• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.61-92
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• 2020

This paper attempts to examine the changes in China's naval strategy and to analyze the goal, range, and method of each strategy during the Xi Jinping's era. Since the founding of New China, the People's Liberation of Army Navy(PLAN) has made four changes in the naval strategy. Under Xi Jinping's administration, China's naval strategy is far seas operation combined with near seas active defense. Now, China's naval strateg y is shifting from a defensive to an aggressive one, increasing the proportion of offensive weapon systems and the number of state-of-the-art warships, and the scope of the naval strategy has been specified in the second island chain including the Indian Ocean. With the changes of naval strategy, the PLAN will set a new strategic goal to secure maritime dominance and implement an assertive strategy to actively respond to the intervention and intrusion of external forces. Moreover, the PLAN will also improve its sea-based deterrence force and the maneuver force to block other countries in the long-distance maritime conflict zones. The operation method of China's future naval strateg y will gradually shift from 'interdiction' to 'rapid-response.'

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.149-177
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• 2014

Today distant oceans around the world are regarded as a major 'global commons' for international trade and transportation. Korea is not an exception, because Korea hugely depends on sea lines of communication (SLOC) for supplying vital commodities such as food and energy resource. As a result, assuring a free and safe use of distant ocean beyond territory is also an important agenda for Korea's maritime security. However there are a number of challenges for Korea to enjoy a free and safe use of distant ocean; dangers of regional maritime conflict in East Asia, naval arms race of China and Japan, and concerns on possible decline of U.S naval presence and power projection capabilities. These factors provide a reasonable basis for Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) to pursue capabilities for major naval operations at distant ocean in a long-term perspective toward the year 2030. The introduction of aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered submarine is a key requirement for achieving this goal. ROKN needs to acquire a 'multi-role strategic landing platform' type of light aircraft carrier, which takes a role to escort naval task force by providing air superiority at distant ocean. Additionally nuclear-powered submarine will offer ROKN a formidable power to carry out offensive missions effectively at distant ocean.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.5-36
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• 2016

Recently, the Japanese government revised the three guidelines of its security policy, the National Security Strategy(NSS), the National Defense Program Outline and Midterm Defense Buildup Plan, exceptionally at one time. This means Japan has been seeking the new strategy and strengthening military power considering changing regional security environment. Moreover, Japan revised the security laws for the right to collective self-defense, which authorized the use of force even when Japan is not under attack. Also, Japan renewed the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in twenty years, and has expanded JSDF's scope of activity to a worldwide level. These changes imply Japan would constantly seek to build military forces focusing on naval forces. Because Japan's naval forces, the JMSDF is the means that allow Japan to use its force at anywhere overseas and expand its roles and missions in international society by the basis of the right to collective self-defense. This research will analyze Japan's new maritime strategy and trend of force development and eventually look for the implication on our maritime security These days, Japan has perceived Chinese rapid increase of naval power and pursuing of maritime hegemony as a grave threat. In response to this, Japan is designing new maritime strategy, which are "remote islands defense and recapture" and proactively develop a new type of naval forces to accomplish this new strategy. The Japan's "remote island defense and recapture strategy" is to harden its defensive posture in Nansei islands which correspond to China's 1st island chain for chinese A2/AD strategy and directly encounter with China and to protect its own dominium and maritime interest while supporting US national strategy in East Asia. Japan continues to build compact, multi-functional ship to accomplish "remote island defense and recapture strategy" and keep strengthening its maritime power projection capability to include build of new amphibious ship, and large, multi-functional ship which can provide effective C2. These changes imply that Japan is shifting its strategy from passive and defensive to proactive and aggressive way and continues to pursue naval buildup.The implication of Japan's new maritime strategy and naval buildup needs to be observed carefully and we need to keep developing naval power required to protect our maritime sovereignty and interest.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.143-176
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• 2012

We are witnessing the growing maritime tension on the East Asian sea these days. Each naval powers in the region are competing each other to acquire more advanced naval capabilities. Based upon the rapid economic development, China is actively beefing up its naval capabilities and expand its boundary of naval activities all over the East Asian region. Chinese Navy already unveiled its expansive naval strategy replacing the traditional concept of 'Near-Sea Defense' with the new concept of 'Far-Sea Defense' strategy. In response to potential rival's naval build up, the U.S. is redeploying its naval forces focusing on the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. enhances its joint naval exercises with the countries in the region, such as Japan, India, Australia and so on. In addition, Washington is devising new naval strategy under the concept of 'Air-Sea Battle' to deter Peking's so-called 'Anti-Access/ Area Denial(A2AD)' strategy. As a close ally of the U.S., Japan also disclosed its clear intention to strengthen the Maritime Self Defense Force(MSDF)'s capabilities by introducing the new concept of 'Dynamic Defense Force' in 2011. Under the new concept, JMSDF is pursuing the additional acquisition of submarines, quasi-aircraft carriers, Aegis-equipped destroyers, etc. Under the new president's strong leadership, Russia is also invigorating the naval build-up. Especially, Russia is fortifying the Pacific Fleet's naval assets by deploying new-type of naval ships such as the Mistral which was imported from France. In the midst of competitive naval build-up among the major naval powers in the region, we are observing the growing maritime conflicts on the East China Sea as well as South China Sea. Those naval conflicts can pose severe threats to our national interests. Maritime conflicts on the East or South China Sea can imperil our sea lanes which will be indispensible for national economic development. Neighboring countries' maritime conflicts also will cast an uncertainty on the path to mobilize international cooperation to resolve the North Korean issues. We should contribute to ease the maritime tension in the region by various ways. First, we should actively galvanize the bilateral maritime dialogue among the major naval powers in the region. Second, we also should take the lead to form a multilateral maritime cooperation mechanism in the region. Above all, we should set the aim to be a peaceful maritime power who can contribute to a building of stable maritime order in the region with a considerable naval power.

• Strategy21
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• s.39
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• pp.140-162
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• 2016

The construction of Jeju Naval Base was finally completed and donated to the Republic of Korea Navy on February 26th this year. There is no doubt that the new base will contribute to the substantial augmentation of Korea's naval power and maritime security. However, we should note that the new naval base took a long and hard twenty-three years to be completed. In the 21st century, Korea should adopt a new strategy that can fulfill the security requirements of Korea for the new age of international relations. The 21st century is characterized by globalization, and in the world of globalization, a national boarder has become meaningless. In the late 20th century, after the Cold War, trade between countries have greatly increased and so did the importance of the seas. Having transformed from an agricultural country into a commercial country, Korea went from a continental state to a maritime state. Korea has become the 9th largest trading state, and obviously, the importance of the sea has become significant. Korea's national strategic focus needs to be on the sea for national survival. Thus, since the 1990s, the Korean Navy has planned to build the Jeju Naval Base. Jeju, due to its geopolitical characteristics, is extremely important to the 21st century Korea's economy and national security. Jeju is the starting point of the sea route that reaches out to the world, and at the same time, the ending point of the sea route that heads towards Korea. Jeju is located in the center of Northeast Asia and thus, Jeju Naval Base is extremely important for the area's security and order. Jeju Naval Base will be very useful not only for the maritime security of Korea, but also for keeping peace and order in Northeast Asia. Jeju Naval Base was the minimal effort against the six sea route security threats towards Korea. The six sea route threats are: 1) Threat from North Korea; 2) China's Threat towards Korea's sovereignty; 3) China's treat towards Korea's fishery; 4) Threat from Japan; 5) Threat towards Korea's sea routes; 6) Threat from recent phenomena of isolationism of the United States. Jeju Naval Base is built for both warships and civilian ships--such as cruise ships--to use. Just like the United States' Pearl Harbor, Jeju Naval Base will become not only the largest military base, but a beautiful tourist site.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.162-189
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• 2016

This research deals with the PLAN's capabilities and its implication for regional security, and suggests some measures for maritime security cooperation among regional states. China has began to focus its national strategy more on 'rising as a new maritime power' since the 18th Party Convention in November 2012. Chinese new strategy aims at building a strong navy, contributing economic prosperity and national security, and thus elevating its prestige in international society. Most of all, building a strong navy is the foremost task at this time, and that is why the PLAN has the priority for military modernization. Chinese new maritime strategy could cause naval arms race in East Asia and aggravate maritime territorial disputes among concerned parties. It is the time for regional states to discuss some measures to build confidence, such as arms control of naval weapons, establishment of multilateral maritime security mechanism, and foundation of regional security regime, thus enhancing regional maritime cooperation.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.103-141
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• 2018

As the South China Sea maritime dispute illustrates, when considering the place where maritime claims occur, states do not have many choices to respond to maritime claims in which disputed areas are located far away from the land and are surrounded by the sea. As Mearsheimer (2014) points out, the sea stops power projection. Therefore, in order to adopt coercive as well as peaceful settlement policies to deal with maritime claims, states need to overcome obstacles (the sea) to project power. It means that if states want to conduct a specific foreign policy action, such as negotiating maritime borderlines or arguing sovereignty on islands, they need a tool (naval power) to coerce or to persuade the opponent. However, there are lack of research that studies maritime claims from the perspective of naval power. This research project fills this gap based on naval power. How do relative levels of naval power and (dis) parities of naval power influence the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims? Naval power is a constitutive element during maritime claims. If disputants over maritime claims have required naval power to project their capability, it means that they have the capability to apply various ways, such as aggressive options including MIDs, to accomplish their goals. So, I argue that when two claimants have enough naval power to project their capabilities, the likelihood of MIDs over maritime claims increases. Given that one or both states have a certain level of naval power, how does relative naval power between two claimants influence the management of maritime claims? Based on the power transition theory, I argue that when the disparities of relative naval power between claimants becomes distinctive, militarized conflicts surrounding maritime territory are less probable. Based on the ICOW project which codes maritime claims from 1900 to 2001, the empirical results of the Poisson models show if both claimants have projectable naval power, the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims increases. In addition, the result shows that when disputants maintain similar relative naval powers, they are more likely to initiate MIDs over maritime claims. To put it differently, if naval capabilities' gap between two claimants becomes larger, the probability of the occurrence of MIDs decreases.

• Strategy21
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• s.44
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• pp.377-416
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• 2018

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of the job stresses perceived by R.O.K. naval crews on turnover intentions and job satisfactions. Especially, this study aims to derive the policy implication for the trait characteristics by comparing the job attitude between the surface naval ship and submarine crew. For this purpose, we surveyed 1,000 naval crews. Then, multiple regression analysis was performed. Next, a T-test was conducted to test statistical significance of group differences. First, the job stresses perceived by naval crews were higher in the order of physical environments, overworks, compensation incompetence, lacks of autonomy, and conflicts with people. Second, the job stresses perceived by submarine crews were higher than that of surface naval ship crews. It was also proved statistically significant by the T-test. Third, the physical environments, lacks of autonomy, conflicts of relativity, and inadequate compensation stress have a positive statistically significant effect on turnover intentions of naval crews. Fourth, lacks of autonomy, conflicts of relativity, and inadequate compensation factors have a statistically significant negative effect on the job satisfactions of naval crews. Finally, multiple regression analysis was performed between the independent and dependent variables of the naval crews, and the policy implications were derived.

• Maritime Security
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.1-42
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• 2021

Controversy continues over the offensive nature of China's naval strategy to become a maritime power. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to identify the characteristics of China's naval strategy to become a maritime power by using the three elements of strategy and predict China's military actions in the future. For this purpose, research was conducted by considering the three elements of strategy and the distinct characteristics of naval strategy, and it was found that China's naval strategy was overall aggressive, but there was an imbalance in the pursuit of aggression between each strategic element. Offensive nature was prominent in terms of the methods, but there were limitations in the goals and means, such as the need to cooperate with neighboring countries to become a maritime power and the lack of military technology and operational continuity. The prospects for China's future military actions derived from the imbalance between these strategic elements are as follows. ① The risk of all-out military conflict with the US is low for now. ② China may use its naval power to force or cause limited military clashes against neighboring countries within the first island chain. ③ Accidental military conflicts with the US and neighboring countries may occur over naval confrontation over territorial disputes.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.196-223
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• 2017

The aim of this paper is to analyze China's naval strengthening and threat reflected in submarines, aircraft, destroyers and missile capabilities and US Navy's counter-forces. China is strengthening its naval forces in accordance with its three-step naval force build-up plan, and the introduction of Russian destroyers and submarines is a foothold for China's naval enforcement. The Chinese Navy also converted the concept of the First-Second Island Chain Defense, which it had already maintained, to the concept of maritime layer defense. Currently, the Chinese Navy maintains the concept of a Three-Maritime Layer Defense which includes the South China Sea, where artificial islands are being built by China, in the First Layer Defense and the East China Sea in the Third Layer Defense. Along with the advancement of Chinese Navy's submarines, surface vessels and aircraft's operational capabilities, ballistic and cruise missile capabilities become a major threat to the US Navy. If a crisis occurs in the East China Sea or in the Taiwan Waters, the US Navy will face more difficulties in employing the Carrier Strike Group to manage the crisis. Meanwhile, if a crisis occurs on the Korean Peninsula, it will be a burden to dispatch Carrier Strike GroupS to the East and West Seas of the Korean Peninsula. For the stable future, the US Navy should develop a strategy to respond more effectively to the Chinese Navy, which is challenging new maritime supremacy in East Asia.