• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2022.05a
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• pp.187-188
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• 2022

As information processing technology develops with the trend of the times, the possibility of cyber threats to nuclear facilities is increasing. In the 2000s, there was a growing perception that cyberattacks on nuclear facilities were needed, and in fact, a cybersecurity regulatory system for nuclear power plants began to be established to prepare for cyberattacks. In Korea, in order to prepare for cyber threats, in 2013 and 2014, the Act on Protection and Radiation Disaster Prevention, Enforcement Decree, and Enforcement Rules of Nuclear Facilities, etc., and notices related to the Radioactive Disaster Prevention Act were revised. In 2015, domestic nuclear operators prepared information system security regulations for each facility in accordance with the revised laws and received approval from the Nuclear Safety Commission for implementation of information system security regulations divided into seven stages. In 2019, a special inspection for step-by-step implementation was completed, and since 2019, the cybersecurity system of operators has been continuously inspected through regular inspections. In this paper, we present some measures to build improved training to suit the steadily revised inspection of the nuclear facility cybersecurity system to counter cyber threats to the ever-evolving nuclear facilities.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.55 no.1
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• pp.1-11
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• 2023

To protect people and the environment from environmental radiation, the Act on Protective Action Guidelines against Radiation in the Natural Environment was formulated in Korea in 2011. This law regulates matters related to radiation safety that can be encountered in life. In accordance with this law, radiation monitoring equipment is operated at major airports and ports across the country, ensuring radiation monitoring of imported cargo. Currently, six ministries conduct radiation monitoring of imported cargo: the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission; the Korea Customs Service; the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety; the Ministry of Environment; the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs; and the Korea Forest Service. Each ministry designates the relevant cargo items for radiation monitoring. The objective of this study was to comprehensively review the Korean radiation monitoring system for imported cargo and identify the areas and scopes of improvement. This paper also proposes a new law and an integrated supervision plan, which involves establishing a dedicated department to enhance the efficiency and professionalism of the national radiation monitoring system for imported cargo. The review will contribute to the development of a more sophisticated national radiation monitoring system for imported cargo.

• Journal of Astronomy and Space Sciences
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• v.39 no.2
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• pp.51-57
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• 2022

Cosmic radiation exposure of the flight crews in Korea has been managed by Radiation Safety Management around Living Life Act under Nuclear Safety and Security Commission. However, the domestic flight crews are excluded from the Act because of relatively low route dose exposure compared to that of international flight crews. But we found that the accumulated total annual dose of domestic flight crews is far from negligible because of relatively long total flight time and too many flights. In this study, to suggest the necessity of management of domestic flight crews' radiation exposure, we statistically analyzed domestic flight crew's accumulative annual dose by using cosmic radiation estimation models of the Civil Aviation Research Institute (CARI)-6M, Nowcast of Atmospheric Ionizing Radiation for Aviation Safety (NAIRAS), and Korean Radiation Exposure Assessment Model (KREAM) and compared with in-situ measurements of Liulin-6K LET spectrometer. As a result, the average exposure dose of domestic flight crews was found to be 0.5-0.8 mSv. We also expect that our result might provide the basis to include the domestic flight crews as radiation workers, not just international flight attendants.

• Journal of the Society of Disaster Information
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.294-303
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• 2014

The state has the constitutional duty to secure the safety of its citizens and provide protection against any physical dangers. The Republic of Korea has a high threat of nuclear, biological and or chemical(hereafter referred to as NBC) attack from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Thus, the state has a responsibility to form a legislation to provide the protection for its citizens and implement duty to guarantee the human rights. Under the current legislation, the 'United Defense Act', 'Framework Act on Civil Defense' that are applied under wartime conditions are insufficient in providing the protection of the citizens of the state in the occurrence of NBC attack. Therefore, it is necessary that the 'Act for the Protection of Citizens in the occurrence of NBC Attack' is legislated to provide a system that protects the nation's citizens under the wartime conditions mentioned above. This paper incorporates a theoretical analysis of the need for the constitutional responsibility of the state to provide protection for its citizens under wartime conditions, the necessity of a specific measure to protect citizens during NBC attack, the relationship between 'Act for the Protection of Citizens in the occurrence of Nuclear, Chemical and or Biological Attack' and current legislations that are applied under wartime conditions, and the particulars of the proposed act.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.119-142
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• 2013

It is not easy to regulate the amount of radiation used for the medical purpose as there usually is more good than harm to the patient's health and life caused by the medical exposure to the radiation. However, the rapid increase of the use of diagnostic radiation involves a high possibility of increasing the radiation hazard exposure. Therefore, it is imperative to implement effective regulations in order to secure the safety of diagnostic radiation. The one and only rule we currently have for the diagnostic radiation is "Medicine Act" with only one clause dedicated to regulate the safety management that does not include any rules for the medical radiation. A set of inclusive rules for the whole medical radiation inclusive of diagnostic radiation and therapeutic radiation need to be based on the "Medicine Act" rather than "Nuclear Safety Act" in order to protect the medical professionals, patients and the guardians of patients from the hazards of diagnostic and/or therapeutic radiation that was not used the purpose of medical treatment. If there is an administrative measure to be imposed to secure the safety of diagnostic radiation, it is considered as exertion of governmental authority of administrative agency. There must be clear and realistic legal guidelines for in-fringe on people's interests. The administrative measures for the safety management of the diagnostic radiation must be clearly and specifically based on the law and the detailed standards for the administrative measures must be dele-gated by the presidential decree or departmental ordinance. Accordingly, the restrictions imposed by the administrative measures to the "Safety Inspection Institute of Radiation along with Radiation Exposure Measuring Institutes" should have clear legal basis as well and the detailed standards for the administrative measures should be regulated by the Ministry of Health and Welfare decree instead of the notification by the Director of Korean Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. While securing the safety of radiation on one side, careful review and up-grade on our legal system for the safety management of the diagnostic radiation is required on the other side to guarantee the legality, interest balance and reliability of the administrative measures.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.9-27
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• 2013

Nagra was established in 1972 by the Swiss nuclear power plant operators and the Federal Government to implement permanent and safe disposal of all types of radioactive waste generated in Switzerland. The Swiss Nuclear Energy Act specifies that these shall be disposed of in deep geological repositories. A number of different geological formations and sites have been investigated to date and an extended database of geological characteristics as well as data and state-of-the-art methodologies required for the evaluation of the long-term safety of repository systems have been developed. The research, development, and demonstration activities are further supported by the two underground research facilities operating in Switzerland, the Grimsel Test Site and the Mont Terri Project, along with very active collaboration of Nagra with national and international partners. A new site selection process was approved by the Federal Government in 2008 and is ongoing. This process is driven by the long-term safety and feasibility of the geological repositories and is based on a step-wise decision-making approach with a strong participatory component from the affected communities and regions. In this paper a brief history and the current status of the Swiss radioactive waste management program are presented and special characteristics that may be useful beyond the Swiss program are highlighted and discussed.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.37
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• pp.325-354
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• 2013

The concept of national security and the fundamental system for crisis management have departed from traditional methods and the importance of a national critical infrastructure crisis management has been emphasized. A national critical infrastructure crisis means a situation where human resource, material and functional system that may have a material effect on the critical functions of the government, the vitality and integrity of society, national economy and the safety of the public becomes disabled due to causes such as terrorism or major disasters. Although North Korea had been subject to numerous rounds of negotiations and sanctions as it continually developed nuclear weapons since the 1960s, it has also showed off its nuclear armaments through successful nuclear testings and missile launches. As the development and threat of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction becomes more noticeable and the range of its risk expands, this study focuses on the potential for an absence of leadership for national crisis management where the country's leadership, which should serve the critical role and function of handling national crises, becomes completely destroyed by the unexpected initial attacks by North Korea. As a result, the purpose of this study is to propose safety measures for the country's leadership in preparation for North Korea's threat of nuclear weapons by examining the concept and degree of risk of weapons of mass destruction with a focus on nuclear weapons, analyzing the substance of the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and evaluating such threat. In conclusion, first, to ensure the normal functioning of a national crisis management system in the event of a national crisis, we must seek safety measures that conform to the scope and succession order of the leadership of the national crisis management for an Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG) and the Continuity Of Operations (COOP). Second, in the event of a national ceremony, the gathering of the country's leadership all together in an open place should be avoided. In unavoidable circumstances, the next in rank that will act on behalf of the current leader should be designated and relevant safety measures should be taken. Third, during time of peace, in preparation for national crises, the scope of protection for the country's leadership should be prescribed and specific security and safety measures should be implemented. Fourth, the succession order for acting president in the case of the death of the president pursuant to Articles 71 and 26(1) of the National Government Organization Act should reconsidered to see whether it is a reasonable provision that takes into consideration a national crisis management that corresponds to the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Pursuant to the Basic Guidelines for National Crisis Management set out under Presidential Directive No. 229, the Korean government is currently operating a case-by-case "crisis management standard manual" and its sub-manuals and has also prepared the Presidential Security Service's security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president. Therefore, the Korean government should actualize the above points in the case-by-case crisis management standard manual and security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president to implement and legislate them.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.18 no.2_spc
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• pp.291-303
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• 2020

The Kori-Unit 1 nuclear power plant, which is scheduled to be decommissioned after permanent shutdown, is expected to generate large amounts of various types of radioactive waste during the decommissioning process. Among these, nuclear reactors and internal structures have high levels of radioactivity and the dismantled structure must have the proper size and weight on the primary side. During decommissioning, it is important to prepare an appropriate and efficient disposal method through analysis of the disposal status and the legal restrictions on wastes generated from the reactors and internal structures. Nuclear reactors and internal structures generate radioactive wastes of various levels, such as medium, very low, and clearance. A radiation evaluation indicates that wastes in the clearance level are generated in the reactor head and upper head insulation. In this study, a clearance waste safety evaluation was conducted using the RESRAD-RECYCLE code, which is a safety evaluation code, based on the activation evaluation results for the clearance level wastes. The clearance scenario for the target radioactive waste was selected and the maximum individual and collective exposure doses at the time of clearance were calculated to determine whether the clearance criteria limit prescribed by the Nuclear Safety Act was satisfied. The evaluation results indicated that the doses were significantly low, and the clearance criteria were satisfied. Based on the safety assessment results, an appropriate metal recycle and disposal method were suggested for clearance, which are the subject of the deregulation of internal structures of nuclear power plant.

• Journal of Radiation Industry
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.173-179
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• 2016

Coals and coal ashes, raw materials and by-products, in coal-fired power plants contain naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM). They may give rise to internal exposure to workers due to inhalation of airborne particulates containing radioactive materials. It is necessary to characterize radioactivity concentrations of the materials for assessment of radiation dose to the workers. The objective of the present study was to analyze radioactivity concentrations of coals and by-products at four coal-fired plants in Korea. High purity germanium detector was employed for analysis of uranium series, thorium series, and potassium 40 in the materials. Radioactivity concentrations of $^{226}Ra$, $^{228}Ra$, and $^{40}K$ were $2{\sim}53Bq\;kg^{-1}$, $3{\sim}64Bq\;kg^{-1}$, and $14{\sim}431Bq\;kg^{-1}$ respectively in coal samples. For coal ashes, the radioactivity concentrations were $77{\sim}133Bq\;kg^{-1}$, $77{\sim}105Bq\;kg^{-1}$, and $252{\sim}372Bq\;kg^{-1}$ in fly ash samples and $54{\sim}91Bq\;kg^{-1}$, $46{\sim}83Bq\;kg^{-1}$, and $205{\sim}462Bq\;kg^{-1}$ in bottom ash samples. For flue gas desulfurization (FGD) gypsum, the radioactivity concentrations were $3{\sim}5Bq\;kg^{-1}$, $2{\sim}3Bq\;kg^{-1}$, and $22{\sim}47Bq\;kg^{-1}$. Radioactivity was enhanced in coal ash compared with coal due to combustion of organic matters in the coal. Radioactivity enhancement factors for $^{226}Ra$, $^{228}Ra$, and $^{40}K$ were 2.1~11.3, 2.0~13.1, and 1.4~7.4 for fly ash and 2.0~9.2, 2.0~10.0, 1.9~7.7 for bottom ash. The database established in this study can be used as basic data for internal dose assessment of workers at coal-fired power plants. In addition, the findings can be used as a basic data for development of safety standard and guide of Natural Radiation Safety Management Act.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.187-201
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• 2002

The KN-12 cask is designed to transport 12 PWR spent nuclear fuels and to comply with the requirements of Korea Atomic Energy Act, IAEA Safety Standards Series No.57-1 and US 10 CFR Part 71 for a Type B(U)F package. It provides containment, radiation shielding, structural integrity, criticality control and heat removal for normal transport and hypothetical accident conditions. W.H 14$\times$14, 16$\times$16 and 17$\times$17 fuel assemblies with maximum allowable initial enrichment of 5.0 wt.%, maximum average burn-up of 50,000 MWD/MTU and minimum cooling time of 7 years being used in Korea will be loaded and subsequently transported under dry and wet conditions. A forged cylindrical cask body which constitutes the containment vessel is closed by a cask lid. Polyethylene rods for neutron shielding are arranged in two rows of longitudinal bore holes in the cask body wall. A fuel basket to accommodate up to 12 PWR fuel assemblies provides support of the fuels, control of criticality and a path to dissipate heat. Impact limiters to absorb the impact energy under the hypothetical accident conditions are attacked at the top and at the bottom side of the cask during transport. Handling weight loaded with water is 74.8 tons and transport weight loaded with water with the impact limiters is 84.3 tons. The cask will be licensed in accordance with Korea Atomic Energy Act 3nd fabricated in Korea in accordance with ASME B&PV Code Section 111, Division 3.