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http://dx.doi.org/10.6109/JKIICE.2009.13.10.2030

The Effects on Social Welfare of Asymmetric Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications Termination Access Charge  

Jung, Choong-Young (한남대학교 경영학과)
Publication Information
Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering / v.13, no.10, 2009 , pp. 2030-2038 More about this Journal
Abstract
We analyze the economic effects of mobile termination rate asymmetry by simulation model. The asymmetry allows the mobile operator to get access profits at the expense of the incumbent and induces negative effects such as the entry of inefficient operator and allocative efficiency as well as productive efficiency. We use simulation model to investigate the effect on social welfare of asymmetric regulation. If the brand loyalty is high, social welfare increase as the termination charge of entrant increases. The extension of the basic model shows that the degree of social welfare increase becomes higher as the brand loyalty increases when the cost of entrant is smaller than that of incumbent. But, the degree of social welfare decrease becomes lower as the substitution effects increase.
Keywords
이동망 착신접속료;접속료 차등;사회후생;가격차별;브랜드충성도;
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