• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제13권2호
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• pp.129-147
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• 2014

This study proposes an optimal operational policy for a green supply chain (GSC) where a retailer pays an incentive for collection of used products from customers and determines the optimal order quantity of a single product under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer produces the optimal order quantity of product using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts. Here, two scenarios for the product demand are assumed as: the distribution of product demand is known, and only both mean and variance are known. This paper develops mathematical models to find how order quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recycling affect the expected profits of each member and the whole supply chain under both a decentralized GSC (DGSC) and an integrated GSC (IGSC). The analysis numerically compares the results under DGSC with those under IGSC for each scenario of product demand. Also, the effect of the quality of the recyclable parts on the optimal decisions is shown. Moreover, supply chain coordination to shift the optimal decisions of IGSC is discussed based on: I) profit ratio, II) Nash bargaining solution, and III) Combination of (I) and (II).

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제14권3호
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• pp.248-274
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• 2015

This study discusses a contract to promote collection and recycling of used products in a green supply chain (GSC). A collection incentive contract is combined with a reward-penalty contract. The collection incentive contract for used products is made between a retailer and a manufacturer. The reward-penalty contract for recycling used products is made between a manufacturer and an external institution. A retailer pays an incentive for collecting used products from customers and delivers them to a manufacturer with a product order quantity under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer remanufactures products using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts by sharing the reward from an external institution. Product demand information is assumed as (i) the distribution is known (ii) mean and variance are known. Besides, the optimal decisions for product quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recyclable parts under decentralized integrated GSCs. The analysis numerically investigates how (1) contract for recycling activity, (ii) product demand information and (iii) quality of recyclable parts affect the optimal operation for each GSC. Supply chain coordination to shift IGSC is discussed by adopting Nash Bargaining solution.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제12권4호
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• pp.317-329
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• 2013

In recent years, for the purpose of solving the problem regarding environment protection and resource saving, certain measures and policies have been promoted to establish a green supply chains (GSC) with material flows from collection of used products to reuse of recycled parts in production of products. In this study, we propose an optimal operation of the GSC while considering the collection incentive of the used products and quality for recycling of used products. Two types of decision-making approaches are used for product quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level of reusable parts in the used products for recycling in the GSC. One is the decision-making under an independent policy in decentralized supply chains where a retailer and a manufacturer make decisions so as to maximize profits individually. The other is the decision-making under a cooperative policy in centralized supply chains where a retailer and a manufacturer make decisions cooperatively so as to maximize the whole system's profit. Additionally, we also discuss supply chain coordination as a manufacturer-retailer partnership based on profit sharing. Furthermore, we show the effect of the quality of the reusable parts on the optimal decisions. The collection incentive of the used products was found to bring more profitability to the GSC activity.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제60권3호
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• pp.517-523
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• 2011

A lot of DSM (Demand Side Management) programs have been implemented to promote the effective utilization of resources and the rational development of power industry, and various economic analyses and policy-based studies on DSM have been executed to determine effective subsidy budget. In this paper, a new objective function for deciding an optimal incentive allocation among various programs is presented by introducing the maximization of the total saving power of the programs. For simplicity, the objective function and the constraints is linearized to apply LP(Linear Programming) method. LP program based on Simplex Method was developed by MATLAB. An optimal incentive allocation of 4 DSM programs is presented by the use of the developed MATLAB program.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제67권8호
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• pp.1009-1018
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• 2018

As the generation of renewable energy increases rapidly, the stability of the grid due to its intermittency becomes a problem. The most appropriate way to solve this problem is to combine and operate the renewable generators with the ESS(Energy Storage System). However, since the revenues of operating the ESS are less than the investment cost, many countries are implementing various incentive policies for encouraging investment of the ESS. In this paper we estimated optimal capacity of the ESS to maximize profits of renewable energy generation businesses under the incentive policy of Korea and analyzed the impact of the incentive policy on the future electric power system of Jeju island. The simulation results show that the incentive policy has significantly improved the profitability of the renewable energy businesses generation business. But the volatility of the net demand has increased as the energy stored in the ESS is discharged intensively at the time of the incentive application.

• 한국경영과학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국경영과학회 1993년도 추계학술대회발표논문집; 서강대학교, 서울; 25 Sep. 1993
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• pp.194-211
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• 1993

This paper proposes an optimal incentive scheme for environmental pollution and output control in oligopoly markets under asymmetric information situation where the regulator has no information about each firm's technology on output productions and pollution abatements. We compare two interesting optimal incentive schemes (one is static model previously proposed and the other is dynamic model suggested in this paper), analyze features of these schemes, and carefully discuss its relevances to other schemes.

• 한국유통학회지:유통연구
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• 제15권1호
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• pp.25-47
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• 2010

고객만족제고에 관심을 기울이고 노력을 경주하는 기업이 늘어나면서, 유통업자들에게 고객만족제고 인센티브를 제공함으로써 그들의 고객만족노력을 불러일으키고자 하는 노력 역시 활발해 지고 있다. 이러한 노력은 상호 경쟁하는 멀티채널을 운용하는 기업들 역시 마찬가지이다. 그러나 지금까지의 고객만족제고방안에 관한 연구는 종업원이나 단일유통업자 등단일주체에 초점을 두고 진행되어 왔을 뿐 경쟁이 발생하는 멀티채널 상황에서의 고객만족제고 인센티브에 대해서는 별다른 연구가 이루어지지 않고 있다. 이러한 문제의식에서 출발하여, 본 연구에서는 게임이론에 기반한 수리경제학적 분석을 통해 멀티채널을 운용하는 기업의 고객만족제고방안에 주안점을 두어 제조업자가 두 유통업자를 운용하는 멀티채널 모형을 상정하여 고객만족제고 인센티브를 어떻게 제시하는 것이 바람직한지 규명하였다. 본 연구의 주요결과는 다음과 같다: (1)명성수준이 높을수록 고객만족제고 인센티브 수준을 높이는 것이 바람직하다. (2)멀티채널 사이의 보완적 외부효과가 클수록 고객만족제고 인센티브 수준을 높이는 것이 바람직하다. (3)유통비용이 클수록 멀티채널에서의 고객만족제고 인센티브의 수준은 낮게 제시하는 것이 바람직하다. (4)채널간 경쟁강도가 높을수록 고객만족제고 인센티브 수준을 높이는 것이 바람직하다.

• 한국컴퓨터정보학회논문지
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• 제16권8호
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• pp.165-176
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• 2011

본 연구에서는 재생산 기업의 회수 인센티브와 소매점에서의 회수 인센티브를 고려하여 최적 총 주문량과 이 두개의 최적 인센티브에 대한 결정을 연구한다. '회수율은 기업이 제공하는 인센티브와 밀접한 관련이 있다.'는 가정하에 이 회수율을 두 경로로 가는 각각의 함수로 표현하였다. 재고 모델로는 확정적인 EOQ(경제적 주문 수량)모델을 사용하여 기업의 최소 비용함수를 수식으로 표현하였다. 또한 이 모델을 가지고 볼록성(convexity)을 증명하여 기업이 수여하는 최적 인센티브와 소매점이 수여하는 최적 인센티브 그리고 총 주문수량(보충량)을 최적화하였다. 그리고 각각의 매개변수들을 민감도 분석하여 각각의 결정변수의 변화 추이를 살펴보면서 매개변수와의 관계를 알아보았다. 기업과 소매점은 비용을 감소시키기 위해 인센티브를 낮추려 한다. 하지만 이것은 회수량을 감소시켜 새로운 제품 생산량을 증가시킴으로 비용을 증가하게 한다. 이 논문은 국내외 재생산 기업이 이러한 상충관계(Trade off)를 고려하여 최적 인센티브와 최적 주문량을 결정하는데 있어 도움이 될 것으로 기대한다.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제22권52호
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• pp.21-31
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• 1999

This paper considers how to structure the incentive system between a buy and a single supplier of raw materials when early shipments are forbidden. And this paper is used to take the supplier's behavior into account in the buyer's choice of incentives. Combinations of two types of incentives that the buyer might offer are considered : (1) a fixed value incentive and (2) an incentive that decreases in value as time elapses. Given a desired probability of on time delivery, optimal incentives are found by specifying indifference curves for on time delivery and assessing the expected total cost of incentive schemes along that curve. Difficulties of using incentive to achieve 100% on time delivery are considered and two example flow time distributions are presented.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2003년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.658-660
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• 2003

This paper presents methodology and sample study for calculating optimal incentive for efficient application of DLC program adopted by government since 2001. As well as, several issues for improving DLC program are commented.