• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.29-34
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• 2013

Safety requirements for aircraft and system functions include minimum performance constraints for both availability and integrity of the function. These safety requirements should be determined by conducting a safety assessment. The depths and contents of aircraft system safety assessment vary depending on factors such as the complexity of the system, how critical the system is to flight safety, what volume of experience is available on the type of system and the novelty and complexity of the technologies being used. Requirements that are defined to prevent failure conditions or to provide safety related functions should be uniquely identified and traceable through the levels of development. This will ensure visibility of the safety requirements at the software and electronic hardware design level. This paper has prepared to study on promoting the efficiency of establishing hierarchical safety requirements from aircraft level function to item level through system safety processes.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.9-15
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• 2023

As the first step of risk management, risk identification is inevitable to understand the degree of work safety. However, the safety requirements can be divided in necessary factors and additional factors. Thus, we propose a safety requirements assessment model using Kano model derived from Herzberg's two-factor theory, classifying safety requirements into ideal elements and must-be elements. The Kano model is usually applied to evaluate customer satisfaction divided into three major requirements in the fields of product development and marketing: attractive, must-be, and one-dimensional requirements. Among them, attractive requirement and must-be requirement are matched with ideal element and must-be element for safety requirement classification, respectively. The ideal element is defined as preventive safety elements to make systems more safe and the must-be element is referred to as fatal elements to be essentially eliminated in systems. Also, coefficients of safety measurement and safety prevention are developed to classify different class of safety requirements. The positioning map is finally visualized in terms of both coefficients to compare the different features. Consequently, the proposed model enables safety managers to make a decision between safety measurement and prevention.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.9 no.6
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• pp.89-96
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• 2007

It is well known that the test and evaluation plan (TEP) is very crucial in the successful development of safety-critical systems. As such, this paper discusses an approach to the development of the TEP for a system that should meet safety requirements in the systems development process. It is studied how to incorporate the result of preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) in generating the safety requirements. It is also discussed how to deal with them when the system requirements (i.e., functions, performance, constraints, components, etc) and the safety requirements are integrated into one model. While doing so, we have constructed the required traceability among them, which is necessary and very useful when the safety requirements need to be corrected or be changed. The use of the traceability makes it possible to easily check out whether and how the safety requirements are properly incorporated in the system design process. Furthermore, without the verified traceability, the system cannot be changed or upgraded later. In order to implement the model on a computer-aided tool, we have constructed a database (DB) schema. As a result, the implemented model/DB allows to automatically generate TEP which can be used to measure the performance and safety level of the developed system.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.9-16
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• 2011

Modern systems become more complex and the demand for systems safety goes up sharply. Thus, the proper handling of the safety requirements in the systems design is getting greatly increased attention these days. Hazard analysis has been one of the active areas of research in connection with systems safety. In this paper, we study a subject on how the hazard analysis results can be incorporated in the systems design. To this end we set up a goal on how to systematically generate safety requirements that should reflect hazard analysis results and be implemented in the systems design and development. To do so, we first review the process for systems design and suggest the associated Model. Then the process and results of hazard analysis are analyzed and Modeled particularly with emphasis on the safety data. The resulting data Model incorporating both the hazard analysis and system life cycle is used in the generation of safety requirements. Based on the developed data Model, the generation of the requirements, the construction of requirements DB, and the change management later on is demonstrated through the use of a computer-aided software tool.

• The Safety technology
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• no.48
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• pp.58-61
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• 2001

• The Safety technology
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• no.47
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• pp.60-63
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• 2001

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 1995.05a
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• pp.568-573
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• 1995

Technical Specifications (TSs) for a nuclear power plant is an important licensing document which defines various operational requirements or conditions. Recently, many researchers have evaluated the risk impacts associated with the TS requirements, using probabilistic safety assessments becoming widely available. This paper presents insights gained km our review of recent risk-based analyses of TSs, focussing on surveillance requirements and AOT (allowed outage time) requirements.

• Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.71-79
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• 2011

The work environment of locomotive cabs has long been an important issue in the design of railload systems since it is quite critical in terms of system's operational safety. It is getting more attention as the running speed of the trains goes up these days. To this end, this paper describes how to systematically construct a DB for the requirements set in the course of the improvement process for the aforementioned cab work environment. As a solution approach, we have adopted the requirement architecture concept to cover the whole activities required to do such as in requirements generation, DB construction, change management, and traceability management. Specifically, based on the requirement architecture framework a requirement process to collect requirements for improvement is discussed, and the guide lines are suggested for verification and validation of the developed requirements. In addition, a base schema and requirements templates are developed, which will be used in generating requirements and constructing a DB. Finally, it is demonstrated how the requirements DB for locomotive cabs can be constructed using a computer-aided tool in an integrated fashion.

• Journal of KIISE:Software and Applications
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.120-133
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• 2000

Major obstruction of using formal methods for hybrid real-time systems in industry is the difficulty that engineers have in understanding and applying the quantitative methods in an abstract requirements phase. While formal methods technology in safety-critical systems can help increase confidence of software, difficulty and complexity in using them can cause another hazard. In order to overcome this obstruction, we propose a framework for qualitative requirements engineering of the hybrid real-time systems. It consists of a qualitative method for requirements specification, called QFM (Qualitative Formal Method), and a safety analysis method for the requirements based on a causality information, called CRSA (Causal Requirements Safety Analysis). QFM emphasizes the idea of a causal and qualitative reasoning in formal methods to reduce the cognitive burden of designers when specifying and validating the software requirements of hybrid safety systems. CRSA can evaluate the logical contribution of the software elements to the physical hazard of systems by utilizing the causality information that is kept during specification by QFM. Using the Shutdown System 2 of Wolsong nuclear power plants as a realistic example, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.51 no.2
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• pp.463-478
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• 2019

The most important non-functional requirements for dependability of any Embedded Real-Time Safety Systems are safety, availability and reliability requirements. System architecture plays the primary role in achieving these requirements. Compliance with these non-functional requirements should be ensured early in the development cycle with appropriate considerations during architectural design. In this paper, we present an application of system architecture modeling for quantitative assessment of system dependability. We use probabilistic model checker (PRISM), for dependability analysis of the DTMC model derived from system architecture model. In general, the model checking techniques do not scale well for analyzing large systems, because of prohibitively large state space. It limits the use of model checking techniques in analyzing the systems of practical interest. We propose abstraction based compositional analysis methodology to circumvent this limitation. The effectiveness of the proposed methodology has been demonstrated using the case study involving the dependability analysis of safety system of a large Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR).