• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제31권4호
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• pp.277-288
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• 2005

The proliferation of the internet technologies and applications has intensified business activities on the Internet. This study considered the price competition between two shopping channels, one on-line seller and the other traditional off-line retailer. Based on the Hotelling's linear market model, we derive the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of the cost parameters which represent the characteristics of the online and off-line channels. By analyzing the equilibrium solutions, the following significant findings were obtained. First, pricing by Stackelberg equilibrium always outperformed that of Nash equilibrium. However the value of the cost parameters played a crucial role in determining both channels' preferred position (price leader or follower). Second, the online seller could benefit more in terms of profit by lowering its efficiency when its efficiency belongs to a certain interval. Third, when the online seller's efficiency is low, lowering its delivery cost has no contribution to its profit. To benefit more from lowering its delivery cost, increasing its channel efficiency to a certain level should be preceded.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제13권2호
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• pp.65-77
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• 1987

Congestion occurs whenever users interfere with each other, while competing for scarce resources. In a congested market, such as a telecommunication service market, users of telecommunication services incur costs in using the service in addition to the price. The user's own time costs involved in learning to use the service, waiting for the service, and making use of the service are typically greater than the price of telecommunication services. A market equilibrium analysis is performed in which a method for user demand aggregation is developed. The effects of price changes on user demands and market demands for congested services are examined. It is found that total market demands may increase as the price for less-congested services increase under certain demand conditions. This suggests that a nonuniform pricing scheme for a congested service may improve the utilization of the congested system. The sign of price cross-elasticity for congested services is show to vary with demand conditions. A possible complementary property of congested services is found and the implication of such a property is discussed. It is argued that such a complementary property may lead to a cross subsidy in a market with congestion. Finally, comparisons between uniform pricing and nonuniform pricing policies are made. A specific numerical example is given to show that a nonuniform pricing policy may be Pareto superior to a uniform pricing policy.

• 한국경영과학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한산업공학회/한국경영과학회 1994년도 춘계공동학술대회논문집; 창원대학교; 08월 09일 Apr. 1994
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• pp.741-741
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• 1994

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제15권1호
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• pp.58-73
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• 2021

Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) enable their users to access Cloud computing and storage services from anywhere in quick and flexible manners through the Internet. With the basis of 'pay-as-you-go' model, it makes the interactions between CSPs and the users play a vital role in shaping the Cloud computing market. A pool of virtualized and dynamically scalable Cloud services that delivered on demand to the users is associated with guaranteed performance and cost-provisioning. It needed a costing scheme for determining suitable charges in order to secure lease pricing of the Cloud services. However, it is hard to meet the satisfied prices for both CSPs and users due to their conflicting needs. Furthermore, there is lack of Service Level Agreements (SLAs) that allowing the users to take part into price negotiating process. The users may lose their interest to use Cloud services while reducing CSPs profit. Therefore, this paper proposes a generic costing scheme for Cloud services using General Equilibrium Theory (GET). GET helps to formulate the price function for various services' factors to match with various demands from the users. It is initially determined by identifying the market circumstances that a general equilibrium will be hold and reached. Specifically, there are two procedures of agreement made in response to (i) established equilibrium supply and demand, and (ii) service price formed and constructed in a price range. The SLAs in our costing scheme is integrated to satisfy both CSPs and users' needs while minimizing their conflicts. The price ranging strategy is deliberated to provide prices' options to the users with respect their budget limit. Meanwhile, the CSPs can adaptively charge based on users' preferences without losing their profit. The costing scheme is testable and analyzed in multi-tenant computing environments. The results from our simulation experiments demonstrate that the proposed costing scheme provides better users' satisfaction while fostering fairness pricing in the Cloud market.

• 한국건축시공학회지
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• 제8권6호
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• pp.65-74
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• 2008

The aim is to get comprehensive view point for the price of apartment. Apartment construction cost is the sun of land cost and building cost. Land price reflects the value of location where building stands. When the gap between price and affordability is narrow enough, effective demand promote apartment construction. The today's trends of rising price, which began in apartment housing, spreads to real estates market and finally overall consumer price. Problem is that price is decided only by supplier's interest. Equilibrium-pricing is common process in housing market. However it is important to review hedonic price and the factor of housing services and focused on the affordability of demanders. AHP analysis was used to study real needs and preference of demanders and dealt with 200 interviewees with brief checklists. We found that social factor is more important than building cost or site development. Especially location of apartment is most important to affect environment quality and accessibility to facilities.

• 대한수학회지
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• 제33권1호
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• pp.25-29
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• 1996

The Debreu-Gale-Nikaido theorem [2] is a potential tool to prove the existence of a market equilibrium price. Walras' law is of a quantitative nature (i.e. it measures the value of the total excess demand), and it is interesting to note that the existence result holds true under some qualitative assumptions. In fact, the Debreu-Gale-Nikaido theorem states that the continuity of the excess demand function and Walras' law has the following implication : For some price and corresponding value of the excess demand function, it is not possible to respond with a new price system such that the value at the new price of every element in the value of the demand function associated with the old price system is strictly positive.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• 제7권11호
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• pp.759-768
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• 2020

The purpose of this study is to assess the state of competition in Nepalese banking over the period from 2010 to 2019. This study employs panel data and a non-structural Panzar-Rosse model to measure the degree of competition in the Nepalese banking industry. The first reduced-form equation is applied to gauge competition, and the second model is used to test the long-run equilibrium in the banking market. The finding reveals that the Nepalese banking market is equilibrium in the long-run. It implies that the factor prices do not affect ROA in the long-run. The result of the H-statistic shows that the Nepalese banking system is operating under the state of perfect competition and is shifted from monopolistic competition to perfect competition. The reduced-form model reveals that the interest income is positive and significantly affected by factor prices. Similarly, the macroeconomic variable GDP growth is positively related to interest income. On the contrary, the bank's specific factors risk and the number of bank branches are inversely associated with the regressand. The outcomes of the study may be advantageous to the policymakers, especially to Nepal Rastra Bank to implement monetary policy and M&A policy for the stability and growth of the financial system of Nepal.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권9호
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• pp.542-549
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• 2003

In this paper, a novel approach to generator maintenance scheduling strategy in competitive electricity markets based on non-cooperative dynamic game theory is presented. The main contribution of this study can be considered to develop a game-theoretic framework for analyzing strategic behaviors of generating companies (Gencos) from the standpoints of the generator maintenance-scheduling problem (GMP) game. To obtain the equilibrium solution for the GMP game, the GMP problem is formulated as a dynamic non-cooperative game with complete information. In the proposed game, the players correspond to the profit-maximizing individual Gencos, and the payoff of each player is defined as the profits from the energy market. The optimal maintenance schedule is defined by subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Numerical results for two-Genco system by both proposed method and conventional one are used to demonstrate that 1) the proposed framework can be successfully applied in analyzing the strategic behaviors of each Genco in changed markets and 2) both methods show considerably different results in terms of market stability or system reliability. The result indicates that generator maintenance scheduling strategy is one of the crucial strategic decision-makings whereby Gencos can maximize their profits in a competitive market environment.

• 사회경제평론
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• 제38호
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• pp.51-83
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• 2012

다수의 상품이 생산되는 경제에서 스라파(Sraffa) 균형가격 조건과 균제성장 및 상품시장 균형 조건이 성립하는 경우를 생각하자. 이 모형에서 임금율 결정식과 투자함수를 동시에 부여하면 전체 경제는 과잉결정 되며 균형이 존재하지 않는다. 본 연구는 이 과잉결정 현상을 불균형 상태로 해석하고, 불균형상태에서 실현되는 임금율과 자본축적률이 각각의 동학식을 따라 결정되는 것으로 해석한다. 그리고 이 해석의 유효성을 주장하기 위하여 전체 경제에 대한 단순한 동학모형을 구축하고, 임금율과 자본축적률의 동학경로를 분석한다. 본 연구의 동학모형은 로카-볼테라 식체계의 구성조건을 만족하며, 따라서 전체 경제의 성장경로는 내생적으로 순환변동하는 경로를 따라 결정된다.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제59권12호
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• pp.2150-2156
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• 2010

In this paper, we investigate how an electricity capacity market design may encourage generators to exaggerate their available capacity. In order for an analytical approach, a two player game model is introduced. We focus on two pure strategy Nash equilibria: an equilibrium at which generators offer their true capacities, and an equilibrium at which generators offer exaggerated capacities. The latter case is caused by asymmetries of information between players and so called 'moral hazard' in terms of the economics literature. This paper shows that, considering practical electricity markets, the moral hazard case is highly probable. Moreover, it is shown that, with the considered capacity market design in the real world, the better the electricity energy market performs, the higher the risk of moral hazard becomes.