• Korean Security Journal
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• no.42
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• pp.205-227
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• 2015

The Korean Peninsula is put in a position to carry out a highly strategic game vis-a-vis nK, which is asserting itself as a nuclear power amongst Northeast Asia's complex dynamics. While the international community recognizes nK's possession of nuclear weapons as released secret based on nK's three nuclear tests, shrewd strategic thinking is needed by ROK to secure itself as a non-nuclear nation in order to assume a responsible role to the international community, while simultaneously being ready to respond at all times for nK's military provocations. ROK must continue with its twofold strategy, by firm response to military confrontation with nK and maintaining flexible policy of tolerance in the areas of economy and ethnicity. Various strategic options to overcome nK's nuclear threats have been presented to ROK, whose possession of nuclear weapons have been difficult, and nK's nuclear capability is a real threat to ROK's national security. We must be able to respond to nK's nuclear threats strictly from ROK's national security perspective. This thesis aims to propose a response policy for nK's nuclear capability and nK's nuclear attack based on analysis of such nuclear damage, ROK Government's response posture against nK's nuclear threats, centered around ROK Government's non-military response posture.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.115-120
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• 2009

Since 1990s, some events - detection of a dirty bomb in a Russian nation park in 1995, 9/11 terrorist attack to WTC in 2001, discovery of Al-Qaeda's experimentation to build a dirty bomb in 2003 etc - have showed that nuclear or radiological terrorism relating to radioactive materials (hereinafter "radioactive materials" is referred to as "nuclear material, nuclear spent fuel and radioactive source") is not incredible but serious and credible threat. Thus, to respond to the new threat, the international community has not only strengthened security and physical protection of radioactive materials but also established prevention of and response to illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. In this regard, our government has enacted or revised the national regulatory framework with a view to improving security of radioactive materials and joined the international convention or agreement to meet this international trend. For the purpose of prevention of nuclear/radiological terrorism, this paper reviews physical characteristics of nuclear material and existing detection instruments used for prevention of illicit trafficking. Finally, national detection regime against nuclear/radiological terrorism based on paths of the smuggled radioactive materials to terrorist's target building/area, national topography and road networks, and defence-in-depth concept is suggested in this paper. This study should contribute to protect people's health, safety and environment from nuclear/radiological terrorism.

• Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.57-68
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• 2015

This paper examines the New York Times' reaction to the 2010 Brazil-Turkey-Iran (BTI) nuclear deal, the very last diplomatic effort before the imposition of international sanctions track over the following years. The New York Times' (NYT) coverage of the deal is examined using the Critical Discourse Analytic (CDA) approach formulated by Teun van Dijk. The results show a strong bias against the BTI deal throughout the NYT's news coverage. The overarching theme in cover-age of the deal is the imputation of malignant intentions on the part of both Iran ("to kill time to further its nuclear weapons program") and Brazil and Turkey ("to advance their own business dealings with Iran and gaining international recognition"). Also, non-relevant information is used to imply a threat of Iranian development of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the NYT leaves almost totally "unsaid" that president Obama had asked Brazilian and Turkish leaders to go to Tehran and get this deal. Therefore, the NYT basically echoed, and legitimized, discursive practices of the U.S. government on the deal.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.45 no.5
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• pp.597-604
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• 2013

Containment Filtered Vent Systems (CFVSs) have been mainly equipped in nuclear power plants in Europe and Canada for the controlled depressurization of the containment atmosphere under severe accident conditions. This is to keep the containment integrity against overpressure during the course of a severe accident, in which the radioactive gas-steam mixture from the containment is discharged into a system designed to remove the radionuclides. In Korea, a CFVS was first introduced in the Wolsong unit-1 nuclear power plant as a mitigation measure to deal with the threat of over pressurization, following post-Fukushima action items. In this paper, the overall features of a CFVS installation such as risk assessments, an evaluation of the performance requirements, and a determination of the optimal operating strategies are analyzed for the Wolsong unit 1 nuclear power plant using a severe accident analysis computer code, ISAAC.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.5
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• pp.173-202
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• 2007

After successful nuclear tests Pakistan launched a more severe surprise attack toward India than before. It is highly possible that North Korea will adopt this Pakistan military strategy if it is armed with nuclear weapons. The North Korean forces armed, with nuclear bombs could make double its war capability through strengthening aggressive force structure and come into effect on blocking reinforcement of the US forces at the initial phase of war time. Therefore we may regard that Pyongyang's nuclear arming is a major one of various factors which increase possibility of waging a conventional warfare or a nuclear war. North Korea's high self-confidence after nuclear arming will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula via aggressive military threat or terror toward South Korea, and endeavor to accomplish its political purpose via low-intensity conflicts. For instance, nuclear arming of the Pyongyang regime enforces the North Korean forces to invade the Northern Limit Line(NLL), provoke naval battles at the West Sea, and occupy one or two among the Five Islands at the West Sea. In that case, the South Korean forces will be faced with a serious dilemma. In order to recapture the islands, Seoul should be ready for escalating a war. However it is hard to imagine that South Korea fights with North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. This paper concludes that the Pyongyang regime after nuclear arming strongly tends to occupy superiority of military strategy and wage military provocations on the Korean Peninsula.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.82-114
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• 2016

The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.142-176
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• 2018

So far, the main threat to South Korea was North Korea. That is why South Korea established a strategy based on the threat of North Korea and most of the budget on defense was used to deter North Korea. Even though the neighboring countries(China, Japan, and Russia) are growing as a real threat with abilities and intentions based on their powerful naval forces, South Korea has not yet been able to establish a strategy that regards neighboring countries as a threat. But the decades-old structural mechanism of the Korean security environment is undergoing a radical change on April 27, 2018, through the South-North summit and the Panmunjom Declaration. Under the changing security environment, South Korea was placed in a complicated dilemma that had to deal with threats of two axes(China), three axes(China, Japan), and four axes(Japan, Russia). If the one axis threat(North Korea) is dominated by land threats, the second, third and fourth axis threats are threats from the sea. This paper analyzed the maritime strategy of Korea within the framework of maritime-geopolitics, in other words recognition and expansion of the sphere of maritime. I have designed that the maritime defense space that we can deny from threats is divided into three lines of defense: 1 line (radius 3,000km), 2 lines (2,000km), and 3 lines (1,000km). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as an active defense(1 line), defensive offense(2 line), active offense(3 line). The three defense zones of the three lines were defined as the sphere of core maritime, As a power to deny the sphere of core maritime, it was analyzed as a maneuvering unit, a nuclear-powered submarine, the establishment of missile strategy, and the fortification of islands station. The marine strategy of South Korea with these concepts and means was defined as 'Offensive Maritime Denial Strategy'.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.56 no.7
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• pp.2666-2675
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• 2024

This study explores the potential for tritium production in North Korea's 5MWe graphite-moderated reactor, a facility primarily associated with nuclear weapons material production. While existing research on these reactors has largely centered on plutonium, our focus shifts to tritium, a crucial element in boosted fission bombs. Utilizing the MCNP6 code for simulations, the results estimate that North Korea can possibly produce approximately 7-12 g of tritium annually. This translates to the potential production of 1-3 boosted fission bombs each year. By incorporating tritium production into assessments of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, our methodology provides insights into the dynamics of the country's nuclear force, revealing a more diversified and complex composition than previously assumed. The findings significantly aid policymakers, regulatory bodies, and researchers in comprehending potential proliferation risks associated with graphite-moderated reactors and in developing strategies to address the nuclear threat emanating from North Korea.

• The Journal of the Korea institute of electronic communication sciences
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• v.6 no.6
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• pp.839-847
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• 2011

Instrumentation & Control(I&C) System in NPP(Nuclear Power Plant) plays a important role as the brain of human being, it performs protecting, controling and monitoring safety operation of NPP. Recently, the I&C system is digitalized as digital technology such as PLC, DSP, FPGA. The different aspect of digital system which use digital communication to analog system is that it has potential vulnerability to cyber threat in nature. Possibility that digital I&C system is defected by cyber attack is increasing day by day. The result of cyber attack can be adverse effect to safety function in NPP. Therefore, I&C system required cyber security counter-measures that protect themselves from cyber threat efficiently and also cyber security design should be taken into consideration at concept stage in I&C system development process. In this study, we proposed the digital asset analysis method for cyber security assessment of I&C system design in NPP and we performed digital asset analysis of I&C system by using the proposed method.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.16 no.5
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• pp.1102-1112
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• 2012

The policy of the United States is a Korean Peninsula free of all nuclear weapons. The United States government was considering the possibility of military action to eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat. Talk of military action peaked from mid-1993 through mid-1994. Such an attack might have led directly to a Korean war. At that time the nuclear crisis solutioned by North Korea-United States negotiation and ROK-United States alliance. PSI's purpose is to prevent or at least inhibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors whose possession would be a serious threat to global or regional security. The most controversial activity of PSI is interdiction. North Korea has expressed grave concern over the initiative, stating that it has a sovereign right to develop, deploy, and export weapons, and that it would view any interdiction of its ships as a declaration of war. If South Korea is to execute interdiction North Korean ships expect tensions to increase dramatically on the peninsula with North Korea doing something quite provacative in response. South Korea cannot help approaching PSI with great caution, since it has to consider the ROK-United States alliance, and inter-Korean relations.