• ETRI Journal
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.447-456
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• 2010

Asymmetric regulation as applied to mobile termination rates refers to regulatory arrangements in which different mobile operators charge different termination rates, even though the services provided are essentially identical. The asymmetric regulation has been frequently used as a regulatory tool to support new entrants to a mobile market. This paper examines the economic effects of asymmetric regulation of mobile termination rates using a theoretical model and its simulation. The result shows that when there is no noticeable difference in brand loyalty between mobile operators with the high degree of substitutability between services provided by mobile operators, and the costs of new entrants are low, a reduction in the asymmetry of mobile access prices results in an enhancement of consumer welfare. These findings provide positive evidence for the argument that in certain situations asymmetric pricing of mobile access services may be counterproductive for consumer welfare.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.34 no.10B
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• pp.1031-1042
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• 2009

Due to liberalization in the early stage, mobile communications market has grown rapidly in the world. However, some dominant operators set higher termination call charges, and thus the market has been distorted and customer welfare has been reduced a lot. The regulation of mobile termination charges is one of key issues of most regulatory agencies in the world. According to the survey, the level of mobile termination charges are quite different from country to country. Why is it so different? This paper investigated the determinants affecting the mobile termination charges for 28 countries by considering country-specific, industry-specific, and regulatory-specific conditions. We found that some regulatory-specific conditions are the most important factors. The rate of pre-paid contract and period of regulation mostly affect the mobile termination charges.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.13 no.10
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• pp.2030-2038
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• 2009

We analyze the economic effects of mobile termination rate asymmetry by simulation model. The asymmetry allows the mobile operator to get access profits at the expense of the incumbent and induces negative effects such as the entry of inefficient operator and allocative efficiency as well as productive efficiency. We use simulation model to investigate the effect on social welfare of asymmetric regulation. If the brand loyalty is high, social welfare increase as the termination charge of entrant increases. The extension of the basic model shows that the degree of social welfare increase becomes higher as the brand loyalty increases when the cost of entrant is smaller than that of incumbent. But, the degree of social welfare decrease becomes lower as the substitution effects increase.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2002.11a
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• pp.102-105
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• 2002

본 고에서는 이동망 착신접속료 규제 필요성과 다양한 착신 접속료 산정 대안을 살펴보고 소매시장 경쟁측면, 접속시장 효율성 측면, 접속제공자 수지보전 측면, 그리고 접속원가 배분측면 등의 회계적인 측면에서 가장 합리적인 이동망 착신접속료 산정방안을 살펴보고자 한다.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2002.05a
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• pp.420-424
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• 2002

이동망 착신접속료의 합리적 산정, 이동망 설비 공동사용 대가 산정 및 보편적 서비스 비용산정 등 다양한 필요성에 따라 영국, 미국 호주 둥에서 이동망 원가를 합리적으로 산정하기 위한 원가선정모델 연구가 활발히 진행되고 있다. 본 고에서는 영국 Oftel 모형을 중심으로 Bottom-up 방식의 이동망 원가모형을 살펴보고 향후 국내 이동망 원가산정 모형 개발시 유의해야 할 시사점을 도출하고자 한다.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2003.05a
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• pp.633-636
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• 2003

이동망 착신접속료는 독점서비스로 원가인하유인이 없으며 기존의 접속료 산정방식인 완전배부방식의 비합리적이고 부당한 원가계산이 문제점으로 거론되면서 합리적인 요금산정방식은 장기증분원가방식이라고 판단됨으로써 영국에서는 이에 대한 연구가 활발하다. 영국의 장기중분방식은 비용을 회수하는 수단으로 경제적 감가상각을 사용하고 있다. 본 고에서는 기존의 완전배부방식에서 사용되던 회계적 감가상각(역사적 원가와 현행원가방식)과 장기증분원가 방식의 경제적 감가상각 방법을 비교함으로써 감가상각 방법에 따라 이동망 착신접속료에 미치는 영향 및 시사점을 분석해 보고자 한다.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.37 no.6B
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• pp.453-463
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• 2012

The Effect of asymmetric interconnection charge is different between where the retail price of incumbent is regulated and that of incumbent is not regulated. When the retail price of incumbent is not regulated, the brand loyalty and the relative magnitude of each marginal cost determine the effect of consumer surplus. However, when the retail price of incombent is regulated, network substitution effect also plays a important role to the consumer surplus. The higher the brand loyalty, the lower the network substitution effect, or the higher the marginal cost of the entrant, the social welfare through the asymmetric interconnection charge is more increased. In the other cases, the consumer surplus might be decreased.