• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.55-73
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• 2021

Psychological essentialism states that people believe some categories to have hidden and defining essential features which cause other features of the category (Gelman, 2003; Hirschfeld, 1996; Medin & Ortony, 1989). Essentialist belief on categories questions the Roschian argument (Rosch, 1973, 1978) that categories merely consist of clusters of correlated features. Unlike family resemblance categories, essentialized categories are likely to have clear between-category boundaries and high within-category coherence (Gelman, 2003; Prentice & Miller, 2007). Two experiments were conducted to test the effects of essentialist belief on category representation (i.e., between-category boundary, within-category coherence). Participants learned family resemblance and essentialized categories in their assigned conditions and then performed categorization task (Expt. 1) and frequency estimation task of category exemplars (Expt. 2). The results showed, in essentialized categories, both boundary intensification and greater category coherence. Theses results are likely to have arisen due to increased cue and category validity in essentialized categories and suggest that essentialist belief influences macroscopic representation of category structure.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.31 no.3
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• pp.77-102
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• 2020

Some progress has been made in the study of the category coherence effect, which states that the attributes of soldiers or nuns with similarities in dress and behavior, and easily distinguished from other categories, are likely to be generalized. However, few studies have examined the fundamental psychological mechanisms that underlie this category coherence effect, and this study aims to fill this gap. For this purpose, two experiments were conducted after selecting categories with high coherence (nuns, soldiers, and flight attendants) and those with low coherence (interpreters, wedding planners, and florists). In experiment 1, we observed that the members of a category were presumed to have certain reasons to prefer [property X] (presumption of reasons for preference), with this presumption becoming stronger when [property X] was observed repeatedly in high-coherence categories than in the case of low-coherence categories. Experiment 2 showed that for the high-coherence categories, the presumption of reasons for preference was stronger when [property X], rarely seen in everyday life (base rate of 30%), was observed, while the presumption of reasons for preference was weaker when [property Y] (base rate 70%), frequently seen in everyday life, was observed. In the low-coherence categories, the presumption of reasons for preference tended to be weak for both rare and frequent attributes. That is, there were significant effects of the two-way interaction between category coherence and base rate on the presumption of reasons for preference. This study has implications for psychological essentialism and stereotyping.

• Journal of The Korean Association For Science Education
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• v.36 no.6
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• pp.935-946
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• 2016

This study aims to explore cognitive biases relating the core competences of science and instructional strategy in reducing the level of cognitive biases. The literature review method was used to explore cognitive biases and science education experts discussed the relevance of cognitive biases to science education. Twenty nine cognitive biases were categorized into five groups (limiting rational causal inference, limiting diverse information search, limiting self-regulated learning, limiting self-directed decision making, and category-limited thinking). The cognitive biases in limiting rational causal inference group are teleological thinking, availability heuristic, illusory correlation, and clustering illusion. The cognitive biases in limiting diverse information search group are selective perception, experimenter bias, confirmation bias, mere thought effect, attentional bias, belief bias, pragmatic fallacy, functional fixedness, and framing effect. The cognitive biases in limiting self-regulated learning group are overconfidence bias, better-than-average bias, planning fallacy, fundamental attribution error, Dunning-Kruger effect, hindsight bias, and blind-spot bias. The cognitive biases in limiting self-directed decision-making group are acquiescence effect, bandwagon effect, group-think, appeal to authority bias, and information bias. Lastly, the cognitive biases in category-limited thinking group are psychological essentialism, stereotyping, anthropomorphism, and outgroup homogeneity bias. The instructional strategy to reduce the level of cognitive biases is disused based on the psychological characters of cognitive biases reviewed in this study and related science education methods.

• Journal of The Korean Association For Science Education
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.41-61
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• 1999

In this study I defined the direction Integrated Science Education(ISE) should take. So that I groped for the direction ISE should take in the inherent nature of science and education, analyzing their respective validity from philosophical and psychological angles. Based upon these researches, I formulated the three directions for ISE to take; knowledge-centered, social problem-centered, and individual interest-centered. The results of this thesis may be summed up as follows: 1. The knowledge-centered ISE that thinks the inherent nature of science is in the scientific knowledge is based upon Hirst's integrated logic which is built on discipline-centered educational viewpoint. Now, the focus of interdisciplinary integration consists in clarifying the meanings of knowledge and the logical relations between one knowledge and another according to the respective form of exploration. The knowledge-centered ISE, therefore, was analyzed to find its justification in the educational philosophy of idealism, realism, neo-scholasticism; in the educational theories of essentialism, behaviorism, perennial ism; in the scientific philosophy of empiricism. positivism; in the educational psychology of developmental psychology and constructivism. 2. The social problem-centered ISE that thinks the inherent nature of science is the process of social concord is based upon Dewey's integrated logic which is built on experience-centered educational viewpoint. Now, the focus of interdisciplinary integration consists in the methodological aspect facilitating the process of experience. The social problem-centered ISE, therefore, was analyzed to find its theoretical justification in the educational philosophy of pragmatism; in the educational theory of progressivism; in the scientific philosophy of relativism and rationalism; and in the educational psychology of developmental psychology and constructivism. 3. The individual interest-centered ISE is based upon Patterson's integrated logic which is built on human-centered educational viewpoint. The focus of education here is self-realization. Therefore, rather than provide in learning conditions from outside, one is made to choose them oneself and the process of satisfying one's motive is emphasized. The individual interest-centered ISE, therefore, was analyzed to find its theoretical justification in the educational philosophy of existentialism; in the educational theory of humanism; in the scientific philosophy of relativism; and in Gestalt psychology.