• Annual Conference on Human and Language Technology
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• 2021.10a
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• pp.340-345
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• 2021

최근 많은 연구들이 BERT를 활용하여, 주어진 문맥에서 언어학/문법적으로 적절하지 않은 단어를 인지하고 찾아내는 성과를 보고하였다. 하지만 일반적으로 딥러닝 관점에서 NLL기법(Negative log-likelihood)은 주어진 문맥에서 언어 변칙에 대한 정확한 성격을 규명하기에는 어려움이 있다고 지적되고 있다. 이러한 한계를 해결하기 위하여, Li et al.(2021)은 트랜스포머 언어모델의 은닉층별 밀도 추정(density estimation)을 통한 가우시안 확률 분포를 활용하는 가우시안 혼합 모델(Gaussian Mixture Model)을 적용하였다. 그들은 트랜스포머 언어모델이 언어 변칙 예문들의 종류에 따라 상이한 메커니즘을 사용하여 처리한다는 점을 보고하였다. 이 선행 연구를 받아들여 본 연구에서는 한국어 기반 언어모델인 KoBERT나 KR-BERT도 과연 한국어의 상이한 유형의 언어 변칙 예문들을 다른 방식으로 처리할 수 있는지를 규명하고자 한다. 이를 위해, 본 연구에서는 한국어 형태통사적 그리고 의미적 변칙 예문들을 구성하였고, 이 예문들을 바탕으로 한국어 기반 모델들의 성능을 놀라움-갭(surprisal gap) 점수를 계산하여 평가하였다. 본 논문에서는 한국어 기반 모델들도 의미적 변칙 예문을 처리할 때보다 형태통사적 변칙 예문을 처리할 때 상대적으로 보다 더 높은 놀라움-갭 점수를 보여주고 있음을 발견하였다. 즉, 상이한 종류의 언어 변칙 예문들을 처리하기 위하여 다른 메커니즘을 활용하고 있음을 보였다.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.220-250
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• 2013

South Korean national security strategy should be developed to effectively handle and counter increasing maritime threats and challenges. There are three major maritime threats South Korea faces today; maritime disputes on the EEZ boundary and Dokdo islet issues, North Korean threats, and international maritime security. Maritime disputes in the region are getting intensified and turned into a military confrontation after 2010. Now regional countries confront each other with military and police forces and use economic leverage to coerce the others. They are very eager to create advantageous de facto situations to legitimize their territorial claims. North Korean threat is also increasing in the sea as we witnessed in the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyoung shelling in 2010. North Korea resorts to local provocations and nuclear threats to coerce South Korea in which it may enjoy asymmetric advantages. The NLL area of the west sea would be a main hot spot that North Korea may continue to make a local provocation. Also, South Korean national economy is heavily dependent upon foreign trade and national strategic resources such as oil are all imported. Without an assurance on the safety of sea routes, these economic activities cannot be maintained and expanded. This paper argues that South Korea should make national maritime strategy and enhance the strength of naval forces. As a middle power, its national security strategy needs to consider all the threats and challenges not only from North Korea but also to maritime security. This is not a matter of choice but a mandate for national survival and prosperity. This paper discusses the importance of maritime security, changing characteristics of maritime threats and challenges, regional maritime disputes and its threat to South Korea's security, and South Korea's future security strategy and ways to enhance the role of naval forces. Our national maritime strategy needs to show middle and long term policy directions on how we will protect our maritime interests. Especially, it is important to build proper naval might to carry out all the roles and missions required to the military.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartB
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• v.17B no.1
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• pp.85-92
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• 2010

A shallow semantic parsing system analyzes the relationship that a syntactic constituent of the sentence has with a predicate. It identifies semantic arguments representing agent, patient, instrument, etc. of the predicate. In this study, we propose a two-phase shallow semantic parsing model which consists of the identification phase and the classification phase. We first find the boundary of semantic arguments from partial syntactic parsing results, and then assign appropriate semantic roles to the identified semantic arguments. By taking the sequential two-phase approach, we can alleviate the unbalanced class distribution problem, and select the features appropriate for each task. Experiments show the relative contribution of each phase on the test data.

• Proceedings of KOSOMES biannual meeting
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.57-60
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• 2007

The Han River is divided into North and South Korea by NLL(Northern Limit Line) and its area has been blocked by CCL(Civil Control Line) since the Korean War in 1950. Satellite remote sensing, therefore, is uniquely suited to monitoring bar transformation in the region. In river with bar, the characteristics of its physical conditions have a close relationship with bar morphology. In this paper, a monitoring approach of bar transformation in the Han River Estuary is presented using RADARSAT/SAR images from 2000 to 2005 and spatial patterns of bar morphology are presented. It could be said that in the estuary vegetated area and natural levees are developed well, but bars are shifted after an event like a flood. It is also showed that suspended solids such as silt transported through the estuary could contribute highly to a sedimentation environment around Incheon.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Navigation and Port Research Conference
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• 2021.11a
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• pp.139-141
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• 2021

In the maritime digital forensic part, it is very important and difficult process that analysis of data and information with vessel navigation system's binary log data for situation awareness of maritime accident. In recent years, anaysis of vessel's navigation system's trajectory information is an essential element of maritime accident investigation for vessel digital forensic process. So, we analysis of maritime navigation systems of vessel and feature of device and environments. In the future, we will research on information of ship's trajectory and movement for useful forensic service.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.216-234
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• 2016

본 논문은 자위권 사용과 군사력 사용 간의 관계를 분석하고 이를 한반도 서해에서의 한국과 북한 간 해상긴장 상황에 적용시킨 이슈를 다룬다. 국가가 행사하는 자위권(self-defense: 自衛權)은 기본적으로 전쟁 방지를 위한 기본적 원칙이다. 그러나 이는 군사력 사용(Use of Forces: 軍事力 使用) 또는 무력행사(武力行事)이라는 측면에서 칼의 양날과 같은 결과를 낳는다. 즉 자위권 행사로 전쟁의 확산을 방지하는 반면에 자위권 행사로 상대방에 대한 적성(敵性)을 인정해 주는 경우이다. 반면 북한의 군사도발은 전방향적이며, 1953년 한반도 정전협정 위반이다. 1953년 정전협정 체결 이후 양국은 서해 북방한계선(NLL)에서의 군사적 충돌을 거쳤으며, 이는 과연 한국이 자위권 차원에서의 방어태세와 군사력 사용 측면에서의 대응태세 간에 괴리가 존재하고 있다는 것으로 나타나고 있다. 당연히 피해를 받는 곳은 한국이며, 이는 서해 북방한계선에서의 남북한 해군 간 대결국면에서 나타나고 있다. 이에 본 논문은 자위권을 국가 차원 행사하는 수준과 작전에 투입된 현장 작전 지휘관 차원에서 행사하는 수준으로 구분하여 다룬다. 서해 북방한계선 부근 수역에서의 북한의 해상 군사도발에 대해 현장 작전 지휘관이 행사하는 자위권은 대한민국 정부 차원에서의 자위권 행사와는 다르면, 이 문제를 국제법을 중심으로 분석하기에는 너무나 많은 제한점이 있다. 현행 국제법상 국가 자위권 문제는 군사력을 동반하는 문제로서 그 행사요건이 매우 애매모호하고 까다롭다. 그러나 현장 작전지휘관의 자위권 행사는 단호해야 하며, 이는 군사력 운용으로 나타나야 한다. 실제 서해에서의 남북한 대결국면에서의 대한민국 해군의 자위권 행사는 정전협정에 의거 제한되고 있으며, 이는 2010년 북한의 천안함 침몰과 연평도 폭격도발 시 대한 민국 해군과 해병대의 대응에서 증명되었다. 현재 대한민국 국방부는 현장 작전 지휘관에서 소위 '선제적 자위권 행사' 부여 필요성에 대한 논의를 진행 중으로 알려져 있다. 이에 따라 선제적 자위권 행사를 위한 조치들을 제도화하는 움직임을 보이고 있다. 예를 들면 2013년 발표된 대한민국 합참과 유엔사령부/한미 연합사령부/주한미군사령부 북한 군사 도발에 대한 대응계획(ROK JCS and UNC/CFC/USFK Counter-Provocation Plan)이 이를 간접적으로 증명하고 있다. 선제적 자위권은 행사에 있어 몇 가지 원칙을 요구하고 있으며, 이에 대한 합법성 문제는 아직 해결되고 있지 않다. 따라서 이 문제와 북한 군사도발 시에 대한 대한민국의 선제적 자위권 행사 간 연관성 문제를 어떻게 해석할 수 있는가에 대한 연구가 필요한 실정이다. 평시 군사력 사용에 따른 무력행사의 적법성은 그 인정이 대단히 어려운 것이 현실이며, 이에 따라 북한의 군사도발에 대한 가장 효율적 방안이 선제적 자위권이라면, 이에 대한 법적 대응이 무엇인가에 대한 제도적 근거를 필요로 할 것이다.

• Explosives and Blasting
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.57-64
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• 2004

There are two major types of underwater blasting at Korea, bridges and harbor construction work. Pier blasting for lay the foundation bridges construction is used dry excavation working (drilling and charging) after pump out water and then fire pump in water that is same as bench blasting. In contrast, underwater blasting for harbor construction and increase of harbor load depth is used to barge with digging equipment that is in oder to drilling on the surface and blasting work(charge, hook-up) under water. Thus, there are need to special concern such as charge method and hook-up method different from tunnel blasting work and bench blasting work. If do not use special concern breaks out dead pressure and mis fire because of there are so many difficult condition such as water pressure, obstruct field of vision. In this study underwater blasting at Busan Harbor Construction have consider with special concern that is plastic pipe charge method used to MegaMITE I and specialized buoy hook- up method make far initial system detonate on the surface used to TLD. The results is designed blast pattern charge per delay effect an inspection of verify between predict velocity and measure velocity. minimized break out mis fire consideration charge method, hook up method. According to result best underwater blasting design is 105mm drilling dia, MeGAMITE II, HiNLL Plus(non electric detonator).

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.20 no.5
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• pp.571-578
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• 2014

The boundaries of ROK maritime jurisdictional area remains unclear as two Koreas failed to draw clear maritime boundaries at the armistice agreement and there are no clear maritime boundaries with China and Japan. After the Korean War, the United Nations Command established the northern limit line(NLL) as well as the area of operations(AO) to enforce the DPRK's compliance with the armistice agreement and has been controlling all of the maritime and air activities in the region. ROK also has been controlling the passage of DPRK vessels in the area. Within the AO, third nation vessels have freedom of navigation, Yet, due to the division followed by the Korean War, ROK classifies DPRK as a hostile state and unique controling system is applied to DPRK vessels. Since the establishment of the AO, many changes have been occurring such as adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) and two Koreas' joining the UN. Also, there are continuous inter-Korean conflicts. Therefore, the geographical span of the AO needs to be reconsidered. Furthermore, a legal measure which ensures ROKN vessel's functional capability of controling DPRK vessels must be introduced. This thesis examines post-Korean War DPRK vessel control system in the Korean peninsula as well as how it should be improved.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.227-233
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• 2023

Along with the 4th Industrial Revolution, the impact of "unmanned" is affecting all fields around the world, and in particular, in the military sector, "unmanned" is so important that it occupies a part of the main combat system. Recently, the South Korean military is facing a crisis due to the North Korea's UAV incident that invaded our airspace and descended to Seoul. In response, the South Korea military declared its willingness and countermeasures to capture and destroy North Korea's UAV. However, as the technological development of UAV continues and the utilization plan is expanding, the countermeasures for UAV at the current level can be useless. Also, the threat from North Korea is not just UAV. North Korea has practically a nuclear power and is set to conduct its seventh nuclear test, and its missile technology is also being advanced, with 38 arounds of 67 missile tests conducted in 2022 alone. It is also developing five key strategic weapons that can pose a fatal threat to Korea, and North Korea's strong conventional forces are located around the NLL(Northern Limit Line), and the port of Long Range Artillery is facing the Seoul metropolitan area. It is important to respond to North Korea's UAV threats, which are now receiving much attention, but it will be necessary to comprehensively analyze and clearly prioritize North Korea's threats and use a limited budget to respond to them.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.58-92
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• 2014

Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.