• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.265-289
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• 2015

The idea that an effect counterfactually depends on its cause is simple and intuitive. However, this simple idea runs into various difficulties. The active route account, in order to avoid the difficulties, analyzes causation in terms of counterfactual dependence under certain control. In her recent article, Seahwa Kim criticizes Sungsu Kim's earlier attempt to defend the active route account from its counterexamples. Her criticisms are convincing, and defenders of the active route account or counterfactual analysis of causation in general need another defense. In response, a two-step defense is proposed. First, the scope of the active route account is restricted to 'proximate' causal relation. Second, a control over factors that are in proximate causal relation is offered to figure out 'distant' causal relation. The result is that with proper control, an effect indeed counterfactually depends on its cause.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.133-153
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• 2015

In his paper "Structural Equations Approach to Token Causation: The Active Route Account Revisited" Professor Sungsu Kim defends the active route account. The active route account is the theory of causation which overcomes counterexamples to the counterfactual theories of causation, while maintaining the counterfactual theorist's essential intuition that an effect depends counterfactually on a cause. Unfortunately, there are counterexamples to the active route account itself. Professor Sungsu Kim attempts to defend the active route account by rebutting those counterexamples. In this paper, I argue that his defense of the active route account is not successful.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.113-141
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• 2017

The standard definition of an instantaneous temporal part cannot properly deal with cases involving time travel. This paper provides a new definition of an instantaneous temporal part by appealing to David Lewis's distinction between external time and personal time. The new definition avoids the problems because it does not allow more than one instantaneous temporal part of an object at each moment of its personal time. We argue that this new definition, combined with our new perdurantist semantic thesis, deals with cases of time travel successfully.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.45-59
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• 2013

In his book Worlds and Individuals: Possible and Otherwise, Takashi Yagisawa Yagisawa argues that his own theory is better than Lewis's theory by showing that his own theory can deal with important objections to modal realism more successfully than Lewis's. In particular, Yagisawa claims that by adopting modal tenses, he can respond to many important objections to modal realism in a uniform way. In this paper, I argue that Lewis can also successfully respond to Peacocke's objection in an exactly parallel way to Yagisawa's by distinguishing existence at the actual world from existence at other possible worlds and that Yagisawa's response to van Inwagen's objection does not succeed. I conclude that Yagisawa fails to show that his own theory is better than Lewis's.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.233-251
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• 2019

In this paper, I raise objections to Sungsu Kim's argument that Sartorio's hard-line reply to the manipulation argument fails. In attacking Sartorio's argument, Sungsu Kim claims that there are two problems with Sartorio's. I argue that Sungsu Kim's argument fails by responding to these two problems. With respect to the first problem, I provide a new example of dilution of responsibility. With respect to the second problem, I argue that, contrary to what Sungsu Kim assumes, for Sartorio's argument to succeed, our intuition that Ernie is responsible in the Lightning Strike Scenario does not have to be as strong as our intuition that Ernie is not responsible in the Diana scenario.