• Title/Summary/Keyword: National Military Strategy

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Comparison of 'Militarism' and 'Normal state' through the Concept of Regional Hegemony: Focus on Imperial Japan before and after the Navy Disarmament Treaty and Modern Japan after Abe Shinzo's 2nd Cabinet (지역 패권 개념을 통한 '군국주의'와 '보통국가' 비교: 해군 군축조약 전·후 일본제국과 아베 2기 내각 이후 현대 일본의 사례를 중심으로)

  • Kim, Dong-eun
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.1 no.1
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    • pp.1-30
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    • 2020
  • The study started with the question, "Is Japan's normalization of nationalization a return to militarism?" Therefore, in order to analyze this, the characteristics of the international system after the inauguration of the Japanese Empire during World War I and World War II and the Abe's 2nd Cabinet in contemporary Japan were compared. Through this, there were some differences in the characteristics of the international system of the two periods, and as a result, it was intended to derive the differences between the two examples. During the prewar period of World War I, the militaristic Japanese Empire suffered great damage from the national pride of being the only power in Asia through the Paris Enhancement Conference, the Washington Navy Treaty, and the London Navy Treaty. However, the Western powers with colonies in Asia still existed in the region, so it was not possible to turn them into immediate power expansion. Meanwhile, World War II broke out in Europe. As a result, the Western powers had to focus on the whole of Europe, and the militaristic Japanese empire became a regional hegemony without missing the international system characteristic of "the hegemony." Unlike in the past militarism, Japan's case of pursuing common nationalization since 2012 has been carried out in the order of Northeast Asia in the composition of the "cold war" new cold war. In particular, Japan is attempting to transform itself into a normal state to strengthen the US-Japan alliance on a self-reliant level due to the lack of quantitative military power compared to the neighboring countries.

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Ingroup's Apology For Past Wrongdoing Can Increase Outgroup Dehumanization (과거 잘못에 대한 집단 간 사과의 역설적 효과: 외집단 비인간화를 중심으로)

  • Hyeon Jeong Kim;Sang Hee Park
    • Korean Journal of Culture and Social Issue
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    • v.25 no.1
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    • pp.79-99
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    • 2019
  • Apologies are used with increasing frequency for mending damaged relations between groups after intergroup conflict. Past research revealed that members of a perpetrator group may engage in (animalistic) dehumanization of victim group members to cope with guilt and responsibility associated with the ingroup's past wrongdoing. We hypothesized that ingroup's apology would relieve perpetrator group members of the moral threat, and therefore would make them perceive more humanness in the victim group members. The study was conducted in the context of South Korea's alleged atrocities against Vietnamese civilians during its military involvement in the Vietnam War. Korean participants read an article on the incidents with Korean government's issuance of an official apology manipulated, and reported their thoughts on the incidents and perceptions of Vietnamese people including their humanness. Contrary to our prediction, apology further enhanced dehumanization of Vietnamese people, even while it also decreased dehumanization through heightened feelings of relief. This study documents a seemingly ironic effect of intergroup apology, and calls for a more careful examination of the consequences of apology before recommending it as a viable strategy for alleviating intergroup tensions.

A Study on the Creation and Use of Nokgakseong and Underwater Wooden Fence (조선시대 녹각성과 수중목책의 조성 및 활용에 관한 연구)

  • SHIM Sunhui;KIM Choongsik
    • Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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    • v.56 no.4
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    • pp.230-246
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    • 2023
  • The wooden fence(木柵), which began to appear in the Bronze Age and is presumed to be the oldest defense facility in human history, was used as a fortress for the purpose of further strengthening military defense functions until after the Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592 in the Joseon Dynasty(壬辰倭亂). As it was established as the concept of a fortress or a fence installed outside a fence castle(城柵) or barracks fence(營柵), its importance as an essential facility for defense was further highlighted. This study is the result of exploring wooden fence that were used as official facilities during the Joseon Dynasty, focusing on literature surveys such as 『Annals of the Joseon Dynasty』 and 『New Jeungdonggukyeojiseungram』 In this study, in particular, the conclusion of this study is as follows, focusing on the use and function of Nokgakseong(鹿角城), underwater wooden fence, installation methods, and materials of wooden fences, is as follows. The conclusions of this study, which focused on the materials of the wooden fence, are as follows. First, as invasions by foreign enemies became more frequent in the late Goryeo and early Joseon Dynasty, wooden fences played a major role as a major out-of-castle defense facility((防禦施設). In addition, wooden fences were modified and installed into various types such as wooden fences(木柵城), Nokgakseong, a fence made up of large branches in the shape of a deer antler, and underwater wooden fences(水中木柵) according to the circumstances of the times, government policy, and location environment. Second, wooden fences were installed in strategic locations in defense facilities for military purposes, such as mountain fortress(山城), fortresses(營), camps(鎭), forts(堡), and castles(邑城) in strategic locations, and were used for defense in case of emergency. According to the urgency of farming, it was installed in accordance with the non-farming season, when it is easy to mobilize manpower to avoid the busy farming season. The size of the wooden fence of the Joseon Dynasty, which are confirmed through literature records, was converted into Pobaekchuk(布帛尺), and the circumference was very diverse from 4,428chuk(2,066m) to 55chuk(25m). Third, Nokgakseong is an efficient combat support facility that is more aggressive than a general wooden fence, and the records of Nokgakseong in the Annals of the Joseon Dynasty appeared during the King Sejong period the record was 20 times, the most. By region, it was found that it was mainly installed in coastal rugged areas such as Pyeongan and Hamgildo(12), which are the 6-jin areas of the 4th Army. Fourth, in the early 15th century, as the royal court established a maritime defense strategy for the coastal area of the southern coast, after the Sampo Invasion(三浦倭亂), riots by Japanese settlers in Sampo in 1510, major military posts including eupseong(邑城), camps, and forts were established. The installation of underwater barriers around various government facilities rapidly increased as a defense facility to block the warships of Japanese pirates around various government facilities. Fifth, between the 15th and 17th centuries before and after the Japanese Invasion of Korea in Sampo, underwater fences were installed in the Southern coast and Ganghwa Island. In particular, in the 15th century, underwater fences were intensively installed in coastal areas of Gyeongsangnam-do, such as Jepo. Pine trees and Oaks are the main materials used for underwater fences, but other materials such as Oldham's meliosma, Loose-flower hornbeam and The vines of arrowroots were also used as materials for wooden fences.

Analysis and implications of North Korea's new strategic drones 'Satbyol-4', 'Satbyol-9' (북한의 신형 전략 무인기 '샛별-4형', '샛별-9형' 분석과 시사점)

  • Kang-Il Seo;Jong-Hoon Kim;Man-Hee Won;Dong-Min Lee;Jae-Hyung Bae;Sang-Hyuk Park
    • The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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    • v.10 no.2
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    • pp.167-172
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    • 2024
  • In major wars of the 21st century, drones are expanding beyond surveillance and reconnaissance to include land and air as well as sea and underwater for purposes such as precision strikes, suicide attacks, and cognitive warfare. These drones will perform multi-domain operations, and to this end, they will continue to develop by improving the level of autonomy and strengthening scalability based on the High-Low Mix concept. Recently, drones have been used as a major means in major wars around the world, and there seems to be a good chance that they will evolve into game changers in the future. North Korea has also been making significant efforts to operate reconnaissance and attack drones for a long time. North Korea has recently continued to engage in provocations using drones, and its capabilities are gradually becoming more sophisticated. In addition, with the recent emergence of new strategic Drones, wartime and peacetime threats such as North Korea's use of these to secure surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning capabilities against South Korea and new types of provocations are expected to be strengthened. Through this study, we hope to provide implications by analyzing the capabilities of North Korea's strategic Drones, predicting their operation patterns, and conducting active follow-up research on the establishment of a comprehensive strategy, such as our military's drone deployment and counter-drone system solutions.

A study on Korea's defense export expansion strategy - Focusing on Korea-Poland Defense Export Case - (한국의 방산수출 확대 전략 연구 - 한·폴란드 방산수출 사례를 중심으로 -)

  • Geum-Ryul Kim
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.23 no.4
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    • pp.141-151
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    • 2023
  • Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, European countries have cut defense costs and reduced armaments as an era of peace without large-scale wars continues, and as a result, the West's defense industry base has gradually weakened. On the other hand, South Korea, the world's only divided country, was able to achieve high growth in the defense industry as a result of continuous arms strengthening in the face of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. With the rapid increase in demand for conventional weapons systems and changes in the structure of the global defense market due to the Russia-Ukraine war, Korea's weapons system drew great attention as a large-scale defense export contract with Poland was signed in 2022. In 2023, K-Defense ranked ninth in the world's arms exports and aims to become the world's fourth-largest defense exporter by 2027. Therefore, this study analyzed the case of Korea-Poland defense exports to derive problems, and presented development strategies related to export revitalization of K-Defense, a national strategic industry. In order for the defense industry to become Korea's next growth engine, it is necessary to establish a defense organization, prepare government-level measures to protect defense industry technology, and expand military and security cooperation with allies linked to defense exports.

A Study Consequence Management System of the Terrorism (테러리즘의 대응관리체제에 관한 고찰 - "9. 11 테러"를 중심으로 -)

  • Kim, Yi-Soo;Ahn, Byung-Soo;Han, Nam-Soo
    • Korean Security Journal
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    • no.7
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    • pp.95-124
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    • 2004
  • It can be said that 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' in 2001 were not only the indiscriminate attacks on innocent people but also the whole - political, economical and military - attacks on human life. Also, 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' can be regarded as the significant events in the history of world, which were on the peak of the super-terrorism or new-terrorism that had emerged from the 1980s. However, if one would have analysed the developments of terrorism from the 1970s, they could have been foreknown without difficulty. The finding from this study can be summarized as the followings, First, in spite that the USA responsive system against terrorism had been assessed as perfect before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks', the fragilities were found in the aspects of the response on the new-terrorism or super-terrorism. The previous responsive system before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' had the following defects as the followings: (1) it was impossible to establish the integrated strategy, because the organizations related to the response against terrorism had not integrated; (2) there were some weakness to collect and diffuse the informations related to terrorism; (3) the security system for the domestic airline service in USA and the responsive system of air defense against terrors on aircraft were very fragile. For these reasons, USA government established the 'Department of Homeland Security' of which the President is the head so that the many organizations related to terrorism were integrated into a single management system. And, it legislated a new act to protect security from terrors, which legalized of the wiretapping in spite of the risk of encroachment upon personal rights, increased the jail terms upon terrorists, froze the bank related to terrorist organization, and could censor e-mails. Second, it seem that Korean responsive system against terrors more fragile than that of USA. One of the reasons is that people have some perception that Korea is a safe zone from terrors, because there were little attacks from international terrorists in Korea. This can be found from the fact that the legal arrangement against terrorism is only the President's instruction No. 47. Under this responsive system against terrorism dependent on only the President's instruction, it is expected that there would be a poor response against terrors due to the lack of unified and integrated responsive agency as like the case of USA before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks'. And, where there is no legal countermeasure, it is impossible to expect the binding force on the outside of administrative agencies and the performances to prevent and hinder the terrorist actions can not but be limited. That is to say, the current responsive system can not counteract effectively against the new-terrorism and super-terrorism. Third, although there were some changes in Korean government's policies against terrorism. there still are problems. One of the most important problems is that the new responsive system against terrorism in Korea, different from that of USA, is not a permanent agency but a meeting body that is organized by a commission. This commission is controled by the Prime Minister and the substantial tasks are under the National Intelligence Service. Under this configuration, there can be the lack of strong leadership and control. Additionally, because there is no statute to response against terrorism, it is impossible to prevent and counteract effectively against terrorism. The above summarized suggests that, because the contemporary super-terrorism or new-terrorism makes numerous casualties of unspecified persons and enormous nationwide damages, the thorough prevention against terrorism is the most important challenge, and that the full range of legal and institutional arrangements for the ex post counteraction should be established. In order to do so, it is necessary for the government to make legal and institutional arrangements such as the permanent agency for protection from terrorism in which the related departments cooperates with together and the development of efficient anti-terror programs, and to show its willingness and ability that it can counteract upon any type of domestic and foreign terrorism so that obtain the active supports and confidence from citizens.

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