• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.93-99
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• 2013

It is expected to continue to increase the number of people who enjoy marine and water sports due to the increase of leisure time because of income increase, the five-day workweek, etc. However, in the safety awareness, the development of equipment is just in the early stage. Established system for fundraising is required for Korean marine and water sports to be developed first. Should the fund be spent on the safety and development of domestic equipment for marine and water sports, it would make for a safer and more enjoyable sports for the people. The profit return measures of motor boat race, among marine and water sports, are surveyed and analyzed to suggest the measures stated above. Japanese legal structure and the profit return measures on motor boat race, which are about 60 years ahead than Korean systems, were analyzed and led to suggest the establishment of professional institutions which promote motor boat, etc. and the legal improvement for funding.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.95-120
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• 1990

The underpricing of new shares of a firm that are offered to the public for the first time (initial offerings) is well known and has puzzled financial economists for a long time since it seems at odds with the optimal behavior of the owners of issuing firms. Past attempts by financial economists to explain this phenomenon have not been successful in the sense that the explanations given by them are either inconsistent with the equilibrium theory or implausible. Approaches by such authors as Welch or Allen and Faulhaber are no exceptions. In this paper, we develop a signalling model of capital investment to explain the underpricing phenomenon and also analyze the efficiency of investment. The model focuses on the information asymmetry between the owners of issuing firms and general investors. We consider a firm that has been owned and operated by a single owner and that has a profitable project but has no capital to develop it. The profit from the project depends on the capital invested in the project as well as a profitability parameter. The model also assumes that the financial market is represented by a single investor who maximizes the expected wealth. The owner has superior information as to the value of the firm to investors in the sense that it knows the true value of the parameter while investors have only a probability distribution about the parameter. The owner offers the representative investor a fraction of the ownership of the firm in return for a certain amount of investment in the firm. This offer condition is equivalent to the usual offer condition consisting of the number of issues to sell and the unit price of a share. Thus, the model is a signalling game. Using Kreps' criterion as the solution concept, we obtained an essentially unique separating equilibrium offer condition. Analysis of this separating equilibrium shows that the owner of the firm with high profitability chooses an offer condition that raises an amount of capital that is short of the amount that maximizes the potential profit from the project. It also reveals that the fraction of the ownership of the firm that the representative investor receives from the owner of the highly profitable firm in return for its investment has a value that exceeds the investment. In other words, the initial offering in the model is underpriced when the profitability of the firm is high. The source of underpricing and underinvestment is the signalling activity by the owner of the highly profitable firm who attempts to convince investors that his firm has a highly profitable project by choosing an offer condition that cannot be imitated by the owner of a firm with low profitability. Thus, we obtained two main results. First, underpricing is a result of a signalling activity by the owner of a firm with high profitability when there exists information asymmetry between the owner of the issuing firm and investors. Second, such information asymmetry also leads to underinvestment in a highly profitable project. Those results clearly show the underpricing entails underinvestment and that information asymmetry leads to a social cost as well as a private cost. The above results are quite general in the sense that they are based upon a neoclassical profit function and full rationality of economic agents. We believe that the results of this paper can be used as a basis for further research on the capital investment process. For instance, one can view the results of this paper as a subgame equilibrium in a larger game in which a firm chooses among diverse ways to raise capital. In addition, the method used in this paper can be used in analyzing a wide range of problems arising from information asymmetry that the Korean financial market faces.

• Korea Journal of Hospital Management
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.47-67
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• 2007

This paper aims at suggesting several ways lo change financial vulnerability and to improve managerial capability of local public hospitals (LPHs) in Korea through the identification of factors affecting profitability. Several findings of the research are as follows: To begin with, LPHs exhibited a statistically significant difference in their profitability from one another, according to tile analyses of their profitable margins from tile general characteristics. It depends on the number of hospitals in the area, the population of the hospital-built area, the number of competing hospitals, the number of staff per 100 beds, the opening of special clinic, the educational function, and the capacity of rooms. However, there was no variable in the managerial characteristics, presenting a significant difference, in contrast with hospitals which have been managed by private companies and made a great amount of profits. Second, according to the analyses of profit differences in behavioral effort-characteristics, a statistically significant difference was revealed upon the basis of the efforts to improve the clinic service, invite special patients, and shorten the period of being hospitalized. Third, the result of analyses about the difference of profitability from medical care and finance is statistically significant in the rate of labor cost, the rate of management cost, bed-occupancy rate, and the period of being hospitalized. Fourth, according to the analyses of the factors influencing the net profit ratio of the entire capital, Adjusted explanatory power(Adjusted $R^2$) was shown up to 65.2%, which is high. To compare the adjusted explanatory power stage by stage, the first stage model applying only two variables such as structural and strategic characteristics exhibited 23.8%, and the second stage model adding financial characteristics showed 51.5%. The explanatory power was much improved up to 65.2% when the third stage model incorporated the outcome of medical care performance. When the return on investment(ROI) was examined by using the multi-variate linear regression analysis at the final model of third stage, it was found that ROI had a positive relationship with the increase rate of patients, labor costs per doctor, and medical care rate of socially protected inpatients. However, it revealed that ROI had a negative relationship with the ratio of labor costs, the number of patients per managerial staff, and occupancy rate of rooms, respectively. The research suggests that in order for LPHs to increase profitability, LPH, should make efforts not only to attract patients to the hospitals without any discrimination of the patients depending on their financial status, but also to develop efficient management methods to reduce labor costs.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.109-116
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• 2014

In this study, the factors affecting the profitability of the oriental medicine hospitals of University to be analyzed. To do this, profitability indicators and current ratio, liquidity, turnover ratio, cost factors analysis and suggested ways to improve management. The results are as follows, the operating margin(1.17%). the return on assets(3.76%), the net profit to gross revenues(2.37%), and the net profit to total assets(-1.89) were lower than the average of the entire oriental medicine hospitals in Korea(respectively 8.9%, 8.7%, 2.6%, 2.5%). Current ratio(256.76%), quick ratio(231.17%), fixed ratio(121.02%), and total assets turnover(135.69%) were similar to the average of all oriental medicine hospitals in Korea. But growth rate of total assets(-2.21%), and growth rate of patient revenue(1.89%) is low. And salaries(53.39%), materials costs(16.62%), administrative expenses(28.58%) were different to the average of all oriental medicine hospitals in Korea(respectively 35.3%, 10.7%, 45.1%). Meanwhile, the cost ratio of the oriental medicine hospitals of University was 98.59%. It was 7.49% higher than the 91.1% of the average of all oriental medicine hospitals in 2011. Correlation analysis, growth rate of patient revenue and operating margin increased at the same time, and net profit to gross revenues and net profit to total assets with a growth rate of total assets increased. And administrative expenses and profitability indicators showed a negative correlation. It means, in order to improve the profitability of the oriental medicine hospitals of University should focus on reducing administrative expenses. Multiple regression analysis, growth rate of total assets, total assets turnover, administrative expenses, and salaries has affected the profitability. Therefore, in order to improve the profitability of the oriental medicine hospitals of University to increase the total capital and the total capital turnover, and to reduce administrative expenses effort.

• Journal of the Korean association of regional geographers
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.99-113
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• 1997

The purpose of this study is to find out about the cause and adaptation process of urban households going to rural areas for agricultural management(Kwihyang nongga) through the microscopic analysis of a case study. Research results are summarized in the followings. The cause of Kwihyang nongga before the 1980s was generally due to the social causes like the support of dependent family or rural-to-urban migrants' maladjustment in urban society. After the 1980s, however, it was related to the economic reasons such as the increase of households' income by commercial agriculture more than the social ones. Most of Kwihyang nongga was traditionally the households which came back to their native places, rural areas. Recently the urban households which did not originally come from rural areas are going to rural space because of the cultivation of high profit oriented agricultural products. Recent Kwihyang nongga increased the size of commercial agriculture through leased farmland, not by a purchase of agricultural land. Even though the number of Kwihyang nongga is now a few, it is expected that the influence of Kwihyang nongga on rural society will be various and high because it consists of young generation. The increase of Kwihyang nongga may be one of the ways to mitigate the decreasing rate of utilization of agricultural lands due to the labor shortage of rural areas after industrialization. To solve rural problems related to underpopulation, it is necessary to establish the active plicies of helping Kwihyang nongga. The actions for Kwihyang nongga ought to emphasize the improvement of educational conditions and living facilities as well as financial aids and the improvement of farming conditions.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.17 no.5
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• pp.129-146
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• 2012

Recently, Korea became the 7th country in the world which has got into the 20-50 clubs that means the population is 50 million and per capital income is $20,000. From the view point of the retail industry, it suggests that Korea should have its own self-sufficient market by itself. With abundant labor and increased disposable income, it made the consumer's needs change. Responding to the change, retail and F&B oriented retail malls are now starting to add culture, art and entertainment facilities in the configurations. Such complexity and variety of the shopping malls became trendy and many shopping complexes are scheduled to open in the near future across the country. Due to above reasons, it became the common trend to develop shopping complex all over the cities now. However, the history of the shopping mall in Korea is much shorter than developed countries such as America and Japan. Thereby, a lot of problems, trial and error have occurred in the process of developing and operating them. If development of shopping complex failed, it would return lots of damages to the stakeholder. Therefore, the corporations should develop the mall properly and government might support positively. In this study, we would like to propose on how all the mall should be developed and well managed and what are the ways for the vitalizing factors of the shopping complex after benchmarking other shopping mall cases. Through the case study, we realized that the most crucial factors for vitalizing shopping complex were interior design, merchandising and how well they operate the mall. In case of the failed shopping mall, developers sell each store to individual proprietors and never take care of them after they get the profit, which make it hard to have integrated marketing strategies. That causes the overall slump of the mall. Corporations developing the mall should operate it as well, so that it could be possible to make the mall consistently well managed and promoted. There is a certificate for the shopping mall expert in The States and Japan. However, we do not have this kind of certificate. In fact, if we judge the capability of a person who is involved in the shopping mall industry, we usually measure how many years they stick to the same industries and that is not equally the same as their competence. Therefore it is necessary to organize "Shopping Mall Associate" and introduce shopping mall license for the mall expert. Due to retail trends, we can easily see a lot of shopping facilities all over the cities but not every mall is able to be successful. We think it's essential that the government should certify the malls which are qualified for the design, merchandising and proficiency of the operation. For the qualified mall, the government could confer a benefit on the company such as reducing corporation taxes. In multi-complex shopping mall it is possible to make convenient for customers. However, if a mall failed to succeed, it would be disaster. To build a shopping complex, developers should invest huge money even take out loan so that many people would be connected to the project, which may affect their whole financial conditions. In addition, only qualified corporation should develop and operate shopping complex and the government must support and aid the developers in order to make a better shopping environment in which customers might be happy during their shopping experience.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.31-57
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• 1991

Korean firms of all sizes, from virtually every industry, have used and are using the term "excessive competition" to describe the state of their industry and to call for government interventions. Moreover, the Korean government has frequently responded to such calls in various ways favorable to the firms, such as controlling entry, curbing capacity investments, or allowing collusion. Despite such interventions' impact on the overall efficiency on the Korean economy as well as on the wealth distribution among diverse groups of economic agents, the term "excessive competition", the basis for the interventions, has so far escaped rigorous scrutiny. The objective of this paper is to clarify the notion of "excessive competition" and "over-investment" which usually accompanies "excessive competition", and to examine the circumstances under which they might occur. We first survey the cases where the terms are most widely used and proceed to examine those cases to determine if competition is indeed excessive, and if so, what causes "excessive competition". Our main concern deals with the case in which the firms must make investment decisions that involve large sunk costs while facing uncertain demand. In order to analyze this case, we developed a two period model of capacity precommitment and the ensuing competition. In the first period, oligopolistic firms make capacity investments that are irreversible. Demand is uncertain in period 1 and only the distribution is known. Thus, firms must make investment decisions under uncertainty. In the second period, demand is realized, and the firms compete with quantity under realized demand and capacity constraints. In the above setting, we find that there is "no over-investment," en ante, and there is "no excessive competition," ex post. As measured by the information available in period 1, expected return from investment of a firm is non-negative, overall industry capacity does not exceed the socially optimal level, and competition in the second period yields an outcome that gives each operating firm a non-negative second period profit. Thus, neither "excessive competition" nor "over-investment" is possible. This result will generally hold true if there is no externality and if the industry is not a natural monopoly. We also extend this result by examining a model in which the government is an active participant in the game with a well defined preference. Analysis of this model shows that over-investment arises if the government cannot credibly precommit itself to non-intervention when ex post idle capacity occurs, due to socio-political reasons. Firms invest in capacities that exceed socially optimal levels in this case because they correctly expect that the government will find it optimal for itself to intervene once over-investment and ensuing financial problems for the firms occur. Such planned over-investment and ensuing government intervention are the generic problems under the current system. These problems are expected to be repeated in many industries in years to come, causing a significant loss of welfare in the long run. As a remedy to this problem, we recommend a non-intervention policy by the government which creates and utilizes uncertainty. Based upon an argument which is essentially the same as that of Kreps and Wilson in the context of a chain-store game, we show that maintaining a consistent non-intervention policy will deter a planned over-investment by firms in the long run. We believe that the results obtained in this paper has a direct bearing on the public policies relating to many industries including the petrochemical industry that is currently in the center of heated debates.