• Strategy21
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• 통권42호
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• pp.53-82
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• 2017

Samuel Eliot Morison (1887-1976) was one of the pre-eminent historians of his generation. He was not only a famous historian at that time, but also was promoted to the rank of Admiral in U.S. Navy Reserve. Fifteen volume History of United States Naval Operations in World War II was published between 1947 and 1962, was not only a comprehensive report on the Navy's projection of power over two oceans, but a classic of historical literature that stands as the definitive treatment of it subject. Although he was fifty-five when war come to America in December 1941. Samuel Eliot Morison was determined to play a role. A professor at Harvard at the time, he joined volunteering for duty in the Navy. An experienced sailor, Professor Morison had earlier sailed that same routes taken by Christopher Columbus while researching his biography, Admiral of the Ocean Sea, which appeared in January 1942 th much acclaim and later got a Pulitzer Prize. Thus Morison plunged into the war, crossing the Atlantic aboard a destroyer. He assumed himself as "Parkman on the sea", tried to follow Parkman's historiographic method, not only participatory history but also literary style. And during writing History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, He emphasized two principles, publicity and objectivity. In terms of publicity, he always worried about who read history and why. In his pamphlet, "History as a Literary Art", he asserted it is useless if readers do not read a history which historians wrote. So he thought historians have forgotten that there is an art of writing of history. Therefore, he built his narratives around brightly rendered visuals and used the present tense to describe actions he witnessed firsthand, he wrote of the U.S. combat in very vividly. But strongly driven by publicity, he sometimes lost his balance in writing the naval history. For instance, the naval history became the focus of criticism for its prejudiced comments about the commanders. Also some reviewers asserted he did not secure the objectivity on writing the naval history. Although he sometimes deliberately torpedoed the objectivity of his work for strengthening publicity, by writing an extensive U.S. naval history, he introduced maritime history and naval history to the public widely. Until in early twentieth century, U.S. historians usually had been focusing their effort to the traditional areas, for example politic, economy, and etc. His intensive effort on the operations of U.S. Navy in World War II aroused a public interest in maritime and naval history. In conclusion, through using literary style and realistic narratives, historian Morison wrote a naval history for all the people which could appealed to the public.

• Strategy21
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• 통권46호
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• pp.123-157
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• 2020

이번 연구는 국제해사국의 연례 보고서를 바탕으로 2009~2014년 동안 아프리카 인근 해역에서 발생한 771건의 해적사건을 음이항 회귀분석(Negative binomial regression)을 이용하여 분석했다. 이번 연구를 통해 소말리아 인근에서 작전하는 다국적 해군함정의 숫자가 증가할수록 소말리아 인근에서 발생하는 해적사건이 감소하는 사실을 정량적으로 확인했다. 이를 통해 청해부대를 비롯하여 소말리아 인근에서 실시되고 있는 다국적 해군의 대(對)해적 작전이 실제로 해적사건 감소에 효과가 있음을 증명했다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.82-113
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• 2016

This paper analyzes the contents and the effects of the UNSC 2270, and its implications to South Korea's defense strategy and navy. The UN Security Council passed strong sanctions against North Korea which punish North Korea's 4^th nuclear test. The sanctions compared to the previous ones require international society to take practical actions such as comprehensive trade bans as well as diplomatic isolation which will put significant pains on North Korea. Especially, these measures would greatly hamper economic development policy of Kim Joung-un regime. Because Kim Jung-un regime has inherent legitimacy problems which stems from the third family succession of the power, economic difficulties may play an important cause on the regime instability in the long term. In fact, the United States sees this possibility as an option to coerce North Korea in which North Korea choose denuclearization for its regime survival. Nevertheless, the prospects of the UN sanctions are not so optimistic. Considering North Korea's willingness for nuclear development and its level of nuclear technology, North Korea will try to play a gambit with the US and South Korea by exploiting its strategic advantages. North Korea's response will have three following strategies. First, it would actively pursue political and economic survival strategy by using China's support for the regime, strengthening its power grip in the name of countering US hostile policy, and enhancing peace propaganda. Second, North Korea will accelerate efforts to position its status as a nuclear de facto state. For this purpose, it could create nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Third, it would exploit local provocations as an exit strategy to get over the current situation. In order to counter North Korea's actions and punish North Korea's behavior strongly, South Korea needs following strategies and efforts. It should first make all the efforts to implement the UN sanctions. Strong and practical nuclear deterrence strategy and capability with the U.S. should be developed. Effective strategy and capabilities for the prevention and deterrence of North Korea's provocation should be prepared. For this purpose, North Korea's provocation strategy should be thoroughly reviewed. Active international cooperation is needed to punish and coerce North Korea's behavior. Finally, South Korea should prepare for the possible occurrence of North Korea's contingency and make use of the situation as an opportunity to achieve unification. All these strategies and efforts demand the more active roles and missions of South Korea's navy and thus, nullify North Korea's intention militarily.

• Strategy21
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• 통권45호
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• pp.188-211
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• 2019

중국 해군의 성장은 동아시아의 안보환경 변화에 지대한 영향을 미치고 있으며, 한국 해군 또한 그 영향에서 벗어날 수 없는 실정이다. 대한민국은 중국과 지리적으로 맞닿아 있으며, 현재 불법 중국어선 및 이어도 문제 등 중국과의 수많은 해양갈등을 겪고 있는 상황으로, 이에 대한 적절한 대응을 위해서 한국 해군은 중국 해군의 현대화에 대한 대응을 준비해야만 한다. 본고는 중국과 한국의 해군력을 로버트 토마스 전 미 해군 중장이 제시한 지휘, 통제, 능력, 수량의 네 가지 측면에서 분석 및 비교하였다. 중국 해군은 적의 접근을 원해에서부터 차단하는 것을 목표로 하고(지휘), 그에 걸맞게 C4I 능력을 확충해나가고 있으며(통제), 전력투사. 수중/수상전, 해상재보급 역량을 늘려가고(능력), 최근 4년간 세계 대다수 해군의 총 톤수를 능가하는 수준의 함정건조 추세를 보이고 있다(수량). 한국 해군은 90년대 이후 "대양해군"을 목표로 해왔으며(지휘) 아덴만까지 실시간으로 통제 가능한 뛰어난 C4I 능력을 갖추었으나(통제), 아직 대양해군에 걸맞는 능력 및 전력을 구비하였다고 보기는 어렵다. 한국 해군이 상기 네 가지 측면에서 중국 해군을 따라잡는 것은 거의 불가능에 가깝다. 중국은 GDP의 2% 이내에서 국방비를 책정함에도 매년 GDP의 2.7%를 국방비에 투자하는 한국 국방비의 6배를 상회하며, 이 격차는 계속 커져가는 추세이다. 따라서, 대한민국 해군은 첫째, 잠수함 등 비대칭 전력 확보에 주력하고 방공/대잠능력 등 방어력을 향상시켜야 하며, 둘째, 관련국과의 긴밀한 협력을 통해 동아시아 및 서태평양 지역에서의 해양안보 안정화를 위해 노력해야한다. ADMM+3 등 다자 안보의 틀 안에서 역내 해양의 안정을 꾀할 수 있도록 한국 해군은 정책적 노력을 경주해야할 것이다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권32호
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• pp.123-159
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• 2013

The purpose of this research paper is to re-valuate the factors that affected the Royal Navy's rearmament and preparation for war by conducting analysis on the discussion held in the Britain on the strategic priorities and Navy's coping measures adopted during the interwar period. After the end of the WWI, each of the military arms of the Britain faced significant difficulty in securing budget and increasing their military power all throughout the interwar period, and the Navy was not an exception. The WWII that got started on September 1939 was the turning point in which this difficulty led to full-fledged crisis. Immensely many criticisms followed after the war and problems were identified when it comes to the Royal Navy's performance during the war. This type of effort to identify problem led to the attempt to analyze whether Royal Navy's preparation for war and rearmament policy during interwar period were adequate, and to identify the root causes of failure. Existing studies sought to find the root cause of failed rearmament from external factors such as the deterioration of the Britain itself or pressure from the Treasury Department to cut the budget for national defense, or sought to detect problems from the development of wrong strategies by the Navy. However, Royal Navy's failed preparation for the war during interwar period is not the result of one or two separate factors. Instead, it resulted due to the diverse factors and situations that the Britain was facing at the time, and due to intricate and complex interaction of these factors. Meanwhile, this research paper focused on the context characterized by 'strategic selection and setting up of priorities' among the various factors to conduct analysis on the Navy's rearmament by linking it with the discussion held at the time on setting up strategic priorities, and sought to demonstrate that the Navy Department's inadequate counter-measures developed during this process waned Royal Navy's position. After the end of WWI, each of the military arms continued to compete for the limited resources and budget all throughout the interwar period, and this type of competition amidst the situation in which the economic situation of Britain was still unstable, made prioritization when it comes to the allocation of resources and setting up of the priorities when it comes to the military power build-up, inevitable. Amidst this situation, the RAF was able to secure resources first and foremost, encouraged by the conviction of some politicians who were affected by the 'theory of aerial threat' and who believed that curtailing potential attack with the Air Force would be means to secure national security at comparatively lower cost. In response, Navy successfully defended the need for the existence of Navy despite the advancement of the aerial power, by emphasizing that the Britain's livelihood depends on trade and on the maintenance of maritime traffic. Despite this counter-measuring logic, however, Navy's role was still limited to the defense of overseas territory and to the fleet run-off instead of sea traffic route production when it comes to the specific power build-up plan, and did not understand the situation in which financial and economic factors gained greater importance when it comes to the setting up of strategic priorities. As a result, Navy's plan to build its powers was met with continual resistance of the Treasury Department, and lost the opportunity to re-gain the status of 'senior service' that it had enjoyed in the past during the competition for strategic prioritization. Given that the strategic and economic situation that Korea faces today is not very different from that of the Britain during the interwar period, our Navy too should leverage the lessons learned from the Royal Navy to make the effort to secure viable position when it comes to the setting of priorities in case of national defense strategy by presenting the basis on why maritime coping should be prioritized among the numerous other threats, and by developing the measures for securing the powers needed effectively amidst the limited resources.

• Strategy21
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• 통권46호
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• pp.89-122
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• 2020

The longing for submarine manufacture and the fear of her power had exited for a long time, but submarine that could submerge and attack was built from 20th century by science technology development. The question, 'Submarine can exercise her power in naval warfare?' had exited before World War I, but the effective value of submarine was shown in the procedure of a chain of naval warfare during World War I and World War II. Germany and the United States made the best use of submarines at that time. The submarines of these nations mounted fierce attack on the enemy's battleships and merchant ships and blocked the sea lanes for war material. These fierce attack on ships became impossible After World War II, and the major powers reduced and coordinated the defence budget, so they considered the role of submarine. However, submarine is still powerful weapon system because she can secretly navigate under the water, and one of the most important force in the navy. The aim of this thesis is analyzing submarine roles in each naval warfare and integrating maritime strategy and weapon system technology into her roles. First, the research about represent submarine roles like anti-surfaceship warfare, anti-submarine warfare, intelligence gathering, land attack, supporting special operation and mine landing warfare will be presented, then the major naval warfare where submarine participated(during ex-World War I, World War I, World War II, The Cold War Era and post Cold War) and the analyzing of submarine roles by time will be presented. Submarine was developed for anti-surfaceship warfare during ex-World War I but could not make remarkable military gain in naval warfare because her performance and weapon was inadequate. However, the effective value of submarine in the procedure of a chain of naval warfare was shown during World War I and World War II. The major powers put battleships into naval warfare undiscriminatingly to command the sea power and submarines did massive damage to enemy navy power, so put a restraint the maritime power of enemy, and blocked the sea lanes for war material. After World War II, the battlefield situation changed rapidly and the concept of preemption became difficult to apply in naval warfare. Therefore, the submarine was unable to concentrate on anti-surfaceship mission. Especially during the Cold War era, nuclear submarine came to appear and her weapon system developed rapidly. These development gave submarines special missions: anti-submarine warfare and intelligence gathering. At that time, United States and Soviet submarines tracked other nation's submarines loaded with nuclear weapons and departing from naval their base. The submarines also collected information on the volume of ships and a coastal missile launching site in company with this mission. After Cold War, the major powers despatched forces to major troubled regions to maintain world peace, their submarines approached the shores of these regions and attacked key enemy installations with cruise missiles. At that time, the United States eased the concept of preemption and made the concept of Bush doctrine because of possible 911 terrorism. The missiles fired from submarines and surface battleships accurately attacked key enemy installations. Many nations be strategically successful depending on what kind of mission a submarine is assigned. The patterns of future naval warfare that my country will provide against will be military power projection and coalition/joint operations. These suggest much more about what future missions we should assign to submarines.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.261-293
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• 2017

Nuclear power is a way of attaining an enormous amount of energy with relatively small amount of resources and after it has been introduced to the submarine since 1954, there are approximately 150 of nuclear powered submarine currently on a mission around the world. This is due to the maneuverability, mountability and covertness of nuclear submarines. However, there are other tasks, not only the high level of nuclear technology that are needed to be dealt with in order to construct nuclear powered submarine. The biggest task of all is to secure the enriched uranium. Accordingly, this research is about the way of enriching and securing the nuclear fuel that are used in the nuclear submarine with the characteristics, merits and demerits of the nuclear submarine. Due to the fact that the pressurized water reactor in South Korea is the reactor that was originally built for the development of nuclear powered submarine, many parts is designed to be suitable for the submarine propulsion. However, in order to apply this to submarine it is needed to consider additional requests such as the position of reactor, accident-coping system, radioactive covering, reactor output adjustment and ship's pitch and roll in order to apply this to submarine. Nuclear submarines have much higher speed based on the powerful propulsion in comparison with diesel-electric submarine and also have bigger loading area. Besides, there is no need to snorkel and they also have advantages in covertness with the multi-noise proof system. The nuclear technology in South Korea has seen the dramatic development since 1962 and in 1998 reached to the level that we have succeeded in the localization of nuclear plant and exported the world-class one-piece small-sized reactor (SMART) to UAE. To operate these reactors, we import the whole quantity of low-enriched uranium and having our own uranium enrich facility is not probable because of the budget and international regulations. With the ROK/US nuclear agreement revised on 2015 November, the enrichment of uranium that are available without special permission has changed up to 20%. According to the assumption that we use the 20% enrichment of Uranium on U.S. virginia class submarine, it is necessary to change the fuel after 11 years and it will cause additional cost of 1 billion dollars. But the replace period by the uranium's enrichment rate is not fixed so that it is possible to change according to the design of reactor. Therefore, I would like to make a suggestion on two types of design concepts of nuclear submarine that can be operated for 30 years without nuclear fuel change by using the 20% enriched uranium from ONNp.First of all, it is possible by increasing the size of reactor by 3 times and it results in the 1,000t increase of the weight. And secondly, it is by designing the one piece reactor to insert devices such as steam turbine, condenser into the inside of nuclear core like the Rubis class submarines of France.

• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.207-235
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• 2014

이 논문의 목적은 해군력 개량화를 소개하고 그 활용에 대하여 제안함에 있다. 어떻게 하면 여러 국가 간의 다양한 분쟁에 대한 해군력의 효과를 효과적으로 이해할 수 있을까? 혹은, 어떻게 하면 다양한 해군력의 나라별, 시간별 변화를 이해를 할 수 있을까? 지금까지 많은 학자들이 해군력의 변화와 그 변화에 따른 해군력이 분쟁에 미치는 영향을 규명하려고 많은 노력을 해왔다. 그 중의 한 방법이 정성적인 방법이나 아직 정량적인 시도는 매우 적다. 이 글은 해군력을 정량화하는 방법과 그 데이터를 이용하여 여러 기존 이론을 검증하고 여러 다른 연구주제를 연구하는데 어떻게 이용이 될 것인지를 소개를 하는 글이다. 본 논문의 주요 쟁점은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 계량화적 접근이란 무엇인가에 대해 논의 해 본다. 계량화란 무엇이며 정성적인 방법과의 차이는 무엇인지를 통해 정량화의 이용 가치에 대해 논의해 본다. 둘째, 해군력의 정량화이다. 해군력의 정량화를 위해 어떠한 기준들을 세우고, 그 기준에 따라 함정들을 코딩하고 톤수를 세는 과정을 설명한다. 셋째, 정량화된 해군력을 바탕으로 동북아시아 국가들의 해군력 변화를 서술적으로 분석한다. 이제 주어진 해군력 데이터(주요 함정의 톤수)를 가지고 각 동북아 국가별 시간별로 어떠한 변화를 거처 왔고, 각 분쟁들 (1,2차 세계대전 등)에는 어떠한 상관관계가 있는지를 단순통계적 방법을 이용하여 알아본다. 넷째, 해군력의 변화가 경쟁국가 간의 전쟁 발발에 있어서 어떤 영향을 미치는 지에 대하여 통계적인 방법을 이용하여 검증해 본다. 묘사적인 방법은 다른 요소들에 대한 통제가 이루어 지지 않아, 정확히 해군력과 경쟁국가 간의 전쟁에 대한 인과적인 관계를 증명하기에는 한계가 있다. 따라서, 다른 경쟁적 이론들을 (예를 들어 민주평화론 등) 통제하여 해군력이 숙적국가 간의 전쟁 발발에 미치는 영향을 검증하였다. 상호 해군력의 증가는 경쟁국가 간에는 전쟁을 덜 일으키는 요인으로 작용하였으며, 이는 해군력이 경쟁국가 간에는 억제력이 있다고 추론 할 수 있다. 궁극적으로 해군력의 영향에 대한 정량적인 접근은 기존 연구의 검증, 미래 예측, 국가의 정책결정자들에게 보다 신뢰가 가는 자료를 제공하는 장점들이 있다. 이러한 장점들을 바탕으로 해군력의 영향에 대한 연구는 분쟁분야에 있어서 학술적이나 실용적인 측면에서 많은 이점이 있다.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권13호
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.216-234
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• 2016

본 논문은 자위권 사용과 군사력 사용 간의 관계를 분석하고 이를 한반도 서해에서의 한국과 북한 간 해상긴장 상황에 적용시킨 이슈를 다룬다. 국가가 행사하는 자위권(self-defense: 自衛權)은 기본적으로 전쟁 방지를 위한 기본적 원칙이다. 그러나 이는 군사력 사용(Use of Forces: 軍事力 使用) 또는 무력행사(武力行事)이라는 측면에서 칼의 양날과 같은 결과를 낳는다. 즉 자위권 행사로 전쟁의 확산을 방지하는 반면에 자위권 행사로 상대방에 대한 적성(敵性)을 인정해 주는 경우이다. 반면 북한의 군사도발은 전방향적이며, 1953년 한반도 정전협정 위반이다. 1953년 정전협정 체결 이후 양국은 서해 북방한계선(NLL)에서의 군사적 충돌을 거쳤으며, 이는 과연 한국이 자위권 차원에서의 방어태세와 군사력 사용 측면에서의 대응태세 간에 괴리가 존재하고 있다는 것으로 나타나고 있다. 당연히 피해를 받는 곳은 한국이며, 이는 서해 북방한계선에서의 남북한 해군 간 대결국면에서 나타나고 있다. 이에 본 논문은 자위권을 국가 차원 행사하는 수준과 작전에 투입된 현장 작전 지휘관 차원에서 행사하는 수준으로 구분하여 다룬다. 서해 북방한계선 부근 수역에서의 북한의 해상 군사도발에 대해 현장 작전 지휘관이 행사하는 자위권은 대한민국 정부 차원에서의 자위권 행사와는 다르면, 이 문제를 국제법을 중심으로 분석하기에는 너무나 많은 제한점이 있다. 현행 국제법상 국가 자위권 문제는 군사력을 동반하는 문제로서 그 행사요건이 매우 애매모호하고 까다롭다. 그러나 현장 작전지휘관의 자위권 행사는 단호해야 하며, 이는 군사력 운용으로 나타나야 한다. 실제 서해에서의 남북한 대결국면에서의 대한민국 해군의 자위권 행사는 정전협정에 의거 제한되고 있으며, 이는 2010년 북한의 천안함 침몰과 연평도 폭격도발 시 대한 민국 해군과 해병대의 대응에서 증명되었다. 현재 대한민국 국방부는 현장 작전 지휘관에서 소위 '선제적 자위권 행사' 부여 필요성에 대한 논의를 진행 중으로 알려져 있다. 이에 따라 선제적 자위권 행사를 위한 조치들을 제도화하는 움직임을 보이고 있다. 예를 들면 2013년 발표된 대한민국 합참과 유엔사령부/한미 연합사령부/주한미군사령부 북한 군사 도발에 대한 대응계획(ROK JCS and UNC/CFC/USFK Counter-Provocation Plan)이 이를 간접적으로 증명하고 있다. 선제적 자위권은 행사에 있어 몇 가지 원칙을 요구하고 있으며, 이에 대한 합법성 문제는 아직 해결되고 있지 않다. 따라서 이 문제와 북한 군사도발 시에 대한 대한민국의 선제적 자위권 행사 간 연관성 문제를 어떻게 해석할 수 있는가에 대한 연구가 필요한 실정이다. 평시 군사력 사용에 따른 무력행사의 적법성은 그 인정이 대단히 어려운 것이 현실이며, 이에 따라 북한의 군사도발에 대한 가장 효율적 방안이 선제적 자위권이라면, 이에 대한 법적 대응이 무엇인가에 대한 제도적 근거를 필요로 할 것이다.