• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.16 no.6_1
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• pp.51-58
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• 2016

"History is a mirror" means that we should be prepared for the threats of enemies through learning from repeating history. Currently South Korea is facing various provocations, including North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile s. For the protection of the life and property of its people, South Korea should regard North Korea as a main enemy and be fully prepared for the threats. The Korean War was a war between well-prepared North Korea and ill-prepa red South Korea. After Liberation, North Korean army incorporated the Chinese Communist army, placed battle equi pment with the support of the Soviet army, and finished corps-level training while South Korea at that time did not finish battalion-level training. In wartime and peacetime, an army should improve military security by concealing its own information and find its enemy's information. North Korea carefully prepared for the war, collecting information about the organization, deployment and operation of the South Korean army. South Korean army failed to cope with it and had hard times in its early battles. In this paper, I will emphasize the importance of military security, focusing on the Battle of Gaeseong, the early part of the Korean War.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.63-98
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• 2012

Northeast Asia has a multi-layered security structure within which major economic and military powers both confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative activities in the economic sphere while competing one another in order to secure a dominant position in the politico-military arena. The multifarious threats, posed by the North Korea's nuclear development, territorial disputes, and maritime demarcation line issues demonstrate that Northeast Asia suffers more from military conflicts and strifes than any other region in the world. Specifically, major maritime security threats include North Korea's nuclear proliferation and missile launching problems as well as military provocations nearby the Northern Limit Line(NLL) as witnessed in the Cheonan naval ship and Yeonpyong incidents. The ROK Navy has been supplementing its firm military readiness posture in consideration of North Korea's threats on the NLL. It has performed superb roles in defending the nation and establishing the Navy advanced and best picked. It also has been conducive to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, secure the sea lanes of communications, and establish regional stability and world peace. In order to effectively cope with the strategic environment and future warfares, the ROK Navy needs to shift its military structure to one that is more information and technology intensive. In addition, it should consolidate the ROK-US alliance and extend military cooperative measures with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Evolved steadily for the last 60 years, the ROK-US alliance format has contributed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. In conclusion, this manuscript contends that the ROK Navy should strive for the establishment of the following: (1) Construction of Jeju Naval Base; (2) Strategic Navy Equipped with War Deterrence Capabilities; (3) Korean-type of System of Systems; (4) Structure, Budget and Human Resources of the Naval Forces Similar to the Advanced Countries; and (5) Strategic Maritime Alliance and Alignment System as well as Domestic Governance Network for the Naval Families.

• Journal of Environmental Health Sciences
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• v.37 no.3
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• pp.226-233
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• 2011

Exactly 25 years after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, 11th of March 2011 the Fukushima nuclear accident occurred in Japan and was ranked at level 7 same to the Chernobyl. A Korean and Japanese joint civil survey was conducted around Fukushima on April 13-17. The radiation survey data clearly shows a large hotspot area between 20 km and 50 km radius north and west direction from the accident reactors, with the highest radiation recorded being 55.64 ${\mu}Sv/hr$ in the air, 99.89 ${\mu}Sv/hr$ in the surface air, and 36.16 ${\mu}Sv/hr$ in a car, respectively. 3.65 ${\mu}Sv/hr$ in the air and 6.89 ${\mu}Sv/hr$ in the surface air were detected at the playground of an elementary school in Fukushima City. Spring came with full cherry blossoms in Fukushima, but it was silent spring of radiation contamination. Interviews with Fukushima nuclear refugees reveal serious problems about Japanese nuclear safety systems, such as there was no practical evacuation drill within 1-10 km and no plan at all for 10-30 km areas. Several reforms items for Korean nuclear safety system can be suggested: minimization of accident damage, clear separation of regulatory and safety bureaus with a new and independent administrating agency, community participation and agreement regarding the safety system and levels, which is the major concern of 80% Korean. To tackle threats of nuclear disaster in neighboring nations like China, a new position entitled 'Ambassador for nuclear safety diplomacy' is highly necessary. The nuclear safety of Korea should no longer be the monopoly of those nuclear engineers and limited technocrats criticized as a 'nuclear mafia'.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Radiology
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.71-77
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• 2023

The issue of North Korea's denuclearization is an global issue that transcends the North and South. It is necessary to prepare for the denuclearization process in preparation for the situation in which North Korea reveals its intention to denuclearize. In the process of North Korea's denuclearization, it is required to guarantee the normal operation of the denuclearization verification equipment. If a performance test criteria that takes into account the North Korean environment is established, it is highly likely that it will be used in the future denuclearization process. For this purpose, basic materials related to performance test standards were established through analysis of test standards such as international standards. After that, we established a performance test criteria. This includes high temperature, low temperature, humidity, vibration and shock tests. Through follow-up studies, validity of test criteria will be established through actual device testing.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.39 no.3
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• pp.127-133
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• 2014

North Korea's uranium enrichment facility is a matter of international concern. It is of particular alarming to South Korea with regard to the security and safety of the country. This situation requires continuous monitoring of the DPRK and emergency preparedness on the part of the ROK. To assess the detectability of an undeclared uranium enrichment plant in North Korea, uranium concentrations in the air at both a short and a long distance from the enrichment facility were estimated. $UF_6$ source terms were determined by using existing information on North Korean facility and data from the operation experience of enrichment plants from other countries. Using the calculated source terms, two atmospheric dispersion models (Gaussian Plume Model and HYSPLIT models) and meteorological data were used to estimate the uranium particle concentrations from the Yongbyon enrichment facility. A maximum uranium concentration and its location are dependent upon the meteorological conditions and the height of the UF6 release point. This study showed that the maximum uranium concentration around the enrichment facility was about $1.0{\times}10^{-7}g{\cdot}m^{-3}$. The location of the maximum concentration was within about 0.4 km of the facility. It has been assumed that the uranium sample of about a few micrograms (${\mu}g$) could be obtained; and that few micrograms of uranium can be easily measured with current measurement instruments. On the contrary, a uranium concentration at a distance of more than 100 kilometers from the enrichment facility was estimated to be about $1.0{\times}10^{-13}{\sim}1.0{\times}10^{-15}g{\cdot}m^{-3}$, which is less than back-ground level. Therefore, based on the results of our paper, an air sample taken within the vicinity of the Yongbyon enrichment facility could be used to determine as to whether or not North Korea is carrying out an undeclared nuclear program. However, the air samples taken at a longer distance of a few hundred kilometers would prove difficult in detecting a clandestine nuclear activities.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.377-413
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• 2004

North Korea and South Korea agreed to refer their investment disputes to arbitration by adopting' Agreed Minutes on Procedures of Settlement of Commercial Disputes' on 16th December 2000. According to the Agreed Minutes, the two Koreas were to establish an arbitration commission within 6 months after the Agreed Minutes had been signed. In 2002, North Korea enacted laws to draw interest of foreign tourists to Mountain Kumgang and to boost investment into the region of Kaesung as it provided in those laws that commercial disputes should be settled by arbitration or judicial procedures. In October 2003, the two Koreas succeeded in adopting another Agreed Minutes as to the establishment and functioning of North-South Arbitration Commission. The fact that the two Koreas have agreed to establish an arbitration commission is meaningful since they are leading their lives quite differently in political, social, and economic sense for more than a half century. Although there still remain doubts as to the North Korean policy on nuclear matters, an arbitration commission could be a cornerstone for the set-up of the dispute settlement system between the two Koreas and a great help for investors from South Korea to pursue their possible legal claims as North Korea is eager to invite South Korean businessmen and other foreign investors to invest in its special economic areas. According to the Agreed Minutes of 2003, the two Koreas are going to adopt procedural rules for the arbitration commission. It will be a great challenge for them to agree on specific issues as to the operation of the arbitration commission. They have to set up a rester of arbitrators respectively and may have to enact or revise their own arbitration laws and rules reflecting the Agreed Minutes of 2000 and 2003. It is quite welcome that the two Koreas have agreed to set up an arbitration commission rather than resort to political or diplomatic means to settle their disputes. The success of the arbitration system between the two Koreas will make sure the safety of investment environment in the northen part of the Korean Peninsula and will bring the peace to the Korean peninsula earlier than expected.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.93-127
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• 2014

During the four years following the sinking of the Cheonan frigate in 2010, the South Korean public opinion has seen changes in four basic ways. First, public polls with respect to the cause of the sinking show that 70% of the people consider North Korea as the culprit, while 20% maintain that it was not an act carried out by North Korea. Second, the opinions relative to the cause of the incident seem to vary according to age difference, generational difference, and educational difference. From 2011, people in their 20s showed 10% increase in regarding North Korea as the responsible party. People in their 30s and 40s still have a tendency not to believe the result of the investigation carried out by the combined military and civilian group. Third, the most prominent issue that arose aftermath of the Cheonan incident is the fact that political inclination and policy preference are influencing the scientific determination of the cause. In other words, scientific and logical approach is lacking in the process of determining the factual basis for the cause. This process is compromised by the inability of the parties concerned in sorting out what is objective and what is personal opinion. This confused state of affairs makes it difficult to carry on a healthy, productive debate. Fourth, rumors, propaganda, and disinformation generated by pro-North Korea Labor Party groups in the internet and SNS are causing considerable impact in forming the public opinion. Proposed Strategy 1. The administration can ascertain public trust by accurately determining the nature of the provocation based on accurate information in the early stages of the incident. 2. Education in scientific, logical, rational methodologyis needed at home, school, and workplace in order toenhance the people's ability to seek factual truths. 3. In secondary education, the values of freedom, human rights, democracy, and market economy must be reinforced. 4. It is necessary for the educational system to teach the facts of North Korea just as they are. 5. Fundamental strength of free democratic system must be reinforced. The conservative, mainstream powers must recognize the importance of self-sacrifice and societal duties. The progressive political parties must sever themselves from those groups that take instructions from North Korea's Labor Party. The progressives must pursue values that are based on fundamental human rights for all. 6. Korean unification led by South Korea is the genuine means to achieve peace in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The administration must recognize that this unification initiative is the beginning of the common peace and prosperity in the Far East Asia, and must actively pursue international cooperation in this regard.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.5
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• pp.19-40
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• 2002

For front, aspect of terror may have to prepare indeed even chemical terror or rocket and small size missile and radioactivity terror because is predicted to become various. Furthermore, when see motion of every countries about nuclear engineerses' bringing round and illicit sale of plutonium, our country may have to prepare in terrorism which is expected thus. So that can finish international event successfully because the United States of America supports great manpower and budget since New York's World Trade Center terror and when see that is considering terror prevention countermeasure, we operate temporarily bursting tube state complete charge team such as terror by each field specialist such as a concern interested including special CBR complete charge moving team among 2002 World Cups soccer game period ahead of international event, must consider safety countermeasure. Specially, biology weapon of chemical weapon and cholera etc. 13 kinds of 5000ton that North Korea plans CBR terror society confusion that North Korea that to terror support nation as well as nuclear weapons development suspicion is defending South Korea communization strategy as real condition that is amplified as well as is saving production brand gets imprinted uses CBR terror at normal times, when see that is planing powerlessness communization unity using CBR weapon at time of war, must operate until bias 2002 World Cups international event finishes cooperation safety countermeasure utensil safely under closer talk between the South Korea ${\cdot}$ Japan ${\cdot}$ North Korea. As for us which must serve 2002 World Cup successfully to accomplish perfectly preparedness of CBR terror firstly, all inhabitants knows well CBR protection trick, and secondly, CBR existing formation that solidify realignment CBR complete charge moving team which of course is consisted of CBR specialist compose and keeping immediate going out attitude operating, by third, that expand CBR individual protection equipment and CBR evacuation equipment and establish individual and group protection attitude naturally, supplement as there is main room that actualize CBR pollution patient's slogan countermeasure by fourth, and develop standard model for CBR terror provision by fifthBecause constructing infra of CBR safety establishing CBR preparedness that utilize it, must minimize damage and contribute inhabitants' life and property protection.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.42
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• pp.205-227
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• 2015

The Korean Peninsula is put in a position to carry out a highly strategic game vis-a-vis nK, which is asserting itself as a nuclear power amongst Northeast Asia's complex dynamics. While the international community recognizes nK's possession of nuclear weapons as released secret based on nK's three nuclear tests, shrewd strategic thinking is needed by ROK to secure itself as a non-nuclear nation in order to assume a responsible role to the international community, while simultaneously being ready to respond at all times for nK's military provocations. ROK must continue with its twofold strategy, by firm response to military confrontation with nK and maintaining flexible policy of tolerance in the areas of economy and ethnicity. Various strategic options to overcome nK's nuclear threats have been presented to ROK, whose possession of nuclear weapons have been difficult, and nK's nuclear capability is a real threat to ROK's national security. We must be able to respond to nK's nuclear threats strictly from ROK's national security perspective. This thesis aims to propose a response policy for nK's nuclear capability and nK's nuclear attack based on analysis of such nuclear damage, ROK Government's response posture against nK's nuclear threats, centered around ROK Government's non-military response posture.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.220-250
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• 2013

South Korean national security strategy should be developed to effectively handle and counter increasing maritime threats and challenges. There are three major maritime threats South Korea faces today; maritime disputes on the EEZ boundary and Dokdo islet issues, North Korean threats, and international maritime security. Maritime disputes in the region are getting intensified and turned into a military confrontation after 2010. Now regional countries confront each other with military and police forces and use economic leverage to coerce the others. They are very eager to create advantageous de facto situations to legitimize their territorial claims. North Korean threat is also increasing in the sea as we witnessed in the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyoung shelling in 2010. North Korea resorts to local provocations and nuclear threats to coerce South Korea in which it may enjoy asymmetric advantages. The NLL area of the west sea would be a main hot spot that North Korea may continue to make a local provocation. Also, South Korean national economy is heavily dependent upon foreign trade and national strategic resources such as oil are all imported. Without an assurance on the safety of sea routes, these economic activities cannot be maintained and expanded. This paper argues that South Korea should make national maritime strategy and enhance the strength of naval forces. As a middle power, its national security strategy needs to consider all the threats and challenges not only from North Korea but also to maritime security. This is not a matter of choice but a mandate for national survival and prosperity. This paper discusses the importance of maritime security, changing characteristics of maritime threats and challenges, regional maritime disputes and its threat to South Korea's security, and South Korea's future security strategy and ways to enhance the role of naval forces. Our national maritime strategy needs to show middle and long term policy directions on how we will protect our maritime interests. Especially, it is important to build proper naval might to carry out all the roles and missions required to the military.