• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.185-211
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• 2003

Initially, the system of outside director of cooperative has the object of consulting an external specialist. Recently, it takes a serious view of monitoring about securing clean management on the operating crisis. Nevertheless, in the field of NFFC(National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives), it is difficult that the system of outside director of cooperative attains that is initial object. And in the field of FC(Fisheries Cooperative), it isn't in force about the outside director of cooperative. Therefore, it is important to make a following system improvement. (1) The ratio of outside directors among the member of board of directors has to be increased. (2) Outside director's term of office has to be amended from lyears to 2years and the current method of selection should be reformed to be a strict one with high standard of requirement and substantial screening for membership. (3) Outside directors' wage system must be actualized by adopting incentive system' etc. A measure of appointing an executive in a similar business line or organizations to ours as an outside director must be considered. FC have to introduce the system of outside director. (4) A recognition of proper management of outside directors and putting in practice is essential.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.85-97
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• 2015

This study examined the effects of outside directors and CEO duality on acquisition strategies and performance of Korean firms in high-technology industry. Based on the resource dependence theory, we focused on the service and resource-dependence roles from board of directors in the process of decision-making of acquisition strategies. In addition, CEO opportunism behavior rises when CEO serves as chairperson of board and induces the negative effects on acquisition performance. Specifically, we investigated the interaction effects between outside directors ratio and CEO duality. For the period of 2004 to 2012, 246 acquisitions of Korean firms in high-technology industry were analyzed to test our intended hypotheses. Our results indicate that there exist positive relationship between outside director ratio and acquisition performance for Korean high-technology firms. Negative associations prevail between CEO duality and performance consequences of acquisitions. While outside director ratio has a positive effect on acquisition performance when there is a presence of CEO duality, negative effect prevail for outside director ratio on acquisition performance in the absence of CEO duality position to hold our interaction hypothesis. The favor of dual structure can be explained with implications referring to unity of command and strong leadership driven from CEO duality that enhances the resource dependence roles of board of directors in the context of high-technology industry acquisition behaviors rendered by Korean firms.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.213-233
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• 2021

Purpose - Our study examines the determinant factors of corporate financial fraud and whether the characteristics of outside directors tend to decrease the fraud in China. Design/methodology/approach - The data come from the enforcement actions of the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The multiple regression analysis were hired in order to analyze the data. Findings - Firms that have smaller size, higher debt ratio, or lower return of assets are associated with the incidence of fraud. However, the firms that have a high proportion of outside directors on the board or whose outside directors have a high compensation are less likely to engage in fraud. Our results show that outside directors monitor the actions of managers and thus help deter fraudulent acts. On the other hand, fraud is more associated with the local outside directors rather than outside directors who are from other locations. Since local outside directors tend to be more related with managers of firms, they can lose their independence. Research implications or Originality - Our findings have implications for the design of appropriate outside directors systems for China-listed firms. Moreover, our results imply that recruiting outside directors from other regions can improve the expertise and independence of outside directors in China. Our study contributes to provide more useful information about investors' investment decisions or management oversight and regulators' decisions on audit activities by disclosing information relating to the characteristics of outside directors.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.131-177
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• 2006

This paper examines a simultaneous determination of corporate control mechanisms, and its effects on firm performance. The corporate control mechanisms considered include the following; insider shareholding, institutional shareholding, the board of directors, dividend policy, and capital structure. This paper applies a simultaneous equation methodology and investigates the interdependence among the corporate control mechanisms. In the first part, the paper finds that firm-level variations of control mechanisms are large across time although average variations are relatively small. These variations are related to one another, which is confirmed by Granger causality test based on dynamic panel autoregression model. More specifically insider shareholding, institutional shareholding and outside director ratio cause each other. With regard to interdependence among the control mechanisms, 2SLS(two stage least squares) regression results show that insider shareholding and institutional shareholding are substitutes while institutional shareholding acts as complements to the ratio of outside members in the board of directors. Then in the second part, the paper examines the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance. Firm performance, measured by Tobin's Q, has a positive association with leverage ratio while that has a negative relation to outside director ratio. This suggests that there may be a room for reforming corporate governance in Korea. Specifically it is necessary to enhance the independence of the outside directors.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.1-39
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• 2013

Considering the relationship between state-owned enterprise (SOE) CEOs and political circles, this study examines the performance impacts of CEO's succession type, board chair separation, and industry expertise and finance expertise of CEOs and outside directors. I propose the definition of political independence in SOE CEOs based on the independence in appearance that might affect general people's perception. It means that there are no relationships or circumstances that might affect SOE CEO's judgment, activity, and report. The definition is able to overcome the limitations of the prior research that could not discover the CEOs who were affiliated to political circles because the research just distinguished the CEOs following their pre-jobs. This study focused on the performance impacts of political independence impaired CEO as well as the CEO's impacts on the relationship between the performance and other corporate governance variables. I selected as dependent variables the average return on asset as operating income divided by total assets and the average customer satisfaction rate evaluated by Korean government during the first three years following the year of the events of explanatory variables. My theory and evidence from the various CEO's personal background and financial information from SOEs in Lee Myung-bak Administration and Rho Moo-hyun Administration suggest the following important things. First, the analysis based on whether or not a SOE CEO keeps political independence shows that a political independence impaired CEO made a significantly negative impact on customer satisfaction rate. Second, the separation between a board chair and a CEO in SOEs introduced by Korean Act on Management of Public Institutions made a significantly positive impact on customer satisfaction rate. However, the positive impact of the board chair separation was removed in a political independence impaired CEO's SOE. Third, outside director's industry expertise made a significantly positive impact on return on asset. However, the positive impact of the outside director's industry expertise was removed in a political independence impaired CEO's SOE. Fourth, the comparison between Lee Myung-bak Administration and Roh Moo-hyun Administration on the corporate governance and performance of SOEs shows that the ratio of political independence impaired CEO was significantly higher in Lee Administration and the ratio of outside director's industry expertise and finance expertise were respectively significantly higher in Roh Administration. Based on these results, I suggested a few policy alternatives for CEO's improved political independence and requirements for executive's expertise in SOEs.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.143-158
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• 2014

Country ownership and management of information security companies generally do not clearly separate from the Board of Directors to function smoothly controlling shareholders do not participate in management decision-making and internal control board does not perform the task correctly, they said the issue was raised. The purpose of this study is to improve corporate governance, information security companies of the outside director system was introduced as part of the transparency of accounting information to investigate whether the effectiveness of the overall business management is also part of the efficient management of operations and earnings being with respect to the empirical data would be analyzed using the. This means that with the specific purpose of the characteristics of a technology-intensive company focusing on information security proportion of outside directors and outside directors of the board of directors of the board of directors of the target attendance rate for identifying the relationship between earnings management purposes. The empirical results is the ratio of outside directors and the relationship between discretionary accruals as a temporary negative (-) boyimyeo significant relationship, so was adopted. is discretionary accruals and attendance of outside directors, as is the hypothesis that the regression coefficient negative (-) shows the relationship between the mind, so was adopted.