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http://dx.doi.org/10.7840/KICS.2012.37.6B.453

The Effect on Social Welfare of Asymmetric Mobile Termination Rate  

Jung, Choong-Young (한남대학교 경영학과)
Jung, Song-Min (한남대학교 경영학과)
Lee, Jong-Yong (ETRI 기술전략연구본부)
Abstract
The Effect of asymmetric interconnection charge is different between where the retail price of incumbent is regulated and that of incumbent is not regulated. When the retail price of incumbent is not regulated, the brand loyalty and the relative magnitude of each marginal cost determine the effect of consumer surplus. However, when the retail price of incombent is regulated, network substitution effect also plays a important role to the consumer surplus. The higher the brand loyalty, the lower the network substitution effect, or the higher the marginal cost of the entrant, the social welfare through the asymmetric interconnection charge is more increased. In the other cases, the consumer surplus might be decreased.
Keywords
접속료 차등;브랜드 충성도;대체성;소비자 후생;소매가격;
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