• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권8호
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• pp.271-309
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• 2010

The main theme of this study is about North Korea's contemporary military strategy which remained a blind spot in the 21st century. Indeed, Pyongyang's contemporary military strategy is evolved from the logic of War. On the basis of this logic, this study examined North Korea's contemporary military strategy with three analytical frameworks. The first is the discovery of Clausewitz's dictums and application of the Trinitarian analysis on the Korean cases. During the course of applying Clausewitzian main dictum--War as continuation of politics, the methodological analysis on war played a important role generalizing the pattern and matrix of North Korea's strategic thinking and military strategy. In particular, Clausewitz's Trinitarian framework on war -Government (reason), Army (chance), People (passion)- was a universal framework to scrutinize the North Korean missile and nuclear strategy. The second is about the matrix of North Korea's military strategy, The study suggested the genealogical feature of Pyongyang's military strategy. In principle, the dictum of 'Military-First Politics' 1S the combination of the political philosophy, Chuch'e (self-reliance) of Kim Il Sung and Kin Jong Il reflected in the military readiness. As a result this analysis was able to equate Clausewitz's dictums to explain Pyongyang's idea of the nature of war in that North Korea's military strategy is the central instrument of delivery to achieve political objectives. The third is about the theoretical encounter of 'Clausewitz's Wonderful Trinity' and 'Remarkable Trinity on North Korea's contemporary strategy'. On the basis, three elements are connected to one of three groups in society; the people, the military, and the government. In order to apply the Clausewitz's Trinitarian analysis into Kim Jong Il's 'Military-First' strategy, two case studies (Missile and Nuclear strategy) were examined. The finding of this study is that Clausewitzian dictum in the 19th century is still valid in the 21st century as it provided plausible theoretical framework to explain the North Korean contemporary military strategy with a reminder that the nature and logic of war are fixed in the socially constructed state.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권5호
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• pp.173-202
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• 2007

After successful nuclear tests Pakistan launched a more severe surprise attack toward India than before. It is highly possible that North Korea will adopt this Pakistan military strategy if it is armed with nuclear weapons. The North Korean forces armed, with nuclear bombs could make double its war capability through strengthening aggressive force structure and come into effect on blocking reinforcement of the US forces at the initial phase of war time. Therefore we may regard that Pyongyang's nuclear arming is a major one of various factors which increase possibility of waging a conventional warfare or a nuclear war. North Korea's high self-confidence after nuclear arming will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula via aggressive military threat or terror toward South Korea, and endeavor to accomplish its political purpose via low-intensity conflicts. For instance, nuclear arming of the Pyongyang regime enforces the North Korean forces to invade the Northern Limit Line(NLL), provoke naval battles at the West Sea, and occupy one or two among the Five Islands at the West Sea. In that case, the South Korean forces will be faced with a serious dilemma. In order to recapture the islands, Seoul should be ready for escalating a war. However it is hard to imagine that South Korea fights with North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. This paper concludes that the Pyongyang regime after nuclear arming strongly tends to occupy superiority of military strategy and wage military provocations on the Korean Peninsula.

• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.190-215
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• 2016

As North Korea's asymmetric threats are growing, there have been numerous discussions to find out effective counter-measures and many official plans and procurements efforts have been established. However, discussions on ROK Navy's roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threats have been taken place very limitedly. Decision makers and military planners put enormous efforts in getting counter-measures, however, most of the options on the table are systems of Army and Air Force. This is true if one looks at components of Kill-Chain, KAMD, and KMPR. With worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula, it has been said by many commentators that ROK Navy needs to consider expanding its roles in countering against North Korea's asymmetric military threats. They asked ROK Navy to go beyond the mind-set that has confined Navy's roles in deterring North Korean naval threats. That is, ROK Navy should fight 'from the sea' as well as fight 'on the sea.' If ROK Navy begins to think about fight 'from the sea,' there would be many possibilities for the Navy to be a part of countering North Korea's asymmetric military threats. In order to pursue proactive roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threat, ROK Navy needs to consider various options. Massive missile forces, nuclear-propelled submarines, naval special forces may be some of them. With those measures, ROK Navy would launch massive and decisive attacks from the sea without risking survivability of our forces. Considering North Korean Navy's weakness, it is very probable that sea would be safer place than ground or sky. Expanding ROK Navy's roles and being a proactive deterrent forces against North Korean asymmetric threats would provide very reliable counter-measures to South Korean military. Thus, military planners should think how to take the best advantage of expanded ROK Navy's roles and capabilities against North Korean asymmetric threats.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.208-231
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• 2017

The balance of power in conventional forces between the two Koreas works in favor of the South Korea in the Korea peninsula. But, the balancing mechanism between the two Koreas in asymmetric forces like nuclear and missile forces works absolutely in favor of the North Korea. That's why it should be timely for the ROK military to review existing strategy and revise a new counter strategy against the threat posed by the North Korea's nuclear and missile forces. The ROK military is now developing 4D, KAMD, KILL Chain strategies as means to cope with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. Considering efforts and resources invested now, the strategies are expected to be in place in next five or more years. However, approaches to those strategies seem to be rather fragmentary and conceptual than comprehensive and pragmatic. The types of strategies against the North Korea's military threats need to be a deterrence in peace time and a fighting and winning in war time in the Korean theater. But, the most important element in the deterrence strategy is the credibility. This study concludes with an new strategic concept titled "ADAD(Assured Defense, Assured Destruction)" as an alternative to existing strategies to deal with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.232-260
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• 해양안보
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• 제6권1호
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• pp.109-135
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• 2023

북한군의 호남방면 대우회 기동은 6.25전쟁 기간 동안 북한군이 보여준 가장 빠른 기동이었으며, 국군과 연합군의 낙동강 방어선을 전면 조정하게 할 만큼 위협적인 공격이었다. 하지만 본 연구가 간접접근전략 측면에서 북한군의 호남방면 대우회기동을 분석한 결과, 이 기동에는 실패할 수밖에 없었던 여러 요인이 존재했다. 간접접근전략 수행 측면에 있어서 북한군은 전투력 분산, 작전선 변경의 융통성 부족, 지상군 위주의 기동, 심리적 견제 결여 등 여러 실패 요인을 노정했다. 하지만 북한군은 마지막 '기습'을 준비였는데, 그것은 북한군 6사단을 후속하던 7사단이 재차 우회를 감행하여 통영 방면으로 공격을 시도한 것이었다. 이를 통해 북한군은 낙동강 방어선을 돌파하고, 부산으로 향하고자 했다. 그러나 북한군의 공격은 한국 해군·해병대의 통영상륙작전으로 인해 최종 좌절되었다. 바다를 기동공간으로 한 신속한 기동으로 해군·해병대는 주요 요충지를 먼저 점령했고, 유리한 상황을 조성한 가운데 북한군 7사단의 공격을 막아냈다. 해군·해병대의 통영상륙작전은 북한군의 호남방면 대우회기동을 최종 저지함으로써 낙동강 방어선이 유지되도록 하였다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.220-250
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• 2013

South Korean national security strategy should be developed to effectively handle and counter increasing maritime threats and challenges. There are three major maritime threats South Korea faces today; maritime disputes on the EEZ boundary and Dokdo islet issues, North Korean threats, and international maritime security. Maritime disputes in the region are getting intensified and turned into a military confrontation after 2010. Now regional countries confront each other with military and police forces and use economic leverage to coerce the others. They are very eager to create advantageous de facto situations to legitimize their territorial claims. North Korean threat is also increasing in the sea as we witnessed in the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyoung shelling in 2010. North Korea resorts to local provocations and nuclear threats to coerce South Korea in which it may enjoy asymmetric advantages. The NLL area of the west sea would be a main hot spot that North Korea may continue to make a local provocation. Also, South Korean national economy is heavily dependent upon foreign trade and national strategic resources such as oil are all imported. Without an assurance on the safety of sea routes, these economic activities cannot be maintained and expanded. This paper argues that South Korea should make national maritime strategy and enhance the strength of naval forces. As a middle power, its national security strategy needs to consider all the threats and challenges not only from North Korea but also to maritime security. This is not a matter of choice but a mandate for national survival and prosperity. This paper discusses the importance of maritime security, changing characteristics of maritime threats and challenges, regional maritime disputes and its threat to South Korea's security, and South Korea's future security strategy and ways to enhance the role of naval forces. Our national maritime strategy needs to show middle and long term policy directions on how we will protect our maritime interests. Especially, it is important to build proper naval might to carry out all the roles and missions required to the military.

• Strategy21
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• 통권39호
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• pp.5-46
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• 2016

North Korea's 4th nuclear test on Jan. 6 and following developments once again awakened the world into seriousness of the nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula. On March 2, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 which is complemented by Seoul government's measures such as withdrawal from the Gaesung Industrial Complex (Feb. 9) and announcement of unilateral sanction (March 8). Seoul government also strongly urged the international community to strangle North Korea's 'financial resources.' The U.S., Japan, China, and other countries have issued unilateral sanctions to complement the UNSC measure. South Korea and the U.S. conducted their annual joint military drill (Resolve-Foal Eagle) in the largest-ever scale. North Korea, however, responded with demonstration of its nuclear capabilities and announcement of de facto 'nuclear-first' politics. North Korea test-fired a variety of delivery vehicles, threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S., and declared itself as an 'invincible nuclear power armed with hydrogen bombs' at the 7th Workers 'Party Congress held in May, 2016. Considering the circumstantial evidences, the North's 4th nuclear test may have been a successful boosted fission bomb test. North Korea, and, if allowed to go on with its nuclear programs, will become a nuclear power armed with more than 50 nuclear weapons including hydrogen bombs. The North is already conducting nuclear blackmail strategy towards South Korea, and must be developing 'nuclear use' strategies. Accordingly, the most pressing challenge for the international community is to bring the North to 'real dialogue for denuclearization through powerful and consistent sanctions. Of course, China's cooperation is the key to success. In this situation, South Korea has urgent challenges on diplomacy and security fronts. A diplomatic challenge is how to lead China, which had shown dual attitudes between 'pressure and connivance' towards the North's nuclear matters pursuant to its military relations with the U.S, to participate in the sanctions consistently. A military one is how to offset the 'nuclear shadow effects' engendered by the North's nuclear blackmail and prevent its purposeful and non-purposeful use of nuclear weapons. Though South Korea's Ministry of Defense is currently spending a large portion of defense finance on preemption (kill-chain) and missile defense, they pose 'high cost and low efficiency' problems. For a 'low cost and high efficiency' of deterrence, South Korea needs to switch to a 'retaliation-centered' deterrence strategy. Though South Korea's response to the North's nuclear threat can theoretically be boiled down into dialogue, sanction and deterrence, now is the time to concentrate on strong sanction and determined deterrence since they are an inevitable mandatory course to destroy the North' nuclear-first delusion and bring it to a 'real denuclearization dialogue.'

• 문화기술의 융합
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• 제6권4호
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• pp.209-217
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• 2020

북한은 국방력 강화를 위하여 꾸준한 국방개혁을 실시해왔으며, 특히 군사기술개발과 군수산업역량 강화를 국방개혁의 중점으로 삼아왔다. 이러한 북한의 국방개혁은 궁극적으로는 핵전력 확보를 목표로 했으며, 김정은 시기에 이르러 기술적 성과가 축적됨에 따라 수소탄과 ICBM/SLBM 등 전력의 발전으로 이어졌다. 이렇게 핵전력을 확보한 북한은 또다시 국방개혁을 통하여 재래식 무기체계의 첨단화를 추구함으로써 전략적 우위를 확보함으로써 재래전력에서의 대칭성까지 추구하고 있다. 여태까지 북한의 국방개혁은 성공적이었으며, 김정은의 새로운 집권체제 확립과 대미협상 등의 동력을 만드는데 성공했던 것으로 볼 수 있다.

• 한국과 국제사회
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• 제1권2호
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• pp.171-208
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• 2017

본 논문은 북한 핵전략의 유형적 특징과 전망을 분석하기 위한 것이다. 이를 위해 핵전략의 개념과 유형, 북한의 핵능력과 선언적 핵전략, 북한 핵전략의 운용상의 특징과 전망을 살펴본 후 결론에서 우리의 대응을 도출해본 것이다. 최근 북한의 핵무기 배치와 핵능력 증강은 우리의 안보와 군사적 대비태세에 매우 심각한 문제를 제기하고 있다. 핵전략이란 핵무기의 구성 배치 운용을 둘러싼 군사전략을 의미한다. 북한의 핵전략에 대한 연구는 북한의 핵무장이 실체화되었다는 매우 현실적인 가정에서 출발한다. 우리 국방당국이 북핵에 대한 대응책으로 선제공격, 미사일방어, 대량응징보복 개념을 제시하고 그 도입과 전개를 서두르는 것은 북한의 핵무장을 전제로 한 조치이다. 표출된 북한의 선언적 핵전략은 (1)'핵보유국법'상의 핵억제 보복전략, (2)핵선제공격론, (3)제7차 당대회에 나타난 '핵선제 불사용원칙으로, 그리고 북한 핵전략의 저의 및 운용상의 특징은 (1)기존핵국가 관행모방을 통한 비난회피, (2)선언적 핵전략을 통한 자신의 핵전략의 호도, (3)핵전력과 핵태세간 격차로 인한 핵전략의 미정착 등으로 각각 요약해 볼 수 있다. 북한은 개정헌법(2012.7), '핵무력과 경제건설의 병진노선(2013.3),' 그리고 핵보유국법(2013.4) 등을 통해 스스로 핵보유국임을 규정 선언하고 있다. 하지만 '핵보유국(핵국가)' 지위는 오로지 NPT만 부여할 수 있는데, 이것은 이미 닫힌 시스템이다. 현실적으로 우리가 당면한 북핵위협을 억제 극복해 나가기 위해서는 튼튼한 한미동맹과 긴밀한 한미 공조하에 북한핵의 억제는 물론 비핵화 무력화를 위한 우리의 단 중 장기적인 정치 군사적 대응책의 수립 이행노력이 긴요하다.