• 무역상무연구
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• 제49권
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• pp.213-236
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• 2011

Korea Shipping Act admits shipping conferences' joint actions like rate agreement, sailing agreement in some degree for development of shipping transport industries for decades. Meanwhile, EU has prohibited all kinds of shipping conferences' joint actions since October 2008, and many advanced countries also have similar position on shipping conference. The balance development between shippers and ship owners is very important in terms of national economic growth. So it is appropriate time to revise related laws such as Shipping Act and Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. First, It is direction for revision of Korean Shipping Act. The act has to define precisely the criteria of "unfairness" in case of admitting of shipping conferences' joint actions. Shipping conferences have a conference with shipper or shipper's delegation substantially on freight and transport conditions and so on. Second, It is direction for revision of Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. The fair trade commission has to perform fair roles between shippers and ship owners. The judgement of fairness has to confirm according to the spirit of not Korea Shipping Act but Korea Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act itself.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• 제20권3_spc호
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• pp.201-217
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• 2013

This paper analyzes the effect of network neutrality regulation on social welfare using the two-sided market under the network congestion. This paper deals with zero price rule regulation which means the price regulation on the side of content. The results are as follows : First, under the monopoly platform, internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all decreasing as the network congestion increases. Second, under the monopoly platform internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all increasing as the network capacity increases. Third, the price of internet use and contents internet use which maximize social welfare are increasing and the number of internet user and content provider are decreasing as the network congestion increases. Fourth, optimal network capacity for monopoly platform provider is less than socially optimal network capacity. Fifth, if network neutrality regulation is enforced, the price of internet use is higher than monopoly platform provider and the price of contents is lower than monopoly platform provider. Also, the number of internet user is less than monopoly platform provider and the number of content provider is more than that. By the way, when network congestion increases, internet use price, the number of internet user, and the number of content provider are decreasing. Sixth, network neutrality regulation is more effective for internet user side than contents provider when network congestion is considered. This means that network neutrality regulation is not effective for contents market side when network congestion is seriously large.

• 한국응용곤충학회지
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• 제17권3호
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• pp.143-147
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• 1978

가. 인삼의 모잘록병을 방제하기 위하여 10종의 약제를 공시하여 실내 및 포장시험을 실시하였다. 나. 공시약제의 효과를 조사하기 위하여 실내에서 토양관법으로 그리고 포장에서는 모잘록병균을 인위적으로 접종한 균포와 자연발병상태의 균포에서 종자소독, 토양소독, 토양관주법으로 처리하였던 바, 다. 모잘록병 방제를 위해 기대되는 약제로는 Homai, Captan, Validamycin, Tachigaren등이 있다.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제32권2호
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• pp.158-170
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• 2009

This paper considers how the optimal export level is influenced by export risk, the degree of risk-averseness for exporting firms, and those firms' cost structure. In addition, export insurance is incorporated into some simple theoretical model to analyze the optimal export level. This paper applies genetic algorithm simulation to show that the exporting firms'risk-averseness do not affect the optimal export decision while export risk and cost function characteristic have relatively more significant effects on the optimal export level. Finally, our findings suggest that the most influential factor for the optimal export levels seems to be the monopoly power of exporting firms.

• 한국콘텐츠학회논문지
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• 제17권11호
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• pp.588-599
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• 2017

본 연구는 콘텐츠 제공자들이 자사의 콘텐츠를 보다 저렴한 비용과 높은 품질로 제공하기 위하여 이용자들이 가입되어 있는 ISP에게 직접 접속할 수 있는 다양한 기술을 적용할 경우, ISP들이 CP와 인터넷 가입자에게 망 혼잡에 따른 추가적인 접속료를 부과할 수 있다는 모형을 설정하고 분석한다. 이 경우 CP의 시장상황에 따라 ISP가 책정하는 접속료의 수준은 많이 달라질 것이다. CP가 경쟁적인 경우에는 이부제 요금을 적용하고 있는 ISP간 경쟁하에서 접속료는 CP요금과 함께 사회적 최적 상태와 동일하게 결정될 것이지만 CP가 독점적일 경우 ISP는 접속료에 대한 CP 요금 민감도에 따라 접속료 수준을 다르게 책정할 가능성이 있다. CP가 독점적인 경우 규제를 통해 사회후생의 왜곡을 치유할 수 있는데, 사회적 최적 접속료는 CP가 경쟁적인 경우보다 낮은 수준이다. 이는 CP가 독점적이므로 규제에 의해 접속료가 결정되면 그 접속료를 기반으로 CP가 한계비용보다 큰 요금을 결정하기 때문에 규제자는 접속료를 CP가 경쟁적일 때보다 낮게 책정하는 것이 사회후생을 더 증가시키게 된다.

• 한국통신학회논문지
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• 제34권11B호
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• pp.1254-1260
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• 2009

본 논문에서는 다수의 병렬 TCP flow들을 가진 소수의 스테이션들이 링크 대역폭을 독점하는 불공평성 문제 에 대해 randam early detection (RED)을 수정한 history-aware RED (HRED)를 제안한다. BitTorrent와 같은 peer-to-peer방식의 파일 공유 애플리케이션들은 파일 다운로드를 위해 다수의 병렬 TCP flow들을 이용한다. 만약 파일 공유 애플리케이션을 수행하는 스테이션들이 다른 스테이션들과 링크를 공유할 경우 대역폭을 독점하는 문제가 발생한다. 이 경우 개별 TCP flow들 간의 공평성 지원을 위해 개발된 RED를 적용하더라도 불공평성은 개선되지 않는다. 제안하는 HRED는 RED와 유사하게 도착하는 패킷들에 대해 확률적으로 drop여부를 결정하되, 스테이션의 링크 점유율에 따라 drop 확률을 조정할 수 있어, 대역폭을 독점하는 스테이션들의 패킷들에 drop 패널티를 부과할 수 있다. 여러 가지 상황을 가정한 시뮬레이션을 통해 HRED가 RED에 비해 스테이션 차원에서의 throughput 공평성 지원 측면에서 최소 60%이상, 전송 효율성 측면에서 4%이상 개선되었음을 확인하였다.

• Asian Journal of Innovation and Policy
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• 제7권1호
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• pp.207-234
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• 2018

A manufacturer of a durable good typically purchases supplies, including parts for assembly - that are also useful for repairs - from independent "original equipment suppliers" with which it contracts. The manufacturer is a branded monopolist of its final assembled product. To put into effect also a monopoly of the replacement parts, it must stipulate in its arrangements with independent suppliers of the parts that they not supply such patented parts to any other buyer. Durable good owners would then only be able to obtain their requirements of replacement parts from the same company that supplied the durable. This would amount to a tie-in of replacement parts to the direct purchase of new durables. And that describes the apparently widespread practice of automobile manufacturers in India, as exposed in a recent case before the Competition Commission of India (Samsher Kataria v Honda Siel Cars India Limited and others). Here, I will argue that such tie-in enabled automotive manufacturers to more fully appropriate consumer surplus, which induced them to lower the price of new cars, sell more cars and also sell more repair parts. The tie-in expanded the auto parts industry and promoted new entry. The main restraint on expansion of India's automotive manufacturing is not monopoly. It is government protection in the form of tariffs on automobiles and auto parts.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• 제16권1호
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• pp.35-69
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• 2014

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

• 건축사
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• 통권518호
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• pp.75-75
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• 2012

• 건축사
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• 통권517호
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• pp.75-75
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• 2012