• 문화기술의 융합
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• 제9권6호
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• pp.25-31
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• 2023

서해 북방한계선에 관한 논쟁은 1953년 8월 유엔군사령관이 한반도 해역에서 남북간의 우발적 무력충돌을 예방한다는 목적으로 설정한 이후부터 지금까지도 첨예하게 대립하고 있는 문제이다. 2022년에는 분단이후 최초로 NLL이남으로 북한이 미사일 도발을 한 바 있다. 이처럼 북한의 실질적 도발이 진행중인 NLL에 대한 연구는 어떻게 진행되어 왔는지 확인해보고 나아갈 방향제시를 하는데 본 연구의 목적이 있다. 본 연구는 1998년부터 2023년까지 NLL에 관해 연구된 학술논문을 중심으로 RISS, 스콜라 등 총 5개의 학술정보 DB를 활용하여 연구의 경향을 살펴보았다. 연도별, 분야별, 연구 방법별 현황을 살펴본 결과 연도별로는 정부별 대북관계 기조에 따라 연구량의 유의미한 차이를 확인할 수 있었으며, 연구 분야는 NLL에 대한 개념소개와 역사적 배경 등이 가장 많아 힘의 논리에 따라 변화하는 국제 환경을 고려할 때 NLL의 국제법적 당위성과 명분을 구비하기 위해 더욱 다양한 분야로 확대될 필요성을 확인했다. 마지막 연구방법면에서는 문헌연구가 대부분이어서 면접, 설문, 빅데이터 등을 활용한 양적연구 등의 필요성도 알 수 있었다. 이러한 본 논문의 분석결과가 현재도 여전히 진행중인 국제정치환경의 이해관계 속에 향후 NLL의 국제적인 대응을 위한 연구방향설정에 긍정적인 역할을 하길 기대한다.

• 수산해양교육연구
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• 제16권1호
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• pp.110-123
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• 2004

Five Islands in the West Sea of Korea (Baekryeong-do, Daecheong-do, Socheong-do, Yeonpyeong-do, and Woo-do) are located very close to the North Korea's coast and all of them are under the jurisdiction of South Korea. The North and South Korean naval vessels clashed twice in the West Sea of Korea on June 15, 1999 and on June 29, 2002. These incidents were resulted from conflicts over the validity of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) and the appropriate maritime boundary between the two Koreas. From the viewpoint of South Korea, the North Limit Line is a lawful Maritime Military Demarcation Line under the Korean Military Armistice Agreement and it must be maintained as a maritime boundary between two Koreas until being substituted by a peace treaty. In conclusion, the maritime boundary between two Koreas cannot be settled easily by the principles of the International Law of the Sea at present.

• 융합보안논문지
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• 제13권5호
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• pp.19-26
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• 2013

1953년 7월 27일 한국정전협정 체결시 육상에서의 경계는 쌍방 간의 군사 접촉선을 중심으로 군사분계선이 합의되었으나 해상경계에 관하여 아무런 근거규정을 두고 있지 않다. 다만 정전협정 제2조 13항목에서 "백령도 등 서해 5도만 유엔군 사령관 통제 하에 둔다"라는 내용만 명시되어 있을 뿐이다. 이러한 입법적 흠결로 북한은 서해북방한계선을 비합법적인 선으로 그 법적 효력을 부인하고 있다. 그러나 서해 북방한계선은 1953년 8월 30일에 유엔군과 한국군의 북쪽 해상으로 월선(越線)을 방지하기 위해 설정되었다. 간헐적으로 무력충돌은 있었으나 쌍방 간의 무력적 충돌방지역할은 물론 평화와 군사적 안정을 유지시켜 온 사실상 남북한 간의 해상경계선이다. 특히 서해 북방한계선은 한국해군에게 북한의 해주 및 옹진반도, 장산곶을 연하는 해역을 통제함으로써 북한 해군의 활동 영역을 제한시키고 있기 때문에 대한 민국의 안보에 중대한 역할을 하고 있다. 따라서 북한은 서해5도의 주변 해역을 자기들의 영해라고 주장하지만 서해5도를 위시하여 38도선 이남에 있는 영역과 섬들은 대한민국이 주권을 중단 없이 행사해온 곳이다. 우리는 실효적 지배를 강화함으로써 서해북방한계선에 대한 영토관할권 행사를 해야 할 것이다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.27-56
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• 2013

The United Nations Command (UNC) and the communist North failed to reach an agreement on where the maritime demarcation line should be drawn in the process of signing a truce after the Korean War because of the starkly different positions on the boundary of their territorial waters. As a result, the Armistice Treaty was signed on July 1953 without clarification about the maritime border. In the following month, Commander of the UNC unilaterally declared the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as a complementing measure to the Armistice. Referring to this, North Korea and its followers in South Korea wrongfully argue that the NLL is a "ghost line" that was established not based on the international law. However, one should note that the waters south of the NLL has always been under South Korea's jurisdiction since Korea's independence from Japan on August 15, 1945. There is no need to ask North Korea's approval for declaring the territorial waters that had already been under our sovereign jurisdiction. We do not need North Korea's approval just as we do not need Japan's approval with regard to our sovereign right over Dokdo. The legal status of the NLL may be explained with the following three characteristics. First, the NLL is a de facto maritime borderline that defines the territorial waters under the respective jurisdiction of the two divided countries. Second, the NLL in the West Sea also serves as a de facto military demarcation line at sea that can be likened to the border on the ground. Third, as a contacting line where the sea areas controlled by the two Koreas meet, the NLL is a maritime non-aggression line that was established on the legal basis of the 'acquiescence' element stipulated by the Inter-Korea Basic Agreement (article 11) and the Supplement on the Non-aggression principle (article 10). Particularly from the perspective of the domestic law, the NLL should be understood as a boundary defining areas controlled by temporarily divided states (not two different states) because the problem exists between a legitimate central government (South Korea) and an anti-government group (North Korea). In this sense, the NLL problem should be viewed not in terms of territorial preservation or expansion. Rather, it should be understood as a matter of national identity related to territorial sovereignty and national pride. North Korea's continuous efforts to problematize the NLL may be part of its strategy to nullify the Armistice Treaty. In other words, North Korea tries to take away the basis of the NLL by abrogating the Armistice Treaty and creating a condition in which the United Nations Command can be dissolved. By doing so, North Korea may be able to start the process for the peace treaty with the United States and reestablish a maritime line of its interest. So, North Korea's rationale behind making the NLL a disputed line is to deny the effectiveness of the NLL and ask for the establishment of a new legal boundary. Such an effort should be understood as part of a strategy to make the NLL question a political and military dispute (the similar motivation can be found in Japan's effort to make Dokdo a disputed Island). Therefore, the South Korean government should not accommodate such hidden intentions and strategy of North Korea. The NLL has been the de facto maritime border (that defines our territorial waters) and military demarcation line at sea that we have defended with a lot of sacrifice for the last sixty years. This is the line that our government and the military must defend in the future as we have done so far. Our commitment to the defense of the NLL is not only a matter of national policy protecting territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction; it is also our responsibility for those who were fallen while defending the North-Western Islands and the NLL.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.63-98
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• 2012

Northeast Asia has a multi-layered security structure within which major economic and military powers both confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative activities in the economic sphere while competing one another in order to secure a dominant position in the politico-military arena. The multifarious threats, posed by the North Korea's nuclear development, territorial disputes, and maritime demarcation line issues demonstrate that Northeast Asia suffers more from military conflicts and strifes than any other region in the world. Specifically, major maritime security threats include North Korea's nuclear proliferation and missile launching problems as well as military provocations nearby the Northern Limit Line(NLL) as witnessed in the Cheonan naval ship and Yeonpyong incidents. The ROK Navy has been supplementing its firm military readiness posture in consideration of North Korea's threats on the NLL. It has performed superb roles in defending the nation and establishing the Navy advanced and best picked. It also has been conducive to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, secure the sea lanes of communications, and establish regional stability and world peace. In order to effectively cope with the strategic environment and future warfares, the ROK Navy needs to shift its military structure to one that is more information and technology intensive. In addition, it should consolidate the ROK-US alliance and extend military cooperative measures with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Evolved steadily for the last 60 years, the ROK-US alliance format has contributed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. In conclusion, this manuscript contends that the ROK Navy should strive for the establishment of the following: (1) Construction of Jeju Naval Base; (2) Strategic Navy Equipped with War Deterrence Capabilities; (3) Korean-type of System of Systems; (4) Structure, Budget and Human Resources of the Naval Forces Similar to the Advanced Countries; and (5) Strategic Maritime Alliance and Alignment System as well as Domestic Governance Network for the Naval Families.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권5호
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• pp.173-202
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• 2007

After successful nuclear tests Pakistan launched a more severe surprise attack toward India than before. It is highly possible that North Korea will adopt this Pakistan military strategy if it is armed with nuclear weapons. The North Korean forces armed, with nuclear bombs could make double its war capability through strengthening aggressive force structure and come into effect on blocking reinforcement of the US forces at the initial phase of war time. Therefore we may regard that Pyongyang's nuclear arming is a major one of various factors which increase possibility of waging a conventional warfare or a nuclear war. North Korea's high self-confidence after nuclear arming will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula via aggressive military threat or terror toward South Korea, and endeavor to accomplish its political purpose via low-intensity conflicts. For instance, nuclear arming of the Pyongyang regime enforces the North Korean forces to invade the Northern Limit Line(NLL), provoke naval battles at the West Sea, and occupy one or two among the Five Islands at the West Sea. In that case, the South Korean forces will be faced with a serious dilemma. In order to recapture the islands, Seoul should be ready for escalating a war. However it is hard to imagine that South Korea fights with North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. This paper concludes that the Pyongyang regime after nuclear arming strongly tends to occupy superiority of military strategy and wage military provocations on the Korean Peninsula.

• 한국지역지리학회지
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• 제13권4호
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• pp.454-460
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• 2007

한국전쟁의 결과 한반도의 허리에 해당하는 DMZ 지역은 반세기 이상 인간의 관심에서 잊혀진 공간이었다. 그러나 최근 국 내외적으로 DMZ에 대한 관심이 고조되면서, 오늘날 DMZ를 대상으로 하는 연구는 점차 활발해 지고 있다. 그러나 정작 연구의 대상인 DMZ의 공간적 범위에 대한 연구는 매우 미약하다. 그마저도 선행연구를 분석한 결과 대부분의 연구에서 군사분계선과 DMZ, 한강하구 중립지역, 그리고 NLL에 대한 기술에 있어서 공간적인 오류를 범하고 있었다. 본 연구에서 조사한 결과, 동해안 고성의 명호리에서 서쪽의 임진강 하구에 이르는 군사분계선의 길이는 약 238km(148마일)이고, 군사분계선을 따라 설정되어 있는 DMZ의 면적은 약 $903.8km^2$로 측정되었다. 이는 현재 '155마일 휴전선' 등과 같이 남북을 양분하는 공간을 지칭하는 용어에 대한 재정립이 필요함을 의미하는 것이다.

• 대한원격탐사학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한원격탐사학회 2007년도 춘계학술대회 논문집
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• pp.188-191
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• 2007

The Han River is divided into North and South Korea by NLL(Northern Limit Line) and its area has been blocked by CCL(Civil Control Line) since the Korean War in 1950. Satellite remote sensing, therefore, is uniquely suited to monitoring bar transformation in the region. In river with bar, the characteristics of its physical conditions have a close relationship with bar morphology. In this paper, a monitoring approach of bar transformation in the Han River Estuary is presented using RADARSAT/SAR images from 2000 to 2005 and spatial patterns of bar morphology are presented. it could be said that in the estuary vegetated area and natural levees are developed well, but bars are shifted after an event like a flood. It is also showed that suspended solids such as silt transported through the estuary could contribute highly to a sedimentation environment around Incheon.

• 한국군사과학기술학회지
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• 제7권3호
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• pp.59-68
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• 2004

Unmanned surface vehicles(USVs) have been developed for special operations in foreign navies. These will be employed to conduct critical missions including inspection, coast guard, ISR, fire protection, precision strike, mine interception warfare and antisubmarine warfare. It is also known the USVs will be deployed at the front line of the network-centric warfare to replace the manned naval operations. The unmanned operation can, thus, minimize unnecessary risk to personnel and enhance the success probability for the imposed mission. In this research, the USVs which are under operation and development in foreign navies are investigated. Based on this, an USV with $7\~10m$ of length and 10ton of weight for the Korean Navy which can be deployed near the Northern Limit Line(NLL), is proposed.

• 해양환경안전학회:학술대회논문집
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• 해양환경안전학회 2007년도 추계학술발표회
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• pp.57-60
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• 2007

북방한계선 주변의 한강하구는 지난 60년 동안 개발 및 이용이 금지되었기 때문에, 자연하천의 모습을 간직하고 있다. 그러나 최근 들어 경인수로를 비롯한 민간 이용을 위한 논의가 이루어지고 있으나, 한강하구의 기본적인 특성에 관한 정보가 부족한 실정이다. 본 연구에서는, 인공위성 합성개구레이더(SAR)를 이용한 하구역 퇴적상의 변동 조사를 실시하고, 퇴적상을 기반으로 한강하구 뱃길을 제안하고자 한다. 2000년부터 2005년까지의 Radarsat-1 영상을 이용하여 시계열해석한 결과에 따르면, 1) 한강 하구역은 집중호우등 에 의해 부유사가 많이 발생하며, 2) 식생역(vegetated area)은 거의 안정화단계에 있으며, 3) 퇴적상(bar)의 월 변동성은 크지 않으나, 매년 발생하는 호우 등에 의해 퇴적상의 위치 변화는 상당히 컸다. 여기서 얻어진 퇴적상의 변동 특성을 기반으로, 북방한계선 이남의 한강 수역에 대한 뱃길의 설계 방향을 제시하였다. 향후, 장기간에 대한 위성 및 현장 조가를 바탕으로 자연하천의 특성을 훼손하지 않는 범위에서의 개발이 이루어져야 한다.