• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.351-381
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• 2010

Established on February 1st, 2010, The ROKN maritime task flotilla has a goal to successfully cope with North Korea and other potential threats. Unlike precedents of its kind, The ROKN maritime task flotilla is expected to concentrate more an far-sea strategies than coastal strategies. In such circumstances however, the existing maritime logistics systems have limitations upon which to utterly support the operation conception of the ROKN maritime task flotilla seven. To ensure it's efficiency, transformation of the systems is prerequisite. The purpose of this study is to deduce an adequate maritime logistics system for the ROKN maritime task flotilla by evaluating the limitation of the current system and foreseeing its performance necessary abilities to operate in the future. In order to do this, the study presented problems and the direction of development on the structural and behavioral sides. Fist, regarding problems in the structure of maritime logistics system, the investigation pronounced the need of improvement in mobile logistics support ability and its speed. In addition, for the behavioral side, the need of improvement in logistics cooperation system and self-maintenance ability was affirmed. For the development of an adequate maritime logistics system, the study suggested the amelioration in the operation of an adequate mobile logistics support platform and the speed of the logistics using high-speed transportation such as planes for the structural side. Moreover, for the behavioral side, it recommended th enhancement of logistics cooperation system including the nations that already imported th weapon system, amelioration of self-maintenance ability, and necessity to operate mobile maintenance group.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.6 no.4
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• pp.493-498
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• 2020

The fourth industrial revolution is the first topic thrown by Klaus Schwab at the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2016, meaning the next industrial revolution led by the Internet of Things (IOT), artificial intelligence (AI), robot technology and life sciences. In addition, in our lives, humans, computers and machines are connected organically, and organic relationships are evolving and developing at a furious rate in all areas of life. Since the 1953 armistice agreement, South Korea has remained in a state of confrontation with North Korea, and there have been continued fighting by the North, including naval skirmishes in the West Sea, artillery attacks on Yeonpyeong Island, the sinking of the Cheonan warship, and unmanned aerial vehicles and ankle mines. To prepare for such a local initiative, our military is constantly preparing and will have to strengthen its combat capabilities by developing and introducing advanced military equipment. After all, the military drone industry linked to the Fourth Industrial Revolution following the development of new war should continue its research on military drones in line with accurate diagnosis and the rapid development of future science and technology and IT technologies.

• Maritime Security
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.1-44
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• 2021

China's new Maritime Policy Law (MPL) purports to regulate the duties of China's maritime police agencies, including the China Coast Guard, and safeguard China's sovereignty, security, and rights and interest. The MPL has potentially far-reaching application, as China claims extensive maritime areas off its mainland and in the South China Sea. This expansive application of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction is problematic given that most of China's maritime claims are inconsistent with international law. To the extent that the MPL purports to assert jurisdiction over foreign flagged vessels in disputed areas or on the high seas, it contravenes international law. Numerous provisions of the MPL regarding the use of force are also inconsistent with international rules and standards governing the use of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction, as well as the UN Charter's prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. China could use the MPL as a subterfuge to advance its illegal territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas and interfere with coastal State resource rights in their respective exclusive economic zone.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.63-98
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• 2012

Northeast Asia has a multi-layered security structure within which major economic and military powers both confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative activities in the economic sphere while competing one another in order to secure a dominant position in the politico-military arena. The multifarious threats, posed by the North Korea's nuclear development, territorial disputes, and maritime demarcation line issues demonstrate that Northeast Asia suffers more from military conflicts and strifes than any other region in the world. Specifically, major maritime security threats include North Korea's nuclear proliferation and missile launching problems as well as military provocations nearby the Northern Limit Line(NLL) as witnessed in the Cheonan naval ship and Yeonpyong incidents. The ROK Navy has been supplementing its firm military readiness posture in consideration of North Korea's threats on the NLL. It has performed superb roles in defending the nation and establishing the Navy advanced and best picked. It also has been conducive to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, secure the sea lanes of communications, and establish regional stability and world peace. In order to effectively cope with the strategic environment and future warfares, the ROK Navy needs to shift its military structure to one that is more information and technology intensive. In addition, it should consolidate the ROK-US alliance and extend military cooperative measures with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Evolved steadily for the last 60 years, the ROK-US alliance format has contributed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. In conclusion, this manuscript contends that the ROK Navy should strive for the establishment of the following: (1) Construction of Jeju Naval Base; (2) Strategic Navy Equipped with War Deterrence Capabilities; (3) Korean-type of System of Systems; (4) Structure, Budget and Human Resources of the Naval Forces Similar to the Advanced Countries; and (5) Strategic Maritime Alliance and Alignment System as well as Domestic Governance Network for the Naval Families.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.215-240
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• 2020

In 2017, the U.S. DARPA coined 'mosaic warfare' as a new way of warfighting. According to the Timothy Grayson, director of DARPA's Strategic Technologies Office, mosaic warfare is a "system of system" approach to warfghting designed around compatible "tiles" of capabilities, rather than uniquely shaped "puzzle pieces" that must be fitted into a specific slot in a battle plan in order for it to work. Prior to cover mosaic warfare theory and recent development, it deals analyze its background and several premises for better understanding. The U.S. DoD officials might acknowledge the current its forces vulnerability to the China's A2/AD assets. Furthermore, the U.S. seeks to complete military superiority even in other nation's territorial domains including sea and air. Given its rapid combat restoration capability and less manpower casualty, the U.S. would be able to ready to endure war of attrition that requires massive resources. The core concept of mosaic warfare is a "decision centric warfare". To embody this idea, it create adaptability for U.S. forces and complexity or uncertainty for the enemy through the rapid composition and recomposition of a more disag g reg ated U.S. military force using human command and machine control. This allows providing more options to friendly forces and collapse adversary's OODA loop eventually. Adaptable kill web, composable force packages, A.I., and context-centric C3 architecture are crucial elements to implement and carry out mosaic warfare. Recently, CSBA showed an compelling assessment of mosaic warfare simulation. In this wargame, there was a significant differences between traditional and mosaic teams. Mosaic team was able to mount more simultaneous actions, creating additional complexity to adversaries and overwhelming their decision-making with less friendly force's human casualty. It increase the speed of the U.S. force's decision-making, enabling commanders to better employ tempo. Consequently, this article finds out and suggests implications for Korea armed forces. First of all, it needs to examine and develop 'mosaic warfare' in terms of our security circumstance. In response to future warfare, reviewing overall force structure and architecture is required which is able to compose force element regardless domain. In regards to insufficient defense resources and budget, "choice" and "concentration" are also essential. It needs to have eyes on the neighboring countries' development of future war concept carefully.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.85-119
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• 2013

This paper asks whether the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy should continue to focus on building ocean-going naval ships when it faces the threats of North Korean provocations in littoral areas. My position is that the ROK Navy should keep pursuing ocean-going capabilities. I provide explanations why it should do so from the perspectives of three important dimensions: capability, doctrine, and organizational identity. First, I argue that the distinction between a littoral navy and an ocean-going navy is an unnecessary dichotomy. It may lead to inefficiency in national security. The military posture should be designed in a way that it can address all external threats to national security regardless of whether they are from North Korea or not. Such capability is the one that the ROK Navy has tried to acquire with the 'Blue Water Navy' initiative since the 1990s. Second, also from the perspective of lately developed military doctrines that emphasize jointness and precision strike capability, ocean-going capabilities such as the mobile task fleet program have become a must, not an option, given today's security situations on and around the Korean peninsula. Lastly, I draw attention to the fact that the 'Blue Water Navy (BWN)' initiative meant more than just capability to the ROK navy. The BWN represents the ROK navy's organizational identity that the navy has defined since the 1980s as it emphasized promoting national interest and international standing as part of its organizational essence. Furthermore, the phrase 'blue water navy' took on symbolic meanings to the people that are associated with South Korean-ness including sovereignty, national pride, standing in the world and hopes for the future. Since 1990s, many scholars and experts have made the case for the necessity of improving South Korea's naval capability based on different rationales. They emphasized the protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), the economic value of the sea, the potential danger associated with territorial disputes over islands, and increasing naval power of neighboring countries since the end of the Cold War. This paper adds to this debate by trying to explain the matter with different factors including naval doctrines and organizational identity. Particularly, this paper constitutes a unique endeavor in that it incorporating constructivist elements (that is, identity politics) in explaining a national security matter.

• Strategy21
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• s.38
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• pp.250-286
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• 2015

The main purpose of this article is to provide an understanding on current maritime issues in the Northeast Asia, and thereby help formulating the right strategy for our national security. The article summarizes core arguments in the recently published 『The 21^st Century Maritime Strategies in the Northeast Asia: Dilemma between Competition and Cooperation』. It will help readers to comprehend historical backgrounds as well as recent updates related to maritime issues and strategies in the region. Also, readers may find guidance to conceive their own maritime strategies for the Republic of Korea. Currently, the U.S. is shifting its focus from Atlantic to Pacific, and increasing its naval presence in Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, the 21^st century China views the maritime interests as the top priority in its national security and prosperity. PLA Navy's offensive maritime strategies and naval building such as aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines are unprecedented. Japan is another naval power in the region. During the Cold War JMSDF faithfully fulfilled the mission of deterring Soviet navy, and now it is doing its job against China. Lastly, Putin has been emphasizing to build the strong Russia since 2000, and putting further efforts to reinforce current naval capabilities of Pacific Fleet. The keyword in the naval and maritime relations among these powers can be summarized with "competition and cooperation." The recent security developments in the South China Sea(SCS) clearly represent each state's strategic motivations and movements. China shows clear and strong intention to nationalize the islands in SCS by building artificial facilities - possibly military purpose. Obviously, the U.S. strongly opposes China by insisting the freedom of navigation(FON) in international waters as recent USS-Lassen's FON operation indicate. The conflict between China and the U.S. surrounding the SCS seems to be heading towards climax as Russia and Japan are searching for their own national interests within the conflict. Also, the neighboring small and middle powers are calculating their own economic and security interests. This is no exception for us in establishing timely strategies to maximize our own national security. Hopefully, this article leads the readers to the right direction.

• Journal of Korean Port Research
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.93-110
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• 1992

The most change in this century is supposed to be declination of ideology, and block of world economy. Addition to down full of cold war atmosphere around Northeast Asia, not only economic and social mood in this region is dramatically changed, but also it gave birth to the block of Northeast economy that accerlated new hub of world economy. According to dramatic change of economic surroundings the dynamic potential of growth in this region will be guided to enlarge inter-regional trade and increase volume of trade, thus suggests to grow steadily transportation. cargos in this region will have to arrange the system of delivery and inner transportation, accessary facilities, inter-regional harbors if North America and EC has connected easily. As have accerlated GATT and UR represented multilateralism and regionalism, it has regulated to increase trades of region due to relief of the trade barrier through specific areas has agreed with separately. The flow of regionalism of world economy has appeared to realize EC and NAFTA centered U.S.A, and also has presented to free trade region or one-size market agreement in Asia as APEC, EAEG in Malaysia, and etc. In defense to this block and internationalism of world economy, Pusan has to come forward to the hub of Northeast others has proposed a project to dominate the Northeast, Economy Association Agreement as Far East comprehensive development project in USSR, Hunchun development project in NK, and East Sea development project in PRC, Niigate regional development in Japan, Duman River development project in NK, and East Sea development project in Korea. As this exercise has proceed, Pusan also have arranged development strategy definitely and prepared provisions systematically. Engaging to participate center of delivery system is meant to be completed complex functions, namely the transfer storage processing & assembly function of international commodity. Pusan has ability to be terminal point of TSR. it had been connected to EC as the biggest economy block and TKR as complex transportation root to Far East, it would be the center of inground and seabase delivery terminal to Rotterdom as the biggest container pier and major piers to North-East and South East Asia. In order to provide a Role of 21 century's internationalization, Pusan has appealed to participate in management information research and development connected to Pohang-Ulsan-Changwon-Masan, and has utilized efficiently the resources such as man, material, money and information.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.52 no.1
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• pp.272-287
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• 2019

The Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) was established in 1953 by the Korean War Armistice Agreement. It extends from the estuary of the Imjin River, in the west, to the coast of the East Sea. It is 4 km in width and 148 km in length. However, the ecosystems of the civilian control zone (CCZ) located between the southern border of the DMZ and the civilian control line (CCL) and the CCZ in the estuary of the Han River and the Yellow Sea are similar to those in the DMZ, and, therefore, the ecosystems of the DMZ and the CCZ are collectively known as the "ecosystems of the DMZ and its vicinities." The flora in the DMZ and its vicinities is composed of 1,864 species, which accounts for about 42% of all the vascular plant species on the Korean Peninsula and its affiliated islands. Conducting a detailed survey on the vegetation, flora, and fauna in the DMZ is almost impossible due to the presence of landmines and limitations on the time allowed to be spent in the DMZ. However, to assess the environmental impact of the Munsan-Gaesong railroad reconstruction project, it was possible to undertake a limited vegetation survey within the DMZ in 2001. The vegetation in Jangdan-myeon, in Paju City within the DMZ, was very simple. It was mostly secondary forests dominated by oaks such as Quercus mongolica, Q. acutissima, and Q. variabilis. The other half of the DMZ in Jangdan-myeon was occupied by grassland composed of tall grasses such as Miscanthus sinensis, M. sacchariflorus, and Phragmites japonica. Contrary to the expectation that the DMZ may be covered with pristine mature forests due to more than 60 years of no human interference, the vegetation in the DMZ was composed of simple secondary forests and grasslands formed on former rice paddies and agricultural fields. At present, the only legal protection system planned for the DMZ is the Natural Environment Conservation Act, which ensures that the DMZ would be managed as a nature reserve for only two years following Korean reunification. Therefore, firstly, the DMZ should be designated as a site of domestic legally protected areas such as nature reserve (natural monument), scenic site, national park, etc. In addition, we need to try to designate the DMZ as a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve or as a World Heritage site, or as a Ramsar international wetland for international cooperation. For nomination as a world heritage site, we can emphasize the ecological and landscape value of the wetlands converted from the former rice paddies and the secondary forests maintained by frequent fires initiated by military activities. If the two Koreas unexpectedly reunite without any measures in place for the protection of nature in the DMZ, the conditions prior to the Korean War, such as rice paddies and villages, will return. In order to maintain the current condition of the ecosystems in the DMZ, we have to discuss and prepare for measures including the retention of mines and barbed-wire fences, the construction of roads and railroads in the form of tunnels or bridges, and the maintenance of the current fire regime in the DMZ.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.27-56
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• 2013

The United Nations Command (UNC) and the communist North failed to reach an agreement on where the maritime demarcation line should be drawn in the process of signing a truce after the Korean War because of the starkly different positions on the boundary of their territorial waters. As a result, the Armistice Treaty was signed on July 1953 without clarification about the maritime border. In the following month, Commander of the UNC unilaterally declared the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as a complementing measure to the Armistice. Referring to this, North Korea and its followers in South Korea wrongfully argue that the NLL is a "ghost line" that was established not based on the international law. However, one should note that the waters south of the NLL has always been under South Korea's jurisdiction since Korea's independence from Japan on August 15, 1945. There is no need to ask North Korea's approval for declaring the territorial waters that had already been under our sovereign jurisdiction. We do not need North Korea's approval just as we do not need Japan's approval with regard to our sovereign right over Dokdo. The legal status of the NLL may be explained with the following three characteristics. First, the NLL is a de facto maritime borderline that defines the territorial waters under the respective jurisdiction of the two divided countries. Second, the NLL in the West Sea also serves as a de facto military demarcation line at sea that can be likened to the border on the ground. Third, as a contacting line where the sea areas controlled by the two Koreas meet, the NLL is a maritime non-aggression line that was established on the legal basis of the 'acquiescence' element stipulated by the Inter-Korea Basic Agreement (article 11) and the Supplement on the Non-aggression principle (article 10). Particularly from the perspective of the domestic law, the NLL should be understood as a boundary defining areas controlled by temporarily divided states (not two different states) because the problem exists between a legitimate central government (South Korea) and an anti-government group (North Korea). In this sense, the NLL problem should be viewed not in terms of territorial preservation or expansion. Rather, it should be understood as a matter of national identity related to territorial sovereignty and national pride. North Korea's continuous efforts to problematize the NLL may be part of its strategy to nullify the Armistice Treaty. In other words, North Korea tries to take away the basis of the NLL by abrogating the Armistice Treaty and creating a condition in which the United Nations Command can be dissolved. By doing so, North Korea may be able to start the process for the peace treaty with the United States and reestablish a maritime line of its interest. So, North Korea's rationale behind making the NLL a disputed line is to deny the effectiveness of the NLL and ask for the establishment of a new legal boundary. Such an effort should be understood as part of a strategy to make the NLL question a political and military dispute (the similar motivation can be found in Japan's effort to make Dokdo a disputed Island). Therefore, the South Korean government should not accommodate such hidden intentions and strategy of North Korea. The NLL has been the de facto maritime border (that defines our territorial waters) and military demarcation line at sea that we have defended with a lot of sacrifice for the last sixty years. This is the line that our government and the military must defend in the future as we have done so far. Our commitment to the defense of the NLL is not only a matter of national policy protecting territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction; it is also our responsibility for those who were fallen while defending the North-Western Islands and the NLL.