• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.17 no.9
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• pp.67-81
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• 2019

Purpose - The overarching aim of this study is to empirically test the effect of ex-post control mechanisms on multi-dimensional trust and channel performance in franchise systems. Although the franchise system is a vertical marketing channel based on trust between the franchisor and the franchisees, issues related to franchisee's opportunistic behavior have persisted and thus requires research into the effective control system of franchise headquarters. Research design, data, and methodology - In this study, data was collected from 150 franchises to identify the effect of two types of franchising headquarters' control system on the multi-dimensional trust and franchise channel outcome between franchisor and franchisee. To test the hypotheses intended to achieve this aim, structural equations modeling technique is utilized. Results - The results of this research reveal that among the two formal control systems studied (output and process control), output control positively and significantly affects multidimensional trust. Additionally, among the three dimensions of trust employed in this study, only expertise has a positive and significant effect on contract compliance. Equally, only expertise and integrity have a negative and significant effect on opportunistic behavior. Conclusions - The study provides managerial and theoretical insights into understanding ex-post control mechanisms, trust, compliance and opportunistic behaviors in franchise systems.

• Journal of agriculture & life science
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• v.46 no.6
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• pp.185-195
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• 2012

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how strategically the bilaterally monopolistic firms, only-one-seller and only-one-buyer, behave in a situation in which each firm has uncertain information on its opponent firm's cost. Even though the two firms know that seeking integrated profit leads to the optimized profit for both firms, each firm has an incentive to opportunistically behave to increase its share of the integrated profit. These opportunistic behaviors of the firms are analyzed through a game theoretic approach especially finding Nash equilibrium mixed strategies for the strategic profiles such as true-report or not and monitoring or not. The comparative statics to the Nash equilibrium mixed strategies shows that as the profit share increases the probability of monitoring an opponent firm is decreased while the probability increases as the size of the overstated production cost increases. This study also shows that high penalty and low monitoring cost lead to high probability to tell the truth of the production cost.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.16 no.11
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• pp.65-72
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• 2018

Purpose - The purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of ex ante governance mechanisms that can be exercised by franchisers on franchise contract compliance and various relationship outcomes. There are many previous studies on control mechanisms in inter-firm relationship, however, most studies focus on ex post governance mechanisms and identify the effects of behavior control and outcome control on performances. Based on transaction cost theory and agency theory, this study defines the ex ante governance mechanisms of franchisers as contractual completeness and extra contractual incentives. The author have examined the two ex ante control mechanisms on contract compliance, recontract intention, multi-shop running intention and opportunistic behaviors of franchisee. Research design, data, and methodology - In this study, 137 questionnaires of food and beverage franchise stores were collected through a specialized research company. The reliability and validity of the variables were analyzed using SPSS 18.0 and AMOS 18.0 programs and hypotheses were verified through the structural equation modeling. Results - As a result of hypothesis testing, contractual completeness and extra contractual incentives have a positive effect on the contract compliance of the franchisee. It is shown that franchisee's contract compliance has a positive effect on recontract intention and multi-shop running intention and has a negative effect on opportunistic behaviors. Conclusions - This study examines the ex ante governance mechanisms such as contractual completeness and extra contractual incentives, which is relatively rare compared to ex post governance mechanism in B2B relationship. According to the results of this research, these two tools can be used as ex ante control mechanisms for franchise headquarters to use their franchisees. In addition, franchisee's contract compliance affects various relationship outcomes between franchisor and franchisees.

• Journal of the Korean Regional Science Association
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.15-31
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• 1999

This study examines the economic effects of ill-defined property rights on the resource usage with special reference to the Korean Green Belt. Property rights are considered ill-defined, when their whereabouts are not clearly delineated, they are not assigned to those who utilize them most efficiently, and they are not exercised precisely. If properly, and they are not exercised precisely. If properly rights are ill-defined, it is more likely that economic agents pursue opportunistic and illegal behaviors and even their rational behaviors tend to bring about undesirable outcomes, and social conflicts occur around the assignment of the rights. Upon the completion of a case study, we found that the ill-defined property right system of the Korean Green Belt has, in fact, resulted in several problems in resource usatge. Inefficient land use, compromising reassignment of property rights, the prevalence of illegal activities, huge management costs, and the spread of social conflicts are the problems in question. These problems can be resolved by the realignment of property rights, since they are caused by the ill-defined property right system. To resolve such problems, we need to reassign properly rights so that their delineation may be complete and those who value them highest may exercise the rights, and social justice in terms of wealth distribution may be achieved.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.19 no.6
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• pp.135-143
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• 2018

Normally there is a one-time relationship between stakeholders in the construction projects. Thus, project participants are easily exposed to opportunistic behavior. According to the theory of transaction costs, a contract effectively influence the behavior of counter-party. The important role of contracts in limiting opponent opportunistic behavior has been academically acknowledged and studied in inter-firm relationships. The purpose of this study is to reveal the mediating effect of the contract on the power of the contractor in the contractor's behavior. Power is divided into mediated and non-mediated power. We surveyed construction companies' employees who have conducted construction projects. Based on the questionnaire response, we examined the influence of the Employer's power on the behavior of the contractor. Both non-mediated power and mediated power were significant for in-role and out-role behaviors. Both non-mediated power and mediated power were found to have a significant effect on the control and coordination function of contracts. The results show that the control function of the contract is significant for the in-role behavior and the extra-role behavior. Finally, the mediating effect of the contract function was significant only in the control function.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.3-24
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• 2017

The effects of strategic partnership can be positive or negative. This paper intends to explain why the partnership produces opposite results. This paper incorporates strategic behavioral direction and perceived values for relational performance. The conceptual model as well as empirical analysis was made and the results are as follows. First, this study uses bi-directional decomposition of two research constructs. The first construct of perceived values is classified into benefits and risks. Also, the behavioral directions are either active or passive behaviors. The critical path is found that the perceived benefits make significant effects on active behavioral direction which does on commitment. Another path is that the perceived risks make passive behavioral direction which results in opportunistic behaviors between strategically partnered firms.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.37 no.3 s.72
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• pp.25-44
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• 2006

This paper tries to suggest reform proposals for the management policy of reported handicraft fisheries based on the intertidal - mudflat productivity. The paper started from the empirical analysis of the current situation of the handicraft fisheries around Seosan and Dangjin counties. The area of intertidal - mudflat around Seosan and Dangjin counties is approximately 855ha. The its ratio to the total areas in our country is 0.3%. By the way, the reported number of handicraft fisheries is 5,245, the ratio of which to the total number in our country is nearly 10.2%. The reason why there exists unbalance between the area of intertidal - mudflat and the reported number of handicraft fisheries is the political behavior of provincial governments. Therefore the paper tries to establish policy remedies focused on the confrontation against the opportunistic behaviors of provincial governments, such as the reform proposals for the Korea's fisheries act.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.1-20
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• 1999

This study aims to provide distributors with several implications on the channel strategy by testing factors which influence on the offsetting investment. Medium-sized distributor facing a relatively inferior power can cause profit vulnerability from large manufacurer's opportunistic behaviors. At the same time, we tested the relationship commitment to the relation with manufacturer as another alternative strategy taken by medium-sized distributer. For this research, samples from dealers in oil-petroleum refinery industry were selected and the data was collected using mail survey. The data was analyzed utilizing validity test, reliability test, factor analysis, correlation analysis and LISREL. The major analyzed results are as follows: First, the offsetting investment of preventing loss from manufacturer's opportunism didn't affect medium-sized distributor's sales empirically. Second, the hypothesis that the more the medium-sized distributor's transaction specific assets which they invest in the transactional relationship with manufacturer, the more the safeguard against the expected opportunism of manufacturer was not supported by the results. Third, the more use of coercive power by the manufacturer, the more increase in the perception of expected opportunism of manufacturer by the medium-sized distributor, it make stimulates offsetting investment as safeguard by medium-sized distributor and it has negative effect on developing commitment. Finally, the large manufactures dealing with a medium-sized distributor firm which had a reputation of fairness didn't make offsetting investment as a response for distributor's opportunism.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.132-157
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• 2011

The purpose of this article is to examine the cause of policy non-compliance in the case of pharmaceutical rebates from the perspective of rational choice institutionalism. In Korea, there have been rebates practices between pharmaceutical companies and hospitals since the introduction of the Actual Remuneration System for insured medicine in 1999. The government has chosen the policy means of punishment to eliminate pharmaceutical rebates but the illegal practices are still widespread. Institution in rational choice institutionalism usually reflects the incentives and preferences of actors, and the Actual Remuneration System has resulted in a the lack of procedures to ensure savings on drug expenditures. Pharmaceutical rebates are the product of the institutions which reflect their incentives: the Actual Remuneration System, the current pricing policy for generic drugs, the drug distribution system, and so on. In the end, the problem of the rebates is the consequence of policy non-compliance as actors' rational choice because their incentives lead to opportunistic behaviors. We should therefore understand the incentive structure of policy stakeholders, which is derived from the view of new institutionalism; also, the newly designed Korean drug pricing policy reform must be compatible with the incentive structure.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.187-207
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• 2005

In the Internet-based B2C e-commerce, trust has been recognized as a critical factor to reduce uncertainties, through interacting with a well-known specific shopping mall. In this study, we view customer trust as not a unitary concept but multidimensional one consisted of the trustworthiness of trustee, familiarity with the specific shopping-mall, disposition to trust, and institution-based trust. In this study, first, we considered the trustworthiness of trustee consisted of capability, benevolence, and integrity as one of the major factors to build customer trust on the specific Internet shopping-mall. In the context of the Internet e-commerce, the role of institutional structures is very important to assure the customer trust from the various opportunistic behaviors because of the characteristics of internet-based commerce such as impersonality, the lack of information on the other party, and the transactions with a number of anonymous people. Second, we examined the effect of the institution-based trust built by institutional structures on customer trust. Third, we examined the effect of customer trust and familiarity on retaining customer loyalty. Our findings showed that customer trust and familiarity played a major role in retaining customer loyalty with the specific shopping-mall. In conclusions, we discussed the strategies to build the customer loyalty for maintaining the customer. We suggest customer trust and familiarity for the factors to bind the customer with the specific shopping-mall based on these results.