• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.39 no.3
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• pp.47-55
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• 2016

The proliferation of the Internet and related technologies has led to a new form of distribution channels, namely online retailers. The conventional offline and the new online retailers have different transaction costs perceived by the consumers in the following perspectives: the accessibility to the product information, the traffic cost and the opportunity cost for the time to visit the store, the delivery time and the possibility of 'touch and feel' to test the quality of the product. In particular, the online retailers have lower distribution cost structure in that they do not have physical stores, which results in lower selling price. Thus they continuously offer price competition against offline retailers using the lower selling cost as competitive weapon. Moreover the emergence of the social commerce is likely to intensify the competition between the online and offline retailers. To survive in this fierce competition, the offline retailers are trying to defend their business interests by sticking to offline transaction in anticipation of increased customer loyalty, customer's preference for 'touch and feel' style shopping, and others. Despite of these efforts, customers who touch and feel a product in an offline store but purchase the product through an online retailer are increasing. To protect such customers, recently, some of the offline retailers began to provide the mobile discount service (MDS) which enables the offline customers to purchase a product at a discounted price through the mobile applications. In business competitions, the price discount strategy is usually considered to secure more market share at the cost of lower profit. In this study, however, we analyze the effect of MDS as a weapon for securing more profit. To do this, we set up a game model between the online and offline retailers which incorporates the effect of the MDS. By numerically analyzing the Nash equilibrium of the game, some managerial implications for using the MDS for more profit are discussed.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.83-100
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• 2015

We analyze a duopoly competition when two firms face input cost increases. The objective of this study is to determine the firms' optimal strategy between a price increase and downsizing under conditions of a spatially differentiated market and consumers' diminishing utility on the product size. We develop a theoretical model of two competing firms offering homogenous products using the standard Hotelling model to determine how firms' optimal strategies change when facing input cost increases. In this paper, there are two types of duopoly competitions: symmetric and asymmetric. In the symmetric case, the two firms have the same marginal cost and are producing and selling identical products. In the asymmetric case, the two firms have different marginal costs. The results show that the optimal strategy decision depends on the size of the input cost increase and the cost differences between the two firms. We find that when two firms are asymmetric (i.e., they have different marginal costs), the two firms might choose asymmetric pairs of strategies in equilibrium under certain conditions. When the cost differences between the two firms are sufficiently large and the cost increase is sufficiently small, the cost leader chooses price increase, and the cost-disadvantaged firm chooses downsizing in equilibrium. This asymmetric strategy reduces price competition between two firms, and consumers are better off. When the cost differences between the two firms are sufficiently large, downsizing is the dominant strategy for the cost-disadvantaged firm. The cost-disadvantaged firm finds it more profitable to reduce the product size than to increase its price to reduce price competition, because consumers prefer downsizing to price increases. This paper might be a good starting point for further analytical research in this area.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.31 no.2
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• pp.33-44
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• 2013

The land use-transportation models typically have complicated model structure that is good for empirical execution but bad for theoretical probe. This complexity makes it very difficult to derive the first-order conditions for system optimization in tractable forms. Yu and Rhee (2011) and Rhee (2012) show how to simplify the derivative of the model's objective function with respect to policy variables in the computable general equilibrium model of land use and transportation. However, the travel demand in their model was fixed. This drawback fundamentally limits the applicability of their methodology in the planning field. We relax this restriction. Once this is done, we can employ the methodology developed in analyzing the impacts of various types of policy instruments in the models where land market is treated endogenously and transportation network is embedded.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.107-131
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• 2013

In this paper, we test and estimate the stochastic non-fundamental trend in Korean stock market. For this, following Kim (2011), we exploit that the long-run equilibrium stock price may be decomposed into fundamental and stochastic non-fundamental trends (i.e., the sum of dividend innovations and a part that are orthogonal with the dividend innovations) by using the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition and projections. In this VAR construction, there is an error correction mechanism through which stock prices converge to their long-run equilibrium, which also contain the stated stochastic non-fundamental trend as well as fundamental trend. The estimation and test results using yearly data from the Korea (1976-2012) indicated that fluctuations in stock prices during that period can be explained mainly not by the stochastic non-fundamental trend but by the dividend trend. However, during some periods like after Seoul Olympic Games, we may observe the non-fundamental trend affected to the stock price variation.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.15 no.5
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• pp.2689-2694
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• 2014

This study analyze the impact of omija(maximowiczia chinensis) market by Korea-China FTA and review the change of mid and long term supply-demand from 2014 to 2018. A scenario is also imported to simulate and measure the impacts of the Korea-China FTA. The scenario is that tariff rates for Chinese product(omija) will be zero after 5 years from 2014. A partial equilibrium model of Omija is specified to forecast mid and long term supply-demand and prices. Equations in the model were estimated by using econometric techniques. The results based on scenario are compared with the results by the baseline case(maintenance of current situation). Our study show that when the tariff rates for Chinese product(Omija) will be zero after 5 years from 2014, the cultivated area of Omija is forecasted to decline until 3,370ha in 2018, and the consumption is forecasted to increase up to 12,040.8MT in 2018, and also total revenue of about 9.8 billion korean won will be decreased during 5 years(2014-2018).

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.27-51
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• 2012

Among the hypotheses regarding the internal process of industrialization, the debates about 'labor-surplus' model have been intensive. The basic idea of this neoclassical theory is that industrial development is brought about by the transfer of the unlimited cheap labor to the modern sector, and thus, under the labor-surplus situation labor-using technologies should be used for industrialization. Fei and Rannis attempted to confirm this theory by applying it to the Japanese economy. The purpose of this paper is to study whether the theory can be applied to Korean economic development. The neoclassical dualistic model which was designed by Kelly and Williamson was utilized. Simulating Korea's major economic variables for the period of 1965-1992 by using computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, we found that there are significant differentials between the simulation and the actual data. It suggests that Korea's economic development has not followed the neoclassical path -- creation of comparative advantage on the basis of market force.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.141-170
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• 2012

There are a couple of methods to analyze the trade effect of FTA. Some compare bilateral trade amounts, partner's share in total export, or market share in partner's total import. Others set up partial equilibrium models or general equilibrium models for more sophisticated analyses. The purpose of this paper is to analyze bilateral trade between Korea and Chile, Singapore, Switzerland and Norway using the Intensity of Trade and Special Country Bias. The Trade Intensity Analysis focuses on how much the real trade diverges from the expected one which is derived by the Gravity Model, and it enable us to define how much the bilateral trade is closely related with each other compared with the rest of the world. Also by excluding the effects of changes in Trade Complementarity, it enables us to evaluate the trade effect of FTA. The results show that regarding Korea's export, the biggest trade effects are found with Norway, and the effects are evading after a couple of years of outstanding accomplishment with Chile and Singapore. With Switzerland, however, almost no effect is found. Regarding Korea's import, Norway has recorded the biggest advance into Korean market, whereas, other countries do not show significant changes.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.24 no.3
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• pp.523-549
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• 2015

This paper investigates an oil refiner's asymmetric behavior in the adjustments of gasoline and diesel prices to changes in his own price and his rivals' prices as well as input costs. An asymmetric error correction model which allows a firm's pricing behavior to the deviation of other firms' prices from their long-run equilibrium level is employed for estimation using weekly data for the period April 2009 to January 2015. Evidence is found that there is a significant degree of asymmetry in the adjustment of wholesale prices to changes in crude oil price. A similar result in regard to the exchange rate is also found by the data. The estimation results for firm's response to changes in other firms' prices indicates that implicit collusion could be more easily exploited in the wholesale petroleum market as results of firms' interaction with each other and anticipation of rivals' pricing behavior. A few refiners show competitive price adjustment in response to the upward deviation of the others' prices from their equilibrium level.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.95-120
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• 1990

The underpricing of new shares of a firm that are offered to the public for the first time (initial offerings) is well known and has puzzled financial economists for a long time since it seems at odds with the optimal behavior of the owners of issuing firms. Past attempts by financial economists to explain this phenomenon have not been successful in the sense that the explanations given by them are either inconsistent with the equilibrium theory or implausible. Approaches by such authors as Welch or Allen and Faulhaber are no exceptions. In this paper, we develop a signalling model of capital investment to explain the underpricing phenomenon and also analyze the efficiency of investment. The model focuses on the information asymmetry between the owners of issuing firms and general investors. We consider a firm that has been owned and operated by a single owner and that has a profitable project but has no capital to develop it. The profit from the project depends on the capital invested in the project as well as a profitability parameter. The model also assumes that the financial market is represented by a single investor who maximizes the expected wealth. The owner has superior information as to the value of the firm to investors in the sense that it knows the true value of the parameter while investors have only a probability distribution about the parameter. The owner offers the representative investor a fraction of the ownership of the firm in return for a certain amount of investment in the firm. This offer condition is equivalent to the usual offer condition consisting of the number of issues to sell and the unit price of a share. Thus, the model is a signalling game. Using Kreps' criterion as the solution concept, we obtained an essentially unique separating equilibrium offer condition. Analysis of this separating equilibrium shows that the owner of the firm with high profitability chooses an offer condition that raises an amount of capital that is short of the amount that maximizes the potential profit from the project. It also reveals that the fraction of the ownership of the firm that the representative investor receives from the owner of the highly profitable firm in return for its investment has a value that exceeds the investment. In other words, the initial offering in the model is underpriced when the profitability of the firm is high. The source of underpricing and underinvestment is the signalling activity by the owner of the highly profitable firm who attempts to convince investors that his firm has a highly profitable project by choosing an offer condition that cannot be imitated by the owner of a firm with low profitability. Thus, we obtained two main results. First, underpricing is a result of a signalling activity by the owner of a firm with high profitability when there exists information asymmetry between the owner of the issuing firm and investors. Second, such information asymmetry also leads to underinvestment in a highly profitable project. Those results clearly show the underpricing entails underinvestment and that information asymmetry leads to a social cost as well as a private cost. The above results are quite general in the sense that they are based upon a neoclassical profit function and full rationality of economic agents. We believe that the results of this paper can be used as a basis for further research on the capital investment process. For instance, one can view the results of this paper as a subgame equilibrium in a larger game in which a firm chooses among diverse ways to raise capital. In addition, the method used in this paper can be used in analyzing a wide range of problems arising from information asymmetry that the Korean financial market faces.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.51 no.2
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• pp.51-69
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• 2020

The purpose of this study is to construct an outlook model that is consistent with the "Fisheries Outlook" monthly published by the Fisheries Outlook Center of the Korea Maritime Institute(KMI). In particular, it was designed as a partial equilibrium model limited to abalone items, but a model was constructed with a dynamic ecological equation model(DEEM) system taking into account biological breeding and shipping time. The results of this study are significant in that they can be used as basic data for model development of various items in the future. In this study, due to the limitation of monthly data, the market equilibrium price was calculated by using the recursive model construction method to be calculated directly as an inverse demand. A model was built in the form of a structural equation model that can explain economic causality rather than a conventional time series analysis model. The research results and implications are as follows. As a result of the estimation of the amount of young seashells planting, it was estimated that the coefficient of the amount of young seashells planting from the previous year was estimated to be 0.82 so that there was no significant difference in the amount of young seashells planting this year and last year. It is also meant to be nurtured for a long time after aquaculture license and limited aquaculture area(edge style) and implantation. The economic factor, the coefficient of price from last year was estimated at 0.47. In the case of breeding quantity, it was estimated that the longer the breeding period, the larger the coefficient of breeding quantity in the previous period. It was analyzed that the impact of shipments on the breeding volume increased. In the case of shipments, the coefficient of production price was estimated unelastically. As the period of rearing increased, the estimation coefficient decreased. Such result indicates that the expected price, which is an economic factor variable and that had less influence on the intention to shipments. In addition, the elasticity of the breeding quantity was estimated more unelastically as the breeding period increased. This is also correlated with the relative coefficient size of the expected price. The abalone supply and demand forecast model developed in this study is significant in that it reduces the prediction error than the existing model using the ecological equation modeling system and the economic causal model. However, there are limitations in establishing a system of simultaneous equations that can be linked to production and consumption between industries and items. This is left as a future research project.