• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.17 no.5
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• pp.105-115
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• 2022

This study aims to investigate the Effect of Money Rush on Entrepreneurial Opportunity Recognition for college students in Busan and Gyeongnam area. We also examine whether Entrepreneurship has a mediating effect between Money Rush and Entrepreneurial Opportunity Recognition. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, digital transformation of the industry have greatly changed the world of work, and job insecurity is becoming more prevalent. As income inequality expands due to the disparity in asset income, the Money Rush phenomenon, which prefers to increase asset income through investment rather than earned income, is becoming common. Money Rush secures an income pipeline and is divided into side hustles and investments that actively utilize Leverage to maximize profits. The findings of this study confirm that Money Rush has a positive effect on Entrepreneurial Opportunity Recognition and a partially positive effect on Entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship has a partial mediating effect between Money Rush and Entrepreneurial Opportunity Recognition. The study analysis is expected to contribute to strengthening college students' competencies in Entrepreneurial Opportunity Recognition and presenting the policy and practical directions necessary to promote Start-up.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.31-46
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• 1978

Consider a time interval during which the demand for trips is fixed (e.g. the rush hour period). The traveller has a choice between various public modes, whose travel times and fares are fixed, and the automobile mode, for which travel time and cost depend on the volume of traffic flow on those roads, which are subject to congestion. We consider the equilibrium in terms of a representative travellerm, who choses for any trip the mode and route with the least combined money and time cost. When several (parallel) model or routes are chosen, then the combined cost of money and time must be equal among these. Our problem is first, to find the optimal flows of cars and of public mode carriers on the various links of their networks and second the optimal fares for trips by the variousmodes. The object is to minimize the total operating costs of the carriers and car plus the total time costs to travellers. The optimal fares are related to, but not identical with the dual variables of the underlying Nonlinear Program. They are equal to these dual variables only in the case, when congestion tolls on trips or on the use of specific roads are collected from automobile users. When such tolls are not collected, they must be passed on as subsidies to travellers using competing modes. The optimal fares of public modes are then reduced by the amounts of these subsidies. Note that subsidies are not a flat payment to public carriers, but are calculated on the basis of tickets sold. Fares and subsidies depend in general on tile period considered. They will be higher during periods of higher demand. When the assumption of fixed trip demand is relaxed, this tare system is no longer best, but only second best since too much traffic will, in general, be generated. The Free Rider Theorem states the following : Suppose road tolls can be charged, so that a best pricing system for public modes is posssible. Then there may exist free rides on some routes and modes, but never on a complete round trip.