the difference between cases of the Philippines and Vietnam by arguing that the number of veto players affects the outcome of foreign policy, underbalancing of two countries. The Philippines has only one veto player, the president, hence its response to external threats is incoherent. On the other hand, the number of veto players in Vietnam is more than one and those players demand negotiation among them on the matter of foreign policy. Upon analyses on two cases we argue that the former is the case of underbalancing caused by a lack of policy stability, while the latter is the case of underbalancing caused by a lack of policy responsiveness.
The purpose of this study is to find out how Korea's national image is being established through content analysis of articles related to Korea by the People's Daily in China. There were 253 articles related to Korea published in the People's Daily from 2016 to 2020. Using content analysis methods, articles related to Korea were reviewed in five categories: number of articles, page, source, subject matter, and propensity to report. According to the results of the study, the number of articles related to Korea in the People's Daily has decreased since 2016, and the topic of articles has been in many political and social sectors. In 2016 and 2017, South Korea's decision to deploy THAAD led to a number of articles published in the military sector, and there were negative articles only in military articles. The majority of articles related to Korea in the People's Daily show that it describes Korea positively or objectively. In this regard, the People's Daily shows that it is building a positive image of Korea.
This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.
Recently, amount of cargoes from main ports in Northeast Asia have rapidly increased and as well surplus port development in same region corresponded with the boom in external trade that resulted from successful export-oriented economics strategy by China, Japan and South Korea. To cope with this business circumstances, a certain form of port alliance is desperately needed to provide a suitable service to customer and establish their countervailing power against the shipping alliance. Nevertheless, Incheon seaport has not made a definite port alliance system with main ports in Northern China yet. Thus, the purpose of this study is to identify the key success factors to form a port alliance through examining previous studies. We have benchmarked previous studies which are related to main ports in global region and the questionnaire on customers of ports. By studying this, we are able to suggest a few strategies for forming successful port alliance to enhance Incheon port's capabilities in the long term plan. As a policy proposal, this study suggests Incheon port and main ports in Northern China should construct a logistics infrastructure through mutual investment and provide an incentive system when the ocean carrier makes port call to both ports.
An anti-dumping has become the trade policy of choice for developing countries as well as advanced countries, hence it is the impending issue to the export-oriented countries including Korea. After colligating the analysis on the trade and industrial policy between Korea and China as well as the analysis on the preceding research, the main reasons of anti-dumping were selected as followings; an unemployment rate, real GDP growth rate and consumer price increase as internal factors, and trade balance, regional coefficient and trade specification index as external factors. Then, the research on how the above seven variable factors can affect the number of anti-dumping measures was accomplished. For the empirical analysis, the above information was used after reorganizing them by on the quarterly basis. Through the use of the correlation analysis, backward elimination of multiple regression analysis model and time-series analysis, it has appeared that the unemployment rate appeared to be the most important factors of anti-dumping measures in addition to the increase rate of trade balance. The variable such as the unemployment rate is uncontrollable for us, so it is appropriate to establish and operate an preemptive monitoring system based on the increasing rate of the amount of export and increasing rate of trade surplus.
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