• The Journal of the Petrological Society of Korea
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• v.28 no.3
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• pp.157-169
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• 2019

Pseudotachylytes, produced by frictional heating during seismic slip, provide information that is critical to understanding the physics of earthquakes. We report the results of occurrence, structural characteristics, scanning electron microscopic observation and geochemical analysis of pseudotachylytes, which is presumed to have formed after the Late Cretaceous in outcrops of the Paleoproterozoic granitic gneiss on the Bulil waterfall of the Jirisan area, Yeongnam massif, Korea. Fault rocks, which are the products of brittle deformation under the same shear stress regime in the study area, are classified as pseudotachylyte and foliated cataclasite. The occurrences of pseudotachylyte identified on the basis of thickness and morphology are fault vein-type and injection vein-type pseudotachylyte. A number of fault vein-type pseudotachylytes occur as thin (as thick as 2 cm) layers generated on the fault plane, and are cutting general foliation and sheared foliation developed in granitic gneiss. Smaller injection vein-type pseudotachylytes are found along the fault vein-type pseudotachylytes, and appear in a variety of shapes based on field occurrence and vein geometry. At a first glance fault vein-type seudotachylyte looks like a mafic vein, but it has a chemical composition almost identical to the wall rock of granitic gneiss. Also, it has many subrounded clasts which consist predominantly of quartz, feldspar, biotite and secondary minerals including clay minerals, calcite and glassy materials. Embayed clasts, phenocryst with reaction rim, oxide droplets, amygdules, and flow structures are also observed. All of these evidences indicate the pseudotachylyte formed due to frictional melting of the wall rock minerals during fault slip related to strong seismic faulting events in the shallow depth of low temperature-low pressure. Further studies will be conducted to determine the age and mechanical aspect of the pseudotachylyte formation.

• Journal of The Korean Association For Science Education
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• v.41 no.2
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• pp.145-154
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• 2021

This study aims to investigate teachers' perceptions of the composition of high school science elective courses ahead of the 2022 curriculum revision, and to derive implications for the organization of the 2022 revised science curriculum in preparation for the full implementation of the high school credit system. To this end, a survey was conducted by randomly sampling high schools across the country. A total of 192 science teachers responded to the questionnaire. In addition, 12 high school science teachers were selected as a focus group, and in-depth interviews were conducted to investigate opinions on the restructuring of elective courses in science. Main research results include 129 (67.2%) science teachers in the survey answered that the current 2015 curriculum's science and elective courses system should be maintained. In the next curriculum, when reconstructing science elective subjects, it is necessary to provide an opportunity to experience the entire contents of each science field through Science I·II system as before, and to ensure student choice in preparation for the credit system. In addition, the opinion that general elective subjects should be organized to include all the contents of science I and II subjects was the highest. Through in-depth interviews, science teachers emphasized that the current science I subject system allows access to the content areas of science as much as possible as the number of subjects is small, and that subjects, such as physics, where the hierarchy of concepts is important, should deal with important content within one subject rather than divided by area. On the other hand, in the current I subject system, there is no subject for liberal arts students to choose from, so teachers suggested that science electives should be organized by subdividing each content area. Based on the research results, the necessity of organizing high school science elective courses in consideration of the purpose of the high school credit system, ways to organize science-convergence elective courses as subjects for all students regardless of career aptitude, ways to organize science-career elective courses, and ways to organize science elective courses in connection with the college admission system were proposed.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Radiology
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• v.16 no.4
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• pp.373-379
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• 2022

The radiation source used for non-destructive testing have permeability and cause a scattered radiation through collisions of surrounding materials, which causes changes in the surrounding spatial dose. Therefore, this study attempted to evaluate and analyze the distribution of spatial dose by source in the working environment during the non-destructive test using monte carlo simulation. In this study, Using FLUKA, a simulation code, simulates ⁶⁰Co, ¹⁹²Ir, and ⁷⁵Se source used in non-destructive testing, The reliability of the source term was secured by comparing the calculated dose rate with the data of the Health and Physics Association. After that, a non-destructive test in the radiation safety facility(RT-room) was designed to evaluate the spatial dose according to the distance from the source. As a result of the spatial dose evaluation, ⁷⁵Se source showed the lowest dose distribution in the frontal position and ⁶⁰Co source showed a dose rate of about 15 times higher than that of ⁷⁵Se and about 2 times higher than that of ¹⁹²Ir. In addition, the spatial dose according to the distance tends to decrease according to the distance inverse square law as the distance from the source increases. Exceptionally, ⁶⁰Co, ¹⁹²Ir, and ⁷⁵Se sources confirmed a slight increase within 2 m of position. Based on the results of this study, it is believed that it will be used as supplementary data for safety management of workers in radiation safety facilities during non-destructive testing using radioactive isotopes.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Journal of Internet Computing and Services
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• v.14 no.5
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• pp.69-76
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• 2013

The incidence of globally infectious and pathogenic diseases such as H1N1 (swine flu) and Avian Influenza (AI) has recently increased. An infectious disease is a pathogen-caused disease, which can be passed from the infected person to the susceptible host. Pathogens of infectious diseases, which are bacillus, spirochaeta, rickettsia, virus, fungus, and parasite, etc., cause various symptoms such as respiratory disease, gastrointestinal disease, liver disease, and acute febrile illness. They can be spread through various means such as food, water, insect, breathing and contact with other persons. Recently, most countries around the world use a mathematical model to predict and prepare for the spread of infectious diseases. In a modern society, however, infectious diseases are spread in a fast and complicated manner because of rapid development of transportation (both ground and underground). Therefore, we do not have enough time to predict the fast spreading and complicated infectious diseases. Therefore, new system, which can prevent the spread of infectious diseases by predicting its pathway, needs to be developed. In this study, to solve this kind of problem, an integrated monitoring system, which can track and predict the pathway of infectious diseases for its realtime monitoring and control, is developed. This system is implemented based on the conventional mathematical model called by 'Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) Model.' The proposed model has characteristics that both inter- and intra-city modes of transportation to express interpersonal contact (i.e., migration flow) are considered. They include the means of transportation such as bus, train, car and airplane. Also, modified real data according to the geographical characteristics of Korea are employed to reflect realistic circumstances of possible disease spreading in Korea. We can predict where and when vaccination needs to be performed by parameters control in this model. The simulation includes several assumptions and scenarios. Using the data of Statistics Korea, five major cities, which are assumed to have the most population migration have been chosen; Seoul, Incheon (Incheon International Airport), Gangneung, Pyeongchang and Wonju. It was assumed that the cities were connected in one network, and infectious disease was spread through denoted transportation methods only. In terms of traffic volume, daily traffic volume was obtained from Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS). In addition, the population of each city was acquired from Statistics Korea. Moreover, data on H1N1 (swine flu) were provided by Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and air transport statistics were obtained from Aeronautical Information Portal System. As mentioned above, daily traffic volume, population statistics, H1N1 (swine flu) and air transport statistics data have been adjusted in consideration of the current conditions in Korea and several realistic assumptions and scenarios. Three scenarios (occurrence of H1N1 in Incheon International Airport, not-vaccinated in all cities and vaccinated in Seoul and Pyeongchang respectively) were simulated, and the number of days taken for the number of the infected to reach its peak and proportion of Infectious (I) were compared. According to the simulation, the number of days was the fastest in Seoul with 37 days and the slowest in Pyeongchang with 43 days when vaccination was not considered. In terms of the proportion of I, Seoul was the highest while Pyeongchang was the lowest. When they were vaccinated in Seoul, the number of days taken for the number of the infected to reach at its peak was the fastest in Seoul with 37 days and the slowest in Pyeongchang with 43 days. In terms of the proportion of I, Gangneung was the highest while Pyeongchang was the lowest. When they were vaccinated in Pyeongchang, the number of days was the fastest in Seoul with 37 days and the slowest in Pyeongchang with 43 days. In terms of the proportion of I, Gangneung was the highest while Pyeongchang was the lowest. Based on the results above, it has been confirmed that H1N1, upon the first occurrence, is proportionally spread by the traffic volume in each city. Because the infection pathway is different by the traffic volume in each city, therefore, it is possible to come up with a preventive measurement against infectious disease by tracking and predicting its pathway through the analysis of traffic volume.