• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.40 no.6
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• pp.623-631
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• 2020

An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack on a nuclear weapon or the airlift of an electronic bomb affects weapons systems, information devices, wired and wireless communication equipment, and power supply equipment. It can lead to confusion on the battlefield. The current standards for EMP protection when applied to the military are centered on fixed and mobile facilities and equipment. It is, however, important to study EMP protection for a single tactical unit centered on the weapon system. In this study, EMP protection standards were established for command and control, maneuvering and firepower systems vulnerable to EMPs, focusing on battle tanks with mobility, firepower, and shock force. Also, specific development plans for EMP protection capabilities are proposed, including the shielding and blocking of EMPs. Through the study, the Korean government intends to ensure a unit's command and control under an EMP attack as well as preserve the viability of a unit's personnel and guarantee the conditions for the execution of a mission.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.359-367
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• 2018

Long-lived Small Modular Reactors are being promoted as an innovative way of catering to emerging markets and isolated regions. They can be operated continuously for decades without requiring additional fuel. A novel configuration of long-lived reactor core employs a mixed neutron spectrum, providing an improvement in nonproliferation metrics and in safety characteristics. Starting with a base sodium reactor design, moderating material is inserted in outer core assemblies to modify the fast spectrum. The assemblies are shuffled once during core lifetime to ensure that every fuel rod is exposed to the thermalized spectrum. The Mixed Spectrum Reactor is able to maintain a core lifetime over two decades while ensuring the plutonium it breeds is below the weapon-grade limit at the fuel discharge. The main drawbacks of the design are higher front-end fuel cycle costs and a 58% increase in core volume, although it is alleviated to some extent by a 48% higher power output.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Systems Engineering
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.29-38
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• 2016

The threats around Korea Peninsula have been dramatically increased because North Korea is developing the Nuclear ballistic missile, Submarine launched ballistic missile(SLBM), and many kinds of weapons for sudden provocations. Therefore, ROK navy needs the cutting-edge warship combat systems in order to defeat the enemy threats effectively in the sea. The paper analyzes current warship combat system acquisition process and studies US navy and other advanced countries acquisition process and their contraction trends. After that, the paper proposes the optimal acquisition process of warship combat system for the ROK navy based on our current situation and other advanced countries acquisition trends. The paper will dedicate the next generation warship combat system acquisition process.

• Journal of Radiation Industry
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.93-100
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• 2023

This study analyzes the neutron shielding performance of Soft Magnetic Material and proposes a military application. In general, the military protection facility has been constructed with thick concrete, so Soft Magnetic Material, consisting of boron, was used with concrete in this study. To do so, Monte-Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) was applied to simulate the Watt-fission neutron spectrum of ²³⁵U and ²³⁹Pu. As a result, a configuration of polyethylene and Soft Magnetic Material is evaluated about four times better than borated polyethylene concerning the atomic weight of boron inside each shielding material. Also, when a nuclear weapon explosion is simulated in MCNP, 1 mm of Soft Magnetic Material with 20 cm of concrete shows about 55% more additional neutron shielding performance compared to when Soft Magnetic Material is not used. In this work, the neutron shielding performance of Soft Magnetic Material could be identified and Soft Magnetic Material would be useful for neutron shielding if applicable to concrete structure.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.89-122
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• 2020

The longing for submarine manufacture and the fear of her power had exited for a long time, but submarine that could submerge and attack was built from 20th century by science technology development. The question, 'Submarine can exercise her power in naval warfare?' had exited before World War I, but the effective value of submarine was shown in the procedure of a chain of naval warfare during World War I and World War II. Germany and the United States made the best use of submarines at that time. The submarines of these nations mounted fierce attack on the enemy's battleships and merchant ships and blocked the sea lanes for war material. These fierce attack on ships became impossible After World War II, and the major powers reduced and coordinated the defence budget, so they considered the role of submarine. However, submarine is still powerful weapon system because she can secretly navigate under the water, and one of the most important force in the navy. The aim of this thesis is analyzing submarine roles in each naval warfare and integrating maritime strategy and weapon system technology into her roles. First, the research about represent submarine roles like anti-surfaceship warfare, anti-submarine warfare, intelligence gathering, land attack, supporting special operation and mine landing warfare will be presented, then the major naval warfare where submarine participated(during ex-World War I, World War I, World War II, The Cold War Era and post Cold War) and the analyzing of submarine roles by time will be presented. Submarine was developed for anti-surfaceship warfare during ex-World War I but could not make remarkable military gain in naval warfare because her performance and weapon was inadequate. However, the effective value of submarine in the procedure of a chain of naval warfare was shown during World War I and World War II. The major powers put battleships into naval warfare undiscriminatingly to command the sea power and submarines did massive damage to enemy navy power, so put a restraint the maritime power of enemy, and blocked the sea lanes for war material. After World War II, the battlefield situation changed rapidly and the concept of preemption became difficult to apply in naval warfare. Therefore, the submarine was unable to concentrate on anti-surfaceship mission. Especially during the Cold War era, nuclear submarine came to appear and her weapon system developed rapidly. These development gave submarines special missions: anti-submarine warfare and intelligence gathering. At that time, United States and Soviet submarines tracked other nation's submarines loaded with nuclear weapons and departing from naval their base. The submarines also collected information on the volume of ships and a coastal missile launching site in company with this mission. After Cold War, the major powers despatched forces to major troubled regions to maintain world peace, their submarines approached the shores of these regions and attacked key enemy installations with cruise missiles. At that time, the United States eased the concept of preemption and made the concept of Bush doctrine because of possible 911 terrorism. The missiles fired from submarines and surface battleships accurately attacked key enemy installations. Many nations be strategically successful depending on what kind of mission a submarine is assigned. The patterns of future naval warfare that my country will provide against will be military power projection and coalition/joint operations. These suggest much more about what future missions we should assign to submarines.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.171-208
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• 2017

This paper is to analyze the type characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy. To this end, the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled introduction; the concept and type of nuclear strategy; the nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the declarative nuclear strategy; the operational characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy; and conclusion. Recently, the deployment of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of nuclear capabilities in North Korea have raised serious problems in our security and military preparedness. Nuclear strategy means military strategy related to the organization, deployment and operation of nuclear weapons. The study of North Korea's nuclear strategy begins with a very realistic assumption that the nuclear arsenal of North Korea has been substantiated. It is a measure based on North Korea's nuclear arsenal that our defense authorities present the concepts of preemptive attack, missile defense, and mass retaliation as countermeasures against the North Korean nuclear issue and are in the process of introducing and deploying them. The declared nuclear declaration strategy of the DPRK is summarized as: (1)Nuclear deterrence and retaliation strategy under the (North Korea's) Nuclear Weapons Act, (2)Nuclear preemptive aggression, (3)The principle of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons in the 7th Congress. And the intentions and operational characteristics of the North Korean nuclear strategy are as follows: (1)Avoiding blame through imitation of existing nuclear state practices, (2)Favoring of nuclear strategy through declarative nuclear strategy, (3)Non-settlement of nuclear strategy due to gap between nuclear capability and nuclear posture. North Korea has declared itself a nuclear-weapon state through the revised Constitution(2012.7), the Line of 'Construction of the Nuclear Armed Forces and the Economy'(2013.3), and the Nuclear Weapons Act(2013.4). However, the status of "nuclear nations" can only be granted by the NPT, which is already a closed system. Realistically, a robust ROK-US alliance and close US-ROK cooperation are crucial to curbing and overcoming the North Korean nuclear threat we face. On this basis, it is essential not only to deter North Korea's nuclear attacks, but also to establish and implement our own short-term, middle-term and long-term political and military countermeasures for North Korea's denuclearization and disarmament.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.11-21
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• 2014

South Korea should not be in subordinate position in international relationships like the past. As the status of middle power. South Korea achieves peaceful unification through overcoming North Korea's nuclear and conventional threats, and builds military power in Northeast Asia as a 'balancer'. This can firstly be achieved by constructing "attack systems triad". 'attack systems triad' can be established through integrating the C41SR as a common strategy for the purposes of preemptive deterrence and retaliatory deterrence against the dangers of the present and the future. Second, denial deterrence can be achieved by establishing "defense system triad" by combining common military power and defensive weapon system. Finally, development of independent advanced technological strategies can be achieved by building defense industry and combination of research and development through constructing "Infra triad". As for constructing and reinforcing the future of the ROK military, a unilateral principle and policy efforts to achieve the aforementioned force construction models are needed. This can only be achieved through the government's national vision to take on the role of mediator and a basis founded upon the consensus of the public.

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 1997.05b
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• pp.439-444
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• 1997

In order to investigate organic association of fallout cesium, strontium and plutonium in the soil, soil samples influenced by fallout from nuclear weapon testings were treated with alkali (0.1 M-sodium hydroxide solution) to extract organic acids. After extraction, the resultant three fractions (sedimentary residue, humic and fulvic acid fractions) were subjected to the r-ray spectrometric analysis for $^{137}$ Cs, and radiochemical analysis for gosr and $^{239,240}$Pu. Alkali extraction experiments showed that a lot of $^{ 239,240}$Pu was extracted to organic acids from the soil samples, whereas most of $^{137}$ Cs and $^{90}$ Sr remained in residual fraction. Less than 10% of the total $^{137}$ Cs and $^{90}$ Sr was found in the organic fraction. The concentrations of $^{137}$ Cs and $^{90}$ Sr associated with humic fractions were higher than those with the corresponding fulvic fractions. It was found that more than 40% of the total $^{239,240}$Pu was associated with the organic fraction of soils. In contrast with $^{137}$ Cs and $^{90}$ Sr, $^{239,240}$Pu associated with vulvic fractions was much higher than in humic fractions.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Economic and Environmental Geology
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• v.35 no.6
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• pp.545-552
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• 2002

In order to investigate the influence of nuclear power plant operation on its nearby environment, soil, stream and marine sediment samples were collected in the vicinity of the Youngkwang Nuclear Power Plant in Korea, and analyzed for artificial and natural radionuclide radioactivity. From the analytical result, Cs-137 was detected in most soil samples. but it may have been derived fiom past nuclear weapon tests because Cs-134 having short half-live was not detected. The radioactivities of Cs-137 in the sediment samples were also detected which are within the normal range in the sediments based upon the published literature between 1997 and 1999. For the quality control of radioactivity analysis of environmental samples, sets of marine sediments in the Gamami area were analyzed using two HPGe Gamma-ray Spectroscopes (30% and 45%) according to the geostatistical sampling strategy, and Cs-137 and K-40 results were interpreted by analysis of variance (ANOVA). In the two-way ANOVA, variances derived from the geochemical variation were significant, but errors from sampling and analytical procedures are negligible. In conclusion. all the radioanalytical procedures of this study including sampling are validated to be acceptable.