• Korean Security Journal
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• no.44
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• pp.85-116
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• 2015

Found in 23 Dec 1953 to cope with illegal fishing of foreign ships and coastal guard duty, Korea Coast Guard was re-organized as an office under Ministry of Public Safety since the outbreak of sinking of passenger ship "Sewolho". In the course of re-organization, intelligence and investigation duty were transferred to Police Department except "Cases happened on the sea". But the definition of intelligence duty is vague and there are lots of disputes over the jurisdiction and range of activities. With this situation in consideration, the object of this study is to analyse legal and institutional characteristic of KCG Intelligence, to compare them to that of Police Department, foreign agencies like Japan Coast Guard and US Coast Guard, to expose the limit and to suggest solution. To summarize the conclusion, firstly, in the legal side, there is no legal basis on intelligence in [The Government Organization Act], no regulation for mission, weak basis in application act. Secondly, in the institutional side, stated in the minor chapter of [The Government Organization Act], 'the cases happened on sea' is a quite vague definition, while guard, safety, maritime pollution duty falls under 'on the sea' category, intelligence fell to 'Cases happened on the sea' causing coast guard duty and intelligence have different range. In addition, reduced organization and it's manpower led to ineffective intelligence activities. In the case of Police Department, there is definite lines on 'administration concerning public security' in [The Government Organization Act], specified the range of intelligence activities as 'collect, make and distribute information concerning public security' which made the range of main duty and intelligence identical. Japanese and US coast guards also have intelligence branch and performing activities appropriate for the main missions of the organizations. To have superiority in the regional sea, neighboring countries Japan and China are strengthening on maritime power, China has launched new coast guard bureau, Japan has given the coast guard officers to have police authority in the regional islands, and to support the objectives, specialized intelligence is organized and under development. To secure maritime sovereignty and enhance mission capability in maritime safety duty, it is strongly recommended that the KCG intelligence should have concrete legal basis, strengthen the organization and mission, reinforce manpower, and ensure specialized training administrative system.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.1-53
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• 2022

One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.1-30
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• 2020

The study started with the question, "Is Japan's normalization of nationalization a return to militarism?" Therefore, in order to analyze this, the characteristics of the international system after the inauguration of the Japanese Empire during World War I and World War II and the Abe's 2nd Cabinet in contemporary Japan were compared. Through this, there were some differences in the characteristics of the international system of the two periods, and as a result, it was intended to derive the differences between the two examples. During the prewar period of World War I, the militaristic Japanese Empire suffered great damage from the national pride of being the only power in Asia through the Paris Enhancement Conference, the Washington Navy Treaty, and the London Navy Treaty. However, the Western powers with colonies in Asia still existed in the region, so it was not possible to turn them into immediate power expansion. Meanwhile, World War II broke out in Europe. As a result, the Western powers had to focus on the whole of Europe, and the militaristic Japanese empire became a regional hegemony without missing the international system characteristic of "the hegemony." Unlike in the past militarism, Japan's case of pursuing common nationalization since 2012 has been carried out in the order of Northeast Asia in the composition of the "cold war" new cold war. In particular, Japan is attempting to transform itself into a normal state to strengthen the US-Japan alliance on a self-reliant level due to the lack of quantitative military power compared to the neighboring countries.

• Maritime Security
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.71-123
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• 2021

Seoul is under increasing pressure to choose between the US-led IndoPacific Strategy (IPS) and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Accordingly, this paper undertakes a detailed appraisal of the IPS and the BRI in the context of Korea's national policy imperatives. Based on a study of network structure by Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright (2007), the present study seeks to identify a particular network structure within the IPS and the BRI. Through this analysis, the relationship between the core and the participant states will be addressed. Awareness of specific configurations of the IPS and the BRI is important as these reveal what participant states can expect from each network. According to Nexon and Wright, there are four types of network structure: unipolar anarchy, hegemonic order, constitutional order, and imperial order. Based on this, we argue that the IPS has a constitutional order and the BRI has an imperial order. Therefore, we suggest to Seoul that participating in the IPS may make more room for an independent foreign policy than would a BRI partnership with China. South Korea would benefit by participating in the IPS in terms of its national security, striking a favourable regional balance of power.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.48
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• pp.147-176
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• 2016

Korean Peninsula is surrounded by ocean on three sides. Because of this geographical quality over 97% of export and import volumes are exchange by sea. Foreign ship and international passenger vessels carries foreign tourist and globalization and internationalization increases this trends. Leisure population grows with national income increase and interest of ocean. And accidents and incidents rates are also increases. Korea Coast Guard's jurisdiction area is 4.5 times bigger than our country. The length of coastline is 14,963km including islands. One patrol vessel is responsible for 24,068km and one coast guard substation is responsible for 94km. Efficient patrol activities can not be provided. This research focus on this problem. Analyze the status and trends of maritime crime and suggest efficient patrol activities. To deal with increasing maritime crime rate this study suggest to use geographical profile method which developed early 1900s in USA. This geographical profile analyse the spatial characteristic and mapping this result. With this result potential crime zone can be predicted. One of the result is hot spot management which gives data about habitual crime zone. In Korea National Police Agency adopt this method in 2008 and apply on patrol and crime prevention activity by analysis of different criteria. Korea National Police Agency analyse the crime rate with crime type, crime zone and potential crime zone, and hourly, regionally criteria. Korea Coast Guard need to adopt this method and apply on maritime to make maritime crime map, which shows type of crime with regional, periodical result. With this geographical profiling we can set a Criminal Point which shows the place where the crime often occurs. The Criminal Points are set with the data of numerous rates such as homicide, robbery, burglary, missing, collision which happened in ocean. Set this crime as the major crime and manage the data more thoroughly. I expect to enhance the reinforcement of marine crime using this Criminal Points. Because this points will give us efficient way to prevent the maritime crime by placing the patrol vessel where they needed most.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.5-26
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• 2013

The South Korean society has experienced many changes since the sinking of ROKS Cheonan. The government reviewed its defense posture and adopted the 5·24 Measure in its relations with North Korea. As a result, the people of South Korea became more conscious of security situations on the Korean peninsula while North Korea's economy suffered badly. Meanwhile, the South Korean government has taken a flexible stance toward North Korea in terms of exchange and cooperation since September 2011. The flexible stance was to manage inter-Korea relations in a stable manner and relieve the hardships of the North Korean people while preserving the spirits and purposes of the 5·24 Measure. The UN Security Council adopted twenty-six resolutions and statements on North Korea since June 25, 1950. They include thirteen U.N. Security Council resolutions including those concerning nuclear weapons or missile programs, nine Presidential statements, and four press statements. Resolution 82, the first U.N. resolution on North Korea, came when the Korean War broke out. Resolution 825, the first one related to nuclear or missile programs, was adopted in response to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Apart from these U.N. resolutions, the United States has imposed separate sanctions against North Korea. North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be considered in comparison with that of Iran in terms of the consequences they create for the regional security. The Security Council has adopted six resolutions on Iran so far. One should note that the resolutions on Iran have had much stronger sanctions compared to those imposed on North Korea. That is, while the North Korea case may be viewed as a more serious threat to international security from the perspective of nuclear weapons development or proliferation, tougher sanctions have been placed on Iran. There are two approaches that South Korea should take in addressing the related issues. First, we should aim to reduce the gap between sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea. It is difficult to understand that a country with more serious problems is rewarded with lighter sanctions. We should take measures through the Security Council Sanctions Committee to make individuals and groups in North Korea that play a central role in developing nuclear weapons and missiles subject to additional sanctions. Second, we have to change. Other countries in the international community have become tired of North Korea's nuclear issue and now they look to South Korea for initiative. We should correctly understand this current situation and play a leading role within our capacity. Knowingly and unknowingly, the notion that the North Korean nuclear issue may be left to South Korea has been spread around the international community. Although the situation is grave, we should try to open a new horizon in ushering in the unification era by taking the initiative with confidence that there is a looming hope ahead of us. For these tasks, we should stop thinking in the old way that has been ossified for the last two decades. We should not be pushed around by neighboring great powers in dealing with North Korea related issues anymore; we should take the initiative with resolution that we will play our role at the center of four great powers and with confidence that we can do it. Based on the confidence that the Republic of Korea has become a country with enough capacity to take the initiative, we should establish a 'National Grand Strategy' representing South Korea's strategic vision that the unification is the ultimate solution to the problems related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

• Journal of Korean Port Research
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.233-244
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• 1999

The world views the sea newly for the supplementation of the limited land resources and extension of the national territory especially the sea is changing from the period of the free availability to that of the sea control y the coastal nations in step with the announcement of the marine laws in November 16.1994. Therefore Korea is changing strang fisheries nation the fact is that korea cannot effectively cope with changing fisheries situation and various fisheries difficulties because the fisheries policy system is dispersed to each parts of the government. Therefore I tried to present a theoretical basis by studying in the fisheries administration organization. The vision of Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries is as follow: a coastal fishery must be able to reproduction change of fishery structure must be able to raising fishery consumption of fishery must be able to improvement live of fishing village must be able to betterment overseas fishing grounds must have to security. The results of this study is as follow: fisheries administration organization must be reform of organization for changing under the all situation fisheries administration organization must be reform of entrepreneurial organization fisheries administration organization must be reform of customer driven organization fisheries administration organization must be reform of competitive organization.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.189-217
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• 2017

Declaration of Air Defense and Identification Zones started with the United States in 1950, which was followed by declaration of KADIZ by the Republic of Korea in 1951. Initial ADIZ were solely linked with air defense missions, but their roles have changed as nations around the globe manifested a tendency to expand their influence over maritime resources and rights. In particular, China declared ADIZ over the East China Sea in October 2013 and forced all passing aircraft to submit flight plan to ATC or military authority, saying failure of submission will be followed by armed engagement. China announced it would declare another zone over the South China Sea despite the ongoing conflict in the area, clearly showing ADIZ's direct connection with territorial claim and EEZ and that it serves as a zone within which a nation can execute its rights. The expanded KADIZ, which was expanded in Dec 15, 2013 in response to Chinese actions, overlaps with the Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea and the Japanese ADIZ. The overlapping zone is an airspace over waters where not only the Republic of Korea but also of China and Japan argue to be covering their continental shelf and EEZ. Military conventions were signed to prevent contingencies among the neighboring nations while conducting identifications in KADIZ, including the overlapping zone. If such military conventions and practice of air defense identification continue to be respected among states, it is under the process of turning into a regional customary law, although ADIZ is not yet recognized by international law or customary law. Moreover, identification within ADIZ is carried out by military authorities of states, and misguided customary procedures may cause serious negative consequences for national security since it may negatively impact neighboring countries in marking the maritime border, which calls for formulation of operation rules that account for other state activities and military talks among regional stake holders. Legal frameworks need to be in place to guarantee freedom of flights over international seas which UN Maritime Law protects, and laws regarding military aircraft operation need to be supplemented to not make it a requirement to submit flight plan if the aircraft does not invade sovereign airspace. Organizational instructions that require approval of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrance and exit of ADIZ for military aircraft need to be amended to change the authority to Minister of National Defense or be promoted to a law to be applicable for commercial aircraft. Moreover, in regards to operation and management of ADIZ, transfer of authority should be prohibited to account for its evolution into a regional customary law in South East Asia. In particular, since ADIZ is set over EEZ, military conventions that yield authority related to national security should never be condoned. Among Korea, China, Japan and Russia, there are military conventions that discuss operation and management of ADIZ in place or under negotiation, meaning that ADIZ is becoming a regional customary law in North East Asia region.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.483-491
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• 2021

The identification of regional collision risks in water areas is significant for the safety of navigation. This paper introduces a new method of collision risk assessment that incorporates a clustering method based on the distance factor - hierarchical clustering - and uses real-time data in case of several surrounding vessels, group methodology and preliminary assessment to classify vessels and evaluate the basis of collision risk evaluation (called HCAAP processing). The vessels are clustered using the hierarchical program to obtain clusters of encounter vessels and are combined with the preliminary assessment to filter relatively safe vessels. Subsequently, the distance at the closest point of approach (DCPA) and time to the closest point of approach (TCPA) between encounter vessels within each cluster are calculated to obtain the relation and comparison with the collision risk index (CRI). The mathematical relationship of CRI for each cluster of encounter vessels with DCPA and TCPA is constructed using a negative exponential function. Operators can easily evaluate the safety of all vessels navigating in the defined area using the calculated CRI. Therefore, this framework can improve the safety and security of vessel traffic transportation and reduce the loss of life and property. To illustrate the effectiveness of the framework proposed, an experimental case study was conducted within the coastal waters of Mokpo, Korea. The results demonstrated that the framework was effective and efficient in detecting and ranking collision risk indexes between encounter vessels within each cluster, which allowed an automatic risk prioritization of encounter vessels for further investigation by operators.