• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.129-147
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• 2014

This study proposes an optimal operational policy for a green supply chain (GSC) where a retailer pays an incentive for collection of used products from customers and determines the optimal order quantity of a single product under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer produces the optimal order quantity of product using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts. Here, two scenarios for the product demand are assumed as: the distribution of product demand is known, and only both mean and variance are known. This paper develops mathematical models to find how order quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recycling affect the expected profits of each member and the whole supply chain under both a decentralized GSC (DGSC) and an integrated GSC (IGSC). The analysis numerically compares the results under DGSC with those under IGSC for each scenario of product demand. Also, the effect of the quality of the recyclable parts on the optimal decisions is shown. Moreover, supply chain coordination to shift the optimal decisions of IGSC is discussed based on: I) profit ratio, II) Nash bargaining solution, and III) Combination of (I) and (II).

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.248-274
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• 2015

This study discusses a contract to promote collection and recycling of used products in a green supply chain (GSC). A collection incentive contract is combined with a reward-penalty contract. The collection incentive contract for used products is made between a retailer and a manufacturer. The reward-penalty contract for recycling used products is made between a manufacturer and an external institution. A retailer pays an incentive for collecting used products from customers and delivers them to a manufacturer with a product order quantity under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer remanufactures products using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts by sharing the reward from an external institution. Product demand information is assumed as (i) the distribution is known (ii) mean and variance are known. Besides, the optimal decisions for product quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recyclable parts under decentralized integrated GSCs. The analysis numerically investigates how (1) contract for recycling activity, (ii) product demand information and (iii) quality of recyclable parts affect the optimal operation for each GSC. Supply chain coordination to shift IGSC is discussed by adopting Nash Bargaining solution.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.317-329
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• 2013

In recent years, for the purpose of solving the problem regarding environment protection and resource saving, certain measures and policies have been promoted to establish a green supply chains (GSC) with material flows from collection of used products to reuse of recycled parts in production of products. In this study, we propose an optimal operation of the GSC while considering the collection incentive of the used products and quality for recycling of used products. Two types of decision-making approaches are used for product quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level of reusable parts in the used products for recycling in the GSC. One is the decision-making under an independent policy in decentralized supply chains where a retailer and a manufacturer make decisions so as to maximize profits individually. The other is the decision-making under a cooperative policy in centralized supply chains where a retailer and a manufacturer make decisions cooperatively so as to maximize the whole system's profit. Additionally, we also discuss supply chain coordination as a manufacturer-retailer partnership based on profit sharing. Furthermore, we show the effect of the quality of the reusable parts on the optimal decisions. The collection incentive of the used products was found to bring more profitability to the GSC activity.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.60 no.3
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• pp.517-523
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• 2011

A lot of DSM (Demand Side Management) programs have been implemented to promote the effective utilization of resources and the rational development of power industry, and various economic analyses and policy-based studies on DSM have been executed to determine effective subsidy budget. In this paper, a new objective function for deciding an optimal incentive allocation among various programs is presented by introducing the maximization of the total saving power of the programs. For simplicity, the objective function and the constraints is linearized to apply LP(Linear Programming) method. LP program based on Simplex Method was developed by MATLAB. An optimal incentive allocation of 4 DSM programs is presented by the use of the developed MATLAB program.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.67 no.8
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• pp.1009-1018
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• 2018

As the generation of renewable energy increases rapidly, the stability of the grid due to its intermittency becomes a problem. The most appropriate way to solve this problem is to combine and operate the renewable generators with the ESS(Energy Storage System). However, since the revenues of operating the ESS are less than the investment cost, many countries are implementing various incentive policies for encouraging investment of the ESS. In this paper we estimated optimal capacity of the ESS to maximize profits of renewable energy generation businesses under the incentive policy of Korea and analyzed the impact of the incentive policy on the future electric power system of Jeju island. The simulation results show that the incentive policy has significantly improved the profitability of the renewable energy businesses generation business. But the volatility of the net demand has increased as the energy stored in the ESS is discharged intensively at the time of the incentive application.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 1993.10a
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• pp.194-211
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• 1993

This paper proposes an optimal incentive scheme for environmental pollution and output control in oligopoly markets under asymmetric information situation where the regulator has no information about each firm's technology on output productions and pollution abatements. We compare two interesting optimal incentive schemes (one is static model previously proposed and the other is dynamic model suggested in this paper), analyze features of these schemes, and carefully discuss its relevances to other schemes.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.25-47
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• 2010

CS is one of the major concerns of managers in the world because it is well known to be a key medium construct for firms' superior outcome. One of the major agents for CS management is retailers. Firms try to manage not only employees but also retailers to promote CS behaviors. And so diverse incentives are used to promote their CS behaviors under diverse channel setting such as multi-channel. However in spite of the rising needs there has been scarce studies on the optimal incentive structure for a manufacturer to offer competing retailers at the multi-channel. In this paper, we try to find better way for a manufacturer to promote the competing retailers' CS behaviors. We investigated how to promote the retailers' CS behavior via game-theoretic modeling. Especially, we focus on the possible incentive, CS bonus type reward introduced in the studies of Hauser, Simester, and Wernerfelt(1994) and Chu and Desai(1995). We build up a multi stage complete information game and derive a subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction. Stages of the game are as following. (Stage 1) Manufacturer sets wholesale price(w) and CS bonus($\eta$). (Stage 2) Both retailers in competition set CS effort level($e_i$) and retail price($p_i$) simultaneously. (Stage 3) Consumers make purchasing decisions based on the manufacturer's initial reputation and retailers' CS efforts.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.16 no.8
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• pp.165-176
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• 2011

In this paper, we develop the cost minimization model to select two incentives and total order quantity with consideration of remanufacture company's return incentive. Return rate is sensitive to the incentive that the manufacture company offers. Using a EOQ(Economic Order Quantity) model of a cost minimization, we show concavities of the model about two incentives and total order quantity respectively. According to the proposed algorithm using the concavities, we find out the optimized incentive prices and total order quantity. Through numerical study, we examine sensitive analysis of the incentive price and order quantity for each parameter when the return rate is sensitive to incentive. Company lessens incentive to reduce total price. However, this makes the total price increase due to a diminution of return quantity. We expect that domestic or overseas remanufacture businesses are able to decide optimal incentive and total order quantity by this research.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.22 no.52
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• pp.21-31
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• 1999

This paper considers how to structure the incentive system between a buy and a single supplier of raw materials when early shipments are forbidden. And this paper is used to take the supplier's behavior into account in the buyer's choice of incentives. Combinations of two types of incentives that the buyer might offer are considered : (1) a fixed value incentive and (2) an incentive that decreases in value as time elapses. Given a desired probability of on time delivery, optimal incentives are found by specifying indifference curves for on time delivery and assessing the expected total cost of incentive schemes along that curve. Difficulties of using incentive to achieve 100% on time delivery are considered and two example flow time distributions are presented.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.658-660
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• 2003

This paper presents methodology and sample study for calculating optimal incentive for efficient application of DLC program adopted by government since 2001. As well as, several issues for improving DLC program are commented.