• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.9 no.6
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• pp.15-24
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• 2018

Purpose - The adjustment of one country's monetary policy can cause the macroeconomic change of other countries. Due to this, this paper attempts to analyze the impact of China's monetary policy on South Korea's exchange rate. Research design, data, and methodology - Based on the flexible-price monetary model, sets of annual time series from 1980 to 2017 are employed to perform an empirical estimation. The vector error correction model is also used to exploit the short-run relationship between both of them. Of course, the South Korea's real GDP, the China's real GDP, South Korea's interest rate, the South Korea's interest rate and the South Korea's monetary supply are treated as independent variables in this paper. Result - The long-run findings reveal that the China's money supply has a negative effect on South Korea's exchange rate. Respectively, the short-run findings depicts that the China's money supply has negative a effect on South Korea's exchange rate. Of course, other variables selected in this paper also have an effect on South Korea's exchange rate whatever positive or negative. Conclusions - As the empirical evidence shows, the China's monetary policy has a negative effect on South Korea's exchange rate whenever in the long run or in the short run.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.1-17
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• 2020

Purpose - Since China has been South Korea's biggest export destination, uncertainty shocks originating from it would influence South Korea's exports. This paper evaluates the effects of China's economic policy uncertainty on Korea's exports to explore the transmission channels. Design/methodology - Incorporating endogeneities and nonlinearities, this study employs a quarterly time-varying parameters vector autoregressive model to investigate the relationships between China's economic policy uncertainty and Korea's exports, where the overparameterization due to time-varying specifications is overcome by a novel stochastic model specification search framework. According to previous theoretical studies, this paper assesses two channels, demand shock channel and exchange rate channel, through which foreign uncertainty affects Korea's exports. This paper identifies the primary drivers of Korea's aggregate exports and analyzes the rationales for the time-variant impacts of China's economic policy uncertainty on Korea's exports to China. Findings - Our empirical results reveal that Korea's aggregate exports are less responsive to China's economic policy uncertainty shocks and significantly move together with global demand. In contrast, its bilateral exports to China are highly responsive in a negative and time-variant way. Moreover, Chinese investment is an important channel through which China's economic policy uncertainty affects Korea's exports to China after 2010. Further, the time-variant effects of China's economic policy uncertainty on Korea's exports to China are related to changes in China's foreign trade policies, global economic conditions, and China's degree of economic freedom. Originality/value - Few previous studies touch the effects of external uncertainty shocks on South Korea's exports. This paper attempts to fill this gap and explicitly investigate the impacts of China's economic policy uncertainty on Korea's exports from a time-varying perspective. As Korea is an export-oriented economy, this study provides insights for the Korean government to understand the transmissions of external uncertainty better.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.30-48
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• 2019

China has initiated a series of "economic sanctions" against South Korea, affecting Korean pop stars visiting China and Korean investments in China. Sanctions were imposed on South Korea in response to the decision of South Korea to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in 2016. Furthermore, the Global Daily assembled local population to boycott Korean products and investments in China. However, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has never positively confirmed these activities as economic sanctions to South Korea related to the THAAD installation. In other words, the Chinese government singled a relatively weak message via these sanctions to South Korea. As a result, the THADD implementation continued in South Korea. In the paper, I interpret China's rationale to impost puzzling economic sanctions, which have a weak resolution, to South Korea and Taiwan. As signaling theory argues, economic sanctions with insufficient resolution, which are more likely to fail, is a more provocative foreign policy. By reviewing China's sanctions usage to South Korea and Taiwan, I propose arguments of bureaucratic competition to answer why China launched such sanctions to other countries: those are caused by domestic institutions who are seeking reward from the Communist Party of China. By comparing shifts of leadership between domestic agencies, the paper provides evidence to support the proposed argument. I also include two alternative explanations to strengthen the proposed argument, albeit connecting the paper with other two larger streams of research, which address analyses of China's aggressive foreign policies as well as the domestic politics of economic sanctions.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.154-195
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• 2017

This paper is to analyse conflict between the US and China over the South China Sea and Korea's responses. To this end the paper is composed of 6 chapters titled instruction; the current status of South China Sea sovereignty disputes; changes in US and Chinese maritime security strategies and the strategic values of the South China Sea; key issues and future prospects for US-China conflicts in the South China Sea; South Korea's security and diplomatic responses; and conclusion. The recent East Asian maritime security issue has evolved into a global issue of supremacy between the US and China, beyond conflicts over territorial disputes and demarcation among the countries in the region. China is pursuing offensive ocean policy to expand economic growth. The core of the maritime order that the United States intends to pursue is the freedom of navigation in the oceans and the maintenance of maritime access. China is making artificial islands in the South China Sea, claiming the sovereignty of these islands, building strategic bases in East Asia, and securing routes. The United States has developed several "Freedom of Navigation Operations" to neutralize the declaration of the territorial sea surrounding Chinese artificial islands. We can not be free from marine conflicts in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Regarding the South China Sea dispute, it is expected that the strategic competition and conflict between the two countries will intensify due to China's failure to make concessions of core interests and adherence to the US compliance with international norms. In the midst of conflict over the South China Sea, we need a harmonious balance between our alliance security and economic diplomacy. We must continue our efforts to strengthen the ROK-US alliance but not to make China an enemy. Considering the significant impacts of the oceans on the survival and prosperity of the nation, we must continue to develop our interest in the oceans, appropriate investments and tactical strategies.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.35 no.4
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• pp.373-381
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• 2013

The Pacific Island Forum that consists of 14 island countries in the South Pacific has long been the focus of keen attention from East Asian countries such as South Korea, Japan and China. The South Pacific area was controlled by Japan right after the First World War. The League of Nations bestowed the right of trusteeship over the region to Japan, one of the victors in the war. However, the U.S. considered the area indispensible for its security interests in the Pacific after victory in the Second World War. With the end of Cold War period, the region again began to gain the competitive attention of Japan, China and Korea. Japan has made efforts to give economic assistance to this region by holding the Japan-Pacific Islands summit every three years. In addition, Japan is promoting a security engagement with this region by dispatching Self Defense Forces with the aim of initiating construction and development projects. In response to Japan's active involvement in the region, China also began to convene a summit meeting with these countries in 2006, making pledges of economic assistance. Furthermore, Chinese civilian companies struck deals of investment with municipal institutions in the region with a view to enhancing China's influence in the region. Japan's and China's active engagement in the region has galvanized South Korea to craft a more effective strategic approach to the region.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.104-143
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• 2015

China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21^st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.

• Journal of Environmental Science International
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• v.20 no.11
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• pp.1483-1497
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• 2011

The result of comparison and analysis study of institutionalization and exchange status of environmental education in South Korea, the People's Republic of China, and Japan, Northeast Asian countries that are closely related to Korea, is summarized as the following: First, this study shows that the process of environmental education institutionalization requires an instigation. For example, a specific environmental policy is established after raising awareness to modify environmental policies, as the result of aggravation of damage due to pollution. Therefor, it is the necessary process for the establishment of an environmental policy in order to proceed environmental education institutionalization. Second, even though institutionalization processes of environmental education for the three countries are considered to be very similar, differences are apparent if one carefully examines the content of environmental education for each country. In particular, South Korea, the People's Republic of China, and Japan all agree that environmental education is necessary, but differ in their ideas of main body for advocating institutionalization, as well as maintenance level of environmental education. Third, the order of establishment of environmental education institutionalization is Japan, South Korea and China and there exists about a 10 years time gap between each country. Fourth, the environmental education exchange was formed between South Korea and the People's Republic of China and between South Korea and Japan, first. Then it was enlarged to TEMM(Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting) and TEEN(Tripartite Environmental Education Network) among three countries.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.46 no.6
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• pp.21-38
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• 2021

China adopts the "Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China and the Long-Range Objectives Through the Year 2035" in the context of tremendous changes in the international environment. A new development paradigm is proposed to prioritize domestic circulation, reinforcing both domestic and international circulations. The industrial policies of China's "14th Five-Year Plan" will have an impact on Korea. Thus it is necessary for Korea to cooperate with China to actively respond to changes in the industrial chains and value chains in Asia and the world. Over the past 29 years since the establishment of diplomatic relation between China and South Korea, the two countries have enjoyed close economic and trade relations. China-ROK cooperation is critical to regional economic development in the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the era of remarkable changes in the world's political and economic structure. China is a robust developing country, while Korea is a developed one in with steady foothold in the world economy. China and South Korea should work together to contribute to the rapid recovery and development of the world economy instead of becoming competitors.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.5-25
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• 2014

On July 3~4, 2014, the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to Seoul might be seen as a step on the path toward strategic outcomes for both country. For South Korea, Seoul shrewdly retains some degree of self-reliance by balancing between ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership relationship and ROK-US alliance. For China, Beijing appears to put its interests on the Korean Peninsula increasingly within China's larger geopolitical influence. To what extent can ROK-China relationship maintain futuristic strategic cooperative partnership between them? As we observed joint press communiques of the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit on July 3, 2014, four agendas of bilateral relationship between Seoul and Beijing can be identified: intractable rivalry between the two great powers, North Korea nuclear issues, disparities of their displeasure with Japan denying the past wrongdoing and enhancing its military capabilities and Chinese imposing of its core interests on its Korea policy. With these evolving strategic environments, however, China and the ROK appear justifiably be pleased with the state of their relations: their strategic cooperative partnership is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region and continues to grow broader and deeper.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.131-143
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• 2016

On 12 July 2016, China's maritime claim to most of the South China Sea (SCS) based on the so-called nine-dash line was rejected by the Arbitral Tribunal, constituted under Annex VII to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concerning issues in the South China Sea including the legality of the so-called "nine-dashed line", the status of certain maritime features and their corresponding maritime entitlements, together with the lawfulness of certain actions by China which the Philppines, in a case brought in 2013, alleged were violations. As having the Tribunal determined that China's claim had no legal grounds in UNCLOS, thus undermining China's claims, and establishing that China has no exclusive legal rights to control the area roughly the size of India. There are some major implications from the Tribunal's ruling in the Arbitration award. These include implications on: how to delimit the maritime boundary in disputed waters, how to promote maritime confidence-building measures, how to safeguard maritime safety and security, and how to promote the rule of law in the SCS. Since its application of UNCLOS in East Asia, it has been obvious that the only way to resolve maritime disputes in the region is to build strong maritime cooperative partnerships under the auspices of the rule of law.