• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.158-170
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• 2009

This paper considers how the optimal export level is influenced by export risk, the degree of risk-averseness for exporting firms, and those firms' cost structure. In addition, export insurance is incorporated into some simple theoretical model to analyze the optimal export level. This paper applies genetic algorithm simulation to show that the exporting firms'risk-averseness do not affect the optimal export decision while export risk and cost function characteristic have relatively more significant effects on the optimal export level. Finally, our findings suggest that the most influential factor for the optimal export levels seems to be the monopoly power of exporting firms.

• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.22
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• pp.39-75
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• 2003

This essay begins with the following questions; "What is a fundamental source of media power?" and "How can the media power dominate market?". This essay aims at answering the questions. I made my selection of countries such as Venezuela, Italy and UK for this article with a political economic approach. This analysis found evidence that an enormous conglomerate ownership, and alliance or convergence between media and political power are two fundamental source of the media power. With the integration of newspaper and television the media monopoly increased their supplies and political influences as I have shown. Despite the growing threat of media monopoly power to democracy and public interest, in recent years, governments worldwide have chosen to ease regulations.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.259-277
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• 2008

This paper empirically analyzes the influence of export insurance on export promotion using panel data for the Korean case during the sample period from 2003 to 2006. We use the Korean export's share in trading partners' imports as a weight for the weighted least square (WLS) estimation to measure the effect of export insurance on the export promotion. Our main finding is that export insurance subsidy seems to enhance the export performance when the Korean export takes greater share in other countries' markets. On the other hand, under weaker monopoly power of the Korean export, export risk and trading partners' GDP growth rate has more influence on the export promotion rather than export insurance subsidy. Our finding implies that policy makers and practitioners should discern the Korean exports' monopoly power differential across trading countries for better performing export insuarnce policy.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Costume
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• v.59 no.8
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• pp.37-48
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• 2009

This paper summarized the forming, structure and management of the Ui-Jeon(衣廛) in Joseon Dynasty, considered the change of the commercial power of the Ui-Jeon in the $18{\sim}19th$ centuries. The Ui-Jeon was established the early period of the Joseon Dynasty. The Ui-Jeon merchants organized the association named Dojung(都中) and were in business with facilities like Haenrang(行廊) and Doga(都家). The Ui-Jeon was mid-sized Si-Jeon, the licensed shop(市廛). The Ui-Jeon held the monopoly of clothes. The Ui-Jeon merchants sold and bought old clothes, sold new clothes, lent the wedding dress for a bridegroom. The Ui-Jeon paid taxes and supplied clothes, goods and sewing labor for the marriage, funeral ceremonies of the royal family. The commercial power of the Ui-Jeon was threatened by free merchants(私商) named old clothes mercants(破衣商). Finally the Ui-Jeon merchants lost the exclusive right to clothes in 1791. After that, the Ui-Jeon merchanrs appealed to the government to give them the monopoly. The Ui-Jeon merchants regained the sole right to sell Ju-ui(紬衣), one item only, but it was temporary. Separately The Ui-Jeon merchants acquired the rights to collect the sub-taxes(分稅) from free merchants.

• Journal of Korea Society of Industrial Information Systems
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.25-37
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• 2015

The early studies indicated that the firm with monopoly power is likely to engage in X-inefficiency such as a managerial slack. The reflection of the X-inefficiency theory has led to the issue that the public sector may be more inefficient than the private sector. In Korea like other many countries the electricity gas water service which can be considered as natural monopoly have been provided mostly by the public sector. In order to provide the empirical evidence to the argument that the public sector may be more inefficient than the private sector this paper estimated the four types of Solow residual which is called the total factor productivity in the electricity gas water service industry with the associated empirical model and compared its productivity with one in the manufacturing industry. The empirical results do not support the argument that the public sector may be more inefficient or less productive than the private sector.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.15 no.11
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• pp.73-82
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• 2017

Purpose - This paper aims to investigate a profit maximizing incentive of foreign traders in distributing the KOSPI 200 Futures. Such an incentive may induce unsophisticated retail traders to suffer loss from speculative trading. Since Korean government increased the entry barriers of the market to protect unsophisticated traders, the market size has been decreasing while the proportion of the contract held by foreign traders has been increasing. These on going changes make the market imperfectly competitive, where a profit maximization incentives of foreign traders are expected to grow. In this paper, we attempt to find any evidence of such behavior, thereby providing implications regarding market policy and market efficiency. Research design, data, and methodology - According to Kyle(1985), an informed trader exploits his/her monopoly power optimally in a dynamic context so that he/she makes positive profit, where he/she could conceal his/her trading utilizing noise trading as camouflage. We apply the KOSPI 200 Futures market to the Kyle's model: foreign traders who take into account the effect of his/her trading to maximize expected profits as an informed trader, retail investors as noise traders, and financial institutions as market makers. To find any evidence of monopolistic behavior, we test the variants of trading volume and price data of the KOSPI 200 Futures over the period of 2009 and 2017. Results - First, we find that the price of the KOSPI 200 Futures are more volatile than the price of underlying asset. Second, we find that monopolistic foreign trader's trading order flows are consistent with exploiting his/her monopoly power to maximize profit. Finally, we find that retail investors' trading order flows are inversely consistent with maximizing profit, that is, uninformed retail investors suffer loss continuously in speculative trading against informed traders. Conclusions - Our results show that the quantity of strategic order flows may have a large effect on the price, therefore, resulting the market inefficiency. The results also imply that, in implementing regulations, the depth of the market must be considered to maintain market liquidity, and suggesting interesting research topics regarding the market structure.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.6 no.4
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• pp.59-66
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• 2020

This paper considered the measures of securing political neutrality of the prosecutor on the reform of the prosecution. The nation's prosecution has enormous authority. In the meantime, the prosecution enjoyed unlimited power uncontrolled with investigative rights, prosecution monopoly, and police investigation command. No other country has as much power as the Korean prosecution. However, the prosecution, which enjoys such power, is placed on the task of reforming the prosecution due to poor democratic control. Has there been such a prosecutor in Korean history who only looks forward and wields long sword ehrflqtjdrhk against corruption in power? So far, the prosecution has conducted investigations that suit the administration's taste, and the prosecutors have been on the rise in return. That is why the previous administrations tried to ensure the political neutrality of the prosecution. As such, We would like to consider legal logic to analyze the sincerity of the prosecution reform. To this end, the first is to consider the authority of prosecutors and prosecutors. Second, consider the internal requirements of the government's reform of the prosecution. Third, establish the direction of prosecution reform.

• The Korean Society of Law and Medicine
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.295-316
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• 2011

If the medical staff privileges, which mean the eligibility to practice at open hospitals, are excluded in the United States, antitrust claims based on the violation of the Sherman Act have been raised a lot. The proliferation of these lawsuits in the United States, which are characterized as antitrust lawsuits, can be understandable situation. The reason is because doctors who don't belong to specific hospitals are seriously damaged, if the medical staff privileges are excluded and doctors cannot use facilities of open hospitals. In order to decide to allow the privileges of certain doctors, hospitals have to rely on peer review to maintain high quality of medical services, and it is not easy to find alternative of peer review in the professional areas like healthcare. However, there are possibilities that members of the peer review can abuse power to unfairly exclude privileges of potential competitors. In this sense, it is asserted in the U.S. antitrust lawsuits that the restraint of medical staff privilege can be the illegal restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of Sherman Act and can be monopolization or an attempt to monopoly by hospitals in violation of section 2 of Sherman Act. As Korea adopted open hospital system quite recently, there is still no case related with the exclusion of medical staff privileges. However, medical staff privilege system of Korea is not different from that of the United States in principle. Thus, the U.S. jurisprudence on the exclusion of medical staff privileges can be referred in the interpretation of "practice that interferes with or restricts the activities or contents of the business" based on Article 19.1.9 of Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Law of Korea.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.646-648
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• 2003

Distribution pricing has been one of keystones of ongoing deregulation and privatization process in power industries. The electricity market has been established based on open access and nondiscriminatory use of the Distribution assets. As Distribution business remains as a monopoly, it is necessary to provide economic regulation. This paper focuses on the distribution pricing methods using by Incremental Marginal Cost and Yardstick Regulation.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.698-700
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• 2004

Electric power restructuring offers a major change to the vertically integrated utility monopoly. Deregulation has had a great impact on the electric power industry in various countries. Bidding competition is one of the main transaction approaches after deregulation. The energy trading levels between market participants is largely dependent on the short-term price forecasts. This paper presents the short-term System Marginal Price (SMP) forecasting implementation using backpropagation Neural Network in competitive electricity market. Demand and SMP that supplied from Korea Power Exchange (KPX) are used by a input data and then predict SMP. It needs to analysis the input data for accurate prediction.