• Title/Summary/Keyword: Pricing to market

Search Result 456, Processing Time 0.031 seconds

Measuring the Impact of Competition on Pricing Behaviors in a Two-Sided Market

  • Kim, Minkyung;Song, Inseong
    • Asia Marketing Journal
    • /
    • 제16권1호
    • /
    • pp.35-69
    • /
    • 2014
  • The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

  • PDF

UCC의 동적 가격 결정 : 모델링과 시뮬레이션 이용 (Dynamic Pricing for User Created Contents : Computer Modeling and Simulation)

  • 정두식;조현;김성희
    • 한국콘텐츠학회논문지
    • /
    • 제12권6호
    • /
    • pp.56-67
    • /
    • 2012
  • UCC(UCC: User Created Contents)가 온라인상으로 활발히 거래되고 있다. 현재 UCC의 가격은 판매자가 한번 결정을 하면 이후로는 변함이 없는 고정 정책으로 결정된다. 하지만 시장의 수요와 공급은 매시 변화하고, 이러한 변화에 따라 동적으로 가격을 결정하는 연구들이 진행되어 왔다. 본 연구에서는 UCC를 검색하는 사용자들을 분석하여 UCC의 동적인 가격 결정 모형을 제안하였다. 트렌드 변화 반영 결정 모형과 상대적 가격 모형을 고안하였고, 시스템 변수와 시장 변수를 통제하여 다양한 환경에서의 실험을 수행하였다. 또한 컴퓨터 모델링 및 시뮬레이션을 통해 성능을 입증하였다. 본 연구의 결과는 UCC 시장에서의 매출 및 수익 향상에 중요한 지침을 제공할 것이다.

게임이론을 이용한 전력시장 발전입찰에서의 거래가격 결정에 관한 연구 (A Study on Transaction Pricing of Generation Bidding in Electricity Market by Using Game Theory)

  • 이광호
    • 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
    • /
    • 제52권6호
    • /
    • pp.333-339
    • /
    • 2003
  • Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

OPF를 이용한 경쟁적 전력시장에서의 송전가격 수익보정어 관한 연구 (Revenue Reconciled Transmission Pricing Using Optimal Power Flow in a Competitive Electricity Market)

  • 정상헌;정구형;김발호
    • 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
    • /
    • 대한전기학회 2003년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
    • /
    • pp.624-626
    • /
    • 2003
  • Transmission pricing is one of important issues related to competitive electricity markets since rational pricing scheme ensures a fair competition between this market participants. Transmission pricing scheme is classified briefly into marginal cost pricing and embedded cost pricing. In economic efficiency, marginal cost pricing is more adequate for competitive electricity market. However, this pricing scheme requires revenue reconciliation since it cannot ensure full recovery of Transco's revenue requirements. This paper presents a new revenue reconciliation to maximize social welfare. For this analysis, this paper provides the results applied by various revenue reconciliation methodologies.

  • PDF

Modelling and Factor Analysis of Pricing Determinants in the State-Regulated Competitive Market: The Case of Ukrainian Flour Market

  • Dragan, Olena;Berher, Alina;Plets, Ivan;Biloshkurska, Nataliia;Lysenko, Nataliia;Bovkun, Olha
    • International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
    • /
    • 제21권7호
    • /
    • pp.211-220
    • /
    • 2021
  • The aim of the study is to implement a factor analysis of the determinants of pricing in a state-regulated competitive market using economic and mathematical modelling methods and to develop ways to improve the pricing environment of the market under study. The purpose of the work defines the main objectives: (i) to investigate the features of the competitive model of the Ukrainian flour market; (ii) to analyse the current price conjuncture of the flour market and the dynamics of the main determinants of pricing; (iii)to develop ways of improving the price situation on the flour market on the basis of the factor analysis on the results of economic and mathematical modelling. In order to ensure the reliability and validity of the research results, the following methods were applied: the logical-dialectical method of scientific knowledge in the study of the main theoretical aspects of flour market functioning, the method of logical generalisation and synthesis, comparison, factor analysis, correlation and regression analysis, the graphical method, etc. It has been shown that pricing in a state-regulated competitive market has its own characteristics. For example, in the flour market the price of goods cannot be influenced by producers (sellers) by any methods, therefore determinants of pricing by indirect influence have been taken into account. The five-factor power model of wheat flour price has been constructed. It was substantiated that the price of wheat flour in Ukraine is mostly influenced by consumer price index (0.92 %). The received complex model of wheat flour price may be used also for medium-term forecasting and working out the ways of price formation optimization in the flour market.

Congested Market Equilibrium Analysis

  • Oh, Hyung-Sik
    • 대한산업공학회지
    • /
    • 제13권2호
    • /
    • pp.65-77
    • /
    • 1987
  • Congestion occurs whenever users interfere with each other, while competing for scarce resources. In a congested market, such as a telecommunication service market, users of telecommunication services incur costs in using the service in addition to the price. The user's own time costs involved in learning to use the service, waiting for the service, and making use of the service are typically greater than the price of telecommunication services. A market equilibrium analysis is performed in which a method for user demand aggregation is developed. The effects of price changes on user demands and market demands for congested services are examined. It is found that total market demands may increase as the price for less-congested services increase under certain demand conditions. This suggests that a nonuniform pricing scheme for a congested service may improve the utilization of the congested system. The sign of price cross-elasticity for congested services is show to vary with demand conditions. A possible complementary property of congested services is found and the implication of such a property is discussed. It is argued that such a complementary property may lead to a cross subsidy in a market with congestion. Finally, comparisons between uniform pricing and nonuniform pricing policies are made. A specific numerical example is given to show that a nonuniform pricing policy may be Pareto superior to a uniform pricing policy.

  • PDF

경쟁체제 도입시 주택용 전기요금개선에 관한 연구 (A Study of Restructured Residential Electricity Pricing toward the Competitive Power Market)

  • 김민정
    • 전기학회논문지
    • /
    • 제63권7호
    • /
    • pp.889-895
    • /
    • 2014
  • Korea electric power industry had been under vertical monopoly but is typically getting restructured for free competition. An ideal pricing system under the competitive market system is 'unbundled pricing system' and 'marginal pricing system', but the current pricing system still adheres to the traditional bundled system and the average cost pricing system. Especially, progressive electricity rates for residential use reflect governmental policy-making which is focused on income redistribution & welfare, industrial supports and energy saving. This study proposes new and reasonable residential electricity pricing systems which are Time-Of-Use (TOU) and Real-Time Pricing (RTP) to reflect variations in the wholesale price of electricity. It also presents examples of various tariffs for residential electricity pricing systems.

호텔 객실가격정책(客室價格政策)의 합리화(合理化)에 관한 연구(硏究) (A Study on the Optimazation of the Hotel Room Rate Pricing Policy)

  • 한승엽
    • 산학경영연구
    • /
    • 제6권
    • /
    • pp.135-152
    • /
    • 1993
  • The optional market segmentation pricing policy for rooms of hotels are investigated under the assumption of a linear demand function, and for four different situations: (1) single price market, (2) optimal segmentation of the unused capacity of a single-price-maeket, (3) optimal segmantation for all rooms, and (4) opimal segmentation for infiltration from higher priced to adjacent lower priced segments. The purpose of tis study is th show that with proper pricing policy, it would be possible to increase profits considerably. Such a profit increase might be achived by market segmentation coupled with product differentiation, where the different market segments are identified, sperated, and in each segment a different price per room is called for. The different prices are determined based on the specific price elasticity typical for each market segment and the relavant costs. The pricing model implied in this study is based on basic economic pricing theory and optimization techniques. While somewhat complex in its mathmatical solution, it can be easily programmed for use by practitioners, avoiding the need to cope with the technical aspects of the solution. In section II-1, the optimal single-market Single-price policy is evaluated. The optimal strategy under the constraint that only the previously unutilized rooms are segmented is analysed in section II-2, while the optimal strategy without this constraint is determined in section II-3. In section II-4, the optimal market-segmentation pricing policy is derived for the case in which market seperation is allowed for all the rooms under the assumption of custtomer infiltration from each market segment to the adjacent lower priced segment Finally, some considerations relating to the practicality of the model as a decision support tool and the requirements for its implementation are discussed in section III.

  • PDF

The Stochastic Volatility Option Pricing Model: Evidence from a Highly Volatile Market

  • WATTANATORN, Woraphon;SOMBULTAWEE, Kedwadee
    • The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
    • /
    • 제8권2호
    • /
    • pp.685-695
    • /
    • 2021
  • This study explores the impact of stochastic volatility in option pricing. To be more specific, we compare the option pricing performance between stochastic volatility option pricing model, namely, Heston option pricing model and standard Black-Scholes option pricing. Our finding, based on the market price of SET50 index option between May 2011 and September 2020, demonstrates stochastic volatility of underlying asset return for all level of moneyness. We find that both deep in the money and deep out of the money option exhibit higher volatility comparing with out of the money, at the money, and in the money option. Hence, our finding confirms the existence of volatility smile in Thai option markets. Further, based on calibration technique, the Heston option pricing model generates smaller pricing error for all level of moneyness and time to expiration than standard Black-Scholes option pricing model, though both Heston and Black-Scholes generate large pricing error for deep-in-the-money option and option that is far from expiration. Moreover, Heston option pricing model demonstrates a better pricing accuracy for call option than put option for all level and time to expiration. In sum, our finding supports the outperformance of the Heston option pricing model over standard Black-Scholes option pricing model.

경쟁적 가격 행동과 시장구조분석: 한국 이동통신 시장에의 응용

  • 전덕빈;김예구
    • 한국경영과학회:학술대회논문집
    • /
    • 한국경영과학회 2003년도 추계학술대회 및 정기총회
    • /
    • pp.7-10
    • /
    • 2003
  • After the launch of PCS in 1997, price competition between five mobile carriers was so severe that the Korean mobile telephony market achieved a remarkable subscriber base growth. But in that optimal pricing behavior depends on how each fm is likely to react to other frims'choice of price, it is very interesting to analyze competitive pricing behavior and understand market structure in terms of pricing competitiveness in the Korean mobile telecommunications market. In this paper, we use structural econometric models in New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) framework. But previously used models in this framework generally assume that market size is fixed and that all firms maximize their profits. To fit in with the Korean mobile telephony market, we derive various models in using NML market share model under the assumptions that market size varies with industry's total attractions and that firms maximize their market share. In this paper, we find that the model under market share maximization with the assumption that market size varies with total attraction shows the best fitting results.

  • PDF