• Title/Summary/Keyword: Reactor Dismantling

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Development of Low-activation Cement for Decreasing the Activated Waste in Nuclear Power Plant (원전 방사화 폐기물 저감을 위한 저방사화 시멘트의 개발)

  • Lee, Binna;Lee, Jong-Suk;Min, Jiyoung;Lee, Jang-Hwa
    • Journal of the Korean Recycled Construction Resources Institute
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    • v.5 no.3
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    • pp.223-229
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    • 2017
  • When concrete is exposed to neutron rays for a long time, the concrete tends to become activated. If activated, it is classified as middle or low level radioactive waste. However, the great amount of the activated concrete is hard to dispose. In this study, low-activation cement was developed for decreasing the activated waste from shielding concrete around nuclear reactor. Furthermore, the manufactured low-activation was analyzed with activation nuclide Eu, Co. The low-activation cement showed great advantage for low-activation with detecting none of Eu and 3.75ppm of Co while ordinary portland cement showed 0.4~0.9ppm of Eu, 5.5~19.8ppm of Co content. As the results of physical properties of the low-activation cement, it is similar to type 1 ordinary portland cement and accords with type 4 low heat portland cement. Meanwhile, as for the chemical properties of the cement, it accords wite type 1 and 4 at the same time.

An Introduction to the Expansion Plan of the Underground Repository of Low- and Intermediate-level Radioactive Waste In Forsmark, Sweden (스웨덴 포쉬마크 중저준위 방사성 폐기물 지하 처분장 확장 계획 소개)

  • Kwon, Saeha;Min, Ki-Bok;Stephansson, Ove
    • Tunnel and Underground Space
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    • v.26 no.5
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    • pp.339-347
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    • 2016
  • The world's first underground repository for low- and intermediate- level radioactive waste (SFR1) has been in operation since 1988. SFR1 can accommodate $1,000m^3$ of radioactive waste per year with 4 chambers and 1 silo with a total capacity of $63,000m^3$ of radioactive waste. With extended operation time of 10 of the 12 nuclear power reactors and dismantling of the other 2 nuclear reactors, more nuclear waste need to be disposed in the future. Therefore, Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) submitted a license application for a repository extension (SFR3) that consists of 6 additional rock chambers with a capacity of $108,000m^3$ of radioactive waste and for accommodating 9 boiling water reactor tanks. In this study, plans for the extension SFR3 are presented with the geological, geomechanical and hydrogeological issues to be considered.

Separation of Radionuclide from Dismantled Concrete Waste (해체 콘크리트 폐기물로부터 방사성핵종 분리)

  • Min, Byung-Youn;Park, Jung-Woo;Choi, Wang-Kyu;Lee, Kune-Woo
    • Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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    • v.7 no.2
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    • pp.79-86
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    • 2009
  • Concrete materials in nuclear facilities may become contaminated or activated by various radionuclides through different mechanism. Decommissioning and dismantling of these facilities produce considerable quantities such as concrete structure, rubble. In this paper, the characteristics distribution of the radionuclide have been investigated for the effects of the heating and grinding test for aggregate size such as gravel, sand and paste from decommissioning of the TRIGA MARK II research reactor and uranium conversion plant. The experimental results showed that most of the radionuclide could be removed from the gravel, sand aggregate and concentrated into a paste. Especially, we found that the heating temperature played an important role in separating the radionuclide from the concrete waste. Contamination of concrete is mainly concentrated in the porous paste and not in the dense aggregate such as the gravel and sand. The volume reduction rate could be achieved about 80% of activated concrete waste and about 75% of dismantled concrete waste generated from UCP.

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A Study on the Development of High Sensitivity Collision Simulation with Digital Twin (디지털 트윈을 적용한 고감도 충돌 시뮬레이션 개발을 위한 연구)

  • Ki, Jae-Sug;Hwang, Kyo-Chan;Choi, Ju-Ho
    • Journal of the Society of Disaster Information
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    • v.16 no.4
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    • pp.813-823
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    • 2020
  • Purpose: In order to maximize the stability and productivity of the work through simulation prior to high-risk facilities and high-cost work such as dismantling the facilities inside the reactor, we intend to use digital twin technology that can be closely controlled by simulating the specifications of the actual control equipment. Motion control errors, which can be caused by the time gap between precision control equipment and simulation in applying digital twin technology, can cause hazards such as collisions between hazardous facilities and control equipment. In order to eliminate and control these situations, prior research is needed. Method: Unity 3D is currently the most popular engine used to develop simulations. However, there are control errors that can be caused by time correction within Unity 3D engines. The error is expected in many environments and may vary depending on the development environment, such as system specifications. To demonstrate this, we develop crash simulations using Unity 3D engines, which conduct collision experiments under various conditions, organize and analyze the resulting results, and derive tolerances for precision control equipment based on them. Result: In experiments with collision experiment simulation, the time correction in 1/1000 seconds of an engine internal function call results in a unit-hour distance error in the movement control of the collision objects and the distance error is proportional to the velocity of the collision. Conclusion: Remote decomposition simulators using digital twin technology are considered to require limitations of the speed of movement according to the required precision of the precision control devices in the hardware and software environment and manual control. In addition, the size of modeling data such as system development environment, hardware specifications and simulations imitated control equipment and facilities must also be taken into account, available and acceptable errors of operational control equipment and the speed required of work.