• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
• /
• v.55 no.1
• /
• pp.35-50
• /
• 2022

The Korean cultural heritage protection act, enacted in 1962, is known to have been enacted in imitation of the Japanese cultural heritage protection act. The Japanese law differs from the current law dealing with intangible cultural heritage, folklore materials, and buried cultural properties. The Japanese law was enacted in consultation with the GHQ, and reflected the historical issues at the time of the enactment. Recently, in Japan, GHQ documents have been released and so research on the cultural heritage protection act is carried out. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the meaning and achievements of the Japanese cultural heritage protection act before comparing it with the Korean law. GHQ stipulated the emperor as a symbolic entity in the Japanese constitution and prescribed the country as a liberal democracy. Influenced by this, the cultural heritage protection act was enacted to identify the people's cultural heritage. Accordingly, the cultural heritage protection committee is a private and independent organization in Japan. The committee designates cultural heritage assets, and it operates as the national museum and the cultural heritage research institute. This system was a part of policy changes shifting cultural heritage management to the private sector. Since many cultural heritages are associated with the imperial family, museums were managed by the imperial family. Meanwhile, the Japanese house of councillors persuaded GHQ, which was negative about including intangible cultural heritage in the cultural heritage protection act. The purpose of this idea was to provide the system of the government support for Japanese imperial court music and dance. In addition, folk materials were included with the consent of the GHQ in that they represent the cultural heritages and the academic achievements of the people at the time in Japan. According to the Korean Law, the subject of designation of cultural heritage is the government, and the cultural heritage committee acts as an advisory body with its limited functions. In the early days, the committee confused the concept of intangible cultural heritage and folklore materials. This was because the concepts of cultural property was borrowed from Japanese law and applied to the Korean law without a full understanding. In response, the cultural heritage committee urged the ministry to investigate the current situation in Japan. The cultural heritage committee, mainly consisting of folklore scholars, was confused about the concepts of intangible cultural heritage and folklore materials, but the concept became clear when the enforcement regulations of the cultural heritage protection Act was enacted in 1964.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.12 no.3
• /
• pp.71-94
• /
• 1990

This paper reviews the rationale of monetary and banking intervention by an outside authority, either the government or the central bank, and seeks to delineate clearly the optimal limits to the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway in Korea as well as on a global scale. Furthermore, this paper seeks to establish an objective and balanced view on the role of the central bank, especially in light of the current discussion on the restructuring of Korea's central bank, which has been severely contaminated by interest-group politics. The discussion begins with the recognition that the modern free banking school and the new monetary economics are becoming formidable challenges to the traditional role of the government or the central bank in the monetary and banking sector. The paper reviews six arguments that have traditionally been presented to support intervention: (1) the possibility of an over-issue of bank notes under free banking instead of central banking; (2) externalities in and the public good nature of the use of money; (3) economies of scale and natural monopoly in producing money; (4) the need for macro stabilization policy due to the instability of the real sector; (5) the external effects of bank failure due to the inherent instability of the existing banking system; and (6) protection for small banknote users and depositors. Based on an analysis of the above arguments, the paper speculates on the optimal role of the government or central bank in the monetary and banking system and the optimal degree of monetary and banking deregulation. By contrast to the arguments for free banking or laissez-faire monetary systems, which become fashionable in recent years, monopoly and intervention by the government or central bank in the outside money system can be both necessary and optimal. In this case, of course, an over-issue of fiat money may be possible due to political considerations, but this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. On the other hand, the issue of inside monies based on outside money could indeed be provided for optimally under market competition by private institutions. A competitive system in issuing inside monies would help realize, to the maxim urn extent possible, external economies generated by using a single outside money. According to this reasoning, free banking activities will prevail in the inside money system, while a government monopoly will prevail in the outside money system. This speculation, then, also implies that the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway should and most likely will be limited to the inside money system, which could be liberalized to the fullest degree. It is also implied that it will be impractical to deregulate the outside money system and to allow market competition to provide outside money, in accordance with the arguments of the free banking school and the new monetary economics. Furthermore, the role of the government or central bank in this new environment will not be significantly different from their current roles. As far as the supply of fiat money continues to be monopolized by the government, the control of the supply of base money and such related responsibilities as monetary policy (argument(4)) and the lender of the last resort (argument (5)) will naturally be assigned to the outside money supplier. However, a mechanism for controlling an over-issue of fiat money by a monopolistic supplier will definitely be called for (argument(1)). A monetary policy based on a certain policy rule could be one possibility. More importantly, the deregulation of the inside money system would further increase the systemic risk inherent in the current fractional banking system, while enhancing the efficiency of the system (argument (5)). In this context, the role of the lender of the last resort would again become an instrument of paramount importance in alleviating liquidity crises in the early stages, thereby disallowing the possibility of a widespread bank run. Similarly, prudential banking supervision would also help maintain the safety and soundness of the fully deregulated banking system. These functions would also help protect depositors from losses due to bank failures (argument (6)). Finally, these speculations suggest that government or central bank authorities have probably been too conservative on the issue of the deregulation of the financial system, beyond the caution necessary to preserve system safety. Rather, only the fullest deregulation of the inside money system seems to guarantee the maximum enjoyment of external economies in the single outside money system.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.12 no.1
• /
• pp.31-68
• /
• 1990

The concentration of economic power takes the form of one or a few firms controlling a substantial portion of the economic resources and means in a certain economic area. At the same time, to the extent that these firms are owned by a few individuals, resource allocation can be manipulated by them rather than by the impersonal market mechanism. This will impair allocative efficiency, run counter to a decentralized market system and hamper the equitable distribution of wealth. Viewed from the historical evolution of Western capitalism in general, the concentration of economic power is a paradox in that it is a product of the free market system itself. The economic principle of natural discrimination works so that a few big firms preempt scarce resources and market opportunities. Prominent historical examples include trusts in America, Konzern in Germany and Zaibatsu in Japan in the early twentieth century. In other words, the concentration of economic power is the outcome as well as the antithesis of free competition. As long as judgment of the economic system at large depends upon the value systems of individuals, therefore, the issue of how to evaluate the concentration of economic power will inevitably be tinged with ideology. We have witnessed several different approaches to this problem such as communism, fascism and revised capitalism, and the last one seems to be the only surviving alternative. The concentration of economic power in Korea can be summarily represented by the "jaebol," namely, the conglomerate business group, the majority of whose member firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective markets and are owned by particular individuals. The jaebol has many dimensions in its size, but to sketch its magnitude, the share of the jaebol in the manufacturing sector reached 37.3% in shipment and 17.6% in employment as of 1989. The concentration of economic power can be ascribed to a number of causes. In the early stages of economic development, when the market system is immature, entrepreneurship must fill the gap inherent in the market in addition to performing its customary managerial function. Entrepreneurship of this sort is a scarce resource and becomes even more valuable as the target rate of economic growth gets higher. Entrepreneurship can neither be readily obtained in the market nor exhausted despite repeated use. Because of these peculiarities, economic power is bound to be concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and their business groups. It goes without saying, however, that the issue of whether the full exercise of money-making entrepreneurship is compatible with social mores is a different matter entirely. The rapidity of the concentration of economic power can also be traced to the diversification of business groups. The transplantation of advanced technology oriented toward mass production tends to saturate the small domestic market quite early and allows a firm to expand into new markets by making use of excess capacity and of monopoly profits. One of the reasons why the jaebol issue has become so acute in Korea lies in the nature of the government-business relationship. The Korean government has set economic development as its foremost national goal and, since then, has intervened profoundly in the private sector. Since most strategic industries promoted by the government required a huge capacity in technology, capital and manpower, big firms were favored over smaller firms, and the benefits of industrial policy naturally accrued to large business groups. The concentration of economic power which occured along the way was, therefore, not necessarily a product of the market system. At the same time, the concentration of ownership in business groups has been left largely intact as they have customarily met capital requirements by means of debt. The real advantage enjoyed by large business groups lies in synergy due to multiplant and multiproduct production. Even these effects, however, cannot always be considered socially optimal, as they offer disadvantages to other independent firms-for example, by foreclosing their markets. Moreover their fictitious or artificial advantages only aggravate the popular perception that most business groups have accumulated their wealth at the expense of the general public and under the behest of the government. Since Korea stands now at the threshold of establishing a full-fledged market economy along with political democracy, the phenomenon called the concentration of economic power must be correctly understood and the roles of business groups must be accordingly redefined. In doing so, we would do better to take a closer look at Japan which has experienced a demise of family-controlled Zaibatsu and a success with business groups(Kigyoshudan) whose ownership is dispersed among many firms and ultimately among the general public. The Japanese case cannot be an ideal model, but at least it gives us a good point of departure in that the issue of ownership is at the heart of the matter. In setting the basic direction of public policy aimed at controlling the concentration of economic power, one must harmonize efficiency and equity. Firm size in itself is not a problem, if it is dictated by efficiency considerations and if the firm behaves competitively in the market. As long as entrepreneurship is required for continuous economic growth and there is a discrepancy in entrepreneurial capacity among individuals, a concentration of economic power is bound to take place to some degree. Hence, the most effective way of reducing the inefficiency of business groups may be to impose competitive pressure on their activities. Concurrently, unless the concentration of ownership in business groups is scaled down, the seed of social discontent will still remain. Nevertheless, the dispersion of ownership requires a number of preconditions and, consequently, we must make consistent, long-term efforts on many fronts. We can suggest a long list of policy measures specifically designed to control the concentration of economic power. Whatever the policy may be, however, its intended effects will not be fully realized unless business groups abide by the moral code expected of socially responsible entrepreneurs. This is especially true, since the root of the problem of the excessive concentration of economic power lies outside the issue of efficiency, in problems concerning distribution, equity, and social justice.

• Korean Security Journal
• /
• no.18
• /
• pp.169-190
• /
• 2009

Today, the rapid advance of scientific technologies has brought about fundamental changes to the types and levels of terrorism while the war against the world more than one thousand small and big terrorists and crime organizations has already begun. A method highly likely to be employed by terrorist groups that are using 21st Century state of the art technology is cyber terrorism. In many instances, things that you could only imagine in reality could be made possible in the cyber space. An easy example would be to randomly alter a letter in the blood type of a terrorism subject in the health care data system, which could inflict harm to subjects and impact the overturning of the opponent's system or regime. The CIH Virus Crisis which occurred on April 26, 1999 had significant implications in various aspects. A virus program made of just a few lines by Taiwanese college students without any specific objective ended up spreading widely throughout the Internet, causing damage to 30,000 PCs in Korea and over 2 billion won in monetary damages in repairs and data recovery. Despite of such risks of cyber terrorism, a great number of Korean sites are employing loose security measures. In fact, there are many cases where a company with millions of subscribers has very slackened security systems. A nationwide preparation for cyber terrorism is called for. In this context, this research will analyze the current status of Korea's cyber security systems and its laws from a policy perspective, and move on to propose improvement strategies. This research suggests the following solutions. First, the National Cyber Security Management Act should be passed to have its effectiveness as the national cyber security management regulation. With the Act's establishment, a more efficient and proactive response to cyber security management will be made possible within a nationwide cyber security framework, and define its relationship with other related laws. The newly passed National Cyber Security Management Act will eliminate inefficiencies that are caused by functional redundancies dispersed across individual sectors in current legislation. Second, to ensure efficient nationwide cyber security management, national cyber security standards and models should be proposed; while at the same time a national cyber security management organizational structure should be established to implement national cyber security policies at each government-agencies and social-components. The National Cyber Security Center must serve as the comprehensive collection, analysis and processing point for national cyber crisis related information, oversee each government agency, and build collaborative relations with the private sector. Also, national and comprehensive response system in which both the private and public sectors participate should be set up, for advance detection and prevention of cyber crisis risks and for a consolidated and timely response using national resources in times of crisis.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Landscape Architecture
• /
• v.44 no.2
• /
• pp.52-69
• /
• 2016

The fishing port was once the foothold of production as well as the stronghold of communities but with the declining of the fishing industry, ports became abandoned space. Jeju Special Self-Governing Province has continued its effort to vitalize marine tourism since 2010. Shinyang Port in particular is designated as a Prearranged Marina Port Development Zone, and planning for the Jeju Ocean Marina City project is underway. Nevertheless, fishing port remodeling projects implemented on Jeju so far have focused only on civil engineering such as renovating old facilities. In addition, most Marina Port Development Projects have been irrelevant to local communities. Leading projects by the local government mostly suffer from a lack of funding, which results in the renovation of old facilities and improper maintenance, while private sector investment projects do not lead to benefit sharing with the community. Shinyang Port, also renovated in 2008, ended up with outer breakwater extension construction that neither solved the fundamental problem of the site nor gave benefits to residents. To arrange a way to solve problems for civil engineering focused development project, improper maintenance, and benefit sharing with community, first, this study proposes a development plan that connects with the outlying areas near the ports. The plan reflects existing topography, Jeju traditional stonewalls, narrow paths on the master plan and programs by reading the regional context. In this way, this paper suggests a space development plan reflecting the local landscape and characteristic factors. Second, it satisfies various needs by using existing and new Marine Tourism Resources. Third, it examines sustainable operation and management measures through residents' participation. The proposal is significant in two key ways: it is a fresh attempt at connecting the fishing port with its outlying areas from a landscape perspective; and it considers environmental, social, economic issues, and suggests participation for local communities. Thus, the model can be used in future fishing-port remodeling plans for revitalizing unused space, including invaluable traditional landscapes, and for boosting the marine-leisure industry.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Landscape Architecture
• /
• v.46 no.5
• /
• pp.1-9
• /
• 2018

The purpose of this study was to identify differences of perceptions for gardens and parks between experts and the general public concerning several aspects including scope, scale, publicity, artistic and scientific nature, main materials, practicality and aesthetics, executive and management systems as well as legal understanding of garden and park. The properties of garden and park were derived through literature research, and the concept, similarity, and difference of gardens and the parks were recognized by the experts and the public viewpoint was clarified by questionnaire. As for the difference in the scope of the gardens and the parks, the expert group recognized it more widely than the general public. In general, the space recognized as a garden was the rooftop green space, and urban forests were recognized as a park. In addition, the general public recognized urban forests as gardens the same as they recognized parks, and the distinction was unclear. In the expert group, the perception that gardens were small and the parks were large was more prevalent. It was generally recognized that gardens were private spaces and the parks were public spaces. In the expert group, the gardens were more personal and the parks were more apparent to the public. In the general population, functional and scientific aspects rather than artistic creativity in both gardens and parks. In addition, both the general public and experts found that parks are more complex than gardens. The garden was centered on plant material, and the park was recognized as a center where the sculptural facilities were centered, or the plant material and the sculptural facilities were properly balanced. To the experts the view of the gardens was positive. Expert groups emphasized the aesthetics of the garden, and the parks were more practical, and the general population showed similar perceptions of utility and aesthetics when comparing gardens and parks. In addition, the utility of gardens in the general publics is more emphasized than the aesthetics of the park. Regarding the executive system the park was recognized as the public sector, and the difference was larger in the expert group. As for the management system, both experts and the general public perceive the management of the park or the garden to be carried out by the supporting organization, and it is necessary to discuss the diversification of the management subject. It is found that there is a certain difference in recognition with the mixture of concepts, and there is still a big difference in legal system and perception.

• Clinical and Experimental Pediatrics
• /
• v.51 no.10
• /
• pp.1077-1084
• /
• 2008

Purpose : Despite the seriousness of bacterial meningitis in children, there is little information on the incidence, causative organisms, mortality rate and age distribution. We studied the frequency by age group and causal pathogens, and clinical characteristics in children with bacterial meningitis in the private sector in Korea. Methods : The medical records containing the data on bacterial meningitis patients under 18 years of age confirmed by cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) findings were retrospectively analyzed from September, 1993 to August, 2006 at Ewha Womans University Mokdong Hospital. Results : Eighty-one cases of bacterial meningitis were observed. Overall the most common organism was Streptococcus agalactiae (group B streptococcus, GBS) (30 cases, 37.0%) followed by Haemophilus influenzae (22 cases, 27.2%), Streptococcus pneumoniae (12 cases, 14.8%), Escherichia coli (3 cases, 3.7%), Neisseria meningitidis (1 case, 1.2%) and others (13 cases, 16.0%). In neonates and young infants under 2 months, the most common organism was GBS. In children between 3 months, and 5 years, the most common organism was H. influenzae. S. pneumoniae was the most common organism in children over 5 years of age. Thirty-one patients (38.3%) had complications. Of all ages, the mortality rate of bacterial meningitis markedly decreased compared with the previously reported rate. Conclusion : In neonates, GBS meningitis was most common. The frequency of H. influenzae meningitis decreased after the introduction of H. influenzae type b vaccination. A strategy for the prevention of GBS meningitis in neonates should be established. The influence of the pneumococcal conjugate vaccine on S. pneumoniae meningitis should be studied.

• Korean Security Journal
• /
• no.62
• /
• pp.35-63
• /
• 2020

As the frequency and intensity of catastrophic disasters increase, there is widespread public sentiment that government capacity for disaster response and recovery is fundamentally limited, and that the involvement of civil society and the private sector is ever more vital. That is, in order to strengthen national disaster response capacity, governments need to build disaster systems that are more participatory and function through the channels of civil society, rather than continuing themselves to bear sole responsibility for these "wicked problems." With the advancement of smart mobile technology and social media, government and society as a whole have been called upon to apply these new information and communication technologies to address the current shortcomings of government-led disaster management. As illustrated in such catastrophic disasters as the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan, the 2010 Haitian earthquake, and Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005, the realization of participatory potential of smart technologies for better disaster response has enabled citizen participation via new smart technologies during disasters and resulted in positive impact on the management of such disasters. In this context, this study focuses on the South Korean context, and aims to analyze Korean government officials' readiness for public participation using smart technologies. On this basis, it aims to offer policy suggestions aimed at promoting smart technology-enabled citizen participation. For this purpose, it proposes a particular model, termed SMART (System, Motivation, Ability, Response, and Technology).

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
• /
• v.57 no.2
• /
• pp.5-40
• /
• 2005

Social welfare centers and residential care facilities where provide the socially disadvantaged with proper social services, face financial difficulties. This is because not only of the lack of governmental support, but also of social welfare centers and residential care facilities' lack of skills in developing abundant resources from the private sector. In this context, this study tried to find factors affecting resource mobilization of the social welfare facilities to devise policies in resource development. Mail survey was conducted with the structured questionnaire. Employees in charge of community resource development were asked to answer the questionnaire. The study population were welfare centers and residential care facilities. A total of 293 community welfare centers and 632 residential care facilities responded to the survey. The response rate was about 62%. The dependent variables of the study were the amount of resource mobilization in the year 2001 which was measured as the number of donors, the total amount of donation, and estimated amount of gift-in-kind. Three types models were constructed per each welfare institution. Independent variables were selected based on the previous research findings: community environment factor, structural factor, and resource development factor. Multiple regression was utilized to analyze the data. The resource development factor turned out to be significant variable in various models. In the models of donors, the amount of donation, and the amount of gift-in-kind (except for the welfare center model), at least one out of six variables of the resource development factors was significant welfare center. Welfare centers which establish the resource development department or hire employees to take care of resource development, utilize computer softwares to file donors, and utilize donor management programs, have more donors and/or donations than their counterparts. In addition, residential care facilities located in urban area have more donors and donations, and among residential facilities those for the disables, those with longer history and more employees, receive more donations than their counterparts. As for the gift-in-kind model, the welfare centers located in high income area and residential care facilities for the elderly, children and mentally retarded receive less gift-in-kind than their counterparts Based on the above findings, this study suggested that to mobilize resources the welfare centers as well residential care facilities need to have community resource development department or resource development staffs, adopt computer software to systematically organize donors, and utilize donor mobilizing and maintaining programs.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
• /
• v.30 no.5
• /
• pp.909-928
• /
• 2020

From the early 1970s, the US government began to recognize that penetration testing could not assure the security quality of products. Results of penetration testing such as identified vulnerabilities and faults can be varied depending on the capabilities of the team. In other words none of penetration team can assure that "vulnerabilities are not found" is not equal to "product does not have any vulnerabilities". So the U.S. government realized that in order to improve the security quality of products, the development process itself should be managed systematically and strictly. Therefore, the US government began to publish various standards related to the development methodology and evaluation procurement system embedding "security-by-design" concept from the 1980s. Security-by-design means reducing product's complexity by considering security from the initial phase of development lifecycle such as the product requirements analysis and design phase to achieve trustworthiness of product ultimately. Since then, the security-by-design concept has been spread to the private sector since 2002 in the name of Secure SDLC by Microsoft and IBM, and is currently being used in various fields such as automotive and advanced weapon systems. However, the problem is that it is not easy to implement in the actual field because the standard or guidelines related to Secure SDLC contain only abstract and declarative contents. Therefore, in this paper, we present the new framework in order to specify the level of Secure SDLC desired by enterprises. Our proposed CIA (functional Correctness, safety Integrity, security Assurance)-level-based security-by-design framework combines the evidence-based security approach with the existing Secure SDLC. Using our methodology, first we can quantitatively show gap of Secure SDLC process level between competitor and the company. Second, it is very useful when you want to build Secure SDLC in the actual field because you can easily derive detailed activities and documents to build the desired level of Secure SDLC.