• Maritime Security
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.125-149
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• 2021

Even 10 years after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan has yet to solve the problems emerging from generating contaminated water every day. Japan has unilaterally decided to release nuclear wastewater in the sea despite Korea's concerns about safety as their radioactive water storage tanks reach the limits. Despite Korea's response, Japan is still preparing to discharge nuclear wastewater without fulfilling its obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. There are concerns about marine pollution caused by the radioactive materials from nuclear wastewater and invading Korea's maritime sovereignty. In particular, it is impossible to reverse the effects of environmental pollution, so plans to discharge radioactive water must be prevented unless immediate safety is guaranteed. This study proposes Korea's response strategy to resolve the conflict between the two countries due to plans to release contaminated water. Korea should respond to Japan's release of nuclear wastewater in the sea in various ways through cooperation with Japan, provisional measures, and cooperation with neighboring countries.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.104-143
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• 2015

China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21^st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.65-103
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• 2015

This study is an attempt to look into the future role of the ROKN and to provide a strategic way forward with a special focus on naval strategic concept and force planning. To accomplish this goal, this research takes four sequential steps for analysis: 1) assessing the role and utility of naval power of ROKN since its foundation back in 1945; 2) forecasting features of various maritime threats to influence the security of Korea in the future directly or indirectly; 3) identifying the roles to be undertaken by future ROKN; and 4) recommending Korean way of naval force planning and the operational concept of naval power. This study seeks to show that ROKN needs comprehensive role to better serve the nation with respect to national security, national prosperity and development, and future battle-space management. To safeguard the national security of Korea, it suggests three roles: 1) national guard for the peaceful unification; 2) protector of the maritime sovereignty; and 3) suppressor to maritime threats. Three more roles are highlighted for national prosperity: 1) escort of the national economy; 2) guardian for national maritime activities; and 3) contributor to the world peace. These roles need to be closely connected with the role for the battle-space management. This paper addresses the need for a dramatic shift of the central operational domain from land to maritime in the future. This will eventually offer future ROKN a leading role for developing strategic concept and force planning rather than merely a supporting one. This study finally suggests 'balanced' strategy both in concept development and force planning. A balanced force planning is a 'must' rather than an 'option' when considering a division of function between Task Fleets and Area Fleets, constructing cutting-edge conventional forces such as Aegis destroyer, CVs, or submarines, and the mix of high-profile platform and low-profile when composing future fleets. A 'balance' is also needed in operational concept. The fleet should be prepared to fulfill its missions based on two different types of force operation i.e., coercive or cooperative application of the utility of naval force. The findings and recommendations of the study are relevant today, and will be increasingly important in the future to achieve various political goals required by enhancing the utility of naval power.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.198-241
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• 2016

Aircraft carriers: are they national platforms to maximize national interest or just simply paper tigers to be little useful for states' development? To some states such as U.S., U.K, and France, aircraft carriers functioned as national assets which is indispensable to their interest. By contrast, Thailand's aircraft carrier was a dead platform which is useless to its national interest and India's ones were little used on the mission field. What is the mechanism leading to this difference? The key is whether states make aircraft carriers connected to overall national evolution when it comes to establishing military strategy and planning a long-term force structure. Put it another way, conditions to acquire them need to be analyzed regarding two variables-national status(prestige and economic power) and threat(mission)-for the future as well as in the present. The former acquired carriers under the condition of making them becoming national platforms which is balanced with their overall development. However, the latter simply bought them without carefully taking account of economic obstacles, e.g., the poverty rate, when it comes to force planning. At the same time, we should not neglect to identify that states of the former cases might have a hard time in maximizing their key interests if they did not have carriers. Accordingly, conditions on carriers' acquisition need to be carefully examined and a typological theory suggested here could shed light on this process. This theory shows that South Korea's status is eligible to have a necessary and sufficient condition to acquire carriers.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.174-207
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• 2017

Human history shows diverse strategies for survival and prosperity. This study introduces the concept of the expansion of wealth as a key to explain choice and behavior of political entities. American scholar, -Bruce Bueno de Mesquita-, offers theoretical grounds for this concept in that the cores of selectorate theory is settled. The political entity consists of two groups, -the winning coalition that has power to replace leader and non-winning coalition that has not. Leaders implement policies serving for the welfare of winning coalition in return for their loyalty. Both internal problems caused by demographic changes and external ones of climate changes, epidemic disease, or invasion compel leader and winning coalition to adopt policies of expansion that they believe may lead to the acquisition of wealth needed to counter those problems. The process starts by occupying one spot where other entities reside and then connecting it to its own. The line between spots functions as a foothold to form a new line to other spots. By repeating this process, a space is created in which new laws and orders are instated. In the early stage of expansion, war is hardly avoidable. Once finished successfully, the political circumstance tilts to encourage economic activities in order to generate national revenues to strengthen political power of winning coalition. However, as scale of economic activities grows, so does political power of civic classes in production and trade. To gain financial support required to run the political entity, delegation of power or bestowing autonomy to non-winning coalition is inevitable. Thus, expansion is not the ultimate solution, only to prolong the political survival if succeed. Maritime power came to attractive option when overland expansion had become obstructed. It offered much greater advantages in terms of political risks and financial burdens in exploring new regions of precious commodities than overland expansion. Each political entity around world have been, for the first time in human history, connected by maritime means since 15th century. It is worthy of noting that land conditions propelled people out to sea. Political and economic situations created opportunities to exploit geographical position in pursuit of wealth. In the 21st century, we witness the operation of international winning coalition that presides over the rules of expansion. Competing for market is synonymous to the expansion in this era, the cause and aim of it has not been changed though. Energy and dollars are key factors of expansion since the end of the 2nd world war. No matter what the forms and conditions change, naval power is still the most relevant means for expansion as it retains unique characters of maneuver, flexibility, continuity, display and projection of power. The strategy for using naval power should be in line with two different approaches for expansion: Approaches to the international winning coalition by making contribution to world order, and approaches to the non-international winning coalition by enhancing military diplomatic activities. The former will serve our share of winning coalition while the latter will open chances to acquire further prosperity.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.113-136
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• 2022

China has been pushing for a systematic strategy for territorialization over a long period of time to invade Korea's West Sea (Yellow Sea) in order to create China's territorial water. China's strategy for territorializing the West Sea is an activity in which China curbs the use of South Korea and enforces the illegal use of China in order to dominate the West Sea exclusively. China aided Chinese fishing boats that engaged in illegal fishing in Korea's jurisdiction as a means to territorialize the West Sea, and is opposed to combined exercise and training of Korea and the United States Naval Forces in the West Sea, while intentionally entering KADIZ(Korea Air Defense Identification Zone). In addition, Beijing used 'scientific exploration and research' measures as a pretext for its strategies in order to encroach on Korea's West Sea. China is carrying out such work to announce to the world that China is a systematic and organized country while consistently attempting to dominate the West Sea. China's activities in the West Sea seriously infringe South Korea's sovereignty. In order to respond to China's strategies of territorialization in the West Sea stated above, I analyzed the rejection effect of the ROK-US combined military training in the West Sea and presented a 'proportional response strategy centered on the ROK-US combined forces'. Korea should be able to respond proportionally to China's activities in the seas around the Korean peninsula, and Korea should be able to neutralize China's attempt to a Fait Accompli. In addition, just as China installs buoys in the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone, Korea should be able to install and actively utilize some devices in the West Sea and for the use of free and open West Sea. Korea should not just wait for the tragic future to come without preparing for China's gradual and long-term strategy, and Seoul needs to respond to China's maritime policy in the West Sea with a more active attitude than it is now. China has historically taken a bold and aggressive response to neighboring countries that are consistent with a passive attitude, on the other hand, Beijing has taken a cautious approach to neighboring countries that respond with an active attitude. It should not be forgotten that Korea's passive response to the Chinese strategy in the name of a 'realistic approach' such as Korea's economic dependence on China for economy will result in China's success for territorialization of the West Sea.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.79-102
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• 2018

2015년 미 해군에서 발간한 미 수상함대전략(Surface Force Strategy)에 따르면, 미 해군은 반접근-지역거부(Anti-Acess and Anti-Denial, A2/AD) 전략에 대한 대응책으로 '분산된 치명성(Distributed Lethality, DL)'이라는 신 작전개념을 개발 중에 있다. 이 개념은 각 유닛(unit)의 공격력(offensive power)을 향상시키고 지리적으로 분산 시킴으로써(geographical dispersion) 생존성을 향상시키는데 목적을 두고 있다. 하지만 동맹국(한국/일본 등)이 '분산된 치명성(DL)' 개념에 기여할 수 있는 영역이 다양함에도 불구하고, 지금까지 미 해군 내에서는 동맹국과 어떻게 공조해야 할 것인가에 대한 논의가 부족한 것이 사실이다. 따라서, 미 해군은 향후 '분산된 치명성(DL)' 이라는 작전개념에 동맹국이 줄 수 있는 이점을 추가적으로 적용하는 '동맹국을 활용한 분산된 치명성(Distributed Lethality with Allies, DL+A)' 개념을 발전시켜야 할 것이다. '동맹국을 활용한 분산된 치명성(DL+A)' 개념이란 동맹국이 가지고 있는 전력, 시설, 플랫폼 등 가용자산을 최대한 활용하여 기존의 '분산된 치명성(DL)' 개념을 강화시키는 신 작전개념이다. 미 해군은 본 논문에서 제시하는 신 작전개념(DL+A)을 적용함으로써 다양한 영역(정찰, 군수, 지리적 요충지, 플랫폼)에서 동맹국으로부터 지원을 받을 수 있을 것이다. 또한, 동맹국은 미 해군의 신 작전개념을 적용함으로써 A2/AD 전략에 대비한 안보능력을 향상시킬 수 있을 것이다.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.85-119
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• 2013

This paper asks whether the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy should continue to focus on building ocean-going naval ships when it faces the threats of North Korean provocations in littoral areas. My position is that the ROK Navy should keep pursuing ocean-going capabilities. I provide explanations why it should do so from the perspectives of three important dimensions: capability, doctrine, and organizational identity. First, I argue that the distinction between a littoral navy and an ocean-going navy is an unnecessary dichotomy. It may lead to inefficiency in national security. The military posture should be designed in a way that it can address all external threats to national security regardless of whether they are from North Korea or not. Such capability is the one that the ROK Navy has tried to acquire with the 'Blue Water Navy' initiative since the 1990s. Second, also from the perspective of lately developed military doctrines that emphasize jointness and precision strike capability, ocean-going capabilities such as the mobile task fleet program have become a must, not an option, given today's security situations on and around the Korean peninsula. Lastly, I draw attention to the fact that the 'Blue Water Navy (BWN)' initiative meant more than just capability to the ROK navy. The BWN represents the ROK navy's organizational identity that the navy has defined since the 1980s as it emphasized promoting national interest and international standing as part of its organizational essence. Furthermore, the phrase 'blue water navy' took on symbolic meanings to the people that are associated with South Korean-ness including sovereignty, national pride, standing in the world and hopes for the future. Since 1990s, many scholars and experts have made the case for the necessity of improving South Korea's naval capability based on different rationales. They emphasized the protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), the economic value of the sea, the potential danger associated with territorial disputes over islands, and increasing naval power of neighboring countries since the end of the Cold War. This paper adds to this debate by trying to explain the matter with different factors including naval doctrines and organizational identity. Particularly, this paper constitutes a unique endeavor in that it incorporating constructivist elements (that is, identity politics) in explaining a national security matter.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.192-221
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• 2013

In order to deal with the current economic crisis, the U.S. government, as a part of its austerity fiscal policy, implemented a budget sequester. The sequester will hit the U.S. defense budget the hardest, and as a result will most likely put the security of the international community in jeopardy. The U.S. will have to cut 46 billion dollars from its original 525 billon defense spending in 2013. And by the year 2022, will have to cut 486.9 billion dollars. Such an astronomical decrease in the U.S. defense spending will inevitably burden the friendly nations. According to recent studies, pirate related incidents in Somalia, where piracy is most active, has declined from its 226 incidents to 76 incidents per year in 2012, a 66% drop from previous years'. However, piracy threats as well as those related to firearms still remain and thus participants of anti-piracy operations, namely the U.S., U.K., France, Canada, NCC, EUNAVFOR, and NATO, are facing a problem of declining forces. Considering the current situation as well as rising expectations from the international community, Republic of Korea, a supporter of NCC's maritime security operation, not to mention its foremost duty of securing its sea, is at a stage to re-examine its operational picture. Such action will be a good opportunity for Republic of Korea to build the trust and live up to the international community's expectation. To quote from the network theory, although in relation to other friendly nations participating in the anti-piracy operation, Republic of Korea currently remains at a single cell level, this opportunity will certainly develop Korea to a 'node' nation in which power and information would flow into. Through this expansion of operational capability, Republic of Korea will be able to exert more influence as a more developed nation. Currently however, not only is the single 4,500 ton class destroyer deployed in Somalia a limited unit to further expand the scale and amount of force projection in the area, but also the total of six 4,500 ton class destroyers ROK feet possess is at a high fatigue degree due to standard patrolling operations, midshipman cruise and the RIMPAC exercise. ROK fleet therefore must consider expanding the number of ships deployed along with either deploying combat support ships or constructing logistics support site in the African region. Thus, by expanding its operational capabilities and furthermore by abiding to the rightful responsibilities of a middle power nation, Republic of Korea will surely earn its respect among the members of the international community.